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THIS book is one of  opportunism.  Its aim is to present an 
outline  picture  of  the situation  regarding  concentration  of 
industry in the United  States, and to suggest a way to gain 
its economic advantages and at the same time to guard  the 
interests of  the public.  The book  is written because  this is 
the most  pressing problem now before the people  and before 
Congress  and state legislatures.  No other problem  is likely 
to  have  so  large  discussion  in  the political  campaign  now 
waging.  If this book has the good fate to assist in the rule 
of  elllightenment,  reason,  fair play, mutual consideration, and 
toleration, and thus advance the solution of  the problem,  the 
author will  have  been  repaid  many fold  for his  labor in its 
preparation. 
The scope  of  the treatment  does  not  include  the  public  \  utilities.  They are only considered in so far as their develop 
ment and control throw light upon the other industries. 
The reader who is familiar with trust literature will recog- 
nize the influence of  Ely's  "Monopolies  and Trusts,"  Jenks's 
"The Trust Problem,"  von Halle's  Trusts or Industrial Com- 
binations  of  the United  States,"  Ripley's  Trusts, Pools, and 
Corporations,"  Montague's  ((Trusts of  To-day,"  Nolan's  Com- 
binations, Trusts, and Monopolies," Collier's ((Trusts,"  Wyman's 
"  Control of  the Market,"  and  Macrosty's  Trust Movement 
in British Industry." 
Aside from these standard works, the most important sources 
of  information in presenting a  picture of  the situation as it is 
at the present  time are the special  reports on manufactures 
in 1905 by the Census Office,  reports of  the Commissioner of 
Corporations upon Standard Oil, tobacco, steel, beef, lumber, and 
water  powers,  and the hearings  and reports  before  the com- 
mittees  of  the Sixty-second Congress.  Especially important 
in this connection  have  been  the hearings before the United 
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States Senate Interstate Commerce Committee,  the report  of 
Mr. Hardick for the special Committee of  the House of  Rep- 
resentatives to  investigate the Sugar Refining  Industry,  and 
the reports of  the House  Committee of  Investigation  for the 
United States Steel Corporation. 
Further, I had the opportunity  to see the manuscript  of  a 
book now published by Dr. Charles McCarthy, upon  The Wis- 
consin Idea,"  from which I hape  taken  material  concerning 
the situation in that state.  Professor T. K. Urdahl has pre- 
pared  for insertion  a  summary  account of  the steel combina- 
tions of  Germany.  Professor  Richard  T.  Ely and Professor 
Urdahl  have  kindly  read  the  nianuscript  and  made  many 
suggestions of  value to me.  Professor E. A. Gilmore has done 
the same for the chapter upon  the law regarding coijperation. 
TO  these men I am especially indebted.  Also I have had many 
valuable suggestions  from other members  of  the staff  of  the 
University of Wisconsin in the departments of  political science, 
political economy, history, and sociology.  Finally, a number of 
the students in that university, under the direction of  Mr. W. I. 
King,  have  given  me  important  assistance  in  looking  up 
decisions and summarizing material along special lines ; these 
are  S.  A.  Barrett,  W.  K.  Braasch,  Harlow  Brown,  F.  A. 
Buechel,  N.  B.  Bunin,  W.  H.  Butt,  J. S.  Josiassen,  J.  C. 
Pritzlaff, John Schmidt, R. A. Weir, E. E. Witte. 
No  one  has a  keener  realization  than the  author  of  the 
imperfections  of  the volume,  but  since the policies  of  the 
nation concerning concentration are now  under  consideration 
by  the people,  promptness  in publication  seems to be  more 
important than completeness of  statement.  In preparing  the 
book, it has been  the purpose  to put in a  small volume  the 
information which  is  essential  to reach  a  sound  conclusion 
regarding the handling of  the great problem of  concentrations 
of  industry, both in the way  of  legislation and administration. 
Following a statement of  facts, the conclusions of  the author 
are given in these matters,  and it is  hoped  that these may 
appeal to the judgment of  the reader.  However,  even  if  the 
conclusions are not  followed  in all respects, it is still hoped 
that the summary of  facts bearing on the problem  of  concen- 
tration may be helpful. PREFACE 
The material  published  in the magazines and newspapers, 
even much of the testiriiony before the committees of  Congress, 
shows  a  lamentable  lack  of  comprehension  of  the facts  in- 
volved  in concentration  of  industry, and in many cases  con- 
clusions are presented without taking into account more  than 
a very small part of  the facts.  It is hoped that a  brief  and 
clear presentation of  the more important factors of  the problem 
may  help in leading to logical  thinking,  and  thus assist  in 
reaching  a  consensus of  opinion which  may finally  result in 
sound  remedial  legislation. 
CHARLES  R. VAN  HISE. 
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  WIBCONBIN, 
April, 1912. CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
INTRODUCTION 
THE  history of  industry in the United States may be di- 
vided into two  great periods,  that  antecedent  to the Civil 
War of  1861-1865,  and that following this conflict.  In the 
years  preceding  the  Civil  War  the  Middle  West  became 
settled.  A few railroads had crept as far west as the Missis-  The  Civil 
sippi River.  The large cities east of that great north-south pti,"zp 
water thoroughfare were thus connected.  The railroads were  trialperiods. 
wide apart ; their efficiency as compared with present times 
was small.  West of  the Mississippi River the population was 
sparse.  That part of  the country was  still in  its frontier 
stage, with the exception of  portions of  California and Oregon. 
Under the conditions above given many small manufac- 
tories hadkrown up to meet the needs of  the communities 
in which they existed.  Indeed  manufacture in a small way 
had begun in the eastern cities before the end of  the eighteenth 
century. 
During the first half  of  the nineteenth  century there was 
steady and slow  expansion of  manufacture,  not mainly by 
increasing the size of  plants which already  existed, but by 
the multiplication of  plants wherever a clientele was found 
in the township, county, or district.  Thus in the Middle West 
during these times almost every community had its gristmill 
run by the power of  the adjacent creek or small river.  Simi- 
larly there were many small plants for the smelting of  iron. 
For the most part these were located adjacent to small banks 
of  iron ore, and especially in districts where coal and lime- 
stone were near at hand to serve for fuel and flux.  The great 
drift to the cities had not yet begun, and a large proportion of 
the population was rural, 87.5 per cent in 1850, and 83.9 per 
cent in 1860. 
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THE SELF-SUFFICIENT  COMMUNITY 
The farmer in the sparsely settled districts of  the Middle 
West  was  largely self-sufficient.  For  heat  he  cut  his  own 
wood.  He raised his own wheat and corn, took the same to the 
adjacent mill and returned, after paying proper toll, with flour 
Thefarm-  and corn  meal  for  his  family  and bran for  his  stock.  He 
steads  raised  and killed  his own meat;  in the winter he had fresh 
workshop. 
meat ;  in the summer, salt pork and corned beef.  As a matter 
of  course each farmer raised his own vegetables ; he had cows 
which furnished him with milk, butter, and perhaps cheese ; 
he  had  his  poultry  yard,  which  might  include  chickens, 
geese, and ducks.  The farmer of  the North produced his own 
wool and many had a crop of  flax.  In the South cotton was 
the stable for textiles.  In the earlier part of  the nineteenth 
century the wool was cleaned and carded at  the house, but at 
a little later stage of  development was taken to a factory in 
the adjacent small town to be  cleaned  and made into rolls 
ready  for spinning.  The equipment  of  the farmer's  house 
included the spinning wheel and often the loom.  With spin- 
ning wheel the wool and flax were made into yarn or thread to 
be later transformed into stoclrings, mittens, or cloth.  The 
home  loom  produced  either somewhat  coarse  cloth  or car- 
pets.  Cotton  very  early  found  its way  to the  factories, 
which  before the Civil War were largely located  along the 
streams of  New England.  The village or town contained a 
shoemaker, whose raw material frequently came from leather 
supplied by the farmer.  In  a town of  a few thousand inhabit- 
ants, there was likely to be a small agricultural implement 
factory. 
Not every farmstead would have all of  the equipment indi- 
cated, but all would be found in the neighborhood;  and by 
barter among the farmers, or trade between the farmers and 
the villagers, the chief necessities not produced at  home were 
supplied. 
The articles not produced  in a  community  were  mainly 
those which are relatively light as compared with their value, 
sugar, tea, coffee, starch, tobacco, and cloth-cotton or woolen. INTRODUCTION  3 
These were the staples which the farmer purchased from the 
sales of  a part of  his wheat or other crop. 
From the above, it is apparent that each community of  fair 
size was essentially self-sufficient; and this was true without 
reference to the different parts of  the United States, although 
there were differences as to the approach to completeness of 
the self-suflicient character of  the community, the approach 
to this situation being nearer in the North than in the South. 
A city, and in many cases  a county, if  cut off  from the rest 
of  the world would  have  gotten  along without  any special 
hardship.  Some luxuries and conveniences would have been 
missed, but no far-reaching change would have been made in 
the habits of  the community. 
The situation above described has now ceased to exist for 
the United States, with the exception of  those communities 
which,  isolated  by natural  barriers, have  been  left behind 
in  the  industrial  movement.  Some  such  communities 
have  remained  nearly as they were  a hundred  years  ago,  ~e1f-s~~- 
not  affected  by  the  great  stream  of  progress  which  has 2,412'- 
moved  past,/them.  In  the  coves  of  the  Great  Smoky  ~tiu  exist. 
Mountains to-day  may be  found  essentially  the  situation 
described, and that not more  than twenty or thirty miles 
from  a  city  of  considerable size, for  instance,  Cades and 
Tuckaleeche coves, a short distance east of  KnoxvilIe.  In 
one of  those coves, only a few years ago, I saw upon the porch 
of  a  little cabin the complete change from wool  to stockings 
going on at the same time, one of  the three daughters card- 
ing the wool, the second spinning it into hard yarn, and the 
third knitting it into stockings.  What is true for the coves in 
this country still obtains for great  regions in less-developed 
countries.  For instance, in Brazil, in the province of  Minas 
Geraes, the people  are substantially self-sdcient.  The  m- 
ticles which  they raise are not the same as  those produced 
in the United  States.  Their  products  are beans,  bananas, 
other  fruits,  tobacco,  coffee,  etc.  In the district  me  still 
running many small bloomeries for the manufacture of  iron, 
the most primitive type known to man.  From  the blooms 
are wrought iron for rods, nails, horseshoes, etc.  The walls CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
of  the houses are constructed of a lacework of  poles between 
which mud is filled in, and the roof  is of  tile burned from clay 
close at hand. 
THE  CIVIL  WAR AND  CONCENTRATION 
In  the United States, before the Civil War, industry was dis- 
persed, the shops and factdries being  small;  indeed, every 
farm to a considerable extent was a shop and factory.  In  any 
community the shops and factories mainly supplied the needs 
of  the people. 
The Civil War, the most gigantic strife which to that time 
had existed among men, required that things  be done on a 
great scale.  More than a million and a half  of  men were in 
the field at one time from the North and the South together. 
The Civil  The North built up the greatest navy that the world had then 
War de-  seen.  The great armies required similar equipment for more  manded 
large scale  than a million men, -  a million blankets, a million muskets, 
etc.  The artillery required great quantities of  iron, and the 
newly devised monitors more.  Metal was used upon a scale 
never before approached in this country.  Above all, the mil- 
lion men must be fed.  Thus as a result of  the demands of 
civil strife the large manufactory grew up  especially adapted 
to producing  the materials  and munitions  of  war.  These 
supplies must be transported to serve a vast and shifting army. 
But even more important than the great factory was the 
training of  many thousands of  men, both South and North, 
to do things in a large way through the use of  a multitude of 
men, in order that a given big result might  be reached at a 
definite time and place. 
One of the most far-reaching effects of  the Civil War was 
the  acceleration  of  concentration  under  the  tremendous 
necessity to do things on a great scale. 
THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TRANSPORTATION  AND 
COMMUNICATION 
Beginning with the Civil War the period of  concentration 
in industry was on;  but a  condition precedent  to its full INTRODUCTION 
growth was the development of  transportation and communi- 
cation. 
Following the Civil War  came the time of  great railway 
building.  The increase in the number of  miles of  railway in 
the United States by decades from 1850 to 1910 and the per- 
centages of  increase per decade are shown by the following 
table : - 
Concurrently with  the expansion of  the railways was the 
extension of  the telegraph lines, and finally,  with the centennial 
exhibition in  1876, came the telephone.  When the Union 
Pacific Railroad was completed in 1869, it was thought to be a 
highty achievement ;  and it was accomplished only through 
liberal, indeed  extravagant,  federal  grants and guaranties. 
At the present time there are six continental roads stretching 
from the Mississippi to the Pacific coast.  Also the increase 
in the railway mileage east of  the Mississippi has gone on with 
accelerating speed. 
Thus the country is now  linked together  by agencies of 
transportation and communication.  A  large proportion  of  ~silwep 
the population lives within  a half  dozen miles  from a rail- 
way ;  it is only in the sparsely settled sections of  the country 
that a railway is ten or twenty miles distant.  Railway speeds 
and weights have been increased.  A few trains move pas- 
sengers  and the more valuable  freight a thousand  miles  in 
twenty-four  hours.  A  single  train  with  one  locomotive 
may carry five thousand tons of  iron ore.  The telegraph and 
the telephone make communication instantaneous. 
1 Poor's "  Manual of  Railroads," 1910. 6  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
Decreasing  The  freight  and  passenger  rates  have  steadily  fallen. 
In 1864, the charge on  a  bushel- of  wheat,  in  carload lots, 
from  Chicago  to New York, was  from 48  to 96  cents;  in 
1902, 7.8  to  9.6  cents, one  sixth  to one tenth  as  much. 
The heavier, cheaper products, such as coal and iron ore are 
transported in  great  quantities at a cost of  about  one fifth 
of a cent per ton mile, and the rates for such commodities at 
various places are less than one half a cent a ton mile.  It may 
cost the farmer who lives twenty miles from a railroad more 
to get his wheat to the station than it does from the railroad 
point to the central market. 
It is not meant to  imply that the railways are the only means 
of  transportation, although from the present point of  view 
they are dominant 
Before railways existed, navigable streams furnished means 
of  communication and transportation for commodities heavy 
Navigable  and light for those communities which were fortunate enough 
et'esme.  to be thus reached.  Thus there grew up in the early part of 
the nineteenth century a great traffic upon the Mississippi, 
Ohio,  and upon  many  other  rivers  of  smaller  size.  The 
Great Lakes furnished cheap transportation from Buffalo to 
Chicago and the head of  Lake Superior.  Inevitably, settle- 
ment and development proceeded much more rapidly along the 
naturally navigable waters than elsewhere.  But even where 
the conditions were most  favorable,  navigable waters  fur- 
nished transportation  facilities to only a small part of  the 
country, and for that part at a very IOW speed. 
The next  stage  in  transportation  development  was  the 
system of  canals.  The Erie Canal connected the Hudson and 
the Great  Lakes.  Many other less  important  canals were 
built.  But even at  best the construction of  canals was expen- 
sive ; the transportation of  materials upon them slow;  and 
only a small part of  the country was ever reached by them. 
The vanish-  With the era of  railroad development, canals began to wane. 
ing  trfic.  water  Many of  them were acquired by railroad companies and put 
out of  commission.  Upon the Mississippi itself, through the 
acquisition of  terminals, purchasing boat lines, cutting rates, 
refusing to prorate, etc. the railroad companies have reduced INTRODUCTION 
river transportation above St. Louis almost to a negligible 
quantity. 
The country as a  whole,  even  at the present  time,  has 
very  few  good  highways.  Only  a  few  sections  of  the 
country have well-made roads.  Before  the Civil War, and 
locally since, until our own time,  toll roads have  connected 
some of  the great  cities.  Upon  the  toll  and  free  public 
roads  wheel  vehicles  move;  but  before  the  automobile 
appeared  speeds were  limited  to ten  miles  per  hour, and 
quantities to a few tons per  load.  Consequently, by 1875 
railroads  had  a  leading  place  in  transportation  in  this 
country, and they are now dominant. 
It is not meant to  imply that the development of  transporta-  Tranaporta- 
tion went on without concentration of  industry taking place  :,","C:;:a- 
at  the same time.  Naturally there was action and reaction  tion. 
between them.  'Without concentration of  industry and, con- 
sequently,  large  amounts  of  goods  to  ship, the  railroads 
would  not  have  developed so rapidly;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  without  the  development  of  transportation. and 
communication, concentration of  industry would  have  been 
impossible. 
The development  of  transportation  _gd communication 
furnished the fundamental basis for concentration of  industry, 
because through them it became possible at a moderate cost 
to transport goods long distances in a short time and easy to 
communicate with the customer who desired goods.  As soon 
as the freight rates became sufficiently low so that the advan- 
tages of  concentration were greater than the cost of  freight 
and doing business at a distance, the small concerns began to 
suffer in competition with the large manufactory. 
My treatment of  the subject of  concentration and  control 
will  be  divided  into five  chapters:  I, The  General  Facts 
regarding  Concentration;  11,  Some  Important  Illustra- 
tions of  Concentration ; 111,'~he Laws Regarding Coopera- 
tion;  IV,  The  Situation  in  Other  Countries;  and  V, 
Remedies. CHAPTER  I 
THE  GENERAL  FACTS  REGARDING  CONCEN- 
TRATION 
THE  general facts regarding concentration of  industry will 
be considered under the sections : 1, The economic advantages 
of  concentration ;  2, The causes of  concentration ;  3, The pur- 
poses of  concentration;  4, The kinds of  business most likely 
to become  concentrated ; 5,  The extent of  concentration ; 
6, The forms of  organization ; 7, The kinds of  competition ; 
8, The break-down of  competition;  9,  The wastes of  com- 
petition. 
SECTION  1 
THE ECONOMIC  ADVANTAGES  OF  CONCENTRATION 
What are the economic advantages of  manufacturing in a 
large plant and doing business on a large scale, and how im- 
portant are they?  Different industries differ among them- 
selves very greatly in these respects, and any general state- 
ment will need modification when applied to a particular case. 
What is said will be more applicable to those groups of  indus- 
tries which are better adapted for concentration. 
(1) The Handling  of  Material. -  The handling of  material 
on a large scale in itself gives great economy.  In any manu- 
factory the material must be there assembled.  For instance, 
if it be an iron manufactory, and we have a primitive bloom- 
ery depending upon an adjacent bank of  ore, it will not pay to 
go to any great expense in providing for transportation of the 
ore to the bloomery;  and the ore will be hauled in a cart. 
When the bloomery changes to the blast furnace, the quantity 
3f  ore needed will  be  so great that the ore is brought with 
trams or some kind  of  mechanical haulage.  The same is 
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true of  the coal.  Thus the economies due to mere magnitude 
of  operation in this industry become very great.  Also in the 
manufacturing process itself the large furnace has an advan- 
tage in economy of  fuel and efficiency over the small furnace. 
(2)  The Use of  Machinery and Departments. -  In the large 
manufactory it is possible to use machinery to an extent not 
possible in  the small  establishment.  The  introduction of 
labor-saving machines is well known to be one of  the greatest 
causes of  economic efficiency.  The illustration of  the cotton 
gin is classic.  Where there are many processes in the manu- 
facture of  an article, if  the concern be a large one, it is possible 
to have a separate machine or a number  of  them for each 
process. 
Similarly  for  different  departments.  In  making  agri- 
cultural  implements, if  the plant  be  a  large  one, the iron 
and wood  departments will  be separate.  These  again will 
be  specialized  for  different  lines of  work.  The parts  of 
iron  and wood  will  be  assembled in  another  department; 
and Gnally the painting and varnishing will be done in still 
another. 
(3)  Subdivision  of  Labor. -  In most  manufactories  an 
article must go through many processes before it is completed. 
In the old primitive shop, the shoemaker at  the bench did all 
of  the different stages of  work in making the entire shoe.  In 
the large manufactory the part that any one man does has 
been steadily lessened until  now  in the making of  a single 
shoe many persons participate.  In  the making of  a wagon or 
a binder in a large manufactory scores of  people take part. 
In the wagon  shop which  served  the country  community 
one man, or one man with his helper, made the wagon in all 
its parts except that the iron in bars or rods was furnished to 
him.  Specialization of  labor  is  only possible  in  the large 
manufactory, and it is generally agreed that such specializa- 
tion gives increased efficiency. 
(4)  Integration.  -A  further step in  the development  of 
concentration  of  industry is its integration;  that is,  a cor- 
poration  handles not one stage of manufacture only, but a 
number or even all of  the stages from the raw material to the CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
finished product.  This again gives increased economy and 
efficiency, because all the different units of  the integrated in- 
dustry  are  in  harmony,  one  with  reference to the  other. 
Thus  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  mines  its raw 
materials,  assembles  them,  smelts  the  ore  into  pig  iron, 
changes the  iron  to steel,  and  the  steel  into  structural 
forms, -  plate,  wire,  or  nail.  Other  illustrations  of  in- 
tegrated industries are oil, sugar, etc., described pp. 104-150. 
While there is great economic advantage in integration for 
almost every industry, that of iron and steel furnishes one of 
the  best  illustrations.  When the  blast  furnace  was  inde- 
pendent of  the converter, the molten pig iron was allowed to 
cool, and was melted for the Bessemer converter.  The steel 
from the converter was again allowed to cool in the ingot and 
was reheated before rolling into the rail.  At the present time 
the molten pig iron goes to the converter,  is transformed into 
steel, and then after solidification but before cooling goes to 
the rolls where it is wrought into rails.  Similar methods are 
introduced for other products.  The saving of  energy by in- 
tegration is great, as is also the saving in labor.  Independent 
blast furnaces, Bessemer converters, and rolling mills cannot 
possibly give the economic efficiency of  integrated establish- 
ments combining the three. 
(5) Parallel  Consolidation and  Specialization. -  The con- 
centration of  management goes not only to the point of  the 
manufacture on a large scale, integration, and saving of  by- 
products, but extends to the point of  ownership of  manufac- 
tories of  the same general kinds at various points.  Under 
these conditions it is possible to make the same product at 
the different plants, or to specialize the different manufacto- 
ries under the same organization so that one shall handle one 
line of  work, and another another.  Further, the work of  any 
one  branch  may  become  standardized  and  require  com- 
paratively little shifting or changing of  machines.  Thus the 
shapes,  forms, and  sizes  of  the  manufactured  iron  which 
comes from a given plant may remain the same month after 
month, or even year after year;  and this very greatly pro- 
motes efficiency.  If the industry be tobacco, one mmufac- FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  l1 
tory may produce cigarettes, and  another  cigars.  A proof 
of  the superior efficiency of completely equipped concerns is 
fully admitted  in  the case of  tobacco, as  is  shown  by the 
objections filed by Messrs.  Brandeis  and Levy against  the 
plan  of  disintegration of  the American  Tobacco  Company 
(see  pp. 183-187).  As  counsels  for the independent  com- 
panies  they  say that no  independent  tobacco  company is 
now  completely equipped  to do tobacco  business  covering 
all  the  main branches of  the tobacco  trade, and that any 
plan to restore competition will be ineffective which does not 
compel  each of  the elements of  the  disintegrated  tobacco 
company  to contine  itself  to one  line of  business.  They 
state : "  It follows that any corporation taking over a part 
of  the plug tobacco business or smoking tobacco business of 
the trust shall not take over any of  the cigarette  or  cigar 
business;  that a corporation  taking  over a part of  its cig- 
arette business shall not take over  any of  its smoking to- 
bacco  business,  plug  tobacco  business,  or  cigar  business; 
and  that a corporation  taking  over  any part of  the cigar 
business  shall  not  take  over  any of  its  smoking tobacco 
business,  plug  tobacco  business,  or  cigarette  business.''  l 
There  can  scarcely be  stronger  evidence of  the economic 
efficiency of  parallel consolidation and specialization under 
a single corporation than the above remonstrance of  Messrs. 
Brandeis and Levy upon behalf  of  the independent tobacco 
companies. 
The consolidation ir\ management of  plants  making  the 
same class of  products at different points  is especially eco- 
nomical for those articles in which transportation is an im- 
portant factor.  Cross freights are avoided to a large extent 
when the manufactories of  one district supply the markets of 
that  district.  For  articles  which  are  heavy  as  compared 
with  their cost, for instance salt and steel rails, this factor 
may be one of  controlling importance. 
(6)  Saving By-products. -  A further advantage of  magni- 
tude  is  the use  of  by-products.  The  small  manufactory 
1 Hearineg before the Committee on Interatate Commerce  United Stata 
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cannot spend much money in such utilization, although the 
coarser of  them may be saved.  In the production of  meat, the 
by-products,--hides,  fat, bone, etc. are a very important part 
of the income.  These materials are much more largely util- 
ized in the large abattoir than in the small slaughter-house. 
For the great oil refiners, if  kerosene be regarded as the chief, 
as it was the original product, then lubricating oil and gaso- 
line are by-products.  Also  in  addition  to these  scores  of 
other by-products are saved.  In fact for  all  chemical  and 
metallurgical industries by-products are the source of  a large 
part of  the profits.  But to save these materials economically 
requires large scale manufacture. 
(7)  Consolidation of  Allied  Industries. -  The final stage in 
consolidation is the union of  allied and connected industries. 
This frequently goes beyond integration, in that the lines of 
manufacture  are  absorbed  which  use  as raw  material the 
by-products  of  the central organization.  Thus the United 
States  Steel  Corporation  has  begun  the  manufacture  of 
cement,  using  slag, a  by-product  of  the blast  furnace,  for 
that purpose ; but the manufacture of  cement is itself a great 
industry which requires a large and expensive plant, and slag 
is therefore a by-product which it is not possible to save ex- 
cept in plants of  great magnitude. 
The big beef  firms have entered  lines of  business  related 
to  their own.  Those having refrigerator cars have begun the 
transportation of  fruit.  They are largely interested  in the 
stockyards.  In order  to use  the by-products  the packing 
house  companies  have  formed  fertilizer  companies,  soap 
companies, glue companies, curled hair  companies, and felt 
companies ; all of  which industries are large users of  materials 
furnished by the packing industry. 
(8) Keeping Establishments  Up  to Date. -  The large com- 
pany uses only the most modern manufactories which have 
complete and highly efficient machinery  and practices,  in- 
cluding the latest labor-saving devices and the best technical 
improvements.  The weak  company  will  frequently con- 
tinue  to use  an  inadequate  plant  because it has  not  and 
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condition.  The  American Sugar  Refining  Company  after 
organization built one large new plant fully equipped with the 
most modern machinery, simply as a safeguard in case of  in- 
creased  demand  or  stoppage  of  other  factories.  Shortly 
after it abandoned altogether a number of  refineries acquired 
at the time of  consolidation, because of  their inefficient equip- 
ment or disadvantageous location, or both. 
(9) Investigating  Departments. -  Not  only  is  the  large 
organization able to use the most modern methods, but it is 
able to have an investigating department in order that dis- 
coveries may be made for still further improvements.  The 
economies  which  have  come  from  such  a  department  are 
strongly  emphasized  by  many  men  connected  with  great 
organizations.  The Cotton Oil Company has an experiment 
station.  The Standard  Oil  Company  carries on  chemical 
investigations of  the most  elaborate and extensive kind  in 
order to utilize fully the by-products of  the oil; as a result 
of  which  they have on the market some three hundred by- 
products, many of  which come from the part of  the oil which 
otherwise  would  have  been  thrown  away.'  The  United 
States  Steel  Corporation,  the  General  Electric  Company, 
and  indeed  practically all  great  organizations  have  inves- 
tigating departments in which large sums of  money are spent. 
Mr.  Louis  Brandei~,~  who  is  strongly  opposed  to the 
existence of  large  concentrations, recognizes  the  economic 
advantage  of  investigative  departments  to  be  so  great 
as  to  threaten  the  practicability  of  retaining  relatively 
small industrial units under the competitive system;  this is 
shown by the fact that he urges that all investigations which 
are necessary for the advancement of  applied science should 
be carried on by the government.  Apparently,  he does not 
realize  the enormous expense that this  proposal,  if  taken 
seriously, would entail.  Says Mr. Brmdeis, "Whenever  in- 
dustry requires for its advance investigations of the character 
which are so expensive that only a huge concern can assume 
1 Ernst von Halle, "Trusts  or  Industrial  Combinations  in  the United 
Btates," pp. 66-67.  '  Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Interstate Corn- 
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the burden, then it is the government's function to secure the 
information for all the people." 
In favor of  this position he cites the investigations by the 
government for the farmer.  This illustration seems scarcely 
applicable, since the most distinctive feature of  the farmer's 
business is the vast number of  those following it and the av- 
erage smallness of  a single holding of  land.  Because of  this 
the individual farmer is wholly incapable of  carrying on the 
necessary  investigations.  Hence the government,  national 
and  state, has  undertaken  the function.  The proposal of 
Mr. Brandeis, if  carried to its logical conclusion, would blot 
out, or at least profoundly modify, our patent system, under 
which discoverers are protected to the extent of  monopolistic 
use  for a limited period.  No  stronger testimony than the 
proposal of  Mr. Brandeis could be given as to the economic 
advantage  of  concentration  of  industry  gained  through 
investigating departments. 
(10) Business Advantages of  Concentration. -  Thus far the 
industrial  advantages  of  concentration  only  have  been 
given.  Upon the business side there are also great economies. 
Some of  the more important of  these are as follows : - 
(a) Big organizations are able to buy in large quantities 
and thus gain the advantages of  the lowest rates of  purchase. 
(b) Big organizations  are able to sell in large  quantities 
and most advantageously.  A large part of  the cost of  busi- 
ness  under  new  conditions  is  the marketing  of  products. 
In the marketing there are great costs in commercial travel- 
ers,  in  advertisements,  etc.  (see  p.  89).  With  the  large 
concentration the advertising cost per  unit of  sale is much 
lower than with  the small industry.  Work is organized so 
that a traveling salesman or agent does the work in a given 
Marketing  community for a large concern instead of  several for the dif- 
ferent plants  of  that  concern.  When the American  Steel 
Hoop and Wire Company was formed, about two hundred 
salesmen were discharged.  Similarly with the formation of 
the whisky combination three hundred salesmen were spared. 
With the organization of  the International Harvester Company 
the expense of marketing ww reduced by $500,000 a year. FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  15 
(c)  When there is a single great federated  establishment, 
orders can be received at a central office and from that office 
distributed to the different plants as best  required  by effi- 
ciency in  manufacture, taking  into  account  the expense of 
transportation. 
(d)  Also the mere size of  an establishment, so that it may 
be able to take a large order at almost any time and fill it 
promptly, gives a great advantage over smaller concerns. 
(e) For  entering foreign trade the business  economies of 
concentration are undoubtedly  very great.  Sending agents 
to foreign countries to build up a trade for an industry is an  Foreign 
expensive undertaking.  Especially is this the case when the z,"e"ez",", 
markets are already in the possession of  foreign competitors.  tion. 
In  this respect the great corporations of  the country, such as 
the United States Steel Corporation  and Standard Oil Com- 
pany, have proved themselves to be economically superior to 
smaller organizations, more than 90 per  cent of  the export 
business in their respective lines being done by United States 
Steel and Standard Oil.  Moreover, the foreign trade in iron 
and oil has been almost wholly built up since the organization 
of  the steel combination and the Standard Oil Company. 
(B The losses  through  poor  debts  are  less  with  large 
organizations than with small ones.  Frequently where there 
are many organizations having keen competition with a large 
number of  travelling salesmen, sales are made without careful 
reference to the ability of  the purchaser to pay.  To illustrate, 
it is stated that after the American Steel and Wire Company 
was formed, the loss from bad debts for the constituent com- 
panies  was  reduced  from one half  of  one per  cent  to one 
twentyfifth of  one per cent.' 
(g)  One of  the greatest advantages of  concentration with 
cooperation  of  the independent  units  is  the regulation  of 
production.  As we shall see in other connections, with the  Regulation 
competitive system,  underproduction  alternates with  over-  Of  outpu" 
building and overproduction.  Where instead of  fierce compe- 
tition  there  is cooperation (and this  is  only possible where 
there are large units), the great losses are avoided which re- 
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sult from investments of capital in manufactories which  run 
only a portion of  the time and before they shut down produce 
more goods than can be sold at a profit. 
(h) Another  advantage  of  concentration  is  that  a  less 
amount of  capital is necessary in order to handle a combined 
business  than  would  be  necessary  if  a  great  organization 
E5cienc~r  of  were subdivided.  If  a concern be fairly independent of  the 
capital.  banks and the necessity to pay excessive rates of  interest, it 
must keep a considerable amount of  ready cash on hand to 
handle  its  business.  A  very  large  concern,  in  which  the 
variation in the demands for the different products compen- 
sate for one another to some extent at least, is able to handle 
its business with a relatively small cash reserve.  This is one 
of  the advantages which the United States Steel Corporation 
has had since its organization.  By keeping from $50,000,000 
to $75,000,000 in cash, a very large amount as a whole, but 
rather small as compared with its total business, the corpora- 
tion has always had suf3cient money on hand to meet its 
needs without borrowing, and therefore has been independent 
of  the banks at times of  financial depression. 
(11)  Opportunity for High  Order  of  Ability. -  It may be 
that a ha1  advantage of  concentration will  be the opportu- 
nity fcr the display of  ability of  the highest order.  A farmer 
who can successfully run a dairy with twenty cows may fail 
with  a  hundred.  A  man  who  can handle  a  single manu- 
factory may be unable to see the broader comparative aspects 
of  a dozen.  The manager of  each factory will be required as 
before;  but also there will  be needed the man who,  while 
giving large liberty to the individual manager,  will  see the 
work of the whole in its broader relations.  Concentration of 
industry will demand the highest and best trained intellect 
along all lines. 
Says Macrosty  : "Rule of  thumb is dead in the workshop, 
the day is with  the engineer  and  the chemist with  their 
methods of  precision ; in the countinghouse and board room 
there is no longer  a place for the huckster or gambler, the 
future is with the commercial statesman whether in a large 
individual business or a combination." 
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(12) Other  Adtlantages  of  Concentration. -  Other  advan- 
tages of  concentration are frequently claimed.  Among these 
are:  steady  employment  of  labor,  better  wages,  better 
protection  against  industrial accidents, the maintenance  of 
superior quality, etc.  These points are not here introduced 
as advantages of  concentration,  since in reference to them 
there is a marked  difference  of  opinion.  In some cases it 
appears that concentration of  industry has led to the steadier 
employment of  labor, improvement in wages, and  lessening  Wages and 
of  industrial accidents.  In other cases the great industrial 2:;: 
corporations have been  careless or openly regardless of  the 
conditions of  the laboring  population,  and  instead  of  im- 
provement  there  has been no improvement or even  retro- 
gression.  Theoretically the advantages mentioned should be 
possible with  concentration,  and under  proper  control they 
should become  available;  but  they  cannot  be  claimed  as 
general advantages  of  the great  corporations  as they now 
exist.  (See pp. 104-154.) 
Total Advantages of Concentration. -  It is not easy to give 
the economic advantages  in terms of  percentages  for  any 
industry which result from the large factory, the subdivision 
of labor, the full use of  mechanical appliances, the specialisa- 
tion of  departments, integration, utilization of  by-products, 
entrance into allied industries,  distribution of  plants of  the 
same kind, using only the most efficient plants, maintenance 
of investigating departments, economies of  business manage- 
ment, and reduction of  amount of  capital ; but it is safe to 
say that the gain is very great for the large concentration as 
compared with the small plant. 
While percentages cannot be given, the economic advan- 
tages  of  concentration  have  been  conclusively  proved  E*-  d 
for  many  consolidations.  Thus  under  the  competitive  emnomh 
system  some  businesses  became  greatly  overbuilt,  as,  for 
instance,  whisky  distilling.  At  the  time  consolidation 
took  place  when  the whisky  trust was  organized, it was 
found  advantageous to concentrate the business  in  a  few 
plants.  It closed  68 of  its 80 distilleries, doing the entire 
business of  the country with  the remaining  12,  furnishing 
a the same  output,  and  in  a  short  time  even  an increased 
output.  Von  Halle l  mentions  as  evidences of  efficiency 
that the cotton oil  trust shortly after  its formation  closed 
more than a dozen of  the small old-fashioned plants.  The 
sugar trust after  formation  was  able  to supply the whole 
market with one fourth of its refineries.  According to the 
census of  1900, many of  its plants were idle.  Under one of 
the pool arrangements in steel the Carnegie Company paid 
to a Maryland company which did not operate at all $300,000, 
this sum being paid to close the mill ; but the form was gone 
through  of  having  the orders  come to this  mill  while  the 
rails were supplied by the Carnegie Company.  It was more 
economical to close the mill and pay $300,000 than to pro- 
duce the rails in the smaller milL2 
Without  further  development  of  the  economic  gain  of 
concentration, it is evident that the advantages are so great 
as to enable the large  organizations to pay  the freights to 
markets that are not local and to pay the expenses of  market- 
ing  products  at  a  distance.  Thus  transportation  once 
developed,  concentration  became  inevitable.  As  already 
indicated the two have acted and reacted ; for once a market 
secured at a distance, freight and passenger service improved 
so as further to encourage the development of  concentration, 
which  in  turn  further  assisted  transportation, and so on 
continuously. 
The small  manufactory  in  the  little  town,  except  for 
specialities and patent-protected  articles, has  either disap- 
Smallmanu-  peared for the most  part under  the stress of  competition, 
factories  or  else  by combination  has  become  a  unit  of  a  larger 
disappear- 
ing.  organization.  The larger proportion  of  the small manufac- 
tories  of  standard  and  widely  used  articles  have  been 
discontinued;  but  an  occasional  concern  has been  saved 
by  becoming  a  part  of  a  combination.  Those  whose 
years  number  fifty  have  seen  the gristmill  on  the small 
stream  become  intermittent  in  its  running,  then  cease 
altogether, although here and there one favorably located still 
continues  its small  business.  The many  widely  dispersed 
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small  furnaces  for smelting iron  ore  have  gone, and  their 
place is taken by the relatively few great blast furnaces.  No 
longer is the spinning wheel or the loom found in the house. 
The work has gone to the great factory located where labor 
is  available  and  adjacent  to some  stream  which  furnishes 
adequate power,  or where coal is sufficiently cheap so as to 
furnish energy at a reasonable rate.  The shoemaker of  the 
village has become the cobbler, the shoes are manufactured 
at great industrial  centers, such as Boston and vicinity. 
The concentration of  industry during the past fifty years 
has been one of  the chief  factors which has led to the phe-  Growthof 
nomenal  growth  of  the  cities,  the  inevitable  centers  for ,$Ee::- 
manufacture because of  their transportational facilities and  tion. 
the  abundance  of  labor.  Thus  Chicago,  at the  head  of 
Lake  Michigan,  having  cheap  water  transportation  to  all 
lake ports, and the center of the greatest railroad  system in 
the world,  has become a colossus among the manufacturing 
cities of  the nation.  The same is true of  New York, the gate 
of  the continent, and the great group of  cities which cluster 
about  that  harbor.  Boston  and  Philadelphia  are  centers 
less in importance only to the two mentioned. 
While it seems clear that the above statement regarding 
the economic advantages of  concentration cannot  be  gain- 
said,  there  may  be  a  limit  beyond  which  additional 
ecpnomic advantages may not  occur  from further increase 
in .magnitude  or  from  federation of  great establishments. 
Also in some industries in this country the concentration and  Magnitude 
federation  may have gone beyond  the stage of  magnitude  2:;;- 
which does give economic advantage.  This point of view has 
been  strongly presented  by Mr. Louis D.  Brandeis.'  Mr. 
Brandeis mentions a number of  trusts which have been finan- 
cial failures.  He states that since the United States Steel Cor- 
poration was organized our foreign trade in iron has increased 
but slightly in ten years, from 1,114,000 tons  to 1,533,000 
tons;  whereas  the  German  foreign  tonnage  has  increased 
during; that time from 838,000 to 4,868,000 ;  and that of the 
Hearings  before  the  Interstate  Commerce  Committee, United  Statea 
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United Kingdom from 2,213,000 to 4,419,000.  On the other 
hand,  he  gives  illustrations of  manufactories in which  the 
business is fairly competitive, as that of  book paper, in which 
there has been a steady increase in efficiency and decline in 
price.  Unfortunately the illustrations given do not prove the 
general  case.  Had the Standard Oil or American Tobacco 
companies been considered, instead of  United States Steel, an 
immense expansion of  foreign,  trade could have been shown. 
Further, the question of  prices is not the one under  dis- 
cussion at  the present time ;  the question concerns the cost of 
production.  It will be held in another place that the prices 
charged by the great organizations have  been too high  and 
that  they should be lowered.  Furthermore, if  we  consider 
Magnitude  only the cost of  production we  have dealt with but one half 
of  of  the problem.  As has been seen, the economic advantages  production. 
which  come  from  concentration  are  largely  those  on  the 
business side of  the enterprise, buying, selling, finance, etc. 
Therefore, the problem  for consideration is  not the cost of 
production  at the factory,  but the cost  at which  a  given 
article can be placed  upon the market. 
Taking the  entire  problem  into  account,  it  is  believed 
future quantitative investigations will  show that concentra- 
tion must go far in order to give the maximum of  efficiency, 
although it is not held that it should go to the extent that 
the element of  monopoly  enters.  If  the public be  able to 
secure a price based upon investment instead of  capitalization, 
or what the traffic will bear, it is believed the price in most 
cases will be sufficiently low  to justify  the existing concen- 
trations. 
While it seems to the author that the weight of  argument 
is strongly in favor of  the increased efficiency of  very large 
concentrations  of  industry upon  the average, the opinions 
of  Mr.  Brandeis  have  been  brought  forward  to show that 
this view  is not universally accepted.  The position which 
one holds at  the present time for most industries must depend 
upon  qualitative  statements, since there have been  few  in- 
vestigations of the cost accounting in  the same industry for 
different  magnitudes,  and  under  similar  conditions. FACTS REGARDING  CONCENTRATTON  21 
CAUSES  OF  CONCENTRATION 
~hus  far only the inevitable and legitimate causes which 
have  led  to  concentration  have  been  considered.  There 
are in addition very important promoting causes of  concen- 
tration about the legitimacy of  which there will be difference 
of opinion. 
(1)  The Limited  Liability Corporation. -  The first of  these 
is the rise of  the modern limited liability corporation.  Before 
the Civil War an occasional manufactory had  a capital of  a 
million  or  even two million  dollars.  These concerns  were 
usually  partnerships  rather  than  joint  stock  companies. 
The general  corporation  act  of  New  York  was  passed  in 
1848.  Similar acts were later passed in other states.  These 
laws were taken little advantage of  until after the Civil War. 
The  limited  liability  company  gives  immensely  greater 
opportunities in the way of  magnitude than the partnership. 
The owner of  stock in such a company is not responsible for 
the  debts of  the company  beyond  his  investment  in  the 
stock.  A partnership at  best is limited to a few ; the owners 
of  a corporation may be thousands or even many thousands ; 
thus even  relatively  small  individual  holdings  may  make 
possible a large  capitalization.  A corporation which would 
have been regarded as large before the Civil War may have 
the majority of  the stock in holdings of  $10,000 or less.  In 
fact it is not too much to say that without the device of  the 
modern limited liability corporation, it would not have been 
possible  to unite  the  enormous  capital  necessary for  the 
great industrial combination  under  the control  of  a small 
group of men, the officers and directors of  a corporation. 
(2) The Protective  Tariff.  -  The second of  the promoting 
factors is the tariff.  It has been the policy of  the United 
States to develop its industries  and place a tariff  upon for- 
eign goods sufficient to protect the American manufacturer. 
The theory upon which such tar8  has been based has varied 
from time to time.  First, it was to protect  the infant in- 
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tariff, has now  come to the principle that the tariff should 
be sufficient to compensate for the difference of  labor cost 
at home and abroad.  The Democratic party stands by the 
position that the tariff  should be for revenue only.  It will 
scarcely be held by any one familiar with the situation that 
either  party, when  responsible  for  change, has  framed  the 
tariff in accordance with the theory held.  Whatever views 
one  has  regarding  the  tariff,  it  will  be  conceded  by 
all  competent persons  that the tariff  on many articles has 
been more than sufficient to pay the differences of  cost  of 
labor at home and abroad;  that it has been  greater  than 
necessary  to give  the  maximum  revenue;  and  thus  has 
afforded a margin beyond  either of  these principles to pro- 
tect  the home  manufacturer.  This  has  made  possible  a 
development of  concentration in industry which  might not 
otherwise have occurred.  Not only so, but the high tariff, 
often prohibitive, has enabled the manufacturer to sell com- 
modities  at home as high  as the tariff  permitted  and the 
markets would  bear, and to dispose of  his  surplus in  the 
foreign markets at a lower rate.  This practice has been  so 
common that no detailed  evidence  regarding it is  needed, 
but one or two illustrations  may be mentioned.  The Steel 
Corporation  sells  its  products  abroad to meet  the world's 
markets at a lower  rate than the same articles are sold for 
at  home where the freight is lower.  Steel rails from the great 
steel companies of  the United States cost the railway com- 
panies  of  Canada less than do  the same kind  of  rails  the 
companies of  the  United  States.'  As  shown  on  another 
page,  a  similar  situation  obtained  for  Standard  Oil,  that 
article  having  been  sold  in  the markets  of  various  parts 
of  the world at a much  lower  rate than in  America, when 
transportation  charges are  taken  into consideration.  (See 
p.  108).  The same situation has obtained to a large extent 
with  respect  to agricultural  implements. 
(3)  Railway  Rebates  and  Drawbacks. -Another  impor- 
tant cause for the development of concentration in the past 
1 Hearings, How  Committee of  Investigation, Steel Corporation, No. 67, 
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has  been  secret  arrangements  between  the  railroad  com- 
pmies and manufacturing corporations under which rebates 
were  given. 
The published rates applied to the small or weak  manu- 
factory.  Many large concerns in various lines of  industry 
received  rebates greater or less in quantity, and frequently 
so great as to make it possible for the large manufactory to 
sell at a  profit ; whereas  the weaker competitor, obliged  to 
pay  the published  tariff,  could  sell  only  at a  loss.  This 
practice  was  common  before  the interstate  commerce law 
was passed in 1887, and has only ceased within a few years. 
It has had powerful influence in the concentration of  industry, 
since the rebates were usually larger the stronger the corpora- 
tion;  and hence a strong impetus toward  concentration. 
Perhaps  the best  illustration  of  the importance  of  this 
factor  in  producing  concentration  was  the  Standard  Oil 
Company, but the influence on other companies has scarcely 
been  less important.  In one respect Standard Oil  perhaps 
surpassed  all  others  in  profiting  by  unfair  freight  rates, 
in that it not only received rebates upon its own shipments, 
but drawbacks upon the shipments of  its competitors.  In 
other  words,  the rebates  which  should  have  gone  to the 
competitor went  to the Standard  Oil.  Under  these  con- 
ditions  the  destruction  of  the  weak  corporations  was 
inevitable. 
(4)  Local  Underselling. -  Another  factor very influential 
in promoting concentration is that of  local underselling, the 
purpose being to drive out the weaker competitor.  The great 
corporation  having  the advantage of  a  large business  and 
wide markets may sell even at a loss in a given community, 
until the competitor is obliged to discontinue, the loss to the 
large  company  being  recouped  by  large  profits  elsewhere. 
This practice  has  been  engaged in by many  corporations; 
but  probably the  chief  one  was  Standard  Oil,  which  or- 
ganization  almost  to the time  of  its  dissolution followed 
this  method  of  killing  competition  with  great  success. 
Not  infrequently  the  Standard  Oil  Company  used  for 
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to  be  independent,  but  which  secretly  belonged  to  the 
Standard Oil. 
(5) Patents. -  Another  factor  favoring  concentration  is 
the control of  patents.  The patent  itself  gives monopoly. 
If to produce a given article a certain patent is necessary, all 
other competitors are driven out unless an equivalent result 
can be reached in some other way.  A complicated manufac- 
turing business is likely to have many details which are cov- 
ered by patents, so that many great corporations have the 
partial  protection  of  monopoly  through  scores of  patents. 
Such organizations are illustrated by the Westinghouse and 
General Electric companies. 
In some specialized limes  of  machinery, the patents may 
be so important as to become absolutely necessary for the 
industry, and in that case control may be secured by refusing 
to deal  with  a  party unless  all  the machinery  or  all  the 
material is purchmed from the concern controlling the patents. 
This has been  the practice  of  the United  Shoe Machinery 
Company.  Not only so, but this corporation has gone to  the 
point of  so fully controlling the machinery necessary for the 
cheap manufacture of  shoes that it refuses to sell ; it merely 
installs the machines in the factory at a rental.  The Shoe 
Machinery Company has absorbed or driven out all its com- 
petitors. 
(6) Manufacturers' Rebates. -  Another practice of  the large 
corporations, very successfully pursued, to secure the mar- 
ket, is to give a rebate upon the list price of  the article at the 
end  of  a  given period,  provided  the buyer  has  purchaesd 
exclusively from  the corporation.  This practice  was  very 
extensively followed  by  the American  Tobacco  Company. 
Thus, if  at the end of  the year a buyer had purchased only 
from that company, he could get a rebate of  5 to 7 per cent 
upon his purchases, the rate depending upon the magnitude 
of  his business. 
(7)  General  Statements. -  It is now universally agreed that 
many of  these practices are unfair and should be prohibited. 
That of  rebates by the railroads for interstate transportation 
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states have passed similar laws to apply within  the states. 
While these laws were undoubtedly violated by the railroads 
upon  an extensive scale after their passage, at the present 
time it is  agreed  upon  all  sides that rebates  by  railroads 
are morally indefensible;  and  it is  believed  that rebating 
has  nearly ceased  in consequence of  investigations of  com- 
missions, federal and national,  with  attendant prosecutions. 
The protection of  the tariff still holds ; but at the present 
time the tariff is being investigated by a commission and will 
probably be readjusted soon.  It is generally agreed that such 
readjustment  is  necessary.  The  advantages  gained  from 
patents are legal under existing law, and they can only be 
overcome by a thorough revision of  the patent laws. 
The legality of  giving rebates by manufacturers upon pur- 
chases made, provided they are exclusive, has been upheld by 
the courts in some cases ; but such rebates are now regarded 
as contrary to law.  In many of  the states there is no law 
which prevents underselling to drive out a competitor, but in 
some states statutes and decisions place a ban on this prac- 
tice (see pp. 170-202).  Many people have now come to the 
point of  view that corporations should be required to make 
their charges in different parts of  the country correspond to 
factory charge  plus  transportation.  It  is  fully understood 
that there would be great difficulty in carrying out this idea, 
since it is one of the fundamental conceptions of  the competi- 
tive system that a man who owns a thing may sell or refuse 
to sell;  and if  he  decides to sell, he  is without restraint  as 
to the  price  he  may ask; also it has  been  a  universally 
accepted principle of  trade that it is legitimate to sell a large 
quantity of  goods at a lower  rate than smaller quantities. 
THE PURPOSES QF CONCENTRATIOIT 
The purposes which have led to federation and concentra- 
tion, in addition to the economic advantages already consid- 
ered, are the elimination  of  competition, the regulation of CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
output  and  division  of  business  and  territory,  the  main- 
tenance of  prices, and the profits of readjustment. 
(1)  Elimination  of  Competition. -  The  elimination  of 
competition  is  the  most  potent  force which  led to coop- 
eration  and  combination.  When  in  a  village  there  are 
two  competitors and  they are able  to cooperate, competi- 
tion  is  partly  eliminated;  when  they  unite  it  is  wholly 
eliminated.  This  principle  extends in  its  operation  from 
the country cross roads to the great industries.  In another. 
place it is shown that keen competition leads to lessening 
of  profits and oftentimes to wiping out profits altogether, or 
even to loss.  It is obvious that the situation may be met 
by the union of  the competing concerns;  thus competition 
itself  frequently  leads to combination.  The elaborate  in- 
vestigation of  the Industrial Commission of  1900 led to the 
conclusion that "among  the  causes which  have led  to the 
formation  of  industrial  combinations, . . . competition, 
so common, so vigorous, that nearly all competing establish- 
ments were destroyed, is to be given first place."  l 
A study of  the history of  any one of  the great combina- 
tions  which  exist  in  the United  States will  show  that a 
main  purpose in  the establishment of  the combination was 
the  elimination  of  competition.  Therefore  only  a  single 
illustration will be mentioned.  An  elaborate  investigation 
of  the United States Steel Corporation shows that the first 
and most  important of  the purposes,  not only in the for- 
mation of  the groups constituting the steel corporation, but 
later  in  the  union  of  the  groups, was  the  elimination  of 
c~mpetition.~ 
(2) Regulation  of  Output  and  Division  of  Business  and 
Territory. -  Under the competitive system, to be more fully 
discussed later, at  times of  large demand and prosperity, man- 
ufactories are likely to become overbuilt.  Then follows over- 
production in the attempt to reduce cost by a large output, 
and with this falling prices.  When this situation is reached 
1 Industrial Commission, Preliminary Report on the T~sta. 
3 Hearings,  House of  Representatives, Investigation United Stabs Steel 
Corporabon, 63,  Part I, p. 3638. FACTS  REGARDING  CONC ENTRATION  27 
and 3  time of  depression comes, the production of the fac- 
tories  running  full  time  would  far  outrun  the  demands. 
 nufa factories  in  an industry which  would,  at fair  price, 
give a profit if  built for the normal demands of  the country, 
when overbuilt, often become unprofitable or run at a loss, 
at least for many concerns, because of  inability to dispose of 
their goods, or because of  interest on capital and deprecia- 
tion when idle or not running full time, or partly both. 
The extent  to which  overbuilding may  go  is illustrated 
by the whisky industry, which before the trust was  formed 
had distilleries with  a capacity three or four times as great 
as the demands of  the country.  When after a time of  pros- 
perity a time of  depression came on, as in the panic of  1873,  Overbuild- 
there was a strong desire on the part of  the manufacturers to ?,";?la_ 
reduce  the output  of  the different  distiHeries;  but  unless  tion. 
they were united, it was very difficult indeed to control them 
so as to make the output of  each fairly proportional.  This 
the manufacturers could not do through cooperation without 
breaking the law regarding restraint of  trade.  Thus greatly 
overbuilt,  they  were  almost  driven  to  combination  to 
regulate output.  A situation similar to that which  led  to 
the  whisky  combination  led  to  combination  in  various 
industries. 
(3) Maintenance  of  Prices. -  The  competitive  system 
inevitably leads to great irregularity in price.  One of  the 
chief  purposes of  all cooperation in  industry  is  the  main- 
tenance of  prices.  When the demand  exceeds the supply, 
prices will be high  and there will  be  little tendency  to co- 
operate;  but when  the supply exceeds the demand, there 
will be falling prices, and this leads to cooperation for their 
maintenance.  The  cooperations  may  take  the  form  of 
agreements or pools, or may extend to consolidation.  The 
extent of  the control of  prices will depend in large measure 
upon the proportion of  the business which is included in the 
combination. 
(4)  Projits of  Promoters.-  The fourth important purpose 
of union and concentration are the profits to promoters and 
capitalists in putting through the reorganizations.  At each CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
consolidation or reorganization, the capital obligations of the 
company are increased without the investment of  additional 
money.  The inflation takes the form of  bonds or stocks, or 
partly both, of  which the stock-holders get a large share, but 
great blocks often go to the promoters and underwriters. 
As we have seen on another page, the American Tobacco 
Company was first formed ; then there was another company 
formed,  to  which  the  American  Tobacco  Company  was 
subordinate;  and  then  another  reorganization  made  the 
American Tobacco Company the dominant one.  Similarly, 
the  development  of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation 
went  through  several stages, the two chief  ones  being  the 
consolidation of  the elements of  the great subsidiary com- 
panies into units, and later the union of  these units. 
Usually  at each  consolidation  the  bonds  and  the pre- 
ferred  stock  of  the  new  company  represent  the  actual 
value  of  the  constituent  companies;  and  this  frequently 
upon  a  very  liberal  estimate,  sometimes much  above  the 
market  value  of  the outstanding bonds  and  stocks.  The 
Common  common stock issued at such time is usually tile capitaliza- 
stockpure  tion of  the good will, the patents, and the economies which  water. 
are believed will be effected.  Since there is no way to cal- 
culate accurately in advance the amount of  resulting econ- 
omies, the issue of  common stock depends largely upon the 
constructive imagination of  the promoters.  It is the aim to 
capitalize  the  consolidation  sufficiently  so that  the  bond 
and stocks floated will fully utilize the earning power of  the 
combination.  The common  stock  is  speculative,  and  the 
profits  of  the  reorganization  frequently  depend  upon  the 
success of  the stock promoters, financiers, and manipulators 
in getting the public to take the common stock, which usually 
is at  the time aqua pura;  or if  not that, it has no more sub- 
stantial backing than the capitalized somewhat hazy good 
will,  including the trade marks and patents, and economies 
to be effected.  As we have seen, the majority of  the great 
concentrations of  industry have gone through two or three 
stages of  such reorganization, the promoters and financiers 
each  time profiting  greatly,  and sometimes enormously. FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  29 
An illustration  is  furnished  by  the  American  Tobacco 
Company, which between 1890 and  1904 at its various re- 
organization~  capitalized the good  will  of  the company  in 
stock  to  the  extent  of  more  than  $110,000,000,'  which,  TOIWXQ. 
however, between 1904 and 1908 was reduced by $18,000,000. 
Another illustration of  great overcapitalization was  that of 
the  United  States  Shipbuilding  Company.  According  to 
James  Smith, Jr.:  who  was  appointed  receiver  for  this  Shipbuild- 
ing com- 
company when  it was  unable  to meet  its obligations,  the  ,,,. 
value of  the properties which were taken over was about 
$12,440,000;  whereas it was  capitalized at $67,997,000, or 
more than five times as much.  The directors of  the company, 
according to him, appeared to have made a gift of  $55,000,000 
worth of  stocks and bonds  to various  members  interested 
in the manipulations. 
Probably the largest amount of  water that went on to the 
market at one time was placed by the United  States Steel 
Corporation;  more  than  $500,000,000  of  common  stock 
when issued represented no substance whatever ; but this is 
not the present situation (see pp. 000-000).  The speculative 
character  of  this  stock  is  indicated  by  its  wide  market  8ted. 
variations.  This stock was placed on the market at about 
45 ;  went below 30 in 1902 ; in 1903 it ranged from 39 to 10; 
since that time, in 1909, it reached 945, and March 30, 1912 
had a market value of  68.  Many other instances could be 
given of  the very wide ranges of  the common stock of  the 
great corporations, varying from those like the writing paper  The trusts 
trust, the upper leather trust, and the union paper bag trust,  that 
the common stock of  which has ranged from 50 cents a share 
Up  to $4 or $5 a share, to those in which the common stock has 
in large measure been made substance. 
As illustrations of  common stock which have gone far above 
par  may  be  mentioned  American  Tobacco  and  Standard 
Oil.  American Tobacco has been above 525 and Standard 
Oil has reached 900. 
Even the preferred stock of  the better industrials had very 
'  Report of Commissioner of  Corporations, "Tobacco Industry," Part 2, 
P.  13-  '  "Trusts, Pools, and Corporations," Ripley, pp. 197-198. 30  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
wide  ranges in  their  market  values  in  their  earlier  years; 
but there has been a tendency toward solidity and uniformity 
in the prices of  the better class of  American preferred indus- 
trials, a  considerable number  of which  are now  above par. 
This is shown by the following table : - 
Many consolidations organized in  the United States have 
put a  variable  amount  of  watered  stock upon  the market 
from a small sum to the $500,000,000 of  the United  States 
Steel Corporation. 
The most serious of  the evils of  overcapitalization  are as 
follows : - 
(a) That portion  of  the stock which is pure  water or is 
largely diluted, through stock manipulating campaigns, is sold 
to the public, oftentimes for several times its real value. 
(b) When  watered stock  is placed  upon the market,  the 
TABLE  2.  ~NQB  OF  PREFERRED  STOCK  FOR  SOMB  IMPORTANT  INDUB- 
TRIALS  FOR  1900 AND  1910 
1 Bradstreet's, January 5, 1901, p. 8. 
*Ibid., December 31, 1910, p. 251. 
American Car and Foundry.  . . 
American Cotton Oil  .  .  .  . . 
American Smelting and Refining  . 
American Sugar Refining  .  .  . 
American Tobacco  .  .  .  .  . 
General Electric  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Laclede Gas  .  .  . . . .  .  . 
National Lead  . . .  . . .  . 
Pressed Steel Car  . . . . . . 
Pullman  .  .  . . .  . . .  . 
Republic Iron and Steel .  .  .  . 
Union Bag and Paper  . . . . 
United States Rubber  .  .  .  . 
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officers of  a company try to make earnings sufficient to pay 
dividends upon it;  and in order  to do this,  if  practicable, 
excessive prices are charged. 
(c)  Sometimes  the  officers  of  a  company,  which  has  a 
large amount of  watered  stock, put earnings back  into the 
business with the purpose  of  making  the water substance; 
to do this further adds to excessive prices. 
(d)  Oftentimes  the  necessity  of  paying  dividends  upon 
watered stock makes it difficult to accumulate a sufficient re- 
serve to protect the business;  and when a time of  depression 
comes, the concern is likely to  fall into the hands of  a receiver. 
Closely connected  with overcapitalization are the profits 
which come to the financiers in connection with the manip- 
ulation of  the stock on the market, especially the common 
stock.  In this country there is no law which prohibits offi- 
cers and directors  from dealing  in the stocks of  their own 
companies.  Having inside information, they are able to take 
advantage of  the situation, buying when there is likelihood 
of  a rise, selling when there is likelihood of  a fall.  Indeed, 
it is certain that the officers of  some companies, by giving  stock 
favorable and unfavorable  information, by timing the news  manipul* 
tion.  to their purposes,  and in other ways, have both bulled and 
beared their stock, having  as their  aim their own personal 
advantage rather than the benefit of  the stockholders.  Such 
practices are unlawful  in European countries and should be 
prohibited  in America.  It is but just  to say that for the 
majority of  the greater  corporations  there  is  no  evidence 
that this grosser form of  manipulation  has  been  practiced 
on a large scale.  In general  the officers and trustees of  a 
company have tried to increase the value of  its stock, since 
in most cases they are holders of  the securities of  the com- 
pany. 
SECTION  4 
THE  KINDS  OF  BUSINESS MOST  LIKELY  TO  BECOME 
CONCENTRATED 
Certain classes of  business  are especially adapted to con- 
centration.  These  classes  are as follows : - 32  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
(1) Industries in which the element of  natural monopoly 
enters are likely to become concentrated.  Here are included 
the public utilities.  For a long time it was  supposed that 
the railroads were on the same basis as any other business, 
and that the desirable thing  to do  was  to have  as many 
companies as possible.  Parallel lines were  regarded  as ad- 
vantageous  because  they would  compete for  trade wand  in 
price.  The disastrous  costliness of  this theory was  clearly 
brought out by the paralleling of  the Vanderbilt lines between 
Thewest  New York and Chicago by the West Shore and the Nickel 
Plate.  As  the  railroad  business  developed  it  became 
evident that if  great sums of  money were put into unneces- 
sary  railroads  the public  must  bear  the expense;  that if 
there  were  two  railroads  between  two  given  points  when 
one could do the business, the rates must be higher rather 
than lower in the long run in order to pay interest upon the 
investment.  This view was accepted only after ruinous com- 
petition had occurred upon a great scale with enormous eco- 
nomic loss. 
The principles of  this part of  the subject are so well known 
that  they  need  not  be  elaborated.  It  is  now  accepted 
doctrine that railroads, electric lines, both  city and urban, 
telegraph and telephone, and other means of  transportation 
and communication, should  only  be  developed  sufficiently 
Public  to do  the required  business.  The  business  is  best  done 
utditiegand  when the number of  railroad lines from one city to another  monopoly. 
are just  sufficient to handle the traffic, when a single com- 
pany  controls all  of  the city railways, when  the telegraph 
business  is done by two  companies instead of  by  a score, 
when the telephone business of  the country is substantially 
controlled by a single organization.  Indeed, these facts are 
so  well  recognized  abroad  that  in  Europe  the  means  of 
communication are always government monopolies, and the 
means of  transportation  largely or exclusively so except in 
Great Britain. 
(2) Businesses depending upon a natural resource limited 
in quantity and localized in its occurrence are likely to become 
concentrated.  This is  well  illustrated  by  anthracite coal, FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  33 
all of which for the United States is contained in one small  Limited 
area  in  Pennsylvania  of  about  five  hundred  square miles. tz&tes. 
The entire anthracite business is now substantially controlled 
by a half  dozen corporations. 
(3)  Businesses in articles which can be standardized, and 
which in quality are sometimes controlled by inspection, are 
likely to become concentrated.  Here are included sugar, oil, 
salt, whisky, and to a less  extent those industries  in which  standard- 
there  are standard forms  and dimensions, as, for  instance,  kdsztioles. 
steel, matches, etc.  Salt is inspected and must reach a definite 
quality; oil must meet  the test of  the public inspector for 
safety ;  sugar is easiIy tested by the polariscope.  It is notable 
that the early group of  trusts included salt, whisky, oil,  and 
sugar. 
During recent years by large scale manufacture there have 
developed  various  lines  in  which  articles  of  commerce  in 
themselves very complex may  be  regarded as standardized. 
A manufacturer by producing  a  very large number of  ma- 
chines of  exactly  the same kind  is able to standardize the 
machinery  and standardize methods of  operation and thus 
reduce  cost  to a minimum;  whereas this would not have 
been  possible  without such  standardization.  Common  il- 
lustrations of  this type of  standardization are certain kinds 
of automobiles, cash registers, and typewriters.' 
(4)  Articles  which  are  demanded  over  a  wide  territory 
are likely to become  concentrated  in  production.  In this 
connection  the development  of  transportation  is  of  para- 
mount  importance.  If  an article  be  used  throughout  the  Widely 
country, a company producing it may be very large and have  :Erno&- 
many  plants even  if  the object  itself  be  small;  thus the  ties. 
Diamond Match Company produces the greater part of the 
matches of  the United States. 
The strength  of  a  very  large  corporation  producing  an 
article of  wide use may lie not in a single plant at  one locality 
but in many plants of  the same kind in different localities. 
Thus a single lumber company may have hundreds of  yards in 
Hearing before the  committee on Interstate Commerce, United Statee 
senate, Part XXI, p. 1784. 
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as many cities ; a hardware company may have shops distrib- 
uted throughout a large part  of  the country ; and recently, 
we have seen the development of  shops under one company in 
various cities for groceries, dry goods, and other commodities. 
(5) Businesses protected  by patents are especially likely 
to become concentrated  A patent gives a monopoly by law, 
Protection  and thus the same principle applies to the making of  patent- 
protected products that applies to a natural monopoly.  Here 
also are to be  included  trade-marks,  which,  protected  by 
law, have the same effect as patents, although their influence 
upon concentration is by no means so far-reaching. 
(6)  Businesses which in themselves are of  a kind to require 
a large amount of  capital are likely to become concentrated. 
To build a sugar refinery costs several millions of  dollars.  To 
build a steel plant adapted to one line of  product, as, for in- 
stance, steel rails, may involve the expenditure of  many mil- 
lions of  dollars.  As will be seen in another place, there is likely 
Large  to be greater fierceness of  competition among relatively few 
and large companies than among many small ones.  At the 
time  of  the formation  of  the sugar  trust, in  consequence 
of  the killing  of  competition,  consolidation  became inevi- 
table.  At that time, in 1887, there were forty sugar refineries 
in the United States, and the combination only occurred after 
some eighteel1 bad gone into bankruptcy.' 
THE  EXTENT  OF  CONCENTRATION 
The manufacturing census of  1905 enables us to trace the 
stages of  concentration, so far as the establishments are con- 
cerned, for a number of  decades.  By establishment is meant 
a plant which is owned by a single individual, .firm, or cor- 
poration,  located in a single city, town, or county, and en- 
gaged in a single industry. 
CW~ation  in Management Greater than Cmnt~ation  in 
Plants. -There  are certainly hundreds of  corporations in the 
1  "The  Trust Problem," Jenks,  p. 19. FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  35 
united States to which the term "  trust " has been popularly 
applied, because each represents a consolidation in manage-  The number 
merit of establishments once independent.  No list of  organ-  O' 
iZations of  this kind  is  available, but it has been  estimated 
that there  are  five  hundred  or  more  such  in the  United 
States. 
Often a considerable number of  establishments of  different 
kinds and of  the same kind located in different parts of  the 
country are owned or controlled by a single corporation.  The 
greater corporations control several scores of  establishments, 
and some of  them, illustrated  by the United States Steel, 
more than two hundred. 
If  a  list  of  organizations were available controlling more 
than one establishment, and the number of  establishments 
constituting  each  organization  were  known,  it would  be 
practicable to give a more accurate estimate of  the extent to 
which concentration has gone than is now possible. 
Statistics Confined to  Factory System.-The  census reports 
are confined to those establishments which are included within 
the factory system.  They do not include such plants as the 
small custom grist and saw mills, the small shop such as the 
blacksmith shop, or manufacture in the household. 
Considering  all  industries  together,  the census report  of 
1905 for the country as a whole includes 216,262 establish-  Dominance 
ments.  As showing the extent to which the large establish- 
ments control industry, the 24,181 establishments which have  merits. 
products exceeding $100,000 per annum, being only 11.2 per 
cent of the total number, have control of  81.5 per cent of  the 
capital, employ 71.6 per  cent of  the wage earners, and pro- 
duce 79.3 per cent of  the value of  the products.  In some 
lines of industry every establishment has a product exceeding 
$100,000 in value.  Here are included rubber, glucose, loco- 
motives, smelting and refining of  zinc. 
Localization of  Industries. -  In connection with concentra- 
tion there has grown up, as a corollary, a localization of  many 
industries, the larger part of  an industry for the country per- 
haps being located in a state, and sometimes even in a county. 
In other  cases  the localization  is in  a  great  section of  the 36  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
country in which the conditions are similar.  The localiza- 
tion in connection with concentration is dependent upon a 
number  of  causes.  Sometimes  the  resources  upon  which 
the industry is based are found only in one section of  the 
country.  Another  frequent  cause  for  localization  is  that 
when once an industry has become established in a certain 
district, there may be found trained workmen for it.  In con- 
sequence, when the existing corporation is enlarged, a plant 
is built in the same vicinity;  or when a new company enters 
the business, it builds its plant in the locality in which there 
are available workmen.  Other factors favoring localization 
are nearness to markets, water power, and favorable climate. 
If  an industry be an important one, it may have a number 
of  centers, and in these few centers a large part of  the busi- 
ness be located.  In  no case is any industry completely local- 
ized ;  there will be chief  centers in which we  find the larger 
number of  great plants, and in the other parts of  the country 
the industry may exist in a more dispersed form. 
As illustrating the localization principle may be mentioned 
the following industries :-The  chief  center for the manufac- 
ture  of  agricultural  implements  is  the  upper  Mississippi 
Valley,  with  New  York  and Pennsylvania.  The iron and 
steel industry is very largely localized in the states of  Penn- 
sylvania,  Ohio,  Illinois,  and Alabama.  The meat-packing 
industry  is mainly  in  the four  states of  Illinois,  Kansas, 
Nebraska,  and  Missouri; however,  Massachusetts,  Iowa, 
California, Minnesota, and New Jersey are important states. 
As an  illustration  of  extreme localization, 77.2 per  cent  of 
the ammunition of  the country is manufactured in Connecti- 
cut.  This is connected by the Census Bureau with the fact 
that in the manufacture  of  side arms, rifles, shotguns, and 
revolvers, Connecticut has a prominent place.  The manu- 
facture of  rubber boots and shoes is done in  New  England 
to the extent of  90 per cent. 
Concentration in Representative Industries.-For  a number 
of  selected industries the facts as to the increase of  concen- 
tration are tabulated for one or more decades.  The numbers 
other than percentages are taken directly from the census FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  37 
the latter have been  calculated.  For  each  prod- 
uct these tables give the number of  plants, the value of  the 
the  capital  per  establishment,  and the value  of 
per establishment, for a number of  decades, in some 
cases as far back as 1850, in other cases only for one or two 
decades.  Since the reports are from the census of  1905, the 
last numbers are for a half  decade. 
Brief  comments will  be made regarding each of  the fore- 
going tables. 
It will be seen for iron and steel (Table 3))  not only that the 
number of  establishments has not increased since 1870, but 
that it has decreased each decade ;  and that the total number 
of  establishments in 1905, 606, is 25 per  cent  less  than  in 
TABLE  3.  IRON  AND  STEEL- COMPARATNE  SUMMARY  WITH PERCENT- 
AGES  OF INCUEASE  1870-1905, BY PERIODS 
1870.  This is the situation, notwithstanding the fact that 
each decade the capital of  the business has increased from 42 
per cent to 97 per cent, and even for the five years between 
1900 and 1905,60 per cent.  Similarly the value of  the prod- 
ucts has increased each decade from 46 per  cent  to 80  per 
cent, but the proportional increase was not so great for the 
five years from 1900 to 1905.  In the same way, if  we go by 
tons  of  product,  the increases for  the three decades were 
103 per cent, 176 per  cent, and 95 per cent, an average per 
YEAR 
1870 . . . 
1880  . . . 
% of Increase 
1890  . . . 
% of Increase 
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% of Increase 
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967.7 38  CONCENTRATION  AND CONTROL 
decade for the thirty years of  more than 100 per cent; that 
is to say, the output of  each decade between 1890 and 1900 
was more than for all previous decades.  In 1905 the aver- 
age capital per plant was more than $1,500,000, and the value 
of the products annually $1,500,000.  The capital per estab- 
lishment in 1905 was more than ten times as great as in 1870, 
the value of  the product more than five times as much, and 
the output itself  fourteen times as great.  Thus the output 
has increased faster than the price. 
While the number of  iron and steel establishments in 1905 
was 606, seven great companies, now reduced to six, owning 
the great establishments, controlled more than 90 per cent of 
the output of  the country. 
By  inspection  of  the other  tables statements  might  be 
made parallel to that which has been  made  regarding  iron 
and steel,  but  this  hardly  seems  necessary  since a  most 
cursory  examination  of  them  renders  the  facts  apparent. 
Therefore  only  such  general  points  will  be  added  as are 
brought forth by the tables. 
Coke (Table 4) is an industry which  has very rapidly ex- 
panded and is one in which the number of  plants has steadily 
increased.  This is due partly to the great expansion of  the 
1880 .  .  .  . 
1890 .  .  .  . 
%of Increase. 
1900.  .  .  . 
%of Increase. 
1905 .  .  .  . 
% of  Increase . 
yo of  Increase, 
1880-1905  . 
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iron and steel industry, in which coke is mainly used.  Also, 
the  manufacture of  coke distributes itself naturally, either 
adjacent  to the coal fields from which it is made, or to the 
iron furnaces which use the product. 
Shipbuilding (Table 5) shows from 1850 to 1905 a slight in- 
crease in number of plants, capital multiplied nearly twenty- 
TABLE  5.  SHIPBUILDING  -  COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  WITH  PERCENTAGES 
OF INCREASE  FROM  1850-1905 BY PERIODS. 
fold,  and  the  value  of  product  fourfold.  Probably  this 
striking  discrepancy  is  related  to stock  manipulation des- 
cribed, pp. 28-31. 
Electrical  machinery,  apparatus,  and  supplies  (Table  6) 
show a history only from 1880, because these industries have 
mainly arisen  within the past three decades.  As  would be 
expected  under  these circumstances, the increase  of  plants 
has been very great, as has also the capitalization per estab- 
lishment  and the value of  the output.  While there are in 
this  industry  a  large  number  of  establishments,  784,  two 
great companies, the General Electric and Westinghouse, pro- 
yEaa 
1850 .  .  .  . 
1860 .  .  .  . 
yo of Increase . 
1870 .  .  .  . 
%  of  Increase . 
1880 .  .  .  . 
%  of Increase . 
1890 .  .  .  . 
yo of  Increase . 
1900 .  .  .  . 
010 of  Increase. 
1905 .  .  .  . 
%  of  Increase . 
% of  Increase, 
1850-1905  . 
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duce a large per cent of  the value of  the output of  the country. 
This illustrates how  much farther concentration of  manage- 
ment has gone than increase in the magnitude of  establish- 
ments. 
For petroleum  (Table 7)) in 1905 there were 98  refineries, 
but as is shown in another place one company, the Standard 
TABLE  6.  ELECTRICAL  MACHINERY, APPARATUS,  AND  SUPPLIES  -  COM- 
PARATIVE  SUMMARY  WITH  PERCENTAGES  OF  INCREASE  FROM  1880-1906 
BY PERIODS. 
TABLE  7.  ~TROLEUX  REFINING  -COMPARATIVE SUMMARY  WITH  PER- 
CENTAGES  OF  INCREASE  FROM  1880-1905  BY PERIODS 
YEAB 
1880.  .  .  . 
1890 .  .  .  . 
yo of  Increase. 
1900 .  .  .  . 
To of  Increase. 
1905 .  .  .  . 
yo of  Increase . 
% of  Increase, 
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Oil, controlled a sufficient number of  these so as to produce 
more than 95 per cent of  the oil of  the country. 
Clay product  establishments, (Table S), from 1850 to 1905 
became  twice as numerous with a  seventeenfold capitaliza- 
tion,  and  a  sixfold  value  of  product  per  establishment. 
The increase in  number  of  clay product  establishments  is 
explained  by  the  very wide  distribution  of  clay  and  the 
weight  of  the articles  manufactured.  The manufactory  is 
TABLE  8.  CLAY  PRODUOTB-  COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  WITH  PERCENTAGES 
OF INCREAEE  FROM 1850-1905  BY PERIODS 
located  near  the clay  bank  so  as  not  to entail  heavy 
freights in  reaching the market. 
Glass (Table g), like clay products, is one of  the industries 
in  which there has been an increase in the number of  plants 
and at the same time a great increase in the value of  the 
capital  and the output. 
Salt  (Table  10)  is one in which  the normal  process of 
concentration  is  well  illustrated.  We  find  a,  decrease  in 
1850.  .  .  . 
1860 .  .  .  . 
yo of Increase . 
1870 .  .  .  . 
yo of  Increase. 
1880.  .  .  . 
Yo of  Increase . 
1890.  .  .  . 
% of  Increase . 
1900.  .  .  . 
%  of  Increase . 
1905.  .  .  . 
% of  Increase . 
% of Increase, 
1850-1905  . 
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the number of  plants in 1905 to less than one half  those in 
1850, and multiplication of  capital per establishment twenty- 
twofold,  and  value  of  product  tenfold.  As  is  seen  in 
another place, salt is derived from a natural resource limited 
in  amount,  confined  to definite  areas,  and the product  is 
standardized;  therefore  it  is  of  a  kind  in  which  the 
manufacture is especially favorable  to concentration.  Salt 
manufacture was  the first  industry in which  the tendency 
toward  consolidation  in  management  appeared.  At  one 
time  the entire output of  the country was controlled by a 
single combination.  (See pp.  101-103.) 
Manufactured  ice  (Table  11) is  one of  the industries  in 
which  the movement  has been  contrary  to the usual  rule. 
The first decade, that from 1870 to 1880, was an experimental 
one.  The permanent tendency of the manufacture is shown 
by the figures from  1880 to the present time.  Using these, 
it will  be  seen  tbat the number  of  plants  has  increased 
TABLE  9.  GLASS -  COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  WITH  PERCENTAGES  OF 
INCREASE  FROM  1850-1905  BY PERIODS 
YEAB 
1850 .  .  .  . 
1860 .  .  .  . 
O/,  of Increase . 
1870 .  .  .  . 
% of  Increase . 
1880.  .  .  . 
% of Increase . 
1890 .  .  .  . 
O/, of Increase . 
1900.  .  .  . 
yo of Increase . 
1905.  .  .  . 
% of Increase. 
% of Increase, 
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very  greatly.  This  increase  is  due  to the nature  of  the 
poduct.  Ice is an article which is heavy in proportion to its 
cost ; not only so, it is one which must in the warm weather 
be  transported  in cold storage, which still further increases 
the transportation-cost.  Hence where ice does not naturally 
form reasonably close at hand, it is cheaper to manufacture 
it than to transport natural ice to the locality.  Similarly, 
it is cheaper to manufacture the ice at  each important center 
than to transport it from one to another.  Hence we  hd 
1320 plants  in  1905  as compared  with  35  in  1880.  The 
capital per  establishment  has  increased about  50 per  cent 
from  1880  to  1905;  but  the  value  of  the  product  per 
establishment  has  not  radically changed since  the  earlier 
date. 
For  lumber  and timber  (Table 12), the number of  estab- 
lishments from 1850 increased and then later decreased until 
the total number was not much greater in 1905 than in 1850. 
TABLE  10.  SALT  -  COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  WITH  PERCENTAGES  OF IN- 
CREIASE  FROM  1850-1905  BY PERIODS 
Y~AR 
1850.  .  .  . 
1860 .  .  .  . 
% of  Increase . 
1870.  .  .  . 
% of  Increase . 
1880 .  .  .  . 
% of  Increase . 
1890 .  .  .  . 
% of Increase . 
1900.  .  .  . 
% of  Increase . 
1905 .  .  .  . 
% of  Increase. 
% of Increase, 
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2,166.3 44  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
TABLE  11. -  MANUFACTURED  ICE -  COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  WITH  PER- 
CENTAGES  OF  INCREASE  FROM  1870-1905  BY PERIODS 
TABLE  12.  -LUMBER AND  TIMBER  PRODUCTE  -  COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY 
WITH  PERCENTAGES  OF  INCREAB~D  FROM  1850-1905  BY PERIODS 
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However, the capital per establishment for 1905 is more than 
twelve times, and the value of  the product per establishment 
more than nine times, those of  1850.  The explanation of  the 
maintenance of a large number of  establishments for lumber 
and timber is of course the weight of  the material as com- 
pared with its value.  In the manufacture a large part of  the 
wood  of  the logs  is  removed, and therefore the product  is 
usually  handled  near  its source. 
Paper and wood  pulp  (Table 13)  is an industry in which 
there has been an increase in the number of  establishments, 
TABLE  13. -PAPER  AND  WOOD  PULP -COMPARATNE  SUMMARY  WITH 
PERCENTAGES  OF INCREABE  FROM  1850-1905  BY PERIODS 
but a much greater increase in the capital and the value of 
the output per  establishment.  The reasons for this situa- 
tion are the same as those for lumber, the raw material for 
Paper and wood pulp being the forests. 
Printing and publishing (Table 14) is one of  the industries 
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great increase in capital, and no great increase in the value 
of  the product  per  establishment.  It gives the best  illus- 
tration of  any of  the tables of  the lack of  tendency toward 
concentration.  The  explanation  undoubtedly  is  that  the 
great  majority  of  printing  and  publication  establishments 
publish  newspapers.  Every community  of  any size  has  a 
newspaper,  and the large city has a  considerable number, 
each  one  of  which  has  its  own  plant.  Local  news  can 
only be handled locally.  The news of  the day is demanded 
in the evening or the morning.  Concentration of  the print- 
ing industry is therefore  impossible. 
1h agricultural  implements (Table 15),  concentration has gone 
very far, the number of  plants being not half  as great in 1905 
as  in 1850 ;  but the value of  the output of  each establishment 
is more than thirty times as great as in 1850.  Agricultural 
implements illustrate the class of  product which is very widely 
used, can be standardized, and hence is favorable to concen- 
tration in manufacture.  These factors are more important 
than the freight, although agricultural implements are heavy. 
TABLE  14.  PRINTING  AND  PUBLISHING  -  COMPARATNE~  SUMMARY  WITH 
PERCENTAGES  OF  INCREASE  FROM  1880-1905  BY PERIODS. 
YEAB 
1880..  .  . 
1890 .  .  .  . 
% of  Increase. 
1900 .  .  .  . 
% of  Increase. 
1905 .  .  .  . 
%  of Increase . 
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TABLE  15.  AGRICULTURAL   IMPLEMENT^ -  COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  WITH 
PERCENTAGES  OF  INCREASE  FROM  1850-1905  BY PERIODS. 
TABLE  16.  BUTTER,  CHEEBE,  AND  CONDENSED  MILK -  COMPARAT~ 
SUMMABY  WITH PERCENTAGES  OF INCREASE  FROM 1880-1905  BY PERIODS. 
YEAR 
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%  of Increase. 
1870.  . . . 
O/, of  Increase . 
1880.  . .  . 
%  of Increase . 
1890.  . .  . 
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Butter, cheese, and condensed milk  (Table 16) represent an 
industry with an  increase in number of  establishments, and no 
rapid increase in the capital per  establishment and the value 
of  the  output.  The  explanation is that the raw material, 
milk, is being produced over a steadily widening territory, and 
transported, must be transported rapidly.  This is expensive ; 
No.  OF 
YEAR  ESTABLISH- 
1880.  .  .  . 
1900.  .  .  . 
%  of  Increase . 
1905.  .  .  . 
yo of  Increase . 
O/o of  Increase, 
1880-1905  . 
CAPITAL 
VALUE  or  PER Ea-  PBODuCTB 
PER  EB-  PRODUCTS TABLISH-  TABLISH- 
MENT 
hence it is advantageous to have numerous establishments of 
fair size distributed throughout the producing area. 
Beet  sugar  (Table 17) is another  industry  which  has  a 
short history.  In this  case, there is a  very great increase 
in the number of  establishments,  capital per establishment, 
and value of  product per establishment.  The former shows 
dispersion of  the industry with the expansion of  the beet- 
growing territory,  and the latter increase in the magnitude 
of  the establishments.  Beets  are heavy  as compared with 
their cost;  they cannot  be  transported  far,  and wherever 
a  district  undertakes the growing of  beets, a manufactory 
must be located near the source  of  supply. 
Starch (Table 18), one of  the standardized  articles, har 
had something of  a decrease in the number of establishments 
from 1850 to 1905, but a multiplication of  more than eleven- 
fold in capital, and of  sevenfold in the value of  the output 
per establishment. FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  49 
Tobacco  (Table  19) is  an  industry  in  which  there  has 
been a great increase in the number of  establishments.  The 
number  in  1905 was  thirteen  and one  half  times as great 
in  1860.  While  there has been a steady and moderate 
increase in the capital per  establishment and an increase in 
the value of  the product  per  establishment,  these have not 
been  large.  Thus  tobacco  is  a  case  in  which, so  far as 
number of  establishments is concerned, the industry is much 
dispersed. 
But these statistics might lead to quite erroneous conclu- 
sions;  for, as we  have seen  in  another  connection, this is 
One  of the industries in which a few of  the great manufac- 
hries are  doing  a  large part  of  the  business,  and  one  in 
which  a  single  concern  reached  a  position  of  monopoly. 
The American Tobacco Company, before its dissolution, con- 
trolled more than 50 per cent of  the business of the country, 
E 
TA~~x  18.  STARCR-COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  WITH PERCENTAGES  OF IN- 
CREASE  FROM  1850-1905  BY PERIODS 
YEAR 
1850.  .  .  . 
1860.  .  .  . 
To of Increase. 
1870.  .  .  . 
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1890.  .  .  . 
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and controlled from 59 to over 90 per cent of  all of  the lines 
of  tobacco  business  with  the  exception  of  cigars.  This 
illustration shows how far the statistical tables of  the census 
fail to give an idea of  the extent of  concentration of  manage- 
ment which has taken place. 
In the slaughter  and  meat  packing  industry (Table  20), 
the number  of  establishments  has  greatly  increased  from 
1850 to 1905, being five times as numerous;  and during the 
same time the capital per establishment has become thirteen- 
fold, and the  value of the product per establishment fifteenfold. 
The explanation of  the numerous  plants is  the fact that 
concentration  has not gone to the point so that the small 
community  does not  have its own  slaughterhouse.  How- 
ever, as is shown in another place, more than 50 per cent of 
the business of  the country is done at the great abattoirs of 
the large cities.  So far as management  is  concerned  these 
are under the control of  six great concerns;  and these six 
are  charged  with  cooperating  in  business.  The  averwe 
TABLE  19.  TOBACCO  -  COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  WITH  PERCENTAGES  OF 
INCREASE  FROM  1860-1905  BY PERIODS 
YEAR 
1860 .  .  .  . 
1870 .  .  .  . 
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capital per establishment is large, more than a  quarter of  a 
million;  the ratio between capital and output per establish- 
ment is 1 to 4,  a  much higher  ratio than obtains for most 
industries. 
The leather business  (Table 21)  is one of  great concentra- 
tion.  The number of plants in 1905 is less  than one sixth 
as  many  as in  1850,  the  capital  per  establishment  more 
than sixtyseven times as great, and the value of  the product 
thirtyseven times as great.  Tanning is a complex, chemical 
process,  requiring  a  large  plant.  The raw  hides  in  large 
number  come  from  the  great  packing  houses  and  from 
importations.  That portion  derived  from  the  dispersed 
slaughterhouses can readily  reach the great tanneries,  since 
hides are not heavy as compared with their value.  Another 
factor localizing the tanneries is  the necessity for tanbark. 
This largely locates the industry in the parts of  the country 
where this materid  not at a great distance. 
T~LE  20.  SLAUGHTERING  AND MEAT  PACKING-  COMPARATIVE  SU~EY 
WITH  PERCENTAGES  OF  INCREASE  FROM  1850-1905  BY PERIODS 
 YE^^ 
1850.  .  .  . 
1860.  .  .  . 
% of  Increase . 
1870 .  .  .  . 
% of  Increase . 
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% of Increase . 
1905 .  .  .  . 
% of Increase . 
% of Increase, 
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The manufacture of  boots and shoes (Table 22)) a  severely 
competitive industry, and a business which has been freely 
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TABLE  22.  Boom AND  SHOES- COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  WITH  PERCENT- 
AGES  OF INCREABE  FROM  1880-1905  BY PERIODS 
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as compared with  1880 of  seventeen, and as 
with  1890  of  thirty-two.  In this  industry,  as 
elsewhere, the capital per establishment and the value of  the 
output  per  establishment  have  considerably  increased, 
although  not so largely  as  in  some  others.  In 1905 the 
average  capital  per  establishment  was  $93,105  and  the 
value of  the output per  establishment  $243,243, a ratio  of 
one to two  and a  half.  This ratio, like  that of  the meat 
industry, is much higher than the average. 
Leather gloves and mittens (Table 23) illustrate an industry 
in which the number of manufactories has steadily increased 
until  it  was  threefold as  great  in  1905  as  in  1850;  but 
the capital per establishment  and value of  the products per 
establishment  increased  at a  much  greater  rate.  In the 
respect  of  increase  in  number  of  establishments  there  is 
contrast between this industry and the manufacture of boots 
and  shoes. 
T~LE  23.  LEATHER  GLOVES  AND  MITTENS -  COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY 
WITH PERCENTAGES  OF INCREASE  FROM  1850-1905  BY PERIODS 
YEAB 
1850.  . .  . 
1860.  .  .  . 
yo of Increase. 
1870.  . . . 
% of Increase. 
1880.  .  .  . 
%  of Increase. 
1890 .  .  .  . 
% of Increase. 
1900.  .  .  . 
%  of Increase. 
1905.  .  .  . 
%  of Increase . 
% of Increase, 
1850-1905  . 
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TABLE  24.  COTTON  GOODS -  COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  WITH PERCENTAQEB 
OF INCREASE  FROM  1850-1905  BY PERIODS 
YEAR 
1860.  .  .  . 
1870 .  .  .  . 
O/, of  Increase . 
1880 .  .  .  . 
Y0.of Increase . 
1890 .  .  .  . 
%  of Increase . 
1900 .  .  .  . 
%  of Increase . 
1905 .  .  .  . 
%  of Increase . 
O/a  of Increase, 
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The cotton  and  wool  munufactories  (Tables  24  and  25) 
fiord  cases  in  which  the  number  of  establishments  has 
decreased  (for cotton  slightly,  and for  wool  considerably), 
and in which  the concentration has been in the increase of 
the capital and the output per establishment. 
Hosiery  and  knit  goods  (Table 26)  illustrate  a  product 
in which  the number  of  establishments  has increased very 
TUL~  26.  HOSIERY  AND  KNIT GOODS-COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  WITB 
PERCENTAGES  OF INCREASE  FROM  1860-1905  BY PERIODS 
greatly, since in 1905 there were more than five times as many 
as in  1860.  The  capital  per  establishment  is  nearly  five- 
fold,  and  the  value  of  product  per  establishment  nearly 
three and one half fold.  Thus we  have here concentration 
so far as size of  establishments is concerned, but not concen- 
tration  of  establishments.  The reason for the contrast  in 
tendency  so far  as number  of  establishments  is  concerned 
between hosiery  and knit goods and  cotton and woolen is 
not clearly apparent.  All are industries in which invention 
improvement of machinery during the past fifty years 
has  been  most  marked;  but it may be suggested that the 
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size of  the machines is not nearly so great in hosiery and knit 
goods  as in  cotton and woolen  manufacture. 
In  silk  manufacture  (Table  27)) the  number  of  estab- 
lishments from 1860 to 1905 has multiplied  more than four- 
fold, the capital per establishment more  than eightfold, and 
the output per  establishment  more  than  fourfold.  This 
industry affords a  contrast to the manufacture  of  hosiery 
and knit goods and wool manufactories in the great increase 
in the number of  establishments. 
Combined  textiles  (Table 28) show  very well  the normal 
tendency  for  increase  of  concentration  per  establishment. 
The number of  establishments from 1850 to 1905 increased 
fivefold, the capital per establishment nearly eightfold, and 
the value  of  the output per  establishment over sixfold. 
For needles, pins,  hooks,  and  eyes (Table 29)) the number 
of  establishments,  while greater  than in  1860, is less than 
in  1870.  In 1905 as compared  with  1860 the capital  per 
establishment is sixfold and  the value of  the products more 
TABLE  27.  SILK  MANUFACTORIEB  -  COMPARATIVE  SUMMARY  WITH  PER- 
CENTAGES  OF INCREASE  FROM  1860-1905 BY PERIODS 
YEAR 
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yo of Increase . 
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1890.  .  .  . 
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1900.  .  .  . 
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YSAB 
1850 .  .  .  . 
1860 .  .  .  . 
%  of  Increase . 
1870.  .  .  . 
%  of  Increase . 
1880 .  .  .  . 
% of Increase . 
1890 .  .  .  . 
O/, of  Increase . 
1900 .  .  .  . 
%  of Increase . 
1905 .  .  .  . 
yo of  Increase . 
% of  Increase, 
18561905  . 
TABLE  29.  NEEDLES,  PINS,  HOOKS,  AND EYES -  COMPARA'I'NE  ~~~MARY 
WITH  PERCENTAGES  OF  INCREABE  FROM  1860-1905  BY PERIODS 
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than threefold.  The materials are  light  as compared with 
the  value;  they  may  be  standardized;  and  thus  they 
illustrate the natural tendency  toward  concentration.  The 
table is introduced mainly for the purpose of  showing that 
the tendency to concentration may be just  as marked with 
small  and  relatively  unimportant  articles  as  with  large 
and important ones. 
Pens  and  pencils  (Table 30) are industries in  which the 
number  of  establishments  has  steadily  increased,  being 
CAPITAL 
VALUE  OF  PER  E& 
Pso~ncrs  TABLIBH-  1  MENT 
1860.  .  .  . 
1870.  .  .  . 
%  of  Increase . 
1880.  .  .  . 
yo of  Increase . 
1890 .  .  .  . 
To of  Increase . 
1900.  . . . 
%  of  Increase . 
1905.  .  . . 
of  Increase. 
Cr, of  Increase, 
1860-1905  . 
VALUE  OF 
PRODUCTS 















sixtytwo  in  1905 as compared with  fifteen in  1860.  The 
capital  per  establishment  and  the  value  of  prodqct  per 
establishment  have  greatly  increased,  being  respectively 
fortythree  and thirteen times  greater than in 1860.  While 
like needles, pins, hooks,  and  eyes, so far as  magnitude  of 
establishments is  concerned, the two are  unlike  in that for 
pens and pencils the number of  establishments has increased. 
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while concentration has not taken place for every industry,  Concentra- 
in  the great majority of  the more important ones, it has been  tiongener* 
and in some cases amazing,  being marked  by great 
decrease in the number of  plants and relative increase in the 
of the plants and the value of  the output. 
For  certain  industries,  while  the business  done  by  the 
several plants has increased, the actual number of  the plants 
has  increased.  However,  in  most  cases  the  increase  in 
number  of  plants is much smaller  than the increase in the 
value of  the product, showing that even in the cases where 
there  is  increase  in  the  number  of  plants,  concentration 
has been taking place. 
The different  industries  differ greatly  among themselves 
in the ratio between the capital per establishment  and the 
value of  the product per establishment.  From this point of 
view  for  1905  I  shall  classify  them  into  three  divisions: 
those in which the value of  the product per establishment is 
less than the capital per  establishment  by 20  per  cent  or  Variable 
more;  those in which the value of  the product  per  estab- 
lishment  does  not  differ  more  than 20  per  cent  from  the  capital 
value of  the capital per establishment;  and those in which   duct. 
the value of  the product per establishment is greater than the 
capital per establishment by 20 per cent or more. 
The industries in which the value of  the product per estab- 
lishment is less than the value per  establishment by 20 per 
cent or more  are the following : coke ; ship building;  clay 
products ; salt ; manufactured  ice ; paper  and wood pulp, 
agricultural  implements ;  beet  sugar ;  cotton  goods ;  and of 
these, in the cases of  salt, ice, and beet sugar, the value of  the 
output is less than half  the capitalization. 
Those industries  in which  the value  of  the product  per 
establishment does not vary more than 20 per cent from the 
capital per establishment are the following:  iron and steel; 
electrical machinery, apparatus, and supplies ;  glass ;  lumber 
and timber  products ; printing  and  publishing ; tobacco ; 
leather ; wool  manufactories ; combined  textiles ; needles, 
pins, hooks, and eyes ;  and pens and pencils. 
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tablishment is 20 per cent or more than the capitalized value 
per  establishment  are  the  following : petroleum ;  butter, 
cheese, and condensed milk ;  starch ;  slaughtering and meat 
packing;  boots  and  shoes;  leather  gloves  and  mittens ; 
hosiery and knit goods; silk manufacture;  and of  these, in 
the case of  butter, cheese,  and condensed milk,  and meat, 
the value of  the output per establishment is more than three 
times as great as the capitalization, and for boots and shoes 
more than twice as great.l 
If  there were available detailed histories of  each of  these 
industries so that we might know to what extent the capitals 
of the different classes are inflated and to what extent they 
represent substance, the very great differences in ratios might 
be partly explained.  Possibly for the slaughtering industry 
and boots and shoes, we have industries in which there is not 
over capitalization; whereas in some of  the cases where the 
value of the output per establishment is not more than half 
as great as the capitalization there may be inflated capitali- 
zation.' 
FORMS  OF  ORGANIZATIONS 
The development of  the Iaws  concerning combinations in 
this and other countries will be considered in  another  place 
(see Chapter 111) ; but it is to be said that the principle of 
statute law, prohibiting restraint of  trade, has had a powerful 
influence in the forms which concentrations of  industry have 
taken.  Combinations  during  their  history  have  passed 
from those of  the loosest kind to those in which there is com- 
plete unity of  management.  The different kinds of  associa- 
tions and combinations may be roughly classified as follows : 
(1) Informal or Formal Associations for  the General Protec- 
tion or Advancement  of  a Business. -These  are illustrated by 
the various  business  associations.  Almost  every  industry 
has such  an association, and some of  them  many.  Thus 
1 The situation regarding concentration of  industry in 1900 is fully given 
in the Reports of  the United States Industrial Commission for 1901, Vol. I, 
P.  1325 ;  Vol. XIII,  p. 1013 ;  Vol. XIX,  PP.  695-724. FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  61 
there  are associations of  brewers,  butchers,  bankers,  hard- 
ware men, lumbermen, cattlemen, fruit growers, wine makers, 
butter makers, and of  practically every producing industry. 
similarly  there  are  associations of  salesmen,  wholesalers, 
and retailers in each of  the various industries, whether they 
be hardware, drugs, dry goods, or groceries.  These sales asso-  Multitude 
ciations may be national, state, or local, or they may be na- 
tional  with  state and local  branches.  The importance  of 
the local associations depends upon the size of  the town.  The 
merchants' or manufacturers' association in a great city may 
have large importance, and the retail grocers' association in 
a  small town may  be of  little consequence.  Not  only  are 
there associations of  tradesmen and salesmen, but there are 
associations of  people engaged in the same service, teachers, 
dentists,  doctors,  laborers,  etc.  The  laborers'  association 
may be for the entire country or for a definite industry, as, for 
instance, the American Federation of  Labor, and the Brother- 
hood of  Locomotive Engineers. 
The purpose of  all of  these associations is to advance the 
interests of  the group concerned.  This is done in the loosest 
form of  association in the public convention at which views 
are compared, experiences exchanged, papers presented, the 
purposes of  which are to benefit one another merely by the 
exchange of  information, without  any implication whatever 
that any one will  feel impelled to abide by any view  pre- 
sented. 
Thus the members of  the retailers associations meet and 
exchange  information to the common  advantage.  One  of  Erchangeof 
the items concerning which  information is  exchanged is as 
to the manufacturers  that sell  to the so-called mail  order 
house, the severest competitors of  the retailers.  The pur- 
Pose  of  such information is  clearly that the members may 
buy of  wholesalers  and jobbers  that do not  deal with  the 
mail order houses ;  but now the retailers feel that even such 
exchange of  information with no implication that it will be 
used as indicated comes under the ban of  the Sherman act.' 
Another aim in this exchange of  information is to secure 
B&  of Senate Interetate Commerce Committee. XIII, p. 937. 62  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
common  prices  for standard  articles.  There need  not  be, 
indeed usually is  not, a formal agreement in a community 
Common  or  association  upon  this  matter.  One  way  to secure  a 
prices.  common  price  is  by  means  of  a  printed  list  or  cata1og.l 
Even without any formal agreement among the dealers, they 
all understand that the price list is to be followed.  Some- 
times these lists are prepared ,by the retailers, in others by 
the wholesalers or jobbers.  In the latter  case the catalog 
gives the retail prices and the retailer  has a discount from 
the printed  price.  An  excellent illustration  of  this plan of 
regulating  prices  is  furnished  by  wire  rope.  The manu- 
facturers have a common catalog which  they  distribute to 
the retailers and the retailers all sell at  the list price.  The 
Southern Wholesalers' Association printed lists of  prices for 
the information of  its members until enjoined by the court. 
It might be supposed that a loose arrangement of  this kind 
would not work;  but as a matter of  practice it is  success- 
ful.  A.  F. Huston2  well states the force which holds men to 
the  understanding  in  the  following  words:  "  Let  me  say 
that it is a general broad principle that if  a certain price is 
felt to be a fair and right  price,  each  one for himself  feels 
that he ought to maintain that price and not vary from it 
to the detriment of  his  fellows without he  should let  them 
know,  but  without-any agreement, express  or  implied, to 
that effect."  However, in some cases the understood prices 
are departed from.  In such  a  case, if  one decides to cut 
a price, the others may remonstrate;  but if  he  persist, ex- 
cept it be as a leading line for a  short time, the others may 
meet  the  cut,  and a  new  minimum  be  fixed.  Similarly 
as  a  result  of  informal discussion of  the conditions of  the 
market, prices are put up or down in unison. 
The regular and uniform rise and fall of  the price of  anthra- 
cite during any year illustrate the situation.  In early sum- 
mer the price is the lowest; it is increased by regular incre- 
ments as the autumn comes on.  The price is the same in a 
given community from each dealer for purchases at a given 
1  Investigation U. S. Steel Corporation, 10, pp. 604-015. 
2 Investigation U. 8.  Steel Corporation, 11, p. 693. FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  63 
time under similar circumstances.  The result  is almost  as 
certain and as uniform as if  it came about by formal agree- 
ment put into legal form. 
The stage of  the association for exchange of  information 
easily passes into the second phase in which regulations are 
adopted by the association to control the actions of  its con- 
stituent~;  as, for instance, methods to be pursued in adver- 
tising, quotations, and even scale of  prices.  Actions of  this 
kind  are well  illustrated by the brewers'  association, which 
decides as to the price to be  charged for beer  in the retail  Regulatiom 
trade, issues regulations about rebates to retailers, and even $or- 
goes into such minor details as the treating of  drivers, and 
the extent to which favors are to be given by advertising, etc. 
When  the members of  an association are numerous, the 
extent to which they cooperate in these respects is a matter 
of public knowledge ;  but in case an industry is concentrated  Secret 
in several or at most a few corporations, a secret gentlemen's 
agreement may be reached which acts powerfully in restraint 
of trade.  Thus it is charged that at the weekly meetings of 
the Chicago packers, which in the past regularly occurred, 
a definite understanding was reached as to field of  operation, 
output, prices, and margins, which  were  to obtain for  the 
following week. 
Similarly it is charged that at the so-called Gary dinners 
an informal  understanding  was  reached  concerning  these 
points for iron and steel.  What happened, according to Mr. 
E.  H.  Gary, was that the steel makers met together and ex-  Informal 
changed information with reference to one another's affairs, ;,"ptsnd 
their outputs, prices, etc., in order that each might have full  binding. 
knowledge of  the transactions of  other producers to guide his 
own  judgment.  In the case  of  the Chicago packers there 
can be little doubt that the understanding  was  much  more 
definite than in the case of  the steel  conferees ; but so far 
a5 the public was concerned, the results  were  substantially 
the same;  output was regulated, prices were maintained. 
It is charged also that the group of  men who control the 
anthracite industry meet regularly to fix output and prices at 
the various commercial centers, and  that this practice  has 64  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
Anthracite  been in vogue for many years.  That this charge is true can 
coal price8 
fixed.  scarcely be doubted, although it might not be easy to prove. 
Also, there is no doubt that the railroads in the early stage of 
their coijperation entered into agreements and understand- 
ings as to the portion of  business to be handled, the prices to 
be charged, and rebates to be allowed. 
Similarly it is charged that produce exchanges agree upon 
and control prices; thus it is stated that the association of 
butter makers centering in Elgin fix prices on dairy products, 
and especially butter, for a large part of  the country. 
The character and  influence  of  these  associations have 
become  widely  known  through  the  prosecutions  by  the 
United  States Attorney-General  under  the Sherman  anti- 
trust act.  One of  these, the Southern Wholesalers' Associa- 
tion, without going to trial, admitted many of  the practices 
above described and accepted a comprehensive decree enjoin- 
ing the members from cooperating.  A number of  other asso- 
ciations, illustrated by the lumber associations, are under at- 
tack.  These cases bring clearly to light the real significance 
of  a form of  organization which  pervades the commerce of 
the country. 
While associations formal and informal are the least  def- 
inite  of  the various  combinations,  they are probably  the 
most important because their scope is coextensive with  the 
country and with its business. 
(2) Formal  Agreements. -In  certain  lines  of  business, 
corporations  have  made  definite  agreements  about  the 
management  of  the business  of  the uniting  parties.  The 
PO&.  arrangements,  usually called pools,  (1)  divided the produc- 
tion in a definite manner between the different companies ; 
(2) divided the markets ; (3) regulated the sales for the home 
market, perhaps leaving freedom in the matter of  export; or 
(4)  placed the entire profits in a common fund or pool to be 
divided  according to an agreed  plan.  With  the foregoing 
features, there sometimes went agreements as to prices ;  but 
this was not essential, since when controlling outputs, dividing 
markets, regulating sales, and apportioning profits,  it is to 
the interest of  all to keep prices at a high level. FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  65 
As  the railways  developed  in  this  country,  competition 
became so severe as frequently to lead to operation at a seri- 
ous  loss.  Relief  from  this  situation  was  found  by  pools  Railway 
under which the business between two points was definitely * 
divided, and an agreement was made as to rates.  Thus it 
might be agreed that each of  the trunk lines between Chicago 
and  New  York should  handle a definite percentage of  the 
business. 
The pool so largely used by the railroads was also exten- 
sively applied to the industries.  Under the manufacturers, 
which began as early as 1860, each manufacturer was  In- 
usually  allotted  a  certain  percentage  of  the business.  A * 
manufacturer who received more than the allotted percentage 
paid into the pool a sufficient amount to balance the excess ; 
while the manufacturer who received less than his percentage 
received from the pool a sum sufficient to make up the defi- 
ciency.  The business was done through  a  supervisor who 
acted in the capacity of  a clearing house.  For violation of 
the agreements of  the pool, penalties were imposed upon its 
members usually in the way of  fines or a percentage charge 
on business done outside the pool. 
Pools are very well illustrated by the numerous agreements 
which were made by the iron companies among themselves be- 
fore the organization of  the United States Steel Corporation.' 
In  the case of  the Michigan Salt Association, the organiza- 
tion developed to a state intermediate between the pool and 
the trust.  This association, formed in 1876, soon controlled 
85 per  cent of  the business of  the state.  The stockholders  The 
were  the salt manufacturers  of  the state; and each manu- :gKgsn 
facturer was allowed shares in the association in proportion  Association. 
to his production.  The capitalization of  the association was 
nominal.  The association fixed the output of  salt for each 
manufacturer and managed the entire selling business, includ- 
ing the determination of prices.  The manufacturer gave up 
the entire management of  his business to the Salt Association, 
the runningof his manufactory.3  (See pp. 101-103.) 
l Investigation U. S. Steel Corporation, 24, pp. 1813-1817. 
"  Poole and Trusts," Quarterly Reuitw, Vol. 199, p. 185. 
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Very  analogous in  form  of  organization and conduct  of 
business to the Michigan Salt Association, long since dead, 
Fmit  are numerous fruit growers'  exchanges.  Some of  these ex- 
growers' 
exchanges.  changes are district in their  character,  precisely as was the 
Michigan Salt Association.  In others the district exchanges 
first formed have gotten together into a national exchange. 
In some instances such an exchange handles as much as 80 
per  cent  of  the entire crop.  The stockholders  of  the ex- 
change  for  a  definite  fruit  or  group  of  fruits  are  those 
engaged in growing the product.  The exchange is  usually 
a  selling  agency,  charging  commission  for  its  services. 
While  a  fruit  grower  may  sell  a  part  of  his  crops  other 
than through the agency, he pays the same commission that 
he would if  the entire crop were disposed of  by the exchange. 
When the crop of  fruit begins to come upon the market, the 
exchange  sets a  price  for  a  certain period, which may  be 
raised at the beginning of  a second  period  and again  at a 
later period.  For fruits that keep well the usual plan is to 
start the price  sufficiently low so  that the fruit will  begin 
to be marketed  promptly,  and to advance the price rapidly 
enough so that there will  be a supply to the normal termina- 
tion  of  the  season.  For  some  fruits the  prices for  early 
products  may be  high ; later  the prices  are  reduced;  and 
still later, when the height of  the season is  over, they  are 
again advanced.  If  prices be placed  too high, some of  the 
fruit will go to the dump at the end of  the season;  if  they 
be placed too low, there will  not be a sufficient  amount to 
supply the market  during the  latter  part  of  the  season. 
To carry out wisely the above plans, careful estimates  are 
made  of  any crop  for  the year.  Inspectors  are employed 
by the exchange to supervise the harvesting, storing, sort- 
ing, packing, and shipping of  the fruit so as to get definite 
and uniform  grades,  and to have  the fruit shipped under 
the most favorable circumstances.  The growers retain their 
own brands. 
The fruit exchanges do not regulate output; they do con- 
Ad--  trol prices ;  they aim to get the product as directly as possible 
to the jobbers and grocers without falling into the hands of FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  67 
The marketing  costs  are lessened by  the ex- 
change.  Prices start at a reasonable level and have graded 
,,hmges  so that the  producers are sure  of  a  fair  return. 
The public cannot  be disregarded in furing prices, since one 
kind of  fruit competes with another, and since to a certain 
extent fruit is an abundant but desirable luxury which will 
not  be disposed  of  if  the prices are  excessive.  Products 
are  inspected and  standardized.  It  would  seem  that the 
credits due  the fruit exchanges are considerable;  that the 
public is better off  than under the old hit or miss methods of 
disposal of  the crop which  have sometimes been character- 
ized as  mob methods;  and that exchanges should be  en- 
couraged and retained. 
These  fruit  growers'  exchanges  are  illustrated  by  the 
nuit Growers'  Association  of  California.'  For  this  ex- 
change  the  contract  between  the  grower  and  the  local 
association requires  that the  grower  shall sell  only  to the 
association, and that if  he fails to pack and deliver his fruit 
within five days after demand is made upon him the associa- 
tion may enter the orchard, take possession of  the premises, 
pick, pack, and market the fruit, all at the expense of  the 
owner.  The district exchanges of  this association are under 
contract to sell only to the general exchange and as called for 
by that exchange.  It is perfectly clear that the purposeof the 
citrous fruit growers of  California is the control of  the market. 
Other lines  of  cooperation2 among  the farmers are  the 
elevator  systems  for  marketing  grain  and  the warehouse 
exchanges for marketing  cotton.  It  is  said by Mr. E. H. 
Coller  that there  are  in  the  neighborhood  of  twenty-five 
hundred or three thousand buying or selling organizations in 
the United States which are in the interests of  better prices." 
Mr. T. J. Brooks, representing the Farmers' Educational 
Coijperation Union, suggests that  since  these  farmers'  co- 
operative associations are  so advantageous  they  should be 
exempted from the prohibition of  the Sherman antitrust law.' 
'  Hearings,  Interstate Commerce Committee, XXW, pp. 2336-2353. 
Edward G. Dunn, Farm and Fireside, March 16, March30, April 13,1912. 
a Hearinger Interstate Commerce Committee, p.  1344.  'Ibid., p, 2337. 68  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
This is an appropriate suggestion, for  it can be  asserted 
without fear of  contradiction that fruit exchanges organized 
as indicated are as clearly in violation of  the Sherman anti- 
trust law as the selling agencies of  manufacturers which have 
been declared to be illegal by the courts. 
If the farmers'  selling agencies are  admitted to be bene- 
ficial to the farmers and to the public, it may  be  said that 
fully as strong a case may be made for other selling agencies, 
song  which is coal.  Yet when a number of  coal operators 
whose market was Chicago conceived the  idea of  establish- 
ing a selling agency which did not combine more than four 
per  cent  of  the  consumption  of  that market,  they were 
warned  by  the federal  authorities  that such action would 
be combination in restraint of  trade.' 
The pools in the seventies and early eighties occupied an 
Reign  important place  in the development  of  combination; their 
the  chief  reign was  from  1879 to 1887, about ten years.  With  pools. 
the passage  from  the partnership  to the  corporation,  the 
principles of  the law applicable to individuals and to partner- 
ships were carried over to corporations.  But the pool  was 
in effect a  partnership of  corporations, or at least, if  not a 
partnership, such cooperation of  corporations, as to amount 
substantially to the same thing.  Partnerships  of  corpora- 
tions were illegal, and consequently the pool  contracts were 
non-enfor~ible.~ 
The non-enforcible agreement gave the pools a fundamental 
weakness.  Any  member  that  became  dissatisfied  could 
withdraw at any time.  Also, since the courts refused to en- 
Weaknew  force the arrangements made under  pools,  compliance  with 
pOO1s.  the regulations depended exclusively upon the honor of  those 
entering  them; and, in  consequence,  there  were  frequent 
secret  violations  of  the pool  agreements.  A railroad  or a 
manufactory would exceed its percentage, or in order to get 
business would reduce rates.  Further the men and corpora- 
tions entering into the pools were in danger of  penalties from 
the  courts.  As  we  have  already seen, the selling  agency, 
1 Hearings, Interstate Commerce Committee, XXVI, pp. 2320-2321. 
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having many  of  the weaknesses  of  the  pools, still  retains 
an important place in business. 
(3)  Trusts. -Since  the  pool  was  a  failure,  in  order  to 
attain the objects striven for by it, the trust was devised. 
Under the trust, each unit of  the combination transferred its 
stock to trustees.  Thus the entire stock of  the constituent 
companies was held  by a  group of  trustees who  had  com- 
plete authority over the business of  all the companies enter- 
ing into the trust.  An  establishment or company  retained 
its  own  officers  and  conducted  its  business,  but  under 
the direction of  the trustees, as to line of  product,  amount 
of output,  and price.  The trust was  able to prevent over- 
building  and  overproduction,  to  prevent  competition  in 
price  between  its units,  to apportion business,  to consoli- 
date buying and selling, and thus gave all  the advantages 
of  unity  of  organization,  as  described,  pp.  8-20,  due  to 
concentration  of  industry.  Well-known  types  of  this 
organization were  the Standard Oil  trust, the sugar  trust, 
the  cotton-seed  oil  trust,  the  whisky  trust.  The  great 
period of  the trust was from 1888 to 1897. 
If  the pool was a partnership of corporations, it was even 
more clear that the board of  trustees controlling the business 
of  a number of  corporations through their tr.ust certificates 
was such a partnership.  In consequence of  this, in the late 
eighties trusts were declared to be illegal, and this led in the 
early nineties to the next stage of  combination. 
(4) Holding  Corporations. -Under  the trust each of  the 
constituent  companies  was  an  independent  legal  entity. 
The stock was simply placed in the hands of  the trustee for 
management.  In  the  holding  corporation,  the  stock  is 
transferred to the holding concern so that this corporation 
actually  owns  the  stock  of  the  constituent  companies. 
So  far  as  management  and  operation  are  concerned, 
the  situation is precisely the same as under  the trust and 
the advantages the same, only the constituent  companies 
are subsidiary companies instead of  nominally independent. 
The subsidiary company maintains its officers, carries on its 














the other companies of  the combination;  but as to nature 
and quantity of  output and price, the policy  is completely 
controlled by  the corporation  of  which  it is  a  constituent 
member.  The era of  the holding corporation  began in  the 
nineties, and has extended through that decade and the first 
decade of  the twentieth  century.  Great examples  are the 
Standard  Oil  Company  and the United  States Steel  Cor- 
poration. 
While  some  of  the  holding  corporations  have  remained 
merely managing companies, others of  them, and some of  the 
more important, have also become manufacturing companies. 
In these instances some plants are under the direct manage 
ment of  the directors of  the corporation, while other parts 
of  the business are run by subsidiary companies.  This stage 
of  development is intermediate between the strictly holding 
corporation and the merger, next to be spoken of. 
Under the common law the stock of  one corporation could 
not be held by another;  therefore the holding  corporation 
was  declared  to be  invalid.'  This  situation  was  met  by 
the enactment of  corporation laws under which it was valid 
for a corporation to hold  stock of  other corporations.  The 
first of  the states thus to reverse the common law principle 
was New Jersey.  She has been followed by several others, 
notable  among  which  are  Delaware,  West  Virginia,  and 
Maine.  The liberal,  not  to say  lax,  corporation  laws  of 
these  states  have  led  to  the  holding  corporations  being 
organized  under their  laws, and mainly under  the laws of 
New  Jersey and  Delaware.  According  to  Frederick  W. 
Kelsey, the  state of  New  Jersey  profits  to the extent  of 
over $3,000,000 per  annum because of  its pioneer position 
in passing liberal corporation laws. 
However, the corporations which  are in whole or in part 
holding companies, organized under the laws of  these states, 
are now  being  attacked  in  the  United  States  Court.  In 
1911  orders were given for the dissolution of  the Standard 
Oil  and  the  American  Tobacco  companies,  the  first  of 
'People  U. Chicago Gaa  Trust Co.. 130 nl. 268; also other cases. 
Hearings, Interstate Commerce Committee, XVII, p. 1358. FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  71 
which was  strictly  a  holding  company  and the second  of 
which  was  both  a  manufacturing  and  holding  company. 
(See PP.  181-187.)  Many other  holding  corporations are 
now attacked by the Attorney-General of  the United States 
ctnd must  fight for  their  existence. 
The  holding  corporation  began  in  1897,  but  the great 
codsolidations did not begin until in 1899,  since which  time 
the  holding  corporation  has  been  the  dominant  form  of 
consolidation. 
(5) Complete Merger. -  This is the final stage in concen- 
tration  of  management.  The  stock  of  the  constituent 
companies  of  the  combination  is  actually  bought  in  and 
canceled, the only stock being that of  the master company. 
If,  for instance, the different companies of  the United States 
Steel  Corporation -the  Federal  Steel, the Carnegie Steel, 
and others -  cease  to exist by their  stock  being  canceled  Coming 
and stock of  the Steel Corporation be the only existing issue, 
we  should have the final stage of  corporation management  merger. 
for this gigantic company. 
Since the recent  decisions of  the United  States Supreme 
Court (see pp. 180-181),  which seem to indicate that holding 
companies will be in a stronger position if  they are actually 
manufacturing companies, it is easy to predict that the great 
consolidations, now forming, so far as practicable will become 
unified corporations.  The merger began to become impor- 
tant about 1904, and since that time its growth has steadily 
continued,  although,  as  already  pointed  out,  the holding 
company is still the dominant form of  concentration. 
Just  as the pool,  the trust,  and the holding corporation 
have been  successively attacked in the courts, there can be  The 
little doubt that the great merger will also there be attacked. Er 
Indeed, for intrastate commerce such attack has already been 
begun.  For instance, the Diamond Match Company which 
bought outright the properties of  competing concerns engaged 
h  the manufacture of  matches, was declared to be an illegal 
mono~ol~  in the state of  Michigan.'  Similar attack is likely 
to  follow for interstate commerce under the Sherman act. 









General Statements. -It  is to be noted that the develop- 
ment  from pool  to trust, from trust to holding  company, 
from holding company to complete consolidation, has been 
&ccelerated by  the  laws which  exist in  restraint  of  trade. 
The dissolution of  pools by the courts led to the trust; the 
dissolution of  the trust led to the holding corporation;  the 
dissolution of  the holding corporation at the present time is 
now leading to the consolidated company. 
The actions  which  have  led  to the above development 
have  been  partly  under  common  law  and  partly  under 
statute  law.  The  common  law,  forbidding  unreasonable 
restraint of  trade, may be invoked to prevent  any form of 
pool, trust, holding company, or merger, which goes to the 
point  of  producing monopoly.  Actions under  statute law, 
to  be  successful,  must  of  course  comply  with  its  terms, 
somewhat variable in the different states.  (See pp. 192-200.) 
By the above  statements  it is not  meant  that the law 
against restraint of  trade is the only cause which has led to 
the development described.  As  we  have seen, pp. 192-200, 
fierce and unrestricted competition has led directly to com- 
bination,  or else elimination of  the weaker  by destruction, 
until the remainders are reduced to a manageable number, 
usually all strong and at least of  the same order of  magni- 
tude, if  not exactly the same size, when they combine.  Also 
there  are  other  important  factors  leading to combination 
which  have been  discussed, pp.  8-20. 
TBE:  KINDS  OF COMPETITION 
There  are  different  kinds  of  competition.  For present 
purposes the more important  are,  competition in  quality, 
competition in price, and competition in service. 
(1) Competition in Quality. -  The better the quality, the 
easier it is to do business.  For certain articles the quality 
is easily determined and so becomes a very important factor 
in  competition;  for  other  things  it is not  easy  to settle. FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  73 
With such  articles  as tea,  tobacco,  coffee,  the  quality  is 
not  absolute  thing,  but  depends  upon  the  taste  of  Thesame 
the  We frequently hear  the story of  the retail geFh 
dealer who takes a chest of  a poor or medium quality of  tea,  pnces. 
divides the same among  three  caddies upon which he puts 
prices  of  thirty-five cents, sixty-five cents,  and one dollar 
per  pund.  A  person  who  can  afford to pay  but  thirty- 
five cents  quickly takes that kind;  the person who is able 
afford  somewhat  more  takes  from  the  intermediate 
caddie ;  the third, to whom the matter of  a dollar is of  little 
consequence, at once takes the tea having the highest price. 
There is no doubt that this sort of  performance has occurred 
and is occurring at the present time upon an extensive scale 
in thousands of  retail shops. 
If for such articles as tea, tobacco, and coffee there is no 
definite standard, this is  even more  markedly so with  the 
so-called  articles de Paris," or if we use the American term, 
I1 Yankee  notions."  There  is  no  standard  by  which  the 
price of  a lady's hat can be fixed.  The price that is charged  notions 
usually depends more upon the make-up than upon the cost 
of  its  materials.  Indeed in this class of  goods the artistic 
quality enters, or if  not the artistic quality at least the con- 
ventional quality, which itself has a market value, and this 
makes  impossible  any  standardization.  The  price  of  a 
hat  is very  largely fixed  with  reference to what the traffic 
will  bear.  Thus a  lady's  hat in  a town  in which the cus-  Thevdue 
tomer  is  able to pay $50 might  have a  price  one  fifth  of  ~~~lsb.'' 
that amount  in  a  town  in which  the customer  was  able 
to pay  only $10.  Another  illustration : The success of  the 
manufacturer of  silver articles who wishes to sell his goods 
in  lndia  will  depend  very  largely  upon  producing  forms 
which  please  the Indian  taste.  Thus for  many  articles, 
whether or not  a sale is made depends not  only upon the 
of the material in the article, but upon whether it pleases 
the customer.  Competition ih these lines of  business is not 
because there is no basis upon which to compare prices. 
From  the class  of  articles  in  which  success in  business 
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adaptability to the customer, we  have every stage to those 
in which the material of  the article becomes the chief factor. 
(2) Competition in Price. -  When  we  come to deal with 
articles  the quality of  which  may be definitely determined 
competition immediately enters in price, and becomes more 
and  more  important  as  we  approach  standard  products. 
Btandard-  Granulated  sugar  is a  standard article, which  is  the same 
bation  and  whether  purchased  of  one dealer or another ; the same is 
price. 
true of  oil, which has a certain fireproof test ;  and to a large 
extent is true of  cement and coal, at least they may be made 
to meet standard tests.  The same is true of  the more im- 
portant forms of  steel rails,  structural forms,  etc.,  and for 
many  other  products.  For  articles  in  which  quality  is 
standardized, competition  enters  mainly in  the matter  of 
price.  These  standard  articles,  as  we  have seen, are also 
those which usually have very wide use, and are those which 
are especially subject to combination. 
Competition in price is the one in which the public as a 
whole is most deeply interested.  Indeed, this is so dominant 
in the minds of  many, that the securing of  a fair price is 
Blind faith  regarded as the sole purpose of  the competitive system.  In 
in 
competi-  purchasing, the price that one can afford to pay is the para- 
tion.  mount  consideration for  all  but  a  minute  fraction  of  the 
people.  This applies alike to the man or woman buying the 
necessities of  life for the family and to the lady in the middle 
walks of  life purchasing clothes or jewels.  The number of 
people who can afford to ignore the question of  price is  less 
than one per cent of  the population.  It is the general belief 
that competition is the best  means of  securing a fair price 
that has held many with unswerving faith to the competitive 
system.' 
1 The best formulation of  thia faith which I have seen is that of General 
Ro~er  A. Pryor, ss follows : - 
1.  Competition between buyera of  the raw material enhances the price 
to  producer. 
2.  Competition between sellers of  the manufactured article reduces ita 
pri4:  to the consumer. 
3.  Reduction of  price multiplies the number of  consumers. 
"4. Increase of  commption  atimulatea  production to  eupply  the  iw 
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(3)  Competition in Service. -  In addition  to competition 
in quality and in price there is competition in service.  This 
is best illustrated  by  those cases in which competition does 
not exist  for the first two.  Thus in standard articles in a 
town, such as ice, there is no competition in quality;  there 
is  no  competition  in  price;  the  only  competition  is  in 
service.  Similarly  for railways,  now  that  competition  in 
prices has ceased, competition  is  reduced  to the nature of 
the  service, -  the  number  of  trains  run, the convenience 
of the schedules, the excellence of  the cars, etc. 
It is  in  the matter  of  competition  in  service that  the 
personal  element  largely  enters.  Where  quality  is  stand- 
ardized and the price is the same, the decision as to where 
one shall deal depends upon the agreeable qualities of  the 
firm.  Are  the employees polite  and  considerate?  Is the 
service promptly rendered ?  These factors are so important  The 
that agents having a pleasant personality and a persuasive z~z2~ 
way of  putting things are highly paid by corporations, their  competition. 
sole business being to show that the service rendered will be 
of  the highest  quality  and the attention of  the best.  So 
important  is  this  factor  of  service that  many,  indeed  a 
majority, of  the people are influenced  by it in the selection 
of the firm with which they will  deal;  and with the well-to- 
do  it is  frequently  the  dominating  consideration.  Even 
where competition in quality and in price are eliminated there 
may be the keenest competition in service. 
"5.  Increaae of  production  impliee an increaae in the  employment  of 
1ab;r. 
6.  Competition between the employers of  labor  enhances the wages of 
labor. 
"  7.  Enhancement of  the wages of  labor involves the material and mord 
amelioration of  the condition of  the laboring class. 
"  8.  Competition to sell stimulates to improvements in the quality of  the 
arti,yle off ered. 
9.  Competition  to  aell  urging  reduction  in  the  cost  of  the article, 
ingenuity is quickened to the invention  of  expenwaving and labor-aaving 
machinery, and so a stimulus is applied to the progress of the useful arts and 
sciences. 
"  In short, competition ministers to the welfare of  all classes of  the com- 
munity, apd augments the resources and power of  the state.  But the evil 
of excessive competition is counteracted and arrested by the principle of  self- 
interest and the operation of  the law of supply and demand.': '16  CONC~RATION  AND  CONTROL 
THE  BREAK-DOWN OF COMPETITION 
The Faith in Competition. -  Competition for the control of 
prices and quality of  goods has been a faith which has been 
believed in by the great majority of  people of  America ; it has 
been the fundamental principle of  the common and statute 
law  upon which  our court  decisions controlling trade have 
been  built  up.  Every  proposal  to legalize  cooperation in 
trade has been  stoutly resisted  as  interfering with  the in- 
flexible law  of  competition, the bulwark  of  our industrial 
liberty. 
The producer  may  do  m  he  pleases  with  reference  to 
quality;  he may ask the price he  can get;  but he  cannot 
combine with another producer in the regulation of  price or 
do anything which  may  be  interpreted  to  interfere  with 
complete  independence  in  trade.  The  theory  is  that 
the quality  will  be  kept  up  and  the price  kept down  by 
competition, and that the purchaser needs no further pro- 
tection. 
The Failure of  Competition adequately to regulate Quality. - 
This faith in the power of  competition has gone so far in the 
past that any manufacturer might call an article by any name 
~ae  failure  he pleased, provided the name did not have a trade mark, 
O'  cornPS  regardless of  whether or not it had any relation to the prod- 
tition to 
prevent  uct so labeled,  An  article could  be  called pure fruit jelly 
fraud.  and  have no fruit in it ; it could  be called corn whisky and 
not a grain of  corn be used in its manufacture ; it could be 
named strained honey and a bee never have had anything to 
do with its making ;  it could be called maple sirup and never 
a  drop  of  maple  sap have  entered  it; it could  be  called 
butter and have no relation with  milk  or  cream;  it could 
be  called  boneless  chicken  and  consist  of  immature  veal. 
A  hundred  other illustratio~ls  could be given.  As already 
indicated,  if  the producer  could  to his own  advaatage use 
names that had no relation to the product, he did so.  The 
purchaser was  not  obliged to buy.  If  he wished an article FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  77 
which had a relation to the name, he  was  to ascertain this 
for himself. 
These  practices  have  obtained  both  for  intrastate  and 
interstate  commerce  until  within  a  few  years;  but  now 
a  large  number  of  states  (see  p.  245)  have  pure food 
laws.  Most  of  these laws are  comprehensive in their char-  Pure food 
acter  and  they  apply  to  all  foods,  drugs,  and  drinks.  law& 
TO  illustrate,  it is  no  longer  possible  to sell  oleomargarine 
as butter;  indeed, it is not  possible  in  some  of  the states 
to color  oleomargarine  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  it 
appear like butter to the user.  Finally, after many years of 
struggle  against  tremendous  opposition,  a  comprehensive 
pure food law was passed in 1906 by Congress, under which 
the same principles which had been  applied in  some  of  the 
states  for  intrastate  commerce  were  applied  to  interstate 
commerce. 
In addition to the pure food laws, some states have enacted 
laws  prohibiting  the  importation  of  weed-infested  seed, 
regulating  the  importation  of  nursery  stock,  especially to 
prevent  the spread  of  insect  pests,  and  requiring that  fer- 
tilizers shall meet  definite standards. 
Thus for  food  and  drugs  it may  now  be  said  to have 
become an accepted principle that competition in the control 
of  quality has broken  down, and  similarly that competition 
has not furnished sufficient protection in certain other classes 
of  commodities.  For  protection  to  the customer in  these  competition 
has failed  matters of  fundamental importance we  now understand that  ,,, 
we  must  depend upon  regulation.  This regulation has  for  gudity. 
its basis law ; but the success of  the laws has been dependent 
upon  the  creation  of  special  machinery  other  than  the 
courts for  their  enforcement,  viz.,  administrative  commis- 
sions, etc.  (See pp.  245-247.) 
While there is a wide range of  articles in which competition 
a regulator has been abandoned, there are many articles in 
which  competition is left as the guard.  Thus a dealer may 
sell cloth as pure silk which is largely composed of  cotton ; he  The feeble 
may  sell  cotton  as linen ; he  may  sell  shoddy  as woolen.  ion 
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matter of  fact, is wholly unprotected; for the law is not en- 
forced.  Quality, so far as it is satisfactorily controlled, is se- 
curable only through law as administered by commissions or 
other special officers under a broad exercise of  the police power. 
The Failure of  Competition adequutely  to  regulate Price. - 
During the same time that competition has ceased to control 
quality there  has been  a  breakdown  of  competition in the 
control  of  prices.  This  is  now  admitted  for  the so-called 
public  utilities.  It  was  the  theory  in  the  early  days  of 
railroad building that we must get as many lines as possible 
and have  them  compete in  charges.  The  frightful  wastes 
of  that method, bankruptcy, receiverships, financial depres- 
sion, alternately excessively  high  and low  rates,  show that 
for  this  line  of  business  competition in  price  is  a  hopeless 
failure;  and it is  now  a  tacitly  accepted  doctrine  that so 
far as railroads are concerned, prices for the same manner of 
service, whether freight or passenger, between two points  is 
to be the same over the different lines.  This is done through 
mutual  understanding  of  the  supposed  competing  lines. 
That a half-dozen railroads between New York and Chicago 
could  have  the same  complicated  freight  schedules for  all 
classes of  articles without coijperation is incredible.  Every- 
body knows the rates are agreed upon by the various traffic 
associations.  Yet such cooperation and agreements are just 
as  illegal as they have ever been in the past.  The parties 
to  them  under  the  law  are  subject  to criminal  and  civil 
prosecution ; yet  nobody  prosecutes ; nobody  complains. 
Why is this so ?  Because the public through its cormpissions 
is able to secure fair rates.  So far as interstate commerce is 
concerned, the price is fixed  by the railroad and controlled 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission.  Within many of 
the states, the prices are fixed by the corporations, but may 
be modified by the commissions. 
In cities the street  car lines,  gas  companies, and electric 
companies, each have monopoly in a given city, or the two 
or more agree upon identical rates.  Competition has  ceased 
to  control prices.  Where prices are controlled it is  through 
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~ust  as there has been a complete collapse in competition 
in prices for railroad transportation and city utilities, so there 
has  been  complete  collapse  in  charges for  communication. 
The post  office  is  a  public monopoly;  the rates  are fixed. 
The  telegraph business of  the country has  become  consoli- 
dated  into  two  great  corporations the prices  of  which  are 
identical.  The telephone business is now mainly  under  the 
control of  a  single  corporation.  The foregoing facts  show 
that the only present  effect  of  the theory that competition 
gives  adequate  control  of  prices,  so  far  as  the  railroads 
and other public utilities are concerned,  is to bring the law 
into contempt. 
Closely  allied  to  the  natural  monopolies  are  the  great 
companies which for each industry are controlled by a single 
organization  or  by  a  number  of  organizations  working 
together under open or secret agreements or understandings 
and not  competing in  price.  Here are included  anthracite,  Trusts do 
steel,  oil,  beef,  whisky,  sugar) and  other  great  industries. E,"2Grnrn 
When prices  are maintained at the same level for steel rails  price. 
for a decade during times of  panic and great expansion alike, 
it is certain that competition has ceased to control adequately 
prices  for  iron  products.  The same  applies to anthracite, 
oil,  and  many  other  commodities. 
For some articles, the producers, instead  of  uniting their 
concerns and informally agreeing on prices, have united in a 
selling agency and  in  this  way succeed  in  holding  up  the 
prices and maintaining a like price for each producer.  Thus 
the Michigan Salt Association, as first organized (see pp. 101, 
103), was a selling agency.  One of  the largest of  the selling  selling 
agencies is the United Metals Selling Company.  It markets  &penciw. 
upward  of  500,000,000  pounds  of  copper  annually.  It  is 
the sales agent for the Amalgamated Copper Company and 
affiliated corporations.  The commission charged  the Amal- 
gamated was 13 per cent before 1906, but now is 1 per cent. 
The company has  been  highly  successful, having paid  divi- 
dends upon its capital stock of  $5,000,000 of  from 20 to 30 
Per  cent  since  1904,  with  one  extra  50  per  cent  dividend 
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At one time there was a producers' association for oil, the 
association  selling  only  through  its  regularly  appointed 
agencies, andonly  to the refiners' association and its members.' 
In a like manner the manufacturers of  wall paper organized 
a selling company to handle their entire output, selling only 
to such persons as entered into a prescribed agreement;  but 
this  organization got into court, was  declared to be illegal, 
and was therefore dis~olved.~ 
Selling agencies in the industries have existed in a number 
of  lines, but there is a tendency at the present time forthem 
to disappear so far as manufacturers are concerned, since it 
is recognized  that they are violations of  the laws,  national 
and state. 
Selling  While the selling agency is disappearing among the manu- 
facturers, cooperative selling agencies are arising among  the 
among 
farmers.  farmers.  These  are  illustrated  by  the  fruit  growers'  ex- 
changes of  the West in Washington, Oregon, and California, 
by the nut growers' associations of  the South ; indeed at the 
present time all over the country there is a strong movement 
for  cooperation  of  the  farmers  not  only  to buy  through 
coijperative associations, but to form selling associations  for 
marketing their products (see pp.  66-68). 
The selling agencies of  the manufacturers which have held 
~4  and  up prices have been denounced.  The proposals to create sell- 
good  seWng  ing  agencies  for  the farmers'  products  have been  generally 
agenolea. 
commended.  It  is  difficult  to  see  wherein  the  principle 
differs in one case from that in the other.  If  it is not legal 
for the copper producers or wall paper manufacturers to have 
joint  selling agencies, it is difficult to see how  the fruit pro- 
ducers can legally have such an agency. 
To a  large  extent  competition has  ceased  adequately  to 
control the prices for many articles not in great combinations, 
and this is true both in  the wholesale and retail businesses. 
The  various  associations  of  business  men  have,  as  one  of 
their  chief  purposes,  the  maintenance  of  prices.  Many 
articles which  are protected  by patents or trade marks are 
l Tarbell's "History of  Standard Oil  Company," Vol. I, p. 341. 
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to the dealers only on condition that the prices fixed by  How prim 
the  manufacturer  shall  be  maintained.  The  manufacturer zz:L",tr 
of a definite automobile apportions the country into districts  tained. 
md  requires of  the dealers in each of  the districts that the 
prices  ked by  the  manufacturer  shall  be  charged.  The 
same thing is true of  hundreds of  articles, from sewing ma- 
chines to talking machines, and so on down to an atomizer. 
In this class of  trade there  is competition to a certain extent 
between  the different  manufacturers;  there  is no  competi- 
tion between the tradesmen selling  the same articles.  Fre- 
quently the prices for a definite line of  goods are held up by 
agreement  or  understanding  among  the  different  manu- 
facturers producing  the same line  of  goods,  they  agreeing 
among themselves regarding the prices which shall be charged 
by  the retailer;  and in  many  cases the different manufac- 
turers are in  a definite combination. 
While  the  courts  would  not  enforce  any  penalties  for 
a violation of  these agreements, the manufacturer  or jobber 
usually  has  sufficient  power  through  refusal  to  sell  the  Penalties 
article to prevent the agreement from being  broken.  Thus  f0rV'0'8- 
tion of 
the saloon keeper who would  sell a glass of  beer for less than  price agree- 
live cents, or who would use  a glass holding more than the  menta. 
agreed  maximum  amount,  could  no  longer  purchase  beer 
from the brewers.  Through this method of  control  compe- 
tition  in  price  has  broken  down  completely  among  retail 
dealers for many  articles. 
But  this  does  not  indicate  anything  like  the  extent  to 
which  competition in price  has disappeared.  The retailers  Local 
in  a  given  city  or  community  have  an  association  either 
formal or informal, and there is among the members a definite  prices. 
understanding  that  prices  shall  be  maintained.  It  makes 
no difference from what dealer one buys anthracite, or sugar, 
01-  bacon,  or  flour,  or  any  other  standard  article,  in  the 
of  the small towns and cities of  the country;  the 
price asked by each is the same, with possible  slight varia- 
tions in  some cases.  It may  be that for  a  time a retailer 
Cut the price on some standard article in order to increase 
his trade, in  which  care there is  likely to be a cut by some 
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other retailer on another standard line in order to equalize 
this advantage.  But soon they get together and the prices 
are again the same. 
For some concerns which have a large part of  the business 
of  a town, either through  a single retail  shop or a number 
of them, an additional shop may be there established by this 
firm under another name, apparently in complete independ- 
ence, in order that there may be an appearance of  competi- 
tion.  From time to time if  there be danger of  outside parties 
entering the field, the stool pigeon establishment may reduce 
prices under the direction of  the controlling organization. 
The  extent  to  which  there  is  combination  among  the 
retailers  has  led  Professor  Laughlin,  of  the  University  of 
Chicago, before the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, 
to testify that competition among retailers  has  completely 
broken  down.  Says  he:  "We  do  not  have  competition; 
it does  not  exist.  To-day  there  is  really  no  competition 
between the retail men who sell meat or groceries to different 
classes of  people." 
While  the statement is substantially true  for  most  com- 
munities, it does not fully express the facts for all of  them. 
There  still exists  competition in  prices  between  the small 
shops and the great mail order houses.  Indeed, this compe- 
tition is so severe that it is feared by the ordinary retailers, 
who  oppose vigorously a  parcels post  because they believe 
that  this  would  make  the  mail  order  houses  even more 
formidable competitors.  Also there  is competition between 
Competi  the  small  retailers  and  the great  department  stores;  and 
since  the latter have  begun  to  introduce branch  houses  in 
different  this  country as has  been  done extensively in  England, the 
competition is likely to become more serious.  Further, there 
is competition between the regular retailers and the cooper* 
tive stores;  but in this country the latter are relativeIy few 
in number, although numerous in England. 
A  statement  nearer  the  truth  about  the  retail  trade 
would be that competition in price for standard articles has 
ceased to exist between shops of  the same class in the same 
l Hearings, Benate Interetate Commerce Committee, Part XIV,  p. 1005. FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  83 
community.  The regular retailer's prices for a town are the 
same;  the prices for  the department stores are the same; 
the prices of  the mail order houses are the same. 
In short the retail trade is the one in which concentration  Declining 
has not gained dominance ; and we are in a transition stage  L';":: 
between  the old  and new  order  of  things.  One  who  has  petition in 
watched the rise of  the great department store in this country  E'G~ 
and  England and who now sees their  expanding  branches, 
one who has seen the rise of the great mail order house within 
the last score of  years, need  have little prophetic  sense to 
realize that concentration is to rule in the retail trade, the same 
as it has in manufacture.  The retail  trade as pointed out 
by Macrosty, is the '(last ~tronghold  of  c~mpetition."~ 
But even in that business competition has largely broken 
down,  and  presently  there, as  elsewhere, cooperation  will 
become general.  The small retailer can only hold his place 
to the extent that he  best  performs a service to the com- 
munity. 
General  Statements. -  As to the extent of  combinations 
and agreements in the industries,  Mr.  Samuel Untermeyer, 
who certainly ought to know the facts, said before the Sen- 
ate Interstate  Commerce  Committee : "  I have  known  of 
hundreds of  them  being  dissolved  where  they  were  under 
written agreements.  There are safes in  New  York  stuffed 
with  the written  evidences of  these  conspiracies  with  big  Agree- 
men's  signatures  to them.  Those  are gone,  but  in  their ren:& 
places  you  have associations for  the betterment  of  trade, 
etc. ; there are any number of  dinner and luncheon clubs and 
reunions and general  understandings, winks, and telephone 
messages,  that are far more difficult to get at." 
If my one doubts the above statement regarding the extent 
to which  there is  cooperation in  prices in  all  parts of  the 
United States and in  all  lines  of  business,  it is  suggested 
that such doubter talk with the business men of the country, 
from  the  retailer  to  the  great  manufacturer.  This  the 
has done with many, and in no instance has he found 
''The Trust Movement in British Industry," H. W. Macrosty, P. 244. 
'Bearings,  Senate Interetate Commerce Committee, Part V, P. 214. 84  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
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a man who does not say that in his business cooperation exists 
everywhere and that competition does not control in prices; 
that they are matters of  agreement, formal and informal; 
that prices are fixed at what seems to the organization as a 
fair amount, or to such a level as can be maintained without 
encouraging additional competition. 
In making  the statement  that prices  of  many  articles, 
from the great natural monopolies to matches, are controlled 
by some form of combination or agreement, is is not meant 
to imply that any price can be charged for an article.  There 
is a limit beyond which, if the price be  raised, competitors 
will  enter a business.  This so-called  potential  competition 
makes the combinations careful not to place the prices at  so 
high a level as to lead to additional competition.  Although 
this is the situation, if  the combination be a powerful one, it 
may go far ; for the man thinking of  entering the field knows 
that if  he attempts this, the price of  the product may be de- 
pressed by the great organization, and he fears to enter the 
enterprise.  In the  earlier  stages  of  combination  in  this 
country  the  danger  mark  was  frequently  overshot;  and 
competitors  appeared,  sometimes to the  detriment of  the 
organizations, but more often with disaster  to themselves. 
By  practice the great combinations have become skillful in 
exacting as much as possible  without  danger to themselves. 
Beyond the amount which is a fair profit there is a limit 
to the excess  which  can be taken  year  after year  without 
bringing in competitors;  but the total excess may be vast 
in amount.  Sufficient evidence of  this is furnished by the 
great, corporations  which  are  especially  considered.  (See 
pp.  104-154.)  The  United  States  Steel  Corporation,  in 
addition to paying interest on its bonds and ample dividends 
on all of the real valuation of  the stock, has been able to put 
back into the business in a decade more than five hundred 
million dollars.  This was accomplished in ten years by this 
corporation cooperatingwith the other corporations in theiron 
business, through holding the prices as high as the domestic 
trade would bear, but always sufficiently low so that a pro- 
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from  abroad.  At  the prices  fixed,  as large  sales 
were made as possible in the United States and the excess was 
sold  abroad at a  lower  rate.  Precisely the same situation 
has ~btained  for the Standard Oil Company.  The enormous 
profits of  the past decade, far beyond  reasonable amounts 
(see  pp.  108-log),  have  been  accomplished  by  an excess 
margin  of  somewhat more  than two  cents a  gallon.  This 
seems small ; it may be so, -  perhaps not more than twenty- 
five cents each for every man, woman, and child, in the United 
States, -but  even on this basis the excess would be more 
thm twenty million dollars per annum. 
The same principles apply all along the line down to the 
local  grocers.  The advantages  of  prompt  and convenient 
delivery enable the retail dealers of  a town or city to cooperate 
in maintaining their prices above a normal profit by a defi- 
nite margin.  The limit to this margin is that it cannot  be 
made so large as to make it advantageous for the consumer 
to purchase in a large city or in a neighboring town ;  although 
it may approach so close to this that some of  the more care- 
ful and astute do make outside purchases. 
The margin of  profits which may be gained beyond a fair 
price  is known  as monopoly price.  The law  of  monopoly 
price  has been carefully analyzed  by Ely.  He says : "The 
greater the intensity of  customary use, the higher the general 
average of  economic well-being, and the more readily wealth 
generally expended, the higher the monoply charge which  The law of 
will  yield the largest net returns."  l  If  the price be raised  r:::PO1y 
too high, sales will diminish and therefore returns be lowered. 
It is the aim to hold the prices sufficiently high to give the 
largest possible return with the least expansion of  business. 
In this connection it should be understood that the principle 
of  monopoly price  applies where  monopoly  does  not  fully 
exist ;  that it applies in greater or less degree as long as there 
is any coijperation of  a group engaged in a given trade. 
As illustrating  the principle that if  a  local  combination 
go@ beyond  the monopoly  price,  outside  competitors  will 
in, is the case of  ice at Madison, Wisconsin.  Madison 
"Monopolies and Trusts," R. T.  Ely, p. 103. 86  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
is situated  between  two lakes  upon  which  ice forms each 
winter ;  ice houses are located along the lakes ;  and thus the 
Entrance of  ice dealers should be able to furnish this product  at a  low 
outside  rate.  For a moderate sized  house until two or three years 
ago the price of  ice furnished for family use was at  the rate 
of  $1.50  for  five hundred pounds, or $18 per annum.  The 
price was  raised to a flat rate of  $2 a month in 1909, which 
price  was  so  high  that the  Knickerbocker  Ice  Company 
entered the field  in 1910.  This company fixed the price at 
$1 for five hundred pounds, and the local companies met the 
cut.  But later, when the business of  the new  company was 
established, they and the local companies got together and 
raised the rate to $1.50 per five hundred pounds. 
Just as with public utilities, manufacture, and trade,  com- 
petition has broken down as an adequate regulator of  price, 
so in  great measure competition has  broken  down  in  the 
Professional  price of  labor and service.  Thus the physicians of  a given 
menagree  town usually charge exactly the same rate for the same kind 
in prices. 
of  a service.  Not to do so is regarded by the physicians as 
contrary to good medical ethics.  The same practice obtains 
in other professions.  And yet so far as the principle is con- 
cerned,  an understanding by which a common price is charged 
for a  like  service is  just  as  unlawful  in  proportion  to the 
importance of  the matter as any other combination in which 
there are price agreements. 
Not only do professional men agree about prices, but dso 
those who perform services of  an entirely different character. 
The most fundamental  purpose of  the trades-union and all 
combinations of  labor is to do combined bargaining, the chief 
~~bor point  being the price.  A  union scale of  prices is fixed  by 
which all members of  the union must abide.  Not only do the  tions and 
prices.  regulations of  the labor unions prescribe the price which is to 
be charged by the laborer, but the methods under which he is 
to work.  In  many instances in which the price is fixed regard- 
ing the day's wage, the laborer must not do more than a pre 
scribed amount of  work.  The idea of  individual bargaining 
by the laborers in the industries, and their competition among 
themselves aa  proper regulators of  prices, has broken down FACTS REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  87 
absolutely; and  necessarily so,  because  the laborer  as  an 
individual was simply helpless against the great concentra- 
tions of  capital.  The only way that the laborers can be put 
on anything like an equal footing with capital in industry is 
to unite and so give themselves the strength of  concentra- 
tion, and thus do joint bargaining.  From time to time the 
representatives of  labor unions for coal, for railways, for the 
building industries, meet with  the employers of  labor,  and 
agree with them upon a scale of  prices which are to be charged 
for  a  given  period  of  time.  In this  way  competition  in 
the price of  labor between individuals is destroyed ;  not only 
so, but  the fluctuation  in  price is wholly eliminated  for a 
definite period. 
The foregoing description of  the situation cannot but con- 
vince any man who will  look the facts in the face that the 
blind faith that prices are adequately controlled by compe- 
tition in the United States is no longer justified, if  indeed it 
ever was justified.  Unrestrained  competition does not as a 
matter of  fact exist for many articles, except to a very limited  Blind faith 
degree at the present  time.  Everywhere there is restraint   tic‘'^'^; 
of  trade by agreement or combination, either lawful or un-  justsed. 
lawful.  So  inevitable  is  this  situation  that  we  have  seen 
how  the law forbidding  restraint  of  trade has  accelerated 
concentration of  industry from  the loose agreement to the 
pool, from the pool to the trust, from the trust to the holding 
company, and from the holding company to the giant com- 
pletely consolidated industry. 
In making the foregoing statements,  it is not meant to 
imply that competition has not been a most useful economic 
force in the past, nor that it will not continue to be a useful 
force.  Competition  has  been  powerful in stimulating men 
to effort ;  it, under some conditions for some industries, has 
been  potent  in improving  quality ; it has  limited  margins  us,fdne, 
dthin  monopoly prices, and has often been helpful in a wider ;:g';. 
it has been dominarit in improving service.  From 
the smallest firm to the greatest corporation there has been 
an increase rather than a decrease in the power of  competi- 
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wholly destroyed as to quality and as to price, competition 
in service would still remain of  the keenest. 
While therefore agreeing that competition has been a great 
and highly  useful  economic force, it has  been  the purpose 
Competi-  of  the foregoing  pages  to show its severe limitations;  to 
tion  show that it is not adequate alone to control quality or price,  be apple- 
mented by  and that where relied upon for these purposes, it has been a 
redation  lamentable failure.  For these, competition must be supple- 
mented  by regulation in  order to give satisfactory  results. 
In another place it is proposed that we  shall retain the ad- 
vantages of  competition and also secure the advantages of 
regulation.  (See pp. 249-252.) 
THE  WASTES  OF  COMPETITION 
On previous pages the economic advantages of  concentra- 
tion have been given.  The obverse of  these are the wastes 
of  competition.  The  economic  gains  through  concentra- 
tiop are possible savings, which, if  hot taken advantage of, are 
at least losses in the sense that better things could be done 
even if  they are not technically wastes.  Therefore, in one 
sense all of  the advantages of concentration should be here 
Iisted  as  gains  not  securable  through  competition.  The 
various points discussed (pp. 8-20)  will not here be repeated, 
but a brief  statement will  be made of  some of  the evils of 
competition which can manifestly be called wastes. 
(1) Expenses of  Salesmen. -One  of  the largest of  the wastes 
is the unnecessary expenditures for salesmen under the com- 
petitive  system.  Where  there  is  competition,  the  sales 
agents  everywhere  overlap  one  another  in  their  work. 
In a small town or village there may be a half-dozen men 
selling the same kind  of  article within a week;  whereas, if 
coijperation existed, many different brands  could  be exhib- 
ited by a single salesman and the expense greatly reduced. 
A number of  illustrations of  such losses have already been 
given.  (See p.  14.)  Many more  might  be  included;  but FACTS  REGARDING  CONCENTRATION  89 
one of the best is the enormous loading in the life insurance 
business,  which  has  resulted  from the competitive system 
due to the expense of  salesmen selling life insurance, usually 
men  receiving high  pay and high commissions.  Indeed, for 
many companies a  large percentage of  the conduct of  the 
business and a  considerable percentage of  the income has 
gone to compensate salesmen of  insurance. 
(2)  The Expense of  Advertising.  -The  money spent for ad- 
vertising is enormous.  This varies from the frantic efforts 
to push  patent  medicines, through  many  specialties, such 
as automobiles, to staple articles, such as soap, clothing, and 
foodstuffs.  It is a  well-known  fact  that the  great  daily 
newspapers would be losing  enterprises, as conducted, if  it 
were not for the advertising ;  indeed their major profits come 
from this class of  business.  The same is true of  the weekly 
and monthly magazines, many of  which give more space to 
advertising than to reading matter.  If  one looks through 
the  magazines  and makes  an estimate  of  the  amount  of 
money which is spent in the advertising of  such an article 
as soap for a single month, he will  find that this reaches tens 
of  thousands of  dollars.  The enormous cost of  advertising 
will  scarcely be appreciated  without  knowing the cost per 
page  and the number  of  pages  carried per  month  for  the 
different magazines.  The cost of  advertising per  page for 
each issue of  some of the standard magazines is as follows : 
I~adies' Home  Joumzal,  $6000;  Saturday  Evening  Post, 
$4000 ;  and such magazines as the Century, American, Har- 
per's, McClure's,  Munsey's,  Cosmopolitan,  Everybody's,  from 
$250 to $600, depending upon the circulation.'  Exceptional 
positions, such as the back  covers and the pages next  the 
covers  have  special  rates  greater  than  the  above.  The 
average  number  of  pages  of  advertising  for  the  Ladies' 
Home Joumzal  is about 35, and the Saturday Evening Post  is 
"bout  25.  This makes the advertising cost for a single issue 
for these publications $210,0OO+and  $100,000 respectively. 
(3)  Competition  and  Conservation. -  The heaviest  of  the 
of competition with reference to the future of  the race 
Mahin Advertising Company Data Book, 1912. CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
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are those due to the unnecessary destruction of  natural re- 
sources in order to put an article on the market at a competi- 
tive price. 
Of  the wastes  of  natural  resources through  competition 
probably those of fuels and gas are the worst.  Holmes says, 
regarding coal : - 
"Those  who  are less  familiar with  the mining  industry 
than you are with the metallurgy may not be aware of  the 
fact that for every ton of coal brought to the surface in the 
bituminous or soft coal mines of  this country, not less than 
one half  a  ton is left under  the ground, and it will  not be 
possible to bring it to the surface in the future at any reason- 
able cost, if  at all.  But more shocking stiil is the fact that 
in our anthracite coal fields, which  are so limited in extent 
as to be  confined  to a  territory  comprising less  than four 
hundred  square miles, even with all modern improvements, 
not more than 50 per cent of  the anthracite coal of  the areas 
mined is being brought to the surface.  The remainder of  it, 
now aggregating 80,000,000 tons a year, is being left under- 
ground  in  such  condition as to make  its future  recovery 
difficult, if  not  impossible. 
"In the early days of  anthracite mining there was brought 
to the surface an average of  between 30 and 40 per cent of  the 
coal, so that from 60 to 70 per cent remained under theground, 
which  was  sufficient to give strength to the roof;  and to- 
day mining engineers are bringing to the surface a part of 
the coal which was left in the mines 30 or 40 years ago.  But 
as the percentage of  coal mined has increased, from time to 
time, the possibility of  recovering what is left behind dimin- 
ishes.  It has  been  estimated that since the beginning  of 
coal mining in the United  States, more than 2,000,000,000 
tons of  anthracite coal  and 3,000,000,000  tons of  bituminous 
coal have been left underground in such condition as to make 
its future recovery doubtful or impossible. 
"I know of  no other American industry which  to-day  is 
in so deplorable an economic condition as is the bituminous 
1 Journal  of  Industrial  and  Engineering  Chemistry, "Carbon Wastea," 
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coal industry.  The operators, unable under existing laws to Competi- 
and fix prices of  coal or any trade agreements, are 
what appears to be the only alternative -  ruinous  waste. 
which encourages or enforces wasteful and dan- 
gerous mining.  It seems essential that federal or joint state 
legislation be enacted  authorizing such reorganization of  this 
great industry as will permit reasonable returns on the money 
invested and at the same time properly safeguard the public 
interests.  You realize that it isoften less expensive per ton for 
the operator to bring the first half  of  his coal to the surface 
than it is  for him to bring  out the remaining half, because 
this  second  half will  support the roof while  the first half  is 
being  removed;  but while he  removes the  second half  he 
must often temporarily support the roof  with timbers; this 
entails additional expense, to meet which  there  is generally 
neither an  accumulated  surplus  from  which  to draw,  nor 
a temporary profit from  which to meet  this extra expense ; 
hence the coal  is abandoned.  It is  only fair to the coal 
operator that he is not in the mining business for his health, 
but to make a living by earning a  reasonable return on his 
investment.  Therefore, what we may consider a waste may 
be a necessary waste under existing economic conditions ;  a 
waste, however, that is preventable and should be prevented 
by improvements in our economic conditions, and necessary 
legislative requirements.'' 
The above admirable statement by Holmes regarding the 
inevitable waste of  coal under the competitive system may 
be made more concrete by illustrations. 
Mr. Walter S. Bogle, speaking for  the coal operators of 
the state of  Indiana, says that the proposed formation of  a 
selling agency by a number of  small operators was declared 
by the federal officers to be in restraint of  trade, and notice 
was given that if  such selling agency were established, those 
contemplating  its formation  would  be  subject  to  criminal 
and  civil  prosecution.'  This  is  the situation even if  the 
Operators contemplating a selling agency are together  able 
to Put no more coal upon  the market  than  a  single large 
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concern.  The Indiana coals are of  a kind that deteriorate 
rapidly when taken out of  the mine.  Several varieties and 
sizes of  coal  are  produced;  to obtain  one size other sizes 
must be made.  If  an order comes to a mine for a certain 
size, corresponding orders may not come for the other sizes; 
but  such  orders  may  come  to  an adjacent mine.  If  a 
group  of  mines  may  cooperate  so  that  the  orders  will 
equalize themselves among the different varieties  and sizes 
of coal, it is evident the waste will be greatly reduced. 
Mr. G.  W. Traerl1  speaking for the Illinois Coal Operators' 
Association, says in that state there are about three hundred 
independent coal producing companies ; that the demand for 
the Illinois coal  is about 50,000,000 tons  a  year,  but that 
the capacity of  the mines is  about 75,000,000 tons.  It is 
necessary to have a greater mining capacity than the average 
demand,  since  the  demand  in  the winter  months  greatly 
exceeds that of  the summer months. 
The Illinois coal, like the Indiana coal, deteriorates if  un- 
used for several months.  Thus if  the mines be developed 
sufficiently to meet the demands for the year, they must lie 
idle  for  a  portion  of  the  time.  As  a matter of  fact the 
average running period of  the mines per  annum is about one 
hundred seventy days.  If  the mine operators do not agree 
among themselves regarding limitation of  output during the 
summer months, it is inevitable that there will be overpro- 
duction, deterioration, and great waste ; yet it is certain that 
under existing laws agreements to limit output are illegal. 
Mr. J. F.  Callbreath  states that there are 5000 operators 
of  bituminous  coal  in  the  United  States which  have  the 
ability without opening new  mines to produce 200,000,000 
tons  of  coal  per  annum  more  than  the  present  markets 
demand.  Under  existing laws  no group of  these operators 
may cooperate.  He states that three fourths of  the mem- 
bers  of  the American  Mining  Congress  are  consumers of 
coal, not producers, and they urge that there be cooperation 
among the coal mines in order to secure regularity of  out- 
1 Hearings, Interstate Commerce Committee, XXM, pp. 2353-2359. 
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put and uniform prices.  According to him an investigation 
of  the bituminous  coal mining industry for 1910 shows the 
following situation:  The average cost of production for  1910 
I (  was  $1.07  per  ton, 95 cents  for mine  labor  and  supplies 
and 12 cents for general expenses.  It shows that there was 
invested in the  industry  $585,000,000.  The average price 
obtained at the mine during  1910 was  $1.11 -  4 cents per 
ton  to cover  selling  costs,  depreciation  of  machinery, ex- 
haustion of  resources, and interest upon capital invested. 
"  The sworn testimony of  the Pittsburg Coal Co., before 
the  Interstate  Commerce  Committee  in  November,  1911, 
shows that in the previous  17 months  the  company mined 
3,522,500 tons of coal at a cost of  $1.1148,  and the average 
selling price for that period was $1.0930.  It showed further 
that  the  product  of  20  of  its mines, out of  a total of  52, 
produced 5,350,594 tons at a cost of  $1.0788, and when the 
money  actually  spent  in  selling  this coal  is  added to the 
given  cost  and  the  interest  on  bonds  of  the company it 
appears that the cost of  this coal was  actually in excess of 
$1.15  per ton run of  mine."  l 
Under such conditions it is  certain  that the mining will 
not be carried on economically; that only the coal will be 
taken out which can be mined  cheaply, and  the remainder 
left in the mine to be crushed by the gradually sinking roof. 
(I To avert  these  conditions  there  are  but  two  possible 
remedies.  One,  that  the  coal  shall  be  sold  at a  greater 
average price ; the other, a greater economy in operation by 
which the same price will  yield  a  profit.  Neither of  these 
remedies is possible under the system of  cutthroat competi- 
tion which  now  exists.  It  is  only by general cooperation 
that any relief  can be obt,ained except by  a process which 
would  eliminate  the greater  number  of  those  now  in  the 
business."  2 
Nor  will  it be  possible under these  conditions to intro- 
duce  in  the mines  those  devices  which  are  necessary  for 
the preservation of  life ; and plainly it will be impossible to 
'  Hearinge, Interatate Commerce ~ommittee,  XXVI, pp. 2372-2373.  '  Ibid., p. 2376. 94  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
give  the  miners  wages  adequate  to  introduce  good  social 
conditions.  In view  of  the  above  situation  the operator 
asks  that  conditions  be  created  covering  the  following 
points : - 
"  First.  Proper protection to the lives and health of  the 
miners. 
(L Second.  Prevention of  waste and proper conservation of 
fuel resources. 
"Third.  A fair profit to the operator.  '  ( Fourth.  A fair and uniform price to the consumer." 
No one can gainsay the desirability of  creating the above 
conditions, but it is absolutely certain  that they can never 
be established except through  cooperation, and  cooperation 
of  a kind which is illegal under existing laws. 
Regarding gas, Professor Holmes says : "Our waste of  natu- 
ral gas is a crime, and thoroughly discreditable to the nation. 
It is far worse  than the waste  of  coal.  The statistics for 
warrte  of  1910, according to the Geological Survey, showed that some 
480,000,000,000  cubic feet  of  gas were turned into the at- 
mosphere and forever lost.  In the above as in other cases, 
the individual operator finds it easier to save a part, than all, 
of  these resources, yes, cheaper for him to waste a large part 
of  these resources than to save all.  In the case of  natural 
gas he says: 'I want to get oil, and if  I can get the oil cheaper 
by letting the gas escape, that is the operation I will  pursue.' 
And the state and the nation stand by and watch the opera- 
tion. 
"There are many other examples of  extensive and serious 
carbon waste in this country.  Thus, in the coking industry 
Wsste in  the beehive coke ovens have turned into the atmosphere more 
m*g  coke.  than  100,000,000,000 cubic feet  of  valuable  gas, which,  if 
properly treated, will yield not only gas but other important 
carbon by-products." 
Statements  have  been  made  at some  length  regarding 
fuel and gas  because  of  their  paramount  importance; but 
for some of  the metals a  similar situation  exists and must 
continue to exist under  the severely competitive system. 
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This is illustrated by lead and zinc.  Putting together all  Waste of 
the losses in mining, concentration, and smelting, they prob- 
ably amount on an average to at least 40  per  cent  of  the 
metal of  the ore, and in some instances the losses run as high 
as 60 or 70 per cent.  These losses are in large measure due to 
the extreme competitive system under which excessive royal- 
ties are charged to the operators.' 
Untermeyer  calls  attention to this  situation  for copper.  wsllte d 
Methods  of  competition  involve  overproduction  for  this 
country  and  exportation of  the excess, when the copper ore 
in  sight is probably not sufficient to last more than fifty years. 
If the  copper  producers were  allowed  to cooperate in the 
regulation  of  production,  rational  action  could  be  secured 
both as to quantity of  copper which is  to be mined and as 
to methods  of  mining. 
Small  production  and  competition  in  all  mining  enter- 
prises  lead  to great  and  irreparable  wastes,  the  effects of 
which must  be  borne by succeeding generations. 
Another  of  the numerous  wastes  is  that in  metallurgy.  W&  of 
For  instahce, sulphur  is  being  burned upon  a  great  scale,  BU1phur' 
and  the products  are being  passed  into  the atmosphere to 
the  injury or  destruction of  surrounding vegetation.  With 
reference to agriculture this loss of  sulphur is likely to become 
irreparable, since sulphur is one  of  the limiting and crucial 
elements among plant foods.a 
A situation obtains for timber similar to that which applies 
to the metals and coal.  With unrestricted  competition the 
timber  is  cut  and only  the choicest parts  of  the logs  are  Waate in 
marketed,  the  remainder  being  left  in  the  woods.  If  CO-  timber. 
operation  were  possible,  it  would  be  practicable  to  have 
comervative timber  cutting, the additional  expense of  sav- 
ing the wasted material  slightly adding to the price.  Mr. 
D. E. Skinner "illustrates  the situation regarding timber in 
'  "Conservation of Natural  Reeourcea in  the United States,"  C. R. Van 
Rise, pp. 80-85.  '  Hearings, Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, Part V, p:  184.  '  "sulphur  ~e~uirementa  of farm crops in relation to the Soil and hr  Supply," 
Rmearch  Bulletin 14, Agricultud  Experiment Station,  University of  Wit+ 
c0lhn. 
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the  western  part  of  the United  States.  Since  under the 
Sherman act cooperation is not possible the weaker operators 
are bound to make  sales, and  they will  at such  prices  as 
they can get.  For the lower parts of  the trees the average 
sale price is $15 per thousand feet  board measure, and for 
the upper part $7 per thousand feet.  In California it costs 
in round numbers $5  a thousand feet for logging and $5 for 
milling.  Under these circumstances it naturally follows that 
the tops of  the trees and the  small down timber which will 
not produce lumber selling at about $10 a thousand, are left 
to rot in  the  forest;  and  this leaves  on  the ground from 
twenty to thirty per cent of  the material which should have 
been  taken off.  The only  possible remedy  for  the above 
situation  is  to  allow  cooperation so  that a  price may  be 
secured which will permit the utilization of  the upper parts 
of  the trees.  For our wild orgy of competition in the lumber 
industry succeeding generations will  pay heavily. 
Conditions  In making the above statements, it is realized that in a new 
in  older  country,  with  abundant resources  and  a  relatively  sparse 
countries. 
population,  we  cannot  expect  the  same  severe  economies 
that are practiced  in the older, more densely settled  coun- 
tries.  It  would  be  impossible  to  introduce  the  extreme. 
economies  and  labor  costs  of  the  intensive  agriculture  of 
China  into  the  United  States  under  present  conditions. 
The  smaller  twigs  and  limbs  of  timber  cut  in  lumbering 
cannot  be  saved  in  this  country  as yet.  Where  labor  is 
cheap,  savings  are  possible  which  cannot  be  practiced  in 
the  United  States.  While  this  is  the  situation,  upon  the 
other  hand,  reckless  extravagance  in  the  use  of  natural 
resources  is  not  warranted.  Under  present  conditions,  we 
can  and  should  introduce all  practicable  economies in  the 
use  of  our natural  resources along every line. 
Everywhere  the  necessity  to  meet  severe  competition, 
combined with the desire to produce large profits, results in 
extravagant  and wasteful use  of  resources limited in  quan- 
Rwpon-  tity.  It is  our  duty  to our  descendants to  conserve  our 
8ibsty  to  fundamental resources, to use thep economically, to prevent 
poeterity. 
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a ton of  anthracite or iron costs us a few cents more, we should 
bear  this  additional  expense.  Under  unrestricted  compe- 
tition there is no hope for economical use  of  our resources, 
no hope for conservation. 
The Consumer pays  for  the  Wastes  of  Competition. -  Ulti- 
mately all the losses and wastes of  competition come back to 
the consumer and are added to the price which he must pay. 
If,  as a result of  overbuilding, concerns fail and factories are 
dismantled,  the  cost  finally  must  be  borne  by  the  com- 
munity.  The enormous expense of  traveling  salesmen  and 
advertising  is  paid  by the  consumers  of  the articles sold. 
The men .who carry  life  insurance  support  the  numerous 
high-priced  agents.  Succeeding generations will  suffer  for 
our  reckless  exploitations  of  natural  resources. 
Says Nettleton : "  The waste of  wealth due to unrestrained 
competition would, if  saved, go far to enrich the community 
every year.  And this waste finally falls for the most part on 
the general body of  consumers, -the  much enduring public." 
Wastes of  Competition drive  to  Combination. -  Because of 
the  situation  described,  not  only  has  restraint  of  trade 
existed in a thousand matters in contravention to the Sherman 
act and the various state  antitrust  acts;  but  it  will  con- 
tinue to exist  either  lawfully or  unlawfully, because of  the 
frightful wastes of  the competitive system.  If  where fierce 
and  unrestricted  competition  exists,  this  goes  on  until the 
weaker  competitors  are  driven  from  the  business  and  the 
others are on the verge of  bankruptcy, in  order  to prevent 
the destruction of  the group, a combination or coijperation of 
the remaining  companies  will  be  formed  either  secretly or 
openly.  In consequence of  this principle, because of  the law 
againat restraint of  trade in this country, innumerable secret 
combinations have been formed. 
In  Germany and England, where combination is free as well  combin, 
as competition, the organizations of  fair size have coijperated tion per- 
mit&  through one of  the looser forms of  organization, and have thus 
avoided the losses of  fierce competition ; but in America the 
loose  agreements not being enforcible in the courts, in order 
1 "  Trusts or Competition,':  A.  B. Nettleton. 
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to save themselves from destruction, the competing units have 
been  obliged to combine formally in a manner which it was 
supposed  the  courts  would  protect.  We  hbve  seen  that 
many of  the whisky distilleries of  the country had gone into 
bankruptcy  before  the  remainder  combined.  Similarly  it 
was  the still fiercer  competition  between  the  Federal  Steel 
and the Carnegie Steel and other steel companies that led to 
the formation of  the United States Steel Corporation. 
When the stage of  competition resulting in enormous losses 
was reached between the great railroads, agreements and pools 
Railroads  were  first formed;  and finally a  way was found to exempt 
violate  laws  the railroads  and  other  public  utilities  from  the laws  for- 
against 
restraint  bidding combination in restraint of  trade by control through 
trade-  commissions.  To this plan  the public gives  general  assent 
and no prosecutions follow, although the agreements regarding 
prices are as clearly in violation of  the law as were those of 
the packers or those of  the Standard Oil  Trust. 
A like situation exists between the Atlantic liners.  With 
modern conditions we  have  seen  the ships grow  larger  and 
larger.  We  have  now  the Lusitania  and  the  Mauretanics 
of  the Cunard line and the Olympic of  the White Star line. 
Combina-  Occasionally  there  has  been  severe  competition  in  price 
tions on 
the ocean.  between  these  lines  and the other  great  lines,  such as the 
North  German  Lloyd,  Hamburg-American,  etc.;  but  at 
the present  time  for  dehite seasons of  the year  there  are 
substantially like prices for similar accommodations, the prices 
being  raised  and  lowered  for the same accommodations at 
different seasons of  the year, being perhaps twice as high  in 
the summer as in the winter. 
The  illustrations  given  show  that  the  inevitable  conse- 
quence  of  unrestricted  competition  is  bigness  and  finally 
monopoly.  Even  Brandeis,'  who  strongly  advocates  com- 
I I  petition,  says :  Unrestrained  competition will  lead  neces- 
sarily  to  monopoly."  Along  the  same  line,  Untermeyer2 
I I  says :  The logical outcome of  unrestrained  competition is 
legalized  monopoly."  Laughlin  puts  the  case  that  with 
1 Hearings, Senate Interstate Commerce Committee,  Part XVI, p.  1162. 
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"  free competition you  must  inevitably expect to have big- 
ness  and  also  monopoly." ' 
Ruin  or  Combination. -  In the past, the disastrous  com- 
petition which  has led  to ruin has been  largely confined  to 
the small  concerns.  When  there  is  severe  competition  of 
many  small  manufacturers  or  sellers,  a  number  of  them 
with  relatively  small  capital  fail.  The fact  that from  10 
to 20  per  cent of  them go to the wall may not so seriously 
affect  business  as to be  generally  noticed;  but  its  total 
effect is  great,  and,  so  far  as  the  man  whose  business is 
destroyed is  concerned, it is an individual disaster.  As  the 
many  drop  out,  the  competitors  become  fewer  and  the 
competition becomes ever keener.  Finally a situation  arises 
where this can no longer be endured. 
Numerous illustrative cases could be given in which fierce 
and  unrestrained  competition  has  driven  business  men  to 
the verge  of  distraction or  to complete  ruin.  I select one 
or two recently brought before the United States Interstate 
Commerce Committee. 
Vinson2 testified  that  in  West  Virginia  the  small  coal 
producers  cannot  compete  with  the large concern  because 
they  cannot  cooperate through  a  selling agency.  He  says 
that if  the small concerns are not allowed to cooperate so as 
to have the advantage of  the large concentration, the only 
alternative  is  bankruptcy?  Untermeyer  reports  that  a 
dozen of  the paper  manufacturers  had  failed  because  they 
were unable to compete with the big fellows ; and that they 
had  made  a  temporary  trade  agreement  in  order  to save 
themselves from destruction;  but that in consequence they 
were  indicted  and  fined  for  violation  of  the  antitrust 
law.  Says Untermeyer : "  Requiring the enforcement of  un- 
restricted  competition  calls upon  people  either  to  make 
criminals of  themselves or to ruin themselves in obeying the 
law."  Says  Walker:  "  Competition  is  the  life  of  trade ; 
'  Hearinga, Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, Part XIV, p. 996. 
'  Ibid., Part 111,  p. 30.  a Ibid., Part V,  p.  194.  '  Ibid., Part V,  p. 183. 
'Wnregulated Competition Selfdeatructive,"  Aldace F. Walker,  Forum, 
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competition is the death of  trade:  one phrase is as true as 
L c  the other."  And  again :  Unrestrained  competition  as  an 
economic  principle  is  too  destructive  to  be  permitted  to 
exist." 
The  fierceness  of  modern  competition  is  the  inevitable 
result  of  the development of  transportation  and  communi- 
cation.  Until  these were in a highly  advanced condition it 
was not possible for an organization to reach  a great  terri- 
tory with its products.  With highly efficient  transportation 
and  communication  the  strong  organizations,  even  if  far 
apart,  meet  one  another  in  the  wide  markets;  and  the 
destructive  struggle  is  inevitable  unless  they cooperate. 
A situation similar to that which existed with the railroads 
before  coijperation  in  charges was actually  agreed  upon is 
now  reached for the great manufacturing industries.  They 
CoBpera-  have  found  a  way  by  consolidation  to  prevent  the  evil 
tion in  effects  of  unrestricted  competition.  It  is  now  proposed  industry 
imperative.  through  the  courts  to  break  up  these  combinations  and 
restore competition.  If this be  done, it is safe to say that 
even greater disasters will  befall the country  for  the  great 
industries than those which  the country suffered when  the 
same situation existed  with  the railroads. 
With the alternative before the business men of  coopera- 
tion  or  failure,  we  may  be  sure  that they  will  cooperate. 
Since the law is violated by practically every group of  men 
engaged in trade from one end of  the country to the other, 
they do not feel that in combining they are doing a moral 
wrong.  The selection  of  the individual  or  corporation  for 
prosecution depends upon the arbitrary choice of  the Attorney- 
General, perhaps somewhat influenced by the odium which 
Alternative,  attaches to some of  the violators of  the law.  They all take 
law'easneas  their chance, hoping that the blow will fall elsewhere.  With  or failure. 
general violation  and sporadic  enforcement  of  an  imprac- 
ticable law, we cannot hope that our people will gain respect 
for it. CHAPTER  I1 
SOME  IMPORTANT  ILLUSTRATIONS  OP 
CONCENTRATION 
Now  that  a  general  statement  has  been  made  of  the 
economic advantages of  concentration, its extent, the wastes 
of  competition, its  consequent  break-down,  etc.,  it  seems 
advisable as the next step to make the situation more con- 
crete  by  giving  an outline  statement  concerning  some  of 
the  greatest  combinations, including the benefits  and evils 
which  have  appeared  in  connection with  them. 
With  two  exceptions,  the illustrative  industries  selected 
for description are those upon which reports have been made 
by  the United  States Commissioner of  Corporations.  The 
earliest of  these reports, viz., that upon beef, was made when 
James  R.  Garfield  was  Commissioner.  The other  reports 
were  issued  during the time  that Herbert  Knox Smith has 
held  that  office.  The  corporations  reported  upon  by  the 
Commissioner are those of  the first magnitude, and the facts 
concerning them are presented  with  a fullness not available 
for the corporations not investigated by this bureau.' 
THE  MICHIGAN  SALT  COMPANY2 
Beginning  with  1860, there was  a  rapid  development  of 
salt production  in  Michigan.  About  1865  came  overpro- 
duction and unrestricted competition ; the weaker companies 
were driven to the wall.  It was recognized that the solution 
of  the difficulty was  combination.  By  1866 the manufac- 
l The great combinations ss they existed twelve years ago are aeeoribed in 
the Report of  the Industrial Commission, Vols. I and XIII. 
'Summarised  from  an  article by  J.  W. Jenks, contained in  "Tmetn, 
Pools, and Corporations," Ripley, pp. 1-21. 
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turers united their interests for selling the product.  In 1868 
there was formed an association called the Saginaw and Bay 
Salt Company, which handled four fifths of  the salt shipped 
Changing  from the Saginaw Valley.  This association continued until 
name.  1871, when it was broken up as a result of  dissensions; but 
declining prices  and lack of  prosperity led to the formation 
of  the  Michigan  Salt Association  in  1876.  The agreement 
forming this association was for five years, but it was renewed 
in 1881 under the name of  the Salt Association of  Michigan, 
and  again  in  1886 under  the  name  of  the  Michigan  Salt 
Association. 
The associations were  essentially pools;  they had a very 
small  capital,  $200,000,  which  was  distributed  among 
manufacturers of  salt in proportion to their  capacity.  After 
providing  for  the  expense  of  the  business,  there  was  an 
Conditions  annual  dividend of  only 7 per  cent upon the stock.  After 
the pool.  paying this dividend and the expenses, the remainder of  the 
income  was  distributed to the  manufacturers  in proportion 
to their output.  Under the articles of  agreement a contract 
was made every year with each manufacturer  to make salt 
wholly  upon the association's account, of  the best  quality, 
to be delivered to the association according to the conditions 
of  the contract.  If  a manufacturer  violated his agreement, 
he  paid  ten  cents  upon  every  barrel  of  the  salt  so  sold. 
There  was  no  restriction  imposed  upon  the  output  of  the 
various  concerns.  This  lack  of  limitation  was  due  to the 
fact that the  salt  manufactories  obtained their  heat  from 
the by-products in lumber manufacture. 
The economic advantages  accruing to the manufacturers 
through  the association  were  reductions in  the  amount  of 
selling costs due to the maintenance of  a single selling  agency 
at each  of  the  commercial centers, and reasonable  prices, 
Economio  as well  as the avoidance of  cross freights.  After  the  asso- 
dv8nteges.  ciation  was  formed  in  1866 the prices  were  somewhat in- 
creased;  they reached  a maximum in  1868, when the price 
of  salt was $3.25  a  barrel  at Chicago.  From this time on 
prices  continued  steadily  to fall  until  in  1881,. when  the 
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bination  was  extended  to include  not  only  the  Michigan 
producers, but  those  of  Ohio  and  New  York.  Prices 
were  fked by the combination at various points.  The out- 
puts of  the fields  were  apportioned  in  1871,  and  reappor- 
tioned  in  1881.  The  pool  broke  up  in  1882,  after  which 
there was a further decline in the price of  salt.  At Chicago 
in this year it became as low  as 80 cents. 
Jenks places to the credit of  this association the following 
points : - 
As  a result of  the action  of  the association a  system  of 
state  inspection  was  established  under  which  every  block 
of  salt  placed  upon  the  market  was  rigidly  examined. 
In consequence, each manufacturer  was  obliged to produce 
an article which came up to the standard set by the associa-  Credita 
tion  and  by  the  state.  The  prices  were  reasonable  and  to  pool. 
steadily  declined  during  the  life  of  the  association.  In 
consequence of  the combination, less capital was required to 
conduct  the business ; better  rates  of  transportation  were 
secured;  there  was  no  loss  by  cross freights;  the cost  of 
marketing was reduced;  there was a reduction in the losses 
through bad debts. 
It  would  seem  that  the  history  of  the  Michigan  Salt 
Association  was  a  creditable  one,  in  that dealing with  an 
essential article, the output was increased, the quality of  the 
product improved, the cost of  manufacture reduced, so that 
there was placed upon the market a superior article at a price 
much less than when the association was organized. 
The association very well  illustrates the instability of  the 
pool,  since not having the sanction of  law and the support 
of  the court (see p.  68)  any member or group  might with-  POO~ 
draw at any time, or violate any of  the articles of agreement 
and refuse to pay the penalty;  consequently the history of 
the association, as of  other pools, was one of ups and downs 
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THE STANDARD  OIL  COMPANY' 
The report of  the Bureau of Corporations upon the Stand- 
ard  Oil  Company  was  published in  1907, and includes an 
account  of  the business  to  and  including  the  year  1906. 
The facts here stated are to be  considered as of  that date. 
The  Standard  Oil  Company,  with  its  various  affiliated 
concerns, handled 84.2 per  cent of  the crude oil  which goes 
to the refineries in the United States.  One refinery, that at 
Bayonne, New  Jersey, consumed more crude oil than all of 
the independent plants  of  the country. 
The Rise  of  the  Company. -  The rule of  the Standard Oil 
Company began with the union of  several large refining com- 
panies  into  a  partnership  known  as Rockefeller,  Andrews, 
& Flagler, in  1867.  Three years later  this partnership was 
succeeded  by  the  Standard  Oil  Company  of  Ohio, with  a 
~onopoly  capitalization of  $1,000,000 ; and with its organization began 
sw"tly  accom-  the campaign for the control of  the refining business of  the 
plished.  country.  When the company was formed, it did not control 
more  than  10 per  cent.  Within  ten  years  the  Standard 
Oil  and associated companies controlled about 90  per  cent. 
Monopoly was accomplished in a decade. 
Not only did this company control the refining business, 
but it controlled every important pipe line in the oil fields. 
The only serious competitor was the Tide Water Pipe Line 
Company, which, however, in a few years passed to the Stand- 
ard.  Thus the Standard for  many  years  had  no rival  in 
pipe line transmission of  oil to the Atlantic coast; and at  no 
time was there more than one independent pipe line to the sea- 
board and this much smaller than those of  the Standard Oil. 
In 1882 the Standard Oil interests formed the Standard Oil 
Trust, under which the entire stock holdings of  fourteen com- 
panies and a majority interest in  twentysix  additional con- 
cerns were held by trustees.  The capitalization of  the trust 
'Report of  the Commissioner of  Corporations on the Petroleum Industry: 
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at that time was $70,000,000, and the appraised value of  its  Capitalisa- 
property in excess of  $55,000,000.  Of  the $70,000,000 trust ;:cf  the 
certificates nine of  the trustees owned more than $46,000,000. 
The appraised value of  the trust by 1892 had accumulated 
to $126,600,000.  As a result of  a decision against the Stand- 
ard Oil  Company of  Ohio in 1882 (see p. 174) and contempt 
proceedings, the Standard Oil  Company of  New Jersey was 
organized, but not until 1897. 
Thus, the Standard Oil Company of  New Jersey, a holding  Tmst and 
concern, was a direct successor to the trust, the only differ- ~~~, 
ence being that the holding company owned all of  the stock  the same 
of  the subsidiary companies, instead  of  being  a  trustee for  in esgence. 
this stock;  each alike controlled the business of  the subsid- 
iary companies, and received and distributed all dividends. 
The officers  of  the constituent  companies in  one case had 
their orders from the trustees, in the other from the officers of 
the corporation composed of  substantially the same men. 
The authorized  capital of  the Standard Oil  Company of 
New  Jersey  was  $100,000,000,  of  which  $98,338,300  was 
issued.  The  Standard  Oil  Company  included in  America 
eleven companies mainIy engaged in refining, five lubricating 
oil companies, three crude oil companies, fourteen pipe line  scope of 
companies, a tank line company, six marketing  companies,  Operatio* 
and sixteen natural gas companies.  Its business abroad was 
done through sixteen companies.  In addition to these com- 
panies seven pipe lines and refining companies were closely 
affiliated with or controlled by the Standard Oil Company. 
The  Monopolistic  Position of  the  Company. -While  the 
statistics of  production show that the Standard Oil Company 
was dominant in all departments of  the business, it did not 
hold  this position through a direct monopoly of  the owner- 
ship of the wells ;  since in 1905, of  approximately 135,000,000  StanM 
barrels of  crude oil, not over one sixth came from the wells 27- 
owned by the Standard, and in no one district did its own 
welle  produce more than 50  per  cent of  the output.  But 
while  the Standard did not control the wells, it controlled 
the pipe lines, which  are the only means by which oil  may 
be cheaply transported.  Thus the Standard was almost the 106  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
Monopoly 







sole purchaser for the oil owned by others.  The control of 
the pipe  lines controlled the situation because the refinery 
at the distant town was not able to pay the railway rates 
'upon crude oil, which are very high as compared with the pipe 
line transportation. 
The Appalachian, Lima-Indiana,  Illinois, and  Mid-Con- 
tinent are the four great field* which produce the most valu- 
able oil for illuminating purposes; and in these four fields 
there was only one pipe line other than the Standard's, that 
of  the Pure  Oil  Company, a  line  less  than 550  miles  in 
length.  The  percentage  of  business  of  these  four  fields 
handled by the Standard varied  from  84 to 96  per cent. 
In the refining industry the plants of  the Standard were 
favorably  located and of  high  efficiency.  In 1904 it pro- 
duced 86.5 per  cent  of  the refined  illuminating oil, leaving 
13.5 per  cent to the independent refineries.  Of  the.export 
business, Standard Oil  handled, in  1904, 13,240,113 barrels, 
or 87 per  cent, of  the total for the country. 
In the marketing  business  Standard  Oil  was  in  an  es- 
pecially strong position  because  of  the wide  and wise  dis- 
tribution of  its plants, because of  its pipe lines, tank cars, and 
many local storage plants.  This system of  distribution was 
so complete that, for the most part, it eliminated the jobber, 
and dealt directly  with  the retailer  or  with  the individual 
consumer.  For the United States the known Standard con- 
cerns marketed 88.7 per cent of  the illuminating oil. 
The causes which  led to the dominating position of  the 
Standard  Oil  Company  were  efficiency  of  organization, 
magnitude, integration, utilization of  by-products, and uni- 
fied  marketing;  in  short, all  of  the advantages which  are 
described  (pp. 8-20)  as economic  causes  for  concentration. 
But  in  securing the position which  Standard Oil  occupied 
there  is  no  doubt  that very  important,  if  not  determin- 
ing,  factors  in  reaching  it  were  the  following  special 
causes : - 
Railroad  discriminations in  favor  of  Standard Oil  were 
vontinuous from the formation of  the Standard Oil  Company 
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Commission were compelled  to discontinue these  practices. 
The rebates  secured  by  Standard  Oil  from  western Penn- 
sylvania to the seacoast were frequently a considerable part  Railrod 
of  the cost of  transportation.  At one time when the open 2;- 
rate from Pennsylvania to the coast was  $1.44%,  80  cents 
was the rate for the Standard Oil.  Another form of  advan- 
tage was to give lower rates on oil in tank cars than on oil in 
barrels.  At  other times  the published rates were  reduced 
for short periods after previous notice to the Standard, so 
that large shipments could be made by that company, after 
which the rates were again advanced. 
Another  advantage  which  the  Standard  Oil  had  was 
through its pipe lines.  These gave it almost complete mo- 
nopoly of  the cheapest form of  transportation.  Even after 
the  pipe  lines  were  declared  to be  common  carriers,  the 
Standacd Oil  Company still refused to transport  the oil  of  unfdruae 
its competitors;  or if  it transported  the same, it was with 
excessive rates,  under such conditions as to make competi- 
tion extremely difficult.  Where there was a competing line 
the Standard would attack it by purchasing the crude oil of 
the wells in the vicinity of  the independent line at excessive 
prices, sometimes from  15 to 20 cents a  barrel  more than 
the current price.  In this way, even at a loss, the Standard 
prevented  the competing  lines  from getting  business,  re- 
couping the loss by profits from other parts of  its system. 
If the pipe lines had in fact acted as common carriers, and 
transported oil at  reasonable rates at points as asked, a very 
important element in the growth of  the monopolistic power 
of the Standard would have been lacking. 
The Standard Oil  Company maintained a monopoly from 
the establishment of  the Standard Oil Trust in 1882 until the 
time it was dissolved by the order of  the Supreme Court in  Monapdl, 
1911.  Because of  this the organization was able to charge - 
excessive  prices  which  gave  enormous profits.  According 
to the Commissioner of  Corporations, the following  points 
appear regarding prices : - 
1. There was a marked increase in the margin between the 
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formation  of  the Standard Oil  Trust, and even during the 
past ten years. 
2.  Standard Oil  has sold illuminating and free petroleum 
products cheaper abroad than at home, the difference being 
very great in 1902. 
3.  Standard Oil  discriminated greatly  in  fixing prices in 
different sections and different towns,  charging exorbitant 
rates when there was no competition, very low rates, and even 
prices so  low  as to give a  loss,  in  places where there was 
competition. 
4.  The profits of  the Standard Oil Company especially in 
its domestic business were excessive. 
5.  The real  source of  the Standard's  power  was  not  in 
superior service but in long-continued use of  unfair methods 
of  competition. 
6. The Standard by using its influence as a larger shipper 
secured excessive prices for lubricating oil from the railroads 
of  the country.' 
Margins and  Projits. -The  margin between crude oil and 
illuminating  oil increased markedly from  1897-98  to 1903- 
04.  In 1898 it was  5.3 cents; in  1903, 7.1, an increase of 
Excessive  1.8.  Similar  increases of  margins  applied  to gasoline and 
m&F-.  lubricating oil.  Even if  the profits due to increase in margins 
be placed at  only 1.5 cents per gallon, on 1,400,000,000  gallons 
produced in 1904, the increased profit would mean $21,000,000. 
Similar calculations give $25,000,000 for 1903.  Correspond- 
ing with this calculation, the profits of  the company in 1896- 
97  were  in  the neigbborhood  of  $34,000,000;  whereas, in 
1903 they were $81,000,000, an increase of  $47,000,000.  In 
1893-94,  when  the margins were  the lowest, the profits of 
Standard Oil on the capitalization of  the company were be- 
tween 11 and 12 per cent; in 1896 they had  reached 23 per 
cent ;  and since that time to dissolution there were enormous 
profits, due to the increase of  margins.  Prices in the United 
States for  two years,  taking  into account  both  grade  and 
freight, have been from one to nearly three cents higher than 
those which obtain in London and Hamburg. 
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Price  Discriminations. -  Sectional  price  discrimination 
was  shown  by  the  very  great  variation  in  price  among 
the different cities, being  relatively low  where competition 
was keen, and very high  where monopoly was  complete or 
nearly so.  In 1904 at  Los Angeles the price was 6.7 as com- 
pared with 12.3 at San Francisco.  Prices have been as high 
as  16.61 at Butte at the same time they were as low as 7 in 
other cities.  Illustrating the situation very well, in New York 
City and vicinity, the very  seat of  the Standard's greatest 
refineries, the price was 10.5, while at Worcester it was 7.5, 
and at  Cincinnati and Cleveland 7 or less. 
Excessive Profits. -The  total dividends paid by the Stand- 
ard Oil Company from 1882 to 1906 were over $550,000,000, 
on an average over $22,000,000 a year.  This, however, does 
not represent the total net earnings, since there were  large 
accumulations not declared as dividends.  From 1882 to 1896 
the profits on the capital stock  and trust certificates  aver- 
aged about 19 per  cent.  In 1903 they had reached 83 per 
cent and the average from  1903 to 1905 was about 68 per 
cent, annually.  The total profits from 1897 to 1906 are be- 
lieved to be somewhere from $790,000,000 to $850,000,000; 
and this upon properties the value of  which originally aggre- 
gated not more than $75,000,000.  These figures show  that 
after  monopoly  was  obtained  and  improvements made  in 
transportation and  manufacturing, it was possible  because 
of  this situation to secure these enormous profits. 
It is notable that excessive profits came about, not by tak- 
ing any very large amount from a single gallon of  oil, not more 
than two or three cents, and yet these two or three centa 
multiplied by the enormous number of  gallons used by the 
people of  the United States led to the vast profits above given. 
The Standard Oil industry very well  illustrates the principle 
that if  a commodity is widely needed, even if  one family uses 
a  relatively small amount, and the average annual tribute 
levied  upon  that family  is  small,  if  there be  a  moderate 
excess  beyond  that of  a  fair  price,  the  total  illegitimate 
Profits of  the organization may be fabulous ;  not only so, but 
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a few men may enable them to invest in other lines of  busi- 
ness which  have monopolistic elements, and they thus gain 
a commanding intluence in the industry of  the country.  It 
is well known that the excessive profits which have gone to 
the owners of  the Standard Oil Company have enabled them 
to enter many other great lines of  business, so that they, with 
their railroads, industrial organizations, trust companies, and 
banks, are one of  the two great dominating centers which in 
large measure control the money of  the United States.  The 
disintegration of  the Standard Oil Company by the order of 
the courts is discussed on pp. 181-183. 
Summary of  Evils. -  In summary the Standard Oil Com- 
pany illustrates very clearly a number  of  evils which have 
risen in connection with great combinations. 
This company has engaged in the following practices : - 
1. From  the railroads  it has  secured  rebates  and  draw- 
backs;  has had better service than competing corporations; 
has had rates manipulated  for  its own  purposes;  has had 
lower rates on oil in tanks than in barrels ;  has secured infor- 
mation as to business of  competing companies. 
2.  It has owned pipe lines;  by  its position of  ownership 
it has had great advantages through refusing in good faith to 
execute the duties of  common carriers to  competing organiza- 
tions. 
3. Because of  its monopoly it has been able to increase ih 
margins beyond reasonable amounts, and thus has  secured 
excessive profits. 
4.  It has disposed of  its products cheaper abroad than at 
home. 
5.  It has had  greatly varying prices in different sections 
of  the country, the prices being  made  very low  whenever 
competition appeared, the purpose being to destroy competi- 
tors, and it has succeeded in many instances. 
6.  It has pursued methods of  espionage upon  competing 
concerns in order more advantageously to compete with and 
destroy them. 
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THE  UNITED  STATES  STEEL  CORPORATION 
Early  Consolidations. -  Before  the  organization  of  the 
United  States Steel Corporation, consolidation of  the iron 
and steel industry had made much progress.  Prior to 1898 
the steel business was distributed among a large number of 
relatively  small  companies,  although  even at that time  a 
number of  steel companies had obtained considerable promi- 
nence, among which were the Illinois Steel Company and the 
Carnegie Steel Company.  The organizations producing the 
more finely finished materials were almost altogether separate 
from those which made pig iron, steel billets, and the rela- 
tively  heavy  and  simple  finished  products,  such  as rails, 
structural  material,  and  plates.  In  1898  there  began  a 
series of  mergers  which  resulted  in  the  development of  a 
number of  very large companies, each one having as elements 
a number of  organizations before independent.  The earliest 
of  these  was  the  Federal  Steel  Company  incorporated  in 
1898 with  a  capital  of  $100,000,000.  This  included  the 
former Illinois Steel  Company, the  Minnesota  Iron  Com- 
pany,  the Lorain Steel  Company, and the boats and rail- 
ways owned by these companies.  By this merger the steel 
business was for the first time integrated  from  the ore  to 
the coarser of  the finished products. 
The National Steel Company was formed in 1879 with a 
capital  of  $59,000,000.  The  plants  acquired  were  mainly 
in  Ohio. 
In  1900  the  Carnegie  interests  were  organized  into  the 
Carnegie  Company of  New  Jersey, with  a  capitalization of 
$320,000,000.  This  new  organization united  the  Carnegie 
k3teel  Company,  the  H.  C.  Frick  Coke  Company,  and  the 
Oliver  Iron  Mining  Company.  The  company  also  had 
Report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Corporations  on the Steel  Industry : 
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control of  a railway from Lake Erie to Pittsburg  and owned 
boats on the lakes.  Thus there was even greater integration 
than in the case of  the Federal  Steel Company, in that a 
great coke company was included. 
The  three  great  companies  mentioned  were  engaged 
chiefly in the manufacture  of  crude material  or  the coarse 
finished products such as pig iron, steel billets, rails,  beams, 
plates,  and bars. 
During  the  same  period  the  companies  producing  the 
more  refined  products  were  also  largely  consolidated  into 
the American  Tin  Plate Company in  1898,  the American 
Steel and Wire Company in 1898, the National Tube Company 
in  1899, the American Steel Hoop Company in  1899, and in 
1900  the  American  Sheet  Steel  Company,  the  American 
Bridge  Company, and  the  Shelby  Steel  Tube  Company. 
Each  of  these  organizations,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Shelby  Company, which  was  smaller, had  a  capitalization 
varying  from  $33,000,000 to $90,000,000. 
In addition to the above consolidations, all of  which later 
entered into the United States Steel Corporation, there were 
enlargements and  consolidations  of  other  important  com- 
panies, operating in the northeastern quarter of  the United 
States,  among  which  are  notably  the  Republic  Iron  and 
Steel  Company,  the  Pennsylvania  Steel  Company,  the 
Cambria Steel Company, the Lackawanna Steel  Company, 
and the Jones and  Laughlin Steel Company.  These  com- 
panies, at the times of  the reorganizations or later, increased 
their  capitalizations  to amounts  varying  from  $27,250,000 
to $47,500,000. 
In the South the important Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Rail- 
road  Company  had  continued to  expand  during  the same 
period, as had  also the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company in 
the West. 
Causes  of  Consolidation. -  The Commissioner of  Corpora- 
tions  gives  as the  causes  which  led  to  the consolidations 
described  the  desire  to  restrict  competition  among  the 
constituent companies and the desire for integration.  Both 
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instance, the constituent companies of  the Federal Steel did 
,,t  compete among themselves.  The matter of  integration 
will be considered later. 
During  the  period  before  consolidation  the  competition 
had been severe and prices alternately high and low, depend- 
ing upon the tyade conditions and the extent of  cooperation. 
~~r  a  time  excessive prices  would  be  maintained;  but at 
times  of  depression  sooner  or  later  agreements  or  pools 
would  break  and prices  would  go  down.  Thus  upon  the 
breaking up of  an agreement, prices for steel rails fell from 
$28  per ton in 1896 to $17 or $18 in 1897 and 1898.  After 
the combination had been reestablished, prices for rails went 
to $35 per  ton in  1899 and 1900, but in the earlier part of 
1901 fell to $26.  Steel billets went from $16.25  per ton to  Unstable 
$39.50  and  back  to  $16.50  between  December, 1898, and  ~~~~com- 
October, 1900.  During the same time wire nails went from $20  petitive 
to $50 per ton and then back to $30.  These figures show how  'ystem. 
unequal and unsatisfactory were the conditions as to prices. 
When  the  independent  mills  or  the  combined  companies 
could  get  together,  and  demands were  large,  prices  would 
become abnormally high ; as the demands decreased and the 
full capacity of  the mills was not required, the combination 
would  break and the prices become abnormally low. 
Organizations  of  the  Corporation. -  Before  the  consolida- 
tions of  the companies producing  highly  finished  products, 
the  constituent  companies  bought  their  steel  billets  from 
the primary companies.  After the consolidation they began 
to acquire ore and coal lands, to build blast furnaces, and to 
manufacture their  own  steel  ingots;  and  thus  they were 
~1-g  to  cease  buying  crude  steel  from  the  primary 
companies.  This  led  the  Carnegie  Company  to  plan  to 
build  several  plants  for  making  the  finished  products. 
Similar  plans  were  made  by  the  Federal  Steel  Company. 
This contemplated extension of  the two groups to become 
independent  was  the  final  factor  which  led 
in  1901 to the formation of  the United States Steel 
If  the great  companies of  both groups could 
be united into a single corporation, the iron industry would be 
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completely  integrated.  The  different lines of  work  could 
be  divided among the subsidiary companies, and there would 
be great economy.  Obviously also the combination would be 
in a more advantageous position to maintain  prices  than  a 
number  of  independent  companies.  It wss  plain that the 
combination could not succeed unless the Carnegie Company 
could  be  acquired.  Successful  negotiations  were  entered 
into with  Mr.  Andrew  Carnegie  to this end,  and thus,  in 
April, 1901, the United States Steel Corporation was formed, 
consisting  of  the  Carnegie  Company  of  New  Jersey,  the 
Companies  Federal  Steel  Company,  the  American  Steel  and  Wire 
consoli- 
dated.  Company, the National  Tube Company, the National Steel 
Company, the American  Tin  Plate Company, the American 
Steel Hoop Company, and the American  Sheet Steel Com- 
pany.  Shortly afterward there were acquired 'the American 
Bridge Company, the Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines, 
the  Bessemer  Steamship  Company,  and  the  Shelby  SteeI 
Tube Company.  Each one of  the manufacturing organiza- 
tions included a number of  manufacturing plants distributed 
at various  points  as  well  as  other  properties  necessary 
to integrate the business, such as ore companies, coke com- 
panies,  dock companies, railroad companies, gas  companies, 
water  companies, etc. 
The Steel Corporation as organized was essentially a hold- 
ing  company,  having  the  stock  of  all  of  the  subsidiary 
companies.  These  subsidiary  companies  held  their  sub- 
ordinate  properties in  two classes, in fee  and  the stock of 
A holding  the subordinate  companies.  Thus the  Carnegie  Company 
comp8ny'  of  New  Jersey  was  the  holding  company of  the  stock of 
twenty  companies, ranging from  the various works  of  the 
Carnegie  Steel  Company  of  Pennsylvania  to  the  great 
Frick  Coke  Company. 
The United States Steel Corporation, when  formed,  had 
steel  works  with  an annual  capacity  of  9,400,000  tons of 
crude steel, 1000 miles of  railway, 112 lake ore vessels,  iron 
are  deposits  estimated  to  contain  from  500,000,000  to 
700,000,000 tons of  ore, and more than 50,000 acres of  high 
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total number of plants under the control of  the corporation  Capacity 
exceeded 200.  Since its organization it has  acquired  three  :,",",Urcee. 
steel companies in the same region in  which were located the 
other  properties  of  the  corporation,  namely,  Union  Steel, 
Sharon Steel, and Clairton Steel, these being acquired between 
1902 and 1904.  Finally, there was added in  1907 the great 
southern  property,  the Tennessee Coal,  Iron, and  Railroad 
Company. 
Ouercapitalization. -  The  capitalization  of  the  company 
in  1901,  after  acquiring  the  Shelby  Company,  was  as 
follows : - 
Preferred stock  ..........  $510,205,743 
Common stock  ...........  508,227,394 
Steel Corporation bonds ........ 303,450,000 
Underlying bonds  ..........  59,091,657 
Purchase-money  obligations  and  real-estate 
mortgages  ........... 21,872,023 
Total  ...........  $1,402,846,817 
As  a  result  of  careful investigation, the Commissioner of 
Corporations concluded  that  a  fair valuation of  the entire 
physical property  of  the United States Steel Corporation at 
the time  of  its organization was  $676,000,000.  If the val- 
uation were  made upon  a  basis of  the market value of  the 
properties acquired, it would be approximately $793,000,000, 
and  this  figure  should  include  the good  will  of  the going 
business.  Using  the higher  figure, the capitalization of  the 
United  States Steel Corporation exceeded its face value by 
$609,000,000.  This  shows  conclusively  that  the  common 
stock at the time it was issued was all water and that other 
securities were inflated.  Indeed, the managers of  the corpo-  Overcap- 
ration justified  their  capitalization only by  placing  the ore  italication. 
deposits at practically one  half  o'f  the  complete  valuation, 
$700,000,000, a dollar a ton; which, as any one who was or 
is familiar with the situation knows, was an excessive valua- 
tion  in  1901, especially as a  large part  of  the ores are not 
Owned  in  fee, and royalty must  be  paid  to the fee holclers. 
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excessive,  since in  1907 the value  placed  upon  the ore by 
the company was about fifty cents  a  ton,  which  if  correct 
would indicate that the value in  1901 was still lower.  The 
Bureau's estimate of the value of  the ore at the time of  the 
organization  is  about  $100,000,000,  The comparisons  be- 
tween the estimated value of  the properties by the corpora- 
tion and by the Bureau is shown by the following table : - 
31.  VALUE  OF  TANGIBLE  ASSETS  ACQUIRED  BY  STEEL  CORWRA- 
TION  IN  1901,  as COMPUTED  BY  BUREAU,  COMPARED  WITH  ESTIMATE 
OF  CORPORATION  SUBMITTED  IR  THE  HODGE  SUIT  IN JUNE,  1902 
Ore property  .  . 
Manufacturing 
plants, including 
blast furnaces  . 
Railroad,  steam- 
ship,  and  dock 
property  . . . 
Coal  and  coke 
property  . . . 
Natural  gas  prop- 
erty  .  . . . 
Limestone  prop- 
erties  . . . . 
Cash and cash as- 
sets  .  .  .  . 
Total  .  .  I  $682,000,000  1 $1,457,000,WO I $775,~0,&  l 
BUEEAU'B  &TI-  ICORPORATION'B  E& 
MATE  OF TANOIBLE  TIMATE  OF TANCII- 
 VALUE^  IN 1901  BLE VALUES  IN 1902 
'A part of  the differences between the two estimates is accounted for 
through additions made to property during the interval from April 1,1901,to 
July 1, 1902,  such additions, of  course, being included in the corporation's 
figures. 
This figure includes $40,340,000  of indebtedness which waa not included 
in the estimate of  the corporation,  this addition being made in order to render 
the estimates comparable.  '  In arriving at this figure purchase money  obligations and real  estate 
mortgages of  $16,369,000,  which were deducted by the corporation, were re- 
etored by the Bureau to make the amounta comparable. 
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an incident to the organization of  the company, of  the 
stock issued  by  the corporation in  1901,  $150,000,000,  in- 
cluding $40,000,000 preferred, was for promoting and under- 
writing  services.  The  cash  received  from  this  stock  was 
probably  in  the  neighborhood  of  $100,000,000. 
Since the corporation was  organized in  1901, its earnings 
have been sufficiently  large so that aside from paying interests 
on bonds, full dividends of  7 per cent on the preferred stock, 
and  from 2 to 4 per  cent on the common  stock,  sdicient 
money  has  been  saved  so  that  the  net  additions  to  the 
investments, December 31, 1910, amounted to $504,928,653 ;  Water made 
thus,  if  the  market  value  of  the  consolidating  companies 
is  taken  as  a  basis,  the  excessive  capitalization  had  at 
that  time  been  reduced  to  about  $105,000,000.  Using  a 
more  conservative valuation  of  the  property  made  by the 
Commissioner of  Corporations, the amount  of  water at the 
end of  December, 1910, would be $215,000,000. 
If  the iron ore be now appraised on the basis of  assessed 
valuation, and this seems reasonable, the ores controlled by 
the  corporation  are  worth  not  less than  $380,000,000  (see 
pp. 129-132).  But a considerable portion of  these ores are 
subject to s royalty to the feeholders.  If  one fourth be de- 
ducted  to  compensate for this, the value of  the ore to the 
corporation  would  be  $285,000,000.  Using  this  figure, 
rather than $100,000,000, for the present  value of  the ores, 
the appraisal of  the properties  of  the  corporation  exceeds 
its capitalization by  $70,000,000.  Apparently  the mighty 
flood of water put upon the market when the United States 
Steel  Corporation was organized has largely or wholly been 
transformed into substance. 
Earnings. -  The net earnings of  the Steel Corporation by 
Years from 1901 to 1910 are shown by Table 32. Tnam 32.  Acroa~  EABNINGB  or STEEL  COXPOEATION  ON  ITS  TOTAL  INVEBTMENT, M  COMPUTED  BY BUREAU,  1901-1910 














1 Nine montha.  2 Approximated ; this amount never computed by the Corporation. 
In these years these inventory profita were not deducted by the Corporation and hence need not be restored. 
After deducting employees' bonus fund, which in this year was taken out after stating net earnings, but which in other years is 
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According to the Commissioner of  Corporations the net 
earnings on the actual investment of  the Steel Corporation 
from 1901 to 1910, ten years, was 12 per cent.  It thus ap- 
pears,  according t~  the  Bureau,  that  the  earnings of  the 
corporation  for  ten  years  have  been  $1,100,000,000,  or 
$i10,000,000 a year. 
According to Mr. F.  J. MacRae, for the nine years from 
January  1,  1902,  to  December  1,  1910, the  adjusted  net 
earnings amounted to $1,029,685,389, or approximately $13 
per  ton.  He concludes that the percentage of  net earnings 
for sales  to  outside  consumers for  this  period  amounted 
approximately to 29 per  cent;  and that 29 per  cent of  the 
selling price is equivalent to 40 per  cent of  the cost.' 
Proportion of  Business.  -The  proportion of  the iron and 
steel business of the country done by the organization is shown 
by the following table : - 
TABLE  33.  PROPORTION  OF  OUTPUT  OF  ~INCIPAL  IRON  AND  STBIIL 
PRODUCTS  FOR  UNITED  STATES  STEEL  CORPORATION  AND  FOR  INDE- 
PENDENT  COMPANIEB,  RESPECTIVELY,  IN  1901  AND  1910 
P~o~ucrs 
1901  1910  -- 
...  Pig iron, spiegel, and ferro  43.2  43.4 
Steel ingotsand castings.  ...  65.7  54.3 
Rails  ..........  59.8  58.9 
...  Structural shapes  .  62.2  47.0' 
Plates and sheets of  ali kihds  .  .  64.6  49.7 
Black plate produced in tin mills .  79.8  52.9 
Coated tin-mill products  .  .  73.1  61.1 
Black and coated sheets 
in sheet mills  ......  67.3  38.9 
Wire rods.  ........  77.7  67.3 
Wire nails  .  .  ...  68.1  55.5 
Wrought pipe and tubes ;  ...  57.2  38.2 
Seamless tubes J  ......  82.8  55.3 
'  Investigation U.S. steel Corporation, 63, Part I, PP. 3613-3614.  '  Includes sheets for tinning, galvanizing, and other coatings. 
These percentages are based on capacity and not ~roduction. The cam 
ity of Independent companies is, moreover, partly mtimated.  '  For 1909; figurea  for l910 not available. 120  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
The total production of  the iron and steel of  the country 
by the Steel Corporation fell from 60.6 per cent in 1901 to 
Reduce  51.6  per cent in 1909,  and of  steel ingots and castings the 
pe"enb  total fell from 65.7 in 1901 to 54.3 in 1910.  While there has  age of 
output.  been a decrease in the percentage of  the domestic production, 
the total  business of  the corporation  has vastly increased. 
The crude ingots produced increased from 9,743,918 tons in 
1902 to 14,179,369 in  1910, or 45.5  per cent.  The foreign 
business has been greatly extended, and of this line the Steel 
Corporation controls about 95 per cent.  In  1911 there were 
exported  by  the  corporation  1,719,272 tons  of  steel  and 
other finished products.  Such products are sold considerably 
cheaper abroad than at home, the differences  per  gross ton 
for 1910 being as follows : Steel rails, 9b3.84 ; plates, $3.93 ; 
standard shapes, 84.50.' 
The foreign business  is done  through  the United  States 
Steel Products Export C~mpany.~  This company now con- 
trols ninety per  cent of  the total steel  export  trade of  the 
United  States.  Until  1904  the  company  was  allbwed  a 
three per  cent commission on  its business;  but in  1904 it 
was reduced to two per cent.  Any surplus over the actual 
requirements of  the export  company are to be rebated  to 
the different companies, the products of  which are sold.  As 
a matter of  fact the commission is bed  so that it meets the 
operating expenses of  the company.  The advantage to the 
Steel Corporation of  the selling company is that the foreign 
business is handled as a unit and this is a matter of  funda- 
mental importance in the export trade.  See pp. 222-224. 
Cost  of Production. -In  Part I1 of  the Report of  the Com- 
missioner of  Corporations, the cost of  production of  steel is 
considered.  Since this is the most elaborate available inves- 
tigation of  cost of  production of  a great fundamental article, 
and especially since it contains comparisons of  the cost of  the 
large and small companies engaged in the business, the sum- 
mary of  results is reproduced. 
Ll  Certain salient points are brought out by this investiga- 
1 Investigation U.S. Steel Corporation, No. 57, p. 6136. 
Ibid., 53, Part I, pp. 3691-1696. ILLUSTRATIONS  OF  CONCENTRATION  121 
tion of costs.  These points will be discussed in  detail, but 
for convenience are here statedinsummary form, as follows :- 
"  1.  That cost statements for iron and steel products vary 
greatly on account of  differences in scope of  operations and in 
legal organization and accounting methods of  different com- 
panies.  Therefore, the statement and use of  such cost data 
require the most careful discrimination. 
"  2.  That  the 'book costs'  of  highly integrated  concerns 
(that is, those companies which  link  up  under  one control 
successive stages of production of  materials and finished com- 
modities) are not net costs, because they include large items 
of  intermediate profit.  These profits occur as the materials 
pass from one stage of production to another, because these 
materials are transferred from one department or subsidiary 
to another at market prices or at arbitrary 'transfer'  prices, 
instead of  at cost. 
(L 3.  That the average costs differed greatly, according as 
such intermediate profits were included or excluded, is shown 
by Table 34. 
TABL~  34.  Cosm on  VARIOUB  P~onucm,  INCLUDING  INTER MEDIA^ 
 PROFIT^ 
(I 
The above are average costs for companies having a very 
large proportion of the total production in the United States 
for the five years 1902 to 1906. 
(l 
4.  That if  all these companies are divided into two groups, 
large  highly  integrated  companies,  and  small  companies 
Lake ore  . . . .  .  . . . 
Bessemer pig iron  .  .  .  .  . 
Large Bessemer billets  .  .  . 
Bessemer standard rails  .  .  .  - 
This coat doea not exclude, however, transportation profits, which  are 
COmlderable  in amount for the Steel Corporation, as explained later. 








18.80 122  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
which generally were not well  integrated, the average costs 
of  the two groups differed decidedly.  These differences were 
more marked when intermediate profits were excluded.  The 
facts are shown by Table 35. 
11 These differences between the two groups are, of  course, 
largely due to the fact that the more steps in production con- 
trolled by one concern the more intermediate profits go to that 
concern, instead  of  being  paid  to outsiders.  Accordingly, 
when intermediate profits are excluded, the net cost for an in- 
tegrated concern is less than for one not so highly integrated. 
It should be observed that the above figures show costs ex- 
clusive of  transfer  profits on  materiaIs, and not exclusive of 
transportation profits.  Such transportation profits are earned 
by certain large companies, and above all  by the Steel Cor- 
poration 
"  5.  That while  highly integrated  concerns have  a  lower 
net cost than non-integrated concerns, and therefore a higher 
margin  (not  rate)  of  profit  between costs and prices;  yet, 
on the other hand, being so integrated, they have a larger in- 
vestment to be covered by this margin of  profit over net cost. 
"  6. That the costs for this period (1902 to 1906, incIusive) 
are substantially representative of  present conditions.  This 
Lake ore  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Bessemer pig iron .  .  .  .  .  . 
Large Bessemer billets  .  .  .  . 
Bessemer standard rails.  .  .  . 
1 This coat  does  not exclude, however, transportation profits, which  are 
considerable in amount for the Steel Corporation, ss explained later. 
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is shown by a comparison of  costs for a number of  important 
selected  plants  for  several  products  from  1902  to  1906, 
inclusive,  and for 1910. 
"7. That  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  has  a 
special  advantage in  cost  of  production  on  account  of  its 
complete  integration,  particularly  in  producing  all  the ore 
and coke it uses,  and in having railroads  for  ore trampor- 
tation,  which  branches  of  its business  yield  great  profits. 
The costs of the Steel Corporation are especially reduced if 
these  intermediate  profits  are  excluded,  as  is  shown  by 
Table 36. 
TABLE  36.  COMPARISON  BETWEEN  BOOK  AND  INTEGRATED  COSTS OP 
SEVERAL  PRODUCTB  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES  STEEL  CORPORATION 
- 
In considering these integration  costs of  the Steel Corpora- 
tion, the much  more  extensive and  diversified  investment 
of  that  company  should  also  be  taken  account  of. 
"  8. That the indicated investment per ton of  product for 
Bessemer  steel  rails  for  the  period  1902  to  1906,  taking 
conditions of  business then prevailing,  ranged from  $80 to 
$55 per ton of rails.  On the basis of  a price of  $28 per ton 
for rails the profit  for  all  companies whose costs (excluding 
transfer profits only) would be from 11 to 17 per cept on the 
investment. 
<L 9. That the prices of  lake ore have been kept for many 
Years  at an unreasonably high  level compared with the cost 
of production and the cost of the investment in  the produc- 
ing  ore  properties.  Consequently,  integrated  concerns, 
transferring such ore to the pig-iron producing  departments 
of  the  business  at those  high  prices,  necessarily  show  an 
PRODUCTS 
Lake ore  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Bessemer pig iron  .  .  . . 
Bessemer standard rails  .  . 
BOOK  COST 
$2.88 
14.39 
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unduly  high  book  cost  for  pig  iron  and  for  various  steel 
products  made  from  pig  iron. 
"  10.  That  this  policy  in  regard  to  ore  prices  has  two 
important  results.  For  companies  selling  ore  it  tends  to 
make renumerative the investment in vast ore reserves which 
are not at present utilized, and to unduly enhance the value 
of such properties.  It also tends to make the cost of  iron ore 
excessively high to companies which must purchase it in the 
open market, and thus prevents them from becoming effective 
competitors in pig iron or in steel products made therefrom." 
In the above statements and what  is to follow  the large 
companies are  interpreted  to include the following: - 
1. The United  States Steel  Corporation, total capitaliza- 
tion,  $1,402,846,817. 
2.  The  Lackawanna  Steel  Company,  common  stock 
$60,000,000, preferred stock $10,000,000, bonds  $75,412,000, 
total  capitalization  $145,412,000. 
3.  Jones and Laughlin Steel Company, stock $30,000,000, 
bonds  $24,487,000,  total  capitalization  $54,487,000. 
TABLE  37.  AvERAG~  Boon  COST PER  GROSS  TON OF  LAK~  OEtm  AT 
LOWER  LAKE PORTS,  EXCLUDING  INTERCOMPANY  ROYALTY  AND  DIB- 
TINGUISHING  LARGE  AND  SMALL  COMPANIES,  1902-1906 
C08T  ALJ,  COMPANIES  LARCIE  COMPANIES  SMALL  COMPANIES 
(106,268,728 tons)  (84,920,942 tons)  (21,347,788 tow) 
Labor  .  .  .  . 
Other operating  . 
Royalty  .  .  .  . 
Mine cost  . . 
Rail freight  . . 
Lake freight  . . 
Lower Lake cost 
General  expense, 
depreciation, and 
taxes  .  . . . 
Total  cost  at 
lower  Lake 
porta.  . . . Bessemer pig iron, furnace cost  . 
Total cost (with assumed addition of 
$0.50 per ton)  . . . . . . . 
Basic pig iron, furnrtce cost .  . 
Total cost (with assumed addition of 
$0.50 per ton).  . . .  .  .  .  . 
Bessemer billet ingots, works cost . 
Total cost (with assumed addition of 
$0.60 per ton)  .  . . . . . . 
Bessemer rail ingots,' works cost . 
Totd cost (with assumed addition oi 
$0.60 per ton)  . . . . . .  . 
Large Bessemer billets, mill cost . 
Total cost (with assumed addition of 
$1.10 per ton)  . . . . . . . 
Heavy Bessemer rails,'  mill cost  . 
Total cost (with assumed addition of 
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4.  The Republic Iron and  Steel Company, common  stock 
$27,171,000,  preferred stock $25,000,000,  bonds  $18,439,500, 
total  capitalization  $70,630,000. 
5.  Cambria  Steel  Company,  stock  $45,000,000,  iron 
company stock  $8,468,000,  bonds  $6,000,000,  total capitali- 
zation $59,468,000. 
For  the years  1902 to 1906, the book  costs, the transfer 
profits,  and relative costs of  the large and small companies 
are given for a number of  products in the preceding tables. 
The data used includes only the Buffalo plant  of  the Lack- 
awanna and only the Johnstown plant of  the Cambria. 
The costs of  steel for the years 1902-1906  above considered 
do not differ greatly from those less thoroughly investigated 
for later years;  this is shown by Table 39. 
TABLE  39.  COMPARISON  OF AVERAGE  Boox COST  PER GROSB  TON  OF LAK~ 
ORE  AT LOWER  LAKE  PORTS  FOR 1902-1906,  INCLUSIVE,  WITH  1907-1910, 
INCLUSIVE,  FOR  THE  STEEL  CORPORATION  AND TWO  OTHER  LARGE  COM- 
PANIES. 
The comparisons of  diierent years for Bessemer pig iron 
and for Bessemer rails are shown by the following tables: - 
1  For l910  includes  the  costs of the Steel Corporstion only. 
ITEMB  OF  COBT 
Rail freight. 
Lake freight 
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40.  COMPARISON  OF BOOK  COST  PER  GROSS  TON  OF BESSE~R  PIG 
C ON AT THREE  FURNACE  PLANTS  OF THE STEEL  COBPORATION  BOB  1902- 
1906 wrra 1910 
.....  Net metallic mixture 
Coke  .......... 
Limestone ......... 
Labor  .......... 
Other operating  ....... 
Furnace cost2  ...... 
TABLE  41.  COMPARISON  OF  BOOK  COST  PER  GROSS  TON  OF H~VY  B~ssa- 
-R  RAILS  AT TWO  P~lrre  OF THE STEEL CORPORATION  FOR  1902-1906 
WITH  1910 
For 1910 the book, intercompany profits, and integration 
costs for some of the principal products of  the Steel Corpora- 
tion are shown by the following tables: - 
Im~s  or Cow 
Ingots  .......... 
Labor  .......... 
Fuel  ........... 
Other operating  ....... 
Worka  cost  ...... 
The items covered in this figure show a lower aggregate sum in  1910 than 
for the previous period chiefly on account of  credit0 for gm used in other de- 
Partmenta of  the works. 
'  This does not include any allowance for "additional coeta"  &own  on 
Profit and lose accounte. 
1902-1906 
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TABLE  42.  STEEL  CORPORATION'B  FURNACE  COST  PER  GROSS  TON OF 
BEBSEMER  PIG IRON,  AB  BHOWN  BY  PRODUCINO  SUBCOMPANIEB'  COST 
SHEETS,  APPROXIMATE  INTERCOMPANY  PROFITS  INCLUDED  THEREIN,  AND 
INTEGRATION  FURNACE  COST.  AB BHOWN BY  TEE RECORDS  OF  TEE  Cowo- 
BATION,  FOR  1910 (6,269,534  tons) 
1 The amount of, this item was $0.69 before deducting credit for furnace 
gas used in other department, namely, $0.19. 
Intercompany profits $0.002  and losses $0.002. 
This doea  not include any allowance for "additional  cost. " shown on 
the profit and loss account. 
4 In fuel, steam, materiale, and provision for rolls. 
ITSME 
Net  metallic  mix- 
ture  . . . . 
Coke . .  .  .  . 
Limestone  .  .  . 
Labor  .  .  .  . 
Other operating  . 
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-  1.20 
qL5.37 
Imne  or Corn 
Ingots  . . . . 
Labor  .  .  .  . 
Other operating  . 
Mill cost 8  . . 
INTEGRATION  COBT 
(EXCLUSIVE  OF 
ANY RETURN  TO 
INVESTMENT  OR ANY 
ANTERIOR  STAGE 
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Ta~a:  44.  STEEL  CORPORATION'S  MILL  COST  PER  GROSS  TON  OF  HEAVY 
OPEN  HEARTH  RAILS  AT  NORTHERN  AND  SOUTHERN  PLANTS,  AS  SHOWN 
PRODUCING  COMPANIES'  BOOKS,  APPROXIMATE  INTERCOMPANY 
p~omTS  INCLUDED  THEREIN,  AND  INTEGRATION  MILL COST,  AS  SHOWN 
BY m  RECORDS  OF THE COBPORATION,  FOR 1910 
The  value  of  iron  ore. -The  iron  ore  holdings  of  the 
United States Steel Corporation are very important for  the 
future.  Excluding  the  Hill  ore  leases,  which  are  to  be 
dropped in 1915, the  United  States  Steel  Corporation con- 
trols  60  per  cent  of  the  available  Lake  Superior  ores  or 
about 800,000,000 tons.  The total holdings of  the corpora- 
tion are placed at 1,200,000,000 to 1,500,000,000 tons,  The  Amount & 
ore owned  author  is  aware that these figures are lower than those  of  ,,,- 
others, but they are based  upon  careful estimate from the  trolled. 
most  reliable original  sources  of  information.  The  Steel 
Corporation in Minnesota owns railroads from the ore fields 
to the mines,  and  also owns  ore roads from the Lake Erie 
to  the  Pittsburg  district.  Further, it  owns  the  boata  it 
uses on the lakes.  It is  thus in  a commanding position  in 
reS0urces. 
The ore is the fundamental resource upon which rests the 
entire steel industry.  Therefore the question of  ore  costs 
one of paramount irnportaice.  For the year 1902 to 1996 
these  are  shown  by  the following table : - 
'  m  does not include any allowance for additional coata shown On  the 
profit and 10-  accounts. 
X 
~mue  or COET 
Ingots  . . . 
Labor  . .  . 
Other operating 
Mill cost  . 
INTEGRATION 
COBT  (EXCLU- 
SIYE OF AM 
RETURN  TO 
INVESTMENT  OR 
ANY  ANTERIOR 
STAGE  or PRO- 
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TONNAGS  COBT  PER  PRICE  PER  PROFIT  PIE  I  Ton  I  TON  I  TON 
As  we  have seen, the Commissioner  of  Corporations com- 
puted  the  value  of  the  ores  when  the  organization  was 
formed at $100,000,000;  at  the  close  of  1910,  he  placed 
the total  investment  in  ores  at about  $134,000,000.  This 
~r  makes  a  capital  account of  $7.50  to $7.55  per  ton of  pro- 
w-  duction.  On  this basis a  profit  of  66  cents per  ton would 
be  equivalent  to  about  9  per  cent.  The  Commissioner 
regards this valuation as excessive.  He thinks  that on the 
basis  of  carrying an ore  reserve of  from  thirty to  thirty- 
five  years,  the  amount  invested per  ton  of  ore  probably 
would  be less than $5 and that a profit of  66 cents per ton 
on the ore is too large by at least 25 cents. 
In this matter,  the question may well  be  raised  whether 
the Commissioner of  Corporations has not overlooked one very 
Ore the  important  factor.  In order to justify  the vast  investments 
basic 
resource.  of  the United States Steel Corporation in the improvement 
of  the mines,  development of  transportation,  and the con- 
struction of  the great mills, the industry must have a consid- 
erable future.  If  the Steel Corporation owns  only enough 
ores to carry on its business for thirty years, it must not only 
provide  for  current  depreciation,  but  the  entire  capital 
account must  be  written off  before the end of  that  period. 
When  the ores are  exhausted, the entire  capital  outlay  is 
valueless. 
For the larger part of  the investment of  the Steel Corpora- 
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necessary to provide for the outlay and improvements at the 
mine,  but it is necessary by  the  dividends to write off  the 
entire capital account by the time the ore deposit is exhausted. 
~t  may, however, be said that only the high grade ores are 
now  considered in the estimated resources and that the cor- 
poration  owns  great  reserves of  low  grade ores, which  will 
enable the company to carry on its business when the high 
grade ores  are  exhaustgd.  This is  undoubtedly  true;  but 
if  lower  grade ores are used,  those from 35 to 45  per cent 
iron,  the  cost  of  manufacture  will  be  greatly  in- 
creased;  and  if  this be so, it would  be reasonable to allow 
much  more  than the  profit  of  an ordinary  manufacturing 
business for the rich ore from the mines.  Until this factor 
is  taken into account it cannot be said what profit  should 
be  allowed  to the ores. 
Fundamental natural resources, limited in quantity, have 
an  exceptional value because  of  their  early exhaustibility; 
and methods of  computation based upon the hypothesis that 
illimitable quantities may be acquired, as convenient, cannot 
but lead to fallacious results.  The extremely limited quan-  High val- 
tity of  known high grade iron ores, as compared with the cer- :,"p 
tain needs of  this century, justify  a corporation having  the  jwtified. 
great manufacturing  and  transportation  properties  of  the 
United States Steel Corporation in acquiring ore reserves as 
far ahead as they can be obtained at reasonable figures, and 
after obtaining them in placing a high value upon them. 
The above  reasoning is fully confirmed by the rapid in- 
crease  in  the  assessed valuation of  the Lake Superior Iron 
lands.  In 1906 the assessed value of the iron-bearing lands 
of Minnesota was $64,486,409;  in 1910 it was $224,669,845, 
or nearly four times as much.  This assessment  was  made 
upon the basis of  forty per  cent of  real value;  therefore the 
value of  the iron ores of  Minnesota  for  1910 was  not  less 
than $561,674,612.'  Of  this ore, excluding the  ores of  the 
Hill  leases,  the  United  States Steel  Corporation  owns  or 
controls sixty per cent.  According to these figures the value 
of  the  ores  controlled  by  the  corporation  in  Minnesota 
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would be $337,004,767.  In 1911 the ores of  the corporation 
in  Michigan, on the theory of  full valuation but as a mat- 
ter of  fact below  the value, were assessed at $42,645,000.l 
Therefore the ores in Michigan and Minnesota controlled by 
the corporation on the basis of  assessment have a value of 
not  less  than  $379,649,767, or nearly three  times  the  esti- 
mate of  $134,000,000 given  by  the Commissioner  of  Cor- 
porations. 
As further evidence of  the soundness of  tde above position 
may be cited the rising price of  timber.  It is pointed  out 
(pp. 159-160)  that good timber, well located, during the past 
twenty years, has increased in value from six to fifty fold; and 
that the larger part of  this increase has occured during the sec- 
ond half of  this period.  Much of  the increase is unquestion- 
ably due to the limited quantity of  this resource;  although 
it is true that a part of  it is due to the consolidation of  hold- 
ings.  The existing timber will be likely to meet the needs of 
the nation as long as the discovered high grade iron ore ;  and 
there is this difference:  the timber is renewable, indeed, is 
being renewed one third as fast as it is cut, whereas the iron 
ore cannot be increased by a ton through any effort of  man. 
It would seem that the fortunate owners of  high grade iron 
ore are justified in increasing its valuation at least as rapidly 
as the owners of  timber. 
Practices of  the  Corporation.-  Regarding methods of  con- 
solidation,  the United  States Steel  Corporation  illustrates 
only a single phase of  the process.  Before this organization 
was formed, the trust had been declared to be unlawful, and 
consequently the steel company became a holding company 
for all of  the stock of  its subordinate companies ;  and in turn 
each of  these subordinate companies is to a greater or less 
extent a holding company of  subsidiary companies.  As we 
have already seen, the Carnegie Company of  New Jersey was 
strictly  a  holding  company.  The  dividends  of  the  sub- 
sidiary companies, the stock of  which is owned, goes to the 
Steel Corporation, and the Steel Corporation in turn declares 
dividends, it being the only stock which the public holds. 
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In the matter of  combination with other companies there 
is  no charge that the Steel Corporation, as such, has entered 
into  a  formal agreement  to  regulate  prices  and  outputs. 
However, there have been meetings of  the men engaged in  ~utud 
the iron and steel business of  the United States, representing :g'&,, 
nearly 90 per cent of  the total, in which the entire situation  of  com- 
has been gone over ;  and there has been an informal under-  p8n'e8. 
standing as to spheres of  influence and prices,  under which, 
while there has been competition for business, there has been 
no severe fluctuation in price.  In fact, steel rails have been 
held at  $28 per ton since the time the corporation was formed.' 
In the complaint made by the Attorney-General, petition- 
ing for the dissolution of  the Steel Corporation, it is alleged 
that, at these meetings, the different corporations "reached 
a common understanding which was followed under solemn 
admonition  that they  were  bound  by  an obligation more 
estimable  than  life.  These  meetings  brought  about  the 
maintenance  of  prices.  It  was  understood  by  them  that 
they were  traveling  together,  and that they were going to 
stand together.  They understood and acted upon the under- 
standing that a statement as to what one would do as  to prices 
or output was a promise and a  pledge upon  honor to the 
others.  At the meeting of  January 11, 1911, and other meet- 
ings, there was a general expression  of  opinion that prices 
should be maintained, and in pursuance of  this understanding 
and agreement they were maintained.  When an understand- 
ing was reached, individual declarations were made of  inten- 
tion to follow the movement.  It was recognized that they 
followed the policy laid out by them by the head of the cor- 
poration.  This meeting of  January 11, 1911, was attended 
by about 80 representatives of  iron and steel concerns, being 
a large majority in number and output of  such concerns in the 
United States.  They understood  that the purpose was to 
consider the prices of  iron and steel, that the consensus of 
opinion was that the prices should not be lowered, but that 
they should be maintained, and that by virtue of  what oc- 
curred, they were in honor bound to each other to maintain 
Investigation U. 8.8W Corporation, 67, pp. 61384139. 134  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
them.  In fact, they, in pursuance of  this action, did main- 
tain them."  In the answer to the complaint, it is denied that 
(6  at any  time  was  there  any  attempt to reach  any agree- 
ment or understanding with  respect  either to output or  to 
prices, nor was anything said or done which  was  calculated 
or  intended  to suppress competition or  restrain  trade, and 
there  never  was  nor.is there now  any  such agreement or 
understanding." 
To what  extent  the  charges made will  be proved to be 
true is yet to be seen;  but there can be no doubt that since 
the formation of  the United States Steel Corporation, prices 
have been steady as never before in the steel trade in this 
country when conditions of  severe and sometimes destruc- 
tive  competition alternated with pools or gentlemen's agree- 
ments.  The regulation  of  prices  appears  to  be  the  chief 
objection  which  has  been  made  against  the  corporation. 
That the corporation has a steadying influence upon pricea 
is undoubtedly  true.  Also  it seems that the profits of  the 
corporation, as given pp. 117-119,  have been excessive.  Fur- 
ther, the corporation has required unreasonably long hours of 
labor from a part of  its force, and has opposed labor unions. 
The Eficiency of  the Corporation. -The  economic advan- 
tages which have resulted from the Steel Corporation include 
all of  those which have been assigned in the general discus- 
sion  as a  justification  for  concentration.  However,  there 
are certain points in which the concentration has led to es- 
pecially important savings.  These will be briefly mentioned. 
The complete integration  of  the industry has given very 
high efficiency.  The company, owning its ore, coal, and lime- 
stone,  and  owning  its transportation  lines, including rail- 
Complete  roads to and from the lakes and the steamboats on the lakes, 
'rite*"  tion.  has been  able  to get to its various furnaces the material 
in quality and quantity as desired.  Owning a very wide va- 
riety of  ores, the ores of  different qualities have been brought 
to a given furnace in such proportions as to give the proper 
mixtures  for  the  particular  grade  of  iron  needed  at that 
point.  If  for Bessemer use, the material is low in phosphorus; 
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higher  in  this  element; if  for  foundry iron, the 
phosphorus is much higher. 
Since the many millions of  tons of  ore needed by the cor- 
poration must go to the lakes and down the lakes to the docks 
or to the furnaces during approximately seven months of  the 
year, the advantage of  control of  the transpor'tation for the 
ores has been  very great.  Indeed, it is extremely doubtful 
if, without such control, it would have been possible for the 
corporation to have retained the highest efficiency. 
Since the corporation has a set of mills to produce articles 
of various kinds at the great industrial centers of  Pittsburg 
and Chicago, and to a less extent at  many other points from 
Superior to Cleveland, cross freights have been reduced to a 
minimum.  To illustrate,  the products  needed  south  and 
west of  Chicago are furnished by the mills about that city. 
As the corporation has a large number of  plants, it has been 
able to specialize its mills, in many cases a single mill giving  Specializa- 
almost its entire energy to a certain product,  or if  not to a 
single product, to a set of  similar products.  This has enabled 
the corporation to go far in standardizing its goods, which 
is  a  very  great  source of  economy.  Bridge materials  are 
turned out in definife lengths, widths, thicknesses, and forms ; 
so also iron rods, bars, etc.  These practices obviate frequent 
changes in the rolls. 
The manufacture of  iron and steel is one which  is  con- 
stantly  requiring  scientific  investigations.  The magnitude 
of the corporation has enabled it to keep a strong investigat- 
ing department for improvements, mechanical and chemical; 
and this department  has  carried  on  extensive experiments 
which could not have been undertaken by a small company. 
Through the investigating department many advances have  Investi- 
been  made.  Thus  it has  been  ascertained  that with  the 
Pennsylvania coal a very considerable percentage of  Illinois 
coal can be mixed and a satisfactory coke be secured for the 
manufacture of  iron.  This has markedly decreased the ex- 
penses for coke at the furnaces in the Chicago district. 
It is sometimes held  that the great corporation does not 
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smaller organizations; but this cannot be said to be true of 
Comparison  the Steel Corporation.  This is a holding corporation ; the 
man-  officers of  the subsidiary  companies are retained, the same 
agement. 
as  before  the consolidation.  These  officers  have  had  the 
stimulus to efficiency, not only of  general published results, 
but of  actual comparison of  the results of  one management 
with another by parallel columns under the strictest system 
of  cost accounting.  Indeed,  the competition  for  efficiency 
between the different subsidiary companies of  the Steel Cor- 
poration has been nothing short of  terrific.  Ilowever, before 
the consolidation, the competition  was  of  the keenest  be- 
tween the different mills of  the same class in the Federal 
Steel and Carnegie corporations.  There is a general belief 
that the alertness of  management and the efficiency under 
the Steel Corporation has not deteriorated as compared with 
the situation before its formation. 
Relative Eficiency of Large and Small Steel Companies. -  All 
of  the above conclusions rest uponqualitative rather than upon 
quantitative studies.  While the report of  the Commissioner 
of  Corporations does not give the data to enable us to make 
a statistical statement regarding the economic advantages of 
the Steel Corporation as compared with other companies, it 
does furnish material to make a comparison in this respect 
between the Steel Corporation together with four other large 
concerns (Lackawanna Steel Company, Jones and  Laughlin 
Steel Company, Republic Iron and Steel Company, and Cam- 
bria Steel Company), and the small concerns. 
Tables 37 and 38 (pp. 124-125) show that while the cost of 
ore at  the lower lake ports for the small companies  is somewhat 
less than for the large companies, $2.49  as compared with 
$2.64,  that for the manufactured products the cost is always 
greater for the small companies than for the large companies ; 
and this is so whatever the basis of  comparison.  Thus taking 
CO&  book  costs:  Bessemer  pig  iron  costs  the large companies 
greater for 
,d  ,,,-  $13.04  per  ton as compared with $14.18 for the small com- 
panies, a difference of  $1.14; basic pig iron costs the large 
companies  $12.17  as compared with $13.81  for  the small 
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the large companies $18.69 as compared with $22.51 for the 
small companies, a difference of $3.82. 
~f  transfer  profits  be  included,  even  greater  differences 
Thus the costs of  Bessemer pig iron on this basis are 
for the large companies $11.11 per  ton  as compared  with 
$14.12 for the small companies, a  difference of  $3.01;  for 
basic  pig  iron $11.11 for the large companies as compared 
$13.59 for the small companies, a difference of  $2.48; 
and for large Bessemer billets, $16.36 for the large companies 
as  with $21.66 for the small  companies, a differ- 
ence of  $5.30. 
In the above statement  the advantages which the large 
companies have in the matter of transportation are included. 
For  the Steel Corporation it is estimated that the average 
profits  on  transportation  amounted  to  60  cents  per  ton 
upon  the  ore;  this  would  be  roughly  equivalent  to  $1 
a  ton  on  the products  above  mentioned.  The profits  of 
the Steel Corporation on transportation were  undoubtedly  Economic 
much greater than those of  the other companies, and there- :,"Ea$ 
fore  for  the  average  of  the  four  companies  $1  for  the  small 
profits  of  transportation  are  too  high;  75  cents  may  compan'ea- 
perhaps  be  accepted  as  a  rough  approximation.  If  this 
amount be subtracted from the excess profits of  the large 
companies,  they  still  have  a  wide  margin  over  the small 
companies. 
'The above data do not give a basis upon which to compare 
the economic merits of  the large and small companies, since 
in the integrated industry the production of  a ton of  steel in- 
volves a larger capital per ton  of  output than for the small 
companies.  The  capital  of  the small  companies  includes 
only the cost  of  mills  to transform  billets  into steel prod- 
ucts, whereas for  the larger  companies much  capital  is in- 
vested in  the part of  the industry anterior to the billets. 
Unfortunately  the report  of  the commissioner does not 
give the capital accounts of  the large and small companies, 
nor determine the amount which should go to interest on this 
account per ton of  product, and thus enable us to ascertain 
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small  company,  nor  even  to determine  whether  such  net 
advantage exists. 
However,  the  facts available  show, if  ruthless competi- 
tion  were  to  occur  regardless  of  interest  on  capital,  that 
GW~  corn-  the  large  companies  would  be  able  to destroy  the  small 
paniea may  ones; because by eliminating transfer costs the great com- 
ema~  on-.  panies have their materials at the final mills at a lower rate 
than the small companies.  At a  figure for  final products 
which  would  eliminate all profits for  small companies, the 
large companies would  still have  a  profit on  pig  iron and 
billets of  from $2.48 to $5.30, as shown by the last column of 
Table 38.  Thus the large companies, if  they were willing 
to reduce profits below  the above amounts and pay a very 
small interest on capital, could compel competitors to close 
up or run at a loss. 
The figures of  the  commissioner  seem  to show beyond 
question that if  competition be carried on without reference 
to the percentage of  profit on the capital invested, the large 
steel companies could crush the smaller ones. 
Relative Eficiency of  fhe Large Steel Companies. -The  very 
interesting question as to the relative strength of  the United 
States Steel Corporation, as compared with  the other four 
companies reckoned as large, is not taken up by the Commis- 
sioner.  Would  a  similar comparison of  the Steel Corpora- 
tion with these companies, excluding transfers, show a greater 
profit per  ton than the other four large companies?  The 
high  integration  of  the  Steel  Corpotation  would  seem  to 
render this possible.  If  this be so, just as the large companies 
could crush  the small companies, so the Steel Corporation 
could  crush  the  other  large  companies, if  the  competitive 
system were pushed to the limit with the aim of  destroying 
all competitors. 
This  comparison  raises  the  question  whether  the  con- 
solidation of the great constituent companies of  the United 
States Steel Corporation because of  that fact increased their 
joint  efficiency; that is to say, could the companies of  the 
size of  Federal Steel, Carnegie Steel, and the American Steel 
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equal  to that of  the Steel Corporation?  This is 
the crux of  the question concerning the relation of  economy 
and  extent of  consolidation for iron and steel.  It is agreed 
by &ll, that in this industry  an organization to be highly  Relative 
efficient must be large; that it is necessarily  one of  great  ~~~~~~~ 
Is a  capitalization  of  from  $50,000,000 to panies. 
$100,000,000  for  a  steel  corporation  sufficient to give the 
economy?  Some men believe that the undoubted 
economies due to complete integration,  avoidance of  cross 
freights, specialization of  work  in  the different  mills, etc., 
enjoyed  by  the United  States Steel Corporation  are more 
than compensated by deterioration which  it is charged has 
been introduced because of  the gigantic size of  the corpora- 
tion.  It is, in  short, asserted that magnitude has gone be- 
yond  the stage  giving  increased  efficiency. 
On the other hand, it is held by Mr. Gary,l Chairman of 
the Steel Corporation,  that none of  the great independent 
companies could hold their ground against it if  competition 
was driven to its final limit. 
This  view  is  codrmed from  other  sources.  The Wan 
Street  Journul states that in  1911 the  net  profits  of  the 
Steel  Corporation  were  close  to $11  a  ton;  whereas  the 
hightest profits of  the independent companies were approxi- 
mately  $7  per  ton;  and the average of  the independents 
not  much  more  than  $4  per  ton.  These figures me con- 
firmed  by  the  elaborate  investigations of  Mr. Farquhar I. 
MacRae  for  the  Congressional  Committee.  It  therefore 
appears  that if  unrestrained  competition  were  introduced 
into  the  iron  and  steel  industry  it  would  be  possible 
for the United States Steel Corporation  to crush  its  corn- 
Petitors.2 
To  throw  further  light  upon  this  subject, it is  to be 
hoped that the Commissioner of  Corporations will  compare 
the cost  of  production of  the large steel  companies among 
themselves  as  he  has  the  larger  companies  with  the 
'  Investigations U. S. Steel Corporation, 53, Part I, pp. 3690-3691. 
Bee also testimony Chauncy M. Dutton, Hearinga Senate Interstste Com- 
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smaller ones.  Also  it is to be hoped  that these investiga- 
tions will take into account interest on capital in order that 
we may have exact data to base a conclusion concerning the 
relative economic efficiency of  the large independent organi- 
zations, and of  these as compared with the small companies. 
Summary  of  Evils. -  In conclusion, the chief  evils which 
have  appeared in  connection with  the  United  States Steel 
Corporation are : - 
1. Unparalleled ~verca~italization. 
2. Large sums paid to organizers and manipulators at the 
time of  the conversion of  the preferred stock into bonds. 
3.  Excessive  prices;  these  have  resulted  in  enormous 
earnings. 
4.  Selling products  cheaper  abroad  than at home. 
THE  AMERICAN TOBACCO  COMPANY' 
The tobacco  industry  is  one  of  those  in  which  a  single 
combination controlled a large percentage of  the business of 
the  United  States until  the  organization was  dissolved  by 
order of  the Supreme Court into fourteen companies. 
History  of  Company. -  The dominant  corporation in the 
tobaccq industry during recent years has been the American 
Tobacco  Company.  This company had  three great  subsid- 
iary companies, the American Snuff  Company, the American 
Cigar Company,  and  the British-American  Tobacco Com- 
pany.  All four of  these companies controlled a large number 
of  subsidiary  companies,  the  total  number  of  companies 
under the combination doing business in the United States, 
Porta Rico, and Cuba being eighty-six. 
This group of  companies in  1909 controlled 92.7 per  cent 
of the cigarette business of  the country, 62 per cent of  the plug 
tobacco, 59.2 per cent of  the smoking tobacco, and in 1901, 
1 Report of  the Commissioner of  Corporations on the Tobacco Induetry : 
Part  I,' Position of  the Tobacco Combination in the Industry;  Part 11. 
Capitalisation, Investments, and Earnings.  Washington, Government  Print 
ing Office, 1909,1911. ILLUSTRATIONS  OF  CONCENTRATION  141 
the  first year  it entered  the  snuff  business,  80.2  per  cent  Monopo- 
of the snuff.  Later the American Tobacco Company entered :zgion. 
the cigar  business and by 1903 it had  acquired about  one 
of  the cigar  output of  the United  States.  The capi- 
talization of  the companies of  the combination in stocks and 
bonds, when  reported  upon  in  1909  by  the  Commissioner 
of  Corporations, was, without counting duplication of  stock 
by  interholdings, $316,346,281. 
The business of  the American Tobacco Company included 
the  manufacture  and  handling  of  chewing  and  smoking 
tobacco, of  cigarettes  for  domestic consumption, and  little 
cigars,  together  with  enterprises  allied  with  the  tobacco  scope  of 
industry.  The  American  Snuff  Company  confined  its 
operations to the manufacture of  snuff.  The American Cigar 
Company, with  its subsidiaries,  handled  the cigar  business 
of  the combination.  The British-American  Tobacco  Com- 
pany handled all the foreign business of  the company.  The 
dominating organization was  the American  Tobacco  Com- 
pany,  which  held  a  majority  of  the  capital  stock  of  the 
American  Cigar  and  the British-American  Companies,  and 
over 40 per cent of  the stock of  the American Snuff Company. 
The total number  of  companies absorbed in  building  up 
the combination was  in the neighborhood  of  two  hundred 
and  fifty.  The  organization  went  through  three  stages. 
It  began  with  the  formation  of  the  American  Tobacco  TWO  hun- 
Cornpany  in  1890.  This  company,  beginning  with  the g~: E::- 
manufacture  of  cigars  and  cigarettes, soon expanded  its  panies 
operations into the plug tobacco business.  By carrying on  absorbed. 
a vigorous war,  the American Tobacco  Company  acquired 
a number  of  its  competitors, and  in  1898 united  with  the 
strongest of the others into the Continental  Tobacco Com- 
pany.  Following this, in 1900, came the snuff  combination 
under  the  name  of  the  American  Snuff  Company.  This 
Presents  the ht  stage of  combination. 
In 1901 the Consolidated Tobacco Company was formed, 
which  took over  the  Continental  and  American  Tobacco 
Companies,  being itself  strictly a holding corporation.  As 
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business  in  Great  Britain,  the  British-American  Tobacco 
Company was formed in 1902 for the foreign tobacco business 
outside of  Great Britain  and the United States. 
After  the  decision  of  the Supreme Court  dissolving  the 
Northern  Securities Company  (see  p.  180), the  companies 
above mentioned were merged in 1904 into one corporation, 
the reorganized American Tobacco Company. 
In the process of  growth of  the American Tobacco Com- 
pany, we  have illustrated all of  the stages of  most of  the great 
Stages of  concentrations of  industry, with the exception of  pools  and 
develop 
ment.  trusts, which stages of  development had been gone through 
before  the  organization  of  the  first  American  Tobacco 
Company.  These  included  the  consolidation  of  numer- 
ous  companies  into  a  large  company,  then  control  of 
groups of  companies through holding companies, and finally 
a  single  consolidated  combination,  the  American  Tobacco 
Company. 
Overcapitalization. -  At  each  step in the  development of 
the American Tobacco Company, there was opportunity for 
increasing  its securities,  both  stocks  and  bonds;  and  this 
was  done  at each  transformation  upon a  great  scale;  ac- 
crued earnings and good will were capitalized and common 
stock was issued  as  a bonus.  Each  company  when  taken 
into a  new  organization was  treated  most  liberally in  the 
estimate of  values, in some cases the amount of  bonds issued 
being double stock previously held.  In 1908 the good  will 
of  the American Tobacco Company represented a capitaliza- 
tion  of  $105,000,000;  whereas its cash value according to 
the Bureau of  Corporations was only about  $39,000,000,  or 
37 per cent.  Altogether, the transformations resulted in the 
enormous capitalization mentioned. 
As  illustrating  the  amount  of  the  expansion, it may  be 
said  that the capital of  one of  the constituent businesses of 
Expansion  the company in  1885  was  $250,000.  When  the Americau 
Tobacco Company was  organized this went in  on the basis 
of  $7,500,000  in  stock.  By  1908 the readjustment  of  this 
amount  had  reached  $22,@0,000;  and cash  dividends and 
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investment of  $250,000 had by 1908 realized in stock, bonds, 
dividends, and interest $39,000,000, or one hundred fifty-six 
times the value of  the business in  1885. 
~llegitimate  Competition. -  After  the  combination  formed, 
the  of  ruthless  competition  were  used.  Having 
control  of  several  lines  of  business,  when  a  new  line  was 
entered,  there  were  put  upon  the  market  certain  brands 
which  were  sold  either  at no  profit  or  at  a  loss.  These 
were called "fighting brands."  In the case of  plug tobacco, 
one of these was appropriately called "Battle  Ax";  another 
was known as the "Horse  Shoe."  In order more effectively 
to  carry  on  destructive  competition some  twenty  or  more 
companies were secretly purchased, and, while a part of  the 
American Tobacco Company, were supposed to be independ- 
ent firms.  These  companies were  used  in the campaign  of 
underselling;  and  in  this  way  public  disapproval  of  the 
illegitimate campaign was avoided by the American  Tobacco 
Company.  Exclusive contracts were made with sellers, and 
bonuses given for compliance with the  same.  The  business 
of  competitors  was  placed  under  secret  espionage.  The 
methods of  competition were so fierce as often to destroy the 
weaker  competitors.  Others found  too  strong to  be  killed 
by the illegitimate methods of  competition were  purchased 
from time to time, usually at very high prices.  Continuity in 
the plans for expansion and monopoly was secured through 
a group comprising only about half a dozen men who always 
controlled the business of  the American Tobacco Company, 
the center of  the organizations and reorganizations. 
Intemzational  Combination. -  After  the American  Tobacco 
Company had  acquired a  dominant  position in  the United 
States,  the  British  market  was  vigorously  entered.  In 
order to meet the competition of  the strong American com- 
pany,  many  British  companies  united  into  the  Imperial 
Tobacco  Company;  and  thus the  forces  of  the  war  were 
equalised.  This led to  a  mutual  agreement upon  the part 
the  combinations,  each  to  respect  the  territory  of  the 
leaving the British field free to the British Company 
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same time the two combinations united to form an additional 
company,  the  British-American  Tobacco  Company,  which 
was  to push  vigorously  the  tobacco  business in  all  other 
parts  of  the  world,  except  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain.  Thus  the formation of  the great  combination  in 
America led to a simiIar combination in Great Britain, and 
also made a step toward world combination. 
Expansion  into  Allied  Businesses. -  As  is  usual  when  a 
great combination is formed, the companies concerned went 
into allied businesses.  Since licorice is one of  the important 
materials used in the manufacture of  tobacco, this was one 
of  the businesses which was entered ; and the American To- 
bacco  Company obtained  more  than 95  per  cent, nearly  a 
complete monopoly,  of  the licorice  business  of  the United 
States. 
In addition  to acquiring allied manufacturing  businesses, 
the American Tobacco Company had a stock interest, often 
controlling, in the concerns of  the country which were  en- 
gaged  in the dist~ibution  of  tobacco. 
Concentration of  Manufacture. -  The organization concen- 
trated the manufacturing of  tobacco in a limited number of 
large plants, the small pIants which were acquired from time 
to time being closed.  Also the manufacture of  tobacco was 
specialized, a given great factory  devoting itself to one line 
of  product.  Thus, while there  were  two hundred  and fifty 
or more  plants acquired, the main  part of  the business of 
the  company  was  carried  on  in  the  great  plants.  The 
cigarette  and  little  cigar  business  was  conducted  in  nine 
plants;  all  of  the business in  plug  and twist  tobacco was 
carried  on  in  six  plants,  and  about  seven  eighths  of  this 
amount in two plants.  About  30  per  cent of  the business 
was  distributed  among ten subsidiary companies,  of  which 
the relation of  eight with  the American Tobacw Company 
was  kept  a  secret.  Half  of  the  business  of  the  fine-cut 
tobacco was  done in nine plants and the remainder in sub- 
sidiary plants.  The entire  snuff  business  of  the  company 
was  conducted in ten plants,  four  directly  owned  and  six 
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bination  had  a  marked  advantage  over  its  competitors; 
and  still  further advantage  was  gained  by  the  control  of 
more efficient machinery for marketing. 
~~~~~~ive  Projits. -  The profits  of  the combination  were 
very  large.  After the formation  of  the reorganized Ameri- 
can Tobacco Company in  1904, the average earnings upon 
actual investments to 1908 were  19 per cent, or $31,200,000 
yearly;  and  this  upon  the  basis  of  a  capitalization  of 
$316,g00,000,  which  we  have  already seen was  reached by 
several  manipulations,  each  with  great  expansion  of  the 
stock  and  bonds. 
The  combination  was  greatly  assisted  in  securing  these 
enormous profits through  changes in the internal  revenues. 
In 1898, as  a  result  of  the Spanish War, taxes were greatly 
increased upon  tobacco and prices  were  raised  accordingly. 
In 1901-1902  this tax was reduced  to its former level;  but 
by this time the combination had become sufficiently power-  War tax 
ful to hold up prices, so that practically all of  the advmtage 
of  the  reduction  of  the tax  on  the manufactured  tobacco  tion. 
from twelve  cents  to six  cents  per pound went, not to the 
consumer,  but  to  the  combination,  in  this  way  adding 
many millions to its income. 
The enormous profits of  the combination were  thus due 
largely to the following causes : the reduction of  the Spanish 
war  tax, the capitalization of  the good  will  of  the business 
at each  consolidation or  reorganization, putting in  surplus 
increase the capital  stock,  exchanging at inflated  values 
at times of  reorganization,  and  issuing  common  stock as a 
bonus. 
These  enormous  earnings  were  derived  from  an  article 
mainly  sold  in  small packages.  Much  the greater  propor- 
tion of the retail sales of  tobacco is in amount6 of  fifty cents 
Or  less;  but  tobacco  is  very  widely  used.  The American 
Tobacco  Company, by adding a little  additional  tribute to 
the  purchases  of  millions  of  people,  has  made  fabulous 
profits. 
According to the Commissioner of  Corporations  the rates 
Profit obtained  by  independent  concerns  average  much 
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lower than those of  the combination.'  The average rate of 
earnings  of  forty-eight  independent  companies  for  1906 
was  15.9  upon  the total  tangible  assets;  whereas, for the 
same year the earnings of  the American Tobacco Company 
were  40.9  of  its  tangible  assets  or  more  than  three  times 
as much.2 
Monopoly  and  Competition. -  Notwithstanding  the  great 
advantage  which  the  American  Tobacco  Company  had 
through  large plants,  specialization of  business, and control 
of  machinery, the competitors of  the  combination steadily 
gained  in their  business;  and this in spite of  the fact that 
they were  put to great  expense for advertising to meet the 
"fighting  brands"  of  the American  and  illegitimate  com- 
petition  through  secret  companies.  This  was  possible 
because of  the enormous profits which the combination was 
taking.  These facts go to show that even a combination of 
gigantic size,  controlling 80  per  cent of  the business of  the 
country along various lines, may exist, and competitors gain 
upon  it,  if  the prices  charged  are  very  excessive .and  the 
profits correspondingly great.  They indicate that there  is a 
limit beyond which  extortionate charges may not be levied. 
If  the amount of  tribute be  made too great, even fear of  a 
The limits  mighty  combination will  not  prevent  capital  from  entering 
tribute-  a business in order to share in the great profits.  Upon the 
other hand, the facts clearly show that excessive prices may 
be  retained  sufficient  to  give  the  combination  enormous 
profits.  This is  true for  the American  Tobacco Company, 
even upon the basis of  the fictitious capitalization ; and if  we 
consider the great gains made by  the chief  manipulators of 
the company at the various transformations, the profits for 
these  men  are nothing  short  of  amazing. 
It is the opinion of  the Commissioner of  Corporations that 
almost  from  the  outset  it  was  the  aim  of  the  American 
Aim to  Tobacco  Company  to  acquire  monopoly.  This  plan  was 
gain  first applied to one line of  business, the cigarette and little 
cigar;  from  this  it  was  extended  to  plug  tobacco  and 
1 "The Tobacco Industry," Part 11, p. 314. 
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later to snuff  and fine-cut tobacco.  The purpose was largely 
accomplished in these lines, since the combination  succeeded 
in getting four fifths of  the business of  the country; but the 
never  accomplished  its  purpose  in  the  cigar 
business, the maximum  proportion gained  in this line being 
about one sixth.  The dissolution of  the American Tobacco 
Company by order of  the courts is discussed pp. 183-187. 
Summary  of  Evils. -The  chief  evils  illustrated  by  the 
American  Tobacco  Company  are : - 
1. Overcapitalization,  and  especially  excessive  capitali- 
zation  of  good  will,  exchanges  at each  reorganization  at 
inflated  values,  and giving  common stock  as bonus. 
2.  Stock  manipulation.  The  reorganizations  were  made 
in such a manner as greatly to benefit those who were on the 
inside. 
3.  Excessive prices  due in large  measure  to  monopolistic 
position.  The  high  prices  lead  to  enormous  and  unwar- 
ranted earnings. 
4. The use  of secret companies to kill  competitors. 
5. The compelling of  purchasers to deal  exclusively  with 
the American Tobacco Company. 
6.  Espionage  of  competitors'  business  with  other  unfair 
practices  in connection  with  the same. 
THE  AMERICAN  SUGAR REFINING  COMPANY1 
Commanding  Position of  Company. -  The initial organiza- 
tion  of  the  sugar  combination  was  the  Sugar  Refineries 
Company.  From  1887  to  1891  this  company  purchased 
refineries in various parts of  the country until hally twenty 
refineries were  controlled.  In 1891 this organization incor- 
porated  under  the laws of  the state of  New  Jersey as the 
American  Sugar  Refining  Company,  with  a  capital  of 
$b50,000,000.  Most of the plants purchased  were abandoned, 
'  House of  Representatives, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session.  Report by Mr. 
Hardwick from the  ~pecial  committee  to investigate  the  American Sugar 
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all the refining  being  done  in  seven  establishments.  The 
American was engaged in the refining of  cane sugar.  When 
organized it controlled 75 per cent of  that class of  business. 
Shortly after the organization of  the New Jersey corporation 
the Spreckles Company of  the West united with the American, 
so that as  early as 1892 the combination controlled  90 per 
cent  of  the sugar  refining  business  of  the  country.  From 
this time  until  1898 the company had  prwtical  monopoly 
of  the  refining  business  in  the  United  States.  In  1898 
Arbuckle  Brothers  entered  the refining  business, and for  a 
time  there  was  fierce competition;  but  the two  companies 
got together  in  1903 and the war  ended. 
Beginning  with  1901  the  American  Company  began  to 
acquire an interest  in  the beet  sugar  companies and  soon 
secured a large interest in that line of  business. 
In 1900 the American Sugar Company refined 67 per cent 
of  the  sugar.  This  proportion  declined, until,  in  1910,  it 
refined  only  42  per  cent.  But  the  company  also  owned 
stock or controlled a number of  so-called independent com- 
panies.  As  a result, it is calculated that of  the cane sugar 
refining  business and beet  sugar manufacture of  the United 
States in  that year  the American Sugar  Refining Company 
controlled  62 per  cent. 
Increase  in Margins. -During  the years  in  which  the 
American  Company  has  had  approach  to  monopoly  the 
margins for refining have been  increased.  During the four 
years prior  to the formation  of  the  Sugar Refinery  Com- 
pany,  competition was  severe and  the average margin was 
79.6  cents  per  hundred  pounds.  As  soon  as  the  refiners 
became  well  organized the margin was  raised to $1.25.  At 
the time  of  the  competition  between  the Havemeyer, the 
Spreckles, and the Arbuckle interests, it fell  to between  70 
and  75  cents,  and  in  1899  was  as low  as 50 cents.  After 
the Arbuckle war  closed,  in  1901, it rose  to $1 ; but since 
1905 has  gradually declined,  and  while  variable from  time 
to time, in 1911 it was 89.2 cents. 
Price  of  Raw Material. -  There is complaint on the part of 
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sugar  has  been  unduly  depressed,  being made  15 cents per 
hundred pounds lower at New Orleans than at New York; 
but doubtless at least a part of  this difference is justified on 
the ground of  the transportational advantages of  New York. 
The sugar planters of the Hawaiian Islands, Port0 Rico, and 
the  Philippines are  united  and  have  been  able to  protect 
themselves.  Similarly  the  prices  paid  to the  farmers  for 
beets  have  been  satisfactory, there  being  no  evidence of  a 
between  manufacturers to depress  prices. 
Overcapitalization. -  The  Sugar  Refining  Company  when 
organized  with  a  stock  of  $50,000,000  was  greatly  over- 
capitalized.  As  other  companies  were  united  they  were 
taken  in  at excessive  values, and  this led  to a  capitaliza- 
tion  of  $90,000,000 by  1901.  At  least 50  per  cent  of  the 
common stock is regarded as water, of  which the insiders and 
promoters got a large portion. 
Excessive  ProJits. -The  preferred  stock  has  paid  7  per 
cent and the common 9.4 per cent, an average of  8.2 for the 
whole stock issue, or at least 15 or 16 per cent on a fair val- 
uation  of  the properties  and  business.  The promoters  of 
the organization and the manipulators have, with the excep- 
tion of a single firm, sold these watered stocks to the public 
at a  price  of  from  $120  to $130 per  share, so that at the 
present time a large part  of  the stock  originally  owned  by 
fifty  men is now in the possession of  nineteen thousand people 
scattered  all  over  the country, but  largely  located in  New 
England  and  the North  Atlantic  states;  of  these  nineteen 
thousand, ten thousand are women. 
Evils  Illustrated. -  The  American  Sugar  Refining  Com- 
Pany has engaged in exceptionally objectionable practices. 
(1)  Through collusion of  the  officers  of  the  sugar  corn- 
Pany and the officers  of  the government,  duties were  paid 
upon  the  basis  of  short  weights.  There  were  recovered 
from  the  company  on  account  of  these  weighing  frauds 
$11835,486.  The secretary-treasurer  of  the American Sugar 
Refining Company and the general manager of  the Brooklyn 
Refinery were convicted for participation in them. 
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were  also  discovered  under  which  the  company  had  re- 
ceived drawbacks for exported syrup in excess of  the amount 
justly  due.  The company settled the case with the govern- 
ment by the payment of $700,000. 
(3)  The company  has  been  convicted of  taking rebates 
from  a  number  of  railways;  and in  consequence of  those 
practices has been fined sums aggragating $98,000.' 
(4)  In addition  to  the  above,  the  Congressional  Com- 
mittee  finds  strikingly  developed  several  evils  which  they 
regard  as  characteristic  of  combinations.  These  are  as 
follows : - 
L 6 a. Original overcapitalization  of  great  industrial  corpo- 
rations  resulting in increased  cost of  production, if  a  profit 
is to be  made  (as is  always insisted upon)  on  the inflated 
capitalization,  and higher  prices  of  the product  to the con- 
suming public. 
( ( b. The  temptations  of  the  persons  who  organize  and 
control these large corporations to earn dividends on watered 
stock as soon as possible, so that such stock may be ualoaded 
in  the  open  markets  upon  the  investing  public.  These 
dividends  can  rarely  if  ever  be  made  without  increasing 
prices  to the  consumer. 
6(  c.  Exploitation not only of  the consuming public and of 
the  investing  public,  as  already  set  out,  but  also  of  the 
corporations  themselves,  by  their  officers,  directors,  and 
trustees,  who  do not hesitate to overburden the consumer, 
to deceive the investor, and to take advantage of  the cor- 
porations that have trusted them, whenever it will  line the 
pockets of  such individual trustees." 
THE MEAT  PACKING  INDUSTRYa 
The Big  Six. -Another  industry in which a large part of 
the business has been concentrated with a few companies is 
1 Report of  the Attorney-General, 1910,  pp. 12-142,  1911,  p. 21. 
'Report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Corporations on  the  Beef  Industry. 
Washington Government Printing Office, 1906. ILLUSTRATIONS  OF CONCENTRATION  151 
meat  packing.  The report  of  the Commissioner of  Corpo- 
rations is based  upon facts available to the end of  1904, and 
the  statements  below  should  be  considered  of  that  date. 
The large  packing  companies are :  Armour,  Swift, Morris, 
National,  Schwartzchild  &  Sulzberger,  and  Cudahy,  fre- 
quently called the  'L Big Six."  These control 50 per cent of 
the beef packing industry of  the United States.  Also these 
companies handle hogs, sheep, calves;  and they do an exten- 
sive business in the purchase, storage, and sale of  dairy and 
poultry products.  The by-products of  these companies are 
very important ; some of  these are hides, fat, and fertilizer. 
Each of  the companies owns refrigerator lines for the trans- 
portation of  products, and each does a general refrigerating 
business. 
While the total business of  the  '(Big Six"  is  only about 
50 per cent of  the whole, in the large cities of the East they do 
a much  larger  proportion;  for  instance,  in  New  York  75 
per  cent, in Boston 85 per  cent, in  Philadelphia and Pitts- 
burg  60  per  cent.  On  the  other  hand,  in  cities  west  of  Percentage 
Pittsburg,  such as Cleveland, Cincinnati, and  Indianapolis,  ofbudoeak 
not  one  half  of  the  business  belongs  to these  companies. 
Even in the small towns in  New  England these  companies 
control  about  three  fourths  of  the  business;  but  in  the 
Western states, in  cities having populations of  fifty thousand 
or less, they usually control less than half  of  the business. 
The  total  capitalization of  these  companies in  1905 was 
$~3,000,000,  which included $5,000,000 in bonds.  The gross 
businew  of  the six  companies was  about  $700,000,000  per 
mum.  With one exception these  companies have  largely 
grown up as a single corporation and have increased in size as 
has grown, although to a certain extent the growth 
has been  by  accretion through  the purchase of  other com- 
panies.  However,  the  National  Packing  Company  is  an 
to this, in that it was  organized in  1903 through 
the  consolidation of  a  number  of  existing  companies.  In 
lg06 there  was  comparatively little  interownership  among 
the  large companies. 
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terested  in  a  number  of  subsidiary packing companies and 
other companies, the business of  which is allied to the pack- 
ing  business.  Thus the Armour  Company of  Illinois owns 
or controls packing companies in New Jersey and Louisiana, 
car lines, fertiIizer works, soap works, and glue works.  Also 
owned or controlled by the company are the Armour Grain 
Enter  Company, the Armour Elevator  Company, the Continental 
Fruit  Express, and  large interests in stockyards at Omaha, 
Fort  Worth,  Sioux  City,  St.  Louis,  and  Kansas  City.  A 
similar  but not  identical line  of  business  is owned  or  con- 
trolled  by each of  the other large companies.  This is espe- 
cially true  of  the  Swift  and  the  National  Packing  com- 
panies.  Each  of  the large  companies  owns  large  packing 
houses  in  various  cities;  for  instance,  the  Swift  Illinois 
corporation has packing houses at Chicago, Omaha, Kansas 
City, East St. Louis, St. Joseph, St. Paul, and Fort Worth. 
Capitalization  and  Projits. -  It  is  the  opinion  of  the 
Commissioner  of  Corporations, at the time  his  report  was 
rendered in 1906, that these companies are not largely over- 
capitalized.  At any rate, they are in a very marked contrast 
with the American  Tobacco Company, a business of  much 
less importance;  but in which  the capitalization is between 
three and four times that of  the six beef  companies combined. 
At the time the Commissioner made his report he did not 
regard the profits of  the companies as excessive as compared 
with  the business.  Thus the profits  of  Swift in  1904 were 
placed at $3,850,000, and this profit includes that on private 
cars, or  1.9 per  cent on the entire transactions of  the com- 
pany.  In no case, from 1902 to 1904, did the profits of  the 
company exceed  2 per  cent  on  the sales.  However, if  the 
profits be  looked  at from  the  point  of  view of  capitaliza- 
tion,  for  Swift, $3,850,000 would  represent  a  profit  of  11 
per  cent  on  the  capitalization  of  $35,000,000.  c he  net 
profits  of  the Cudahy Company are reported to be $927,969 
in 1904, 1.8 per cent of  the volume of  the business.  If  the 
car  lines  be  considered  separately, the profits on this  part 
of  the business are greater, from  14 to 17 per  cent  on  the 
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~f  the price of  cattle and the price at which  dressed beef 
is  sold are compared, it is found that there is a rough parallel- 
ism  between  the two.  However,  when  the price  of  cattle 
rose, there was a tendency for the price of  beef  to rise to a 
somewhat greater  extent, giving  a  larger  margin of  profit. 
 his was  especially marked  in  1902. 
The  above  statements  refer  to  the  wholesale  prices  of 
beef; the retail price is quite another matter.  It is probable 
that the retailer has been able to secure a larger profit upon 
his sales than was possible  before the combinations existed. 
This is not due altogether to the great combination, but to 
the tendency for  retail  men  at a  given point  to cooperate, 
this tendency being synchronous with the general  movement 
in recent years toward combination of  the men engaged in the 
same  business  in  the  United  States. 
Principles  Illustrated. -  Concentration  in  the  packing 
industry  has  given  various  economic  advantages,  among 
which  are the following:  The returns from the by-products 
are a considerable portion  of  the entire business, the value 
being roughly 25 per cent of  the total.  The small slaughter- 
house  is  at a  great  disadvantage  in  respect  to these  by- 
products;  a large abattoir may save  everything.  A  second 
advantage  of  concentration  is  the location of  abattoirs by 
the same company in different cities.  Through this arrange-  Economio 
ment  cross  freights  are  saved.  The  beef  cattle  for  the 
packing house at a given city are acquired from the territory 
contiguous  to  that  city.  The  demands  for  beef  in  that 
territory are supplied by that plant.  Furthermore,  for the 
emtern part of  the United  States there is an advantage  in 
that the beef  cattle are killed  near  the source and only the 
dressed product shipped to the market, thus reducing greatly 
the mount of  freight to be handled, since the weight of the 
dressed beef  is only from 54 to 57 per cent of  the weight of 
the live  cattle. 
There  can be little doubt that,  since the organization of 
these  six great  beef  companies and their  combination with 
mated companies  in  controlling  the  stockyards,  it has 
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enter  the  business.  The  large  interstate  business  of  the 
country  is  in  very great  measure  controlled  by  the  "Big 
Six";  the  local  business  is  still  largely  with  the  small 
company. 
In 1905 an indictment was brought against a considerable 
number of  the officers of  the "  Big Six,"  charging that they 
were in combination and in  restraint of  trade and that they 
had "  an agreement, understanding, and arrangement among 
themselves  whereby  they  fixed,  regulated,  and  controlled 
prices."  l  The trial of  those charged  under  the indictment 
did  not  take  place  until  in  1912.  On March 26, the long 
contest  was closed  by  the jury  finding that tbe officers  of 
these companies were not guilty under  the criminal section 
of  the Sherman act against conspiracy in restraint of  trade. 
THE  LUMBER  INDUSTRY  2 
In the  United  States concentration  of  the ownership of 
standing timber has progressed  far. 
The General Situation. -  "Certain basic facts in the lumber 
industry are as follows : - 
(I First.  The entire remaining  supply of  standing timber 
in  continental  United  States  (excluding  Alaska)  is  now 
mpp'y.  about two hundred  and eighty billion  board feet, of  which 
about twenty-two hundred  billion is privately owned.  (The 
unit 'board foot' is a foot square and an inch thick.) 
i  i 
Concentra-  Second.  There has  come  about, and there is still pro- 
tion of  ceeding,  a  very  remarkable concentration in  the ownership 
ownership. 
of  this  remaining standing timber  in  the hands  of  a  com- 
paratively  few interests.  This  concentration  results chiefly 
from the speculative holding of  timber lands for future profit, 
primarily  made  possible  by  our  long-standing  public  land 
policy. 
"Third.  From  the time  when  the vast  majority  of  our 
1 United States of  America v.  Louis F. Swift et al., Decision, p. 2. 
2 Summary  of  R;fport of  the Commissioner of  Corporations on tbe  Lumber 
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present timber supply left the hands of  the one great original 
omer, the United  States, till the present there has been  an 
enormous increase in  the value  of  standing  timber.  This 
increase  has  varied  greatly,  according  to  local  conditions,  I,,,, 
but  practically  everywhere it has  been manyfold -  sixfold,  in  value. 
tenfold,  twentyfold,  thirtyfold,  and  in  some  cases  fifty- 
fold.  The  present commercial value of  the privately owned 
standing  timber  in  the country,  not including the value  of 
the land, is estimated  (though in the nature of  the case such 
an estimate must be very rough) as at least $6,000,000,000. 
"These  conditions must be  considered in the light of  the 
further facts that our standing timber is a natural resource 
created  almost  exclusively  by  nature;  that where  it has 
not  been destroyed it is substantially in the same condition 
as when  it left the hands of  the  government ; that human 
effort,  or the private owners that hold and have left it, have 
added practically nothing to it; that while a certain amount  The  un- 
of  reforestation  is  possible,  standing  timber  is  a  resource  ;,":,"ment. 
in the main quite similar to our ore and coal measures ;  that 
our  present  annual  consumption of  timber  is  about  three 
times the annual growth, and the demand is steadily increas- 
ing;  that  speculative  holding  of  timber  land  for  future 
rise  in  no  way  improves the character  of  the timber  and 
does not give such public service as is given  by those who 
acquire  lands  for  actual  present  use  and  improvement. 
While  the profits of  speculative timber  holding  have  been 
enormous, as will be hereafter shown, the risks of  such hold- 
ing and the services rendered by the holders are peculiarly 
small in  comparison with those  profits. 
(( These great facts have brought  about certain results of 
tremendous significance  from  the standpoint  of  the public 
welfare.  The timber supply is a diminishing natural resource.  Rise in 
Its increasing concentration into a comparatively few strong ;,","::;: 
hands has conferred upon those strong holders a vast power  ti,. 
over  the timber industry and over prices therein;  and has 
itself greatly accelerated the enormous rise in timber values." 
The lumber industry is  one in which the units of  manu- 
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is  so  heavy  as compared  with  its value  that it cannot  be 
transported  a  great  distance  advantageously.  The  logs, 
Limitin  by  stream  in  favored  localities  and by  railroad  in  others, 
8izeof  must  be  transported  to the  mill.  Where  the  logs  float 
mill. 
downstream  the expense  is  not  great.  For  the lumber so 
located  that it must  be  transported  by  rail  the  cost  in- 
creases  more  rapidly  with  distance, so  that there is a limit 
beyond which it is not advantageous from the point of  view 
of  economic efficiency to transport  logs, and this fixes the 
size of  the mill  to that adapted to the work  of  sawing the 
L c  logs  for  the tributary  area.  The largest  sawmill  in the 
country cuts less than one half  of  one per  cent of  the total 
annual  output of  lumber."  Since the control  of  the mar- 
ket is not  readily  secured  by  concentration  of  sawmills, it 
has been  secured  by the concentration of  the ownership  of 
standing timber. 
Concentrated  Ownership of  Timber. -  Of  the merchantable 
FOU~  6ftha  saw timber of  the United States 20 per cent is still owned by 
in private 
ownership.  the  government, leaving 80  per  cent  in private  hands.  Of 
the vast amount of  timber in private holdings the concentra- 
tion of  ownership is shown by the following table : - 
Total  .  .  .  . 
Group l .  .  .  . 
Groups 1-2  .  .  . 
Groups 1-3  .  .  . 
Groups l4  .  .  . 
Groups 1-5  .  .  . 
Groups 1-6  .  .  . 
Groups 1-7  .  .  . 
Groups 1-8  .  .  . 
Groups 1-9  .  .  . 
Groups 1-10  .  . 
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"From  this table it will be seen that three holdings include 
no  less than 237.5 billion  feet, or nearly  l1 per  cent of  the 
privately owned  timber in the entire country, and over  13.5 
per cent of  the privately  owned timber in the investigation 
area.  These  three  holders  are  the  Southern  Pacific  Com-  The big 
pany, the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, and the Northern  three. 
Pacific Railway Company.  Five other holders ranking next 
in importance  own  in  the investigation  area  an  aggregate 
of 102 billion feet, or 4.6 per cent of  the total privately owned 
timber of  the country and 5.8 per cent of that in the investi- 
gation  area.  Thus  the  eight  large  holders  together  own 
approximately 340 billion feet of  timber, or  15.4 per cent of 
the total  privately  owned  timber  of  the country  and  19.4 
per  cent of  that in the investigation area. 
"Twenty-two  holders own  26.2 per cent of  all the timber 
in  the  investigation  area;  195  holders  own  48  per  cent. 
Stated in another way, more than one eighth of  the total tim- 
ber in the investigation  area  (this representing 80 per cent 
of  the total privately owned timber of  the United States) is 
owned  by  only 3  holders; more than one fourth  is  owned 
by only 22 holders.  Almost one half is owned by 195 holders. 
(I  The most  marked  concentration is in the hands  of  the 
comparatively few  large  holders of  the upper  groups; the 
lower  groups  control  a  much  less  important  percentage. 
Thus, while the 385 holders in groups 1 to 7, inclusive, con- 
trol 55.6 per cent of  the timber in the investigation area, the 
273 holders in group  8 control  only 5.5 per  cent, the 489 
holders in group 9 only 4.9 per cent, and the 655 holders in 
group 10 only 3.2 per cent. 
(C 
Furthermore,  these  10  groups, 1802  holdings,  embrace 
nearly 70 per cent  of  the total timber in  the investigation 
area, while group  11,  the remaining holdings,  aggregating 
unnumbered thousands,  have in all only 538.2 billion feet, 
Or  30.8 per cent of  the total." 
An organization is regarded as holding a property when it 
has more than one half of  the stock of  a corporation.  Even 
the above statements do not indicate the real extent of  con- 
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have stock in several companies.  Further, where in great 
holdings of  timber  small holdings are blocked  in,  they are 
practically controlled by the large holders, since the owners 
of  the  smaller  blocks  can  only  sell  to the  surrounding 
holders  or  get  the timber  out  through  coiiperation with 
such holders. 
Of  the three great companies, the Southern Pacific is first, 
the Weyerhaeuser is second, and the Northern Pacific is third, 
the holdings of  the three together constituting 23.5 per cent 
of  all the privately  owned  timber  in the five states of  the 
Pacific Northwest.  In order to appreciate  the magnitudes 
of  the Southern  Pacific  holdings  it may  be said  that the 
Enormom  timber  of  this  company "stretches  practically all the way 
holdings in 
Pscifio  from  Portland,  Ore.,  to Sacramento,  Calif., a  distance  of 
states.  682 miles.  The running time of  the fastest  train between 
these two points is thirty-one hours ;  yet during all that time 
the traveler  is passing through  lands a  large proportion of 
which  for thirty miles on  each side of  him  belongs to the 
corporation  over whose  track  he  is  riding, and  in  almost 
the entire  strip,  60  miles  wide  and  682  miles  long,  this 
corporation  is  the dominating  owner of  both  timber  and 
land." 
The holdings of  these three great companies are based upon 
government grants.  That of  the Southern Pacific was  ac- 
quired almost exclusively by government gift, and the Weyer- 
The timber  haeuser holdings were largely purchased from the government- 
away'  granted  lands  of  the Northern  Pacific.  The original vast 
grants were made more valuable by the law which permitted 
the exchange of  lands in  the forest reserves and parks for 
other lands.  Much of  the land released in the Pacific forest 
reserve and Mount Ranier National Park had comparatively 
little timber,  and in exchange the great companies selected 
heavily timbered land. 
While the concentration in timber holding is great for the 
country as a  whole, it is still greater in single regions.  At 
the present time  the largest quantity of  the most valuable 
timber  is in  the  Pacific Northwest.  Concentration in  this 
region is shown by the following table : - ILLUSTRATIONS  OF  CONCENTRATION  159 
"The  pronounced  concentration  of  timber  ownership in 
the Pacific Northwest  is at once  apparent from this table. 
The 3 largest companies own over 23 per  cent of  the total, 
or almost one fourth, while 5 more own  10 per  cent, these 
8 holders having a little more than a third of  the total for this 
region.  The next 12 holders own over 9 per cent, giving the 
20 principal holders 43 per cent of  the total.  The next  18 
own 7 per cent; thus no less than 50 per cent of  the total 
privately owned timber in this vast region is in the hands of 
38 holders.  The next 6 groups, comprising 673 holders, to- 
gether own less than 30 per cent of  the total." 
Concentration of  ownership in the southern pine belt and 
in the lake region; while great, is not so far advanced as in 
the Pacific Northwest.  In all  regions  the concentration is 
greater for the high class timber,  such as fir, pine, and cy- 
press, than it is for the less valuable hard wood. 
Rising Prices.--Since  timber is a natural resource, which 
is diminishing in quantity, it is inevitable that in anticipa- 
tion of  a lack of  supply, the prices for timber are continually 
Total  .  . 
Group l . . . 
Groups 1-2  . . . 
Groups l3  . . . 
Groups 1-4 . . . 
Groups 1-5  .  .  . 
Groups 1-6  .  .  . 
Groups 1-7  .  .  . 
Groups 1-8  .  .  . 
Groups 1-9  .  .  . 
Groups 1-10  .  . 
Group 11  .  .  . 
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rising; for  timber  is being  cut  at the present  time  about 
three times as fast as it is renewed.  However, the enhance- 
ment  of  price  has been  greatly  accelerated because of  the 
Multipli-  concentration  in  ownership.  Many  illustrations  could  be 
cation  given as showing the increase in the value of  timber.  For 
prioee, 
instance, upon the average for Minnesota, the state has re- 
ceived from its pine lands a steadily increasing amount.  In 
1880, the average price per thousand feet was $1.47 ; in 1890, 
$2.25; in 1900, $5.17;  and in 1909, $7.53, or more than five 
times the price  in  1880.  Other  illustrations  of  the rise in 
price during the past twenty years are as follows:  from $5 
to $30 an acre, $7 to $40, $20 to $150, $1 to $13, $4 to $140, 
$1 to $50. 
The government gave its lands as bonuses  to railroads, 
canals, and wagon roads, or received $1.25 or $2.50 per acre 
Our heri-  for the same.  In short, our reckless liberality in giving away 
tage 
squandered.  our natural resources and our defective laid laws were the 
chief  underlying causes which have led to the extraordinary 
concentration  in  ownership of  one of  the great natural re- 
sources of  the country, the timber. 
THE WATER  POWERS' 
The water powers of  the country have ia recent years be- 
come of  rapidly  increasing importance.  This has followed 
as a consequence of  the improvements in the electrical trans- 
mission  of  power.  It  is  now  possible  to transmit  power 
economically from a given center to a distance of  two hun- 
dred miles and over an area of  one hundred thousand square 
miles. 
The Amount  and Distribution. -  The minimum potential 
water power  of  the United States is estimated at  32,083,000 
h.p.,  and  the  maximum  at 61,678,000 h.p.  Assuming an 
1 Report of  Commissioner of  Corporations on Water Power Development 
in  the  United  States.  Washington  Government  Printing  Office, 1912, 
p. 220.  "Conservation  of  Natural Resources  in the United States," C. R. Van 
Hise, pp. 118-161, The Macmillan Company. New  York, 1010. ILLUSTRATIONS  OF CONCENTRATION  161 
of  75 per  cent for this potential horse power, the 
,ater  powers  would  give  a  minimum  effective  energy  of 
26,736,000 h.p.,  and a maximum of  51,398,000 h.p.  By mini- 
mum horse power is meant the average available for the two 
of  lowest  water during a period  of  seven  years;  by 
the maximum  is  meant  that which  is  available  during  a 
period of  not less than six months each year. 
From 1905 to 1907 the amount of  mechanical energy used 
in the United  States was approximately 23,000,000  h.p.,  of 
which 3,432,000 h.p., or 15 per cent, was produced by water, 
the remainder being developed by steam and internal com- 
bustion engines.  In June, 1911, the developed water power 
installations, greater than 1000 each, amounted to 4,016,127 
h.p., and that in units  less than 1000 h.p., to 2,000,000 h.p., 
making a total in round numbers of  6,000,000 h.p. 
Of  the water  power  installations nearly 50  per  cent  of 
those developed  for sale and for public service corporations 
was located in five states, as shown by Table 48. 
TABLE  48.  SHOWING  COMMERCIAL  WATER  POWER  IN FIVE STATES 
PER  CENT 
California  ...............  14 
New York  ...............  13 
Washington.  ..............  10 
Pennsylvania  ..............  6 
South Carolina  .............  5 
- 
Total  ...............  48 
The water power which is used for manufacturing is even 
more concentrated  than the "commercial"  water power, as 
is shown by Table 49. 
PER  CENT 
New  York  .............  30 
New  ~n~land  states ............  36 
Minnesota and Wisconsin ..........  17 
South Carolina  .............  5 
Total  ...............  88 
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Concentration of  Ownership. -  There are strong economic 
forces which  tend  to concentrate  the ownership  of  water 
powers. 
The demand for energy is very unequally distributed, both 
as to time and place.  There are variations in the amount 
of  power  needed in winter and in summer; there are even 
greater variations in the demands during a given day.  If, 
for any district, the different water power9 are coupled up, 
a greater amount of  energy can be utilized than if  each be 
managed  separately.  Consequently the most  efficient  use 
of  water power is gained by "gathering into a single unit all 
Reasons  for  the power available for a given market or group of  markets 
using  the  same  system  of  transmission  lines."  Another  tion. 
reason  for  concentration is  that the limit  of  two  hundred 
miles for economic transmission of  power makes it impossible 
for the water powers of  one district to compete with those of 
another.  Therefore, if  all the water powers of  a single dis- 
trict or a large portion of  them can be acquired by a single 
concern, there will  be monopoly in that district.  Concen- 
tration has also been promoted by the close connection be- 
tween  the  manufacturers  of  hydro-electric  machinery  and 
the water power  companies, and by a  union  of  these with 
fmancial concerns especially interested in these lines of  busi- 
ness. 
In consequence of  the foregoing factors,  in each  of  the 
principal regions in which water powers are developed on a 
large scale, the control of  the greater part of  the same is by 
one or two companies. 
"In  California the bulk  of  the power  produced  in  the 
northern half  of  the state is controlled by a  single interest, 
aid that in the southern half  by only two companies.  In 
Montana two companies control 96  per  cent of  all the de- 
veloped  power  of  the state; and  in  Washington  a  single 
interest  controls the power  situation  in  the  Puget  Sound 
region,,  while another interest, more or less closely miated 
with it, controls the developed power elsewhere in the state. 
All the developed power in the vicinity of  Denver, Colo., and 
nearly 70 per cent of  the total developed power in that state, ILLUSTRATIONS  OF  CONCENTRATION  163 
is controlled by one interest.  In South Carolina one corpora-  Strong 
tion  owns 75  per  cent of  the developed  commercial  power,  of 
while in North Carolina 45 per cent of  such power, developed  companies. 
and  under  construction, is  controlled  by a  single  interest. 
One group of  interests practically controls 58 per cent of  all 
the commercial  power,  developed  and under  construction, 
in Georgia.  In the Lower  Peninsula of  Michigan  a  single 
group owns 73 per cent of  all such power.  The great devel- 
opment at Niagara Falls on the American side is controlled 
by only two companies.'' 
Not only is there concentration in control of  districts, but 
the same companies have large interest in water powers  in 
different districts. 
['The General  Electric interests control the water power 
situation in large portions of  Washington, Oregon, Colorado, 
Montana, and elsewhere.  The Stone and Webster interests 
exercise  control  (based  largely,  however,  on  management 
rather  than  ownership)  in localities in Washington,  Iowa, 
and Georgia.  The Pacific Gas and Electric Co.,  practically 
dominates the power situation in a large number of  localities 
in the northern  half  of  California.  The Southern  Power 
Co., controls the power situation in South Carolina and has 
a strong foothold in North Carolina.  The S. Morgan Smith 
interests  dominate  the  power  situation  in  the vicinity  of 
Atlanta, Ga.  The Telluride Power Co. controls absolutely 
a large territory in Utah and Idaho.  The Commonwealth 
Power, Railway, and Light Co., which is a part of  the Clark- 
Foote-Hodenpyl-Walbridge  interests,  dominates the  power 
situation in the Lower Peninsula of  Michigan.  The Gould 
interests control the best of  the available water powel sites 
in the vicinity of  Richmond, Va." 
Also there is a very close relation between the water power 
companies  and  the  public  service  corporations,  since  the 
largest use of  the power is for street railways, electric lighting 
of cities, etc. 
r< In the country as a whole, water power  companies,  or 
affiliated with them, own or control and operate 










United States, electric lighting plants in 669 cities and towns, 
and gas plants in  113 cities and towns.  These companies, 
moreover, supply power  to municipal  lighting  plants  in a 
considerable number  of  cities  and  towns.  Many  of  these 
are among the most important municipalities in the states 
involved.  Furthermore,  in  many  cities  and towns  in  the 
United States all the public utilities-street  railways, electric 
lighting  and gas  plants -  are controlled  by  water  power 
interests." 
Finally there is very close interrelation of  ,the large water 
power  interests through  common financial houses,  common 
directorates, and common ownership of  public utilities. 
The  use  of  the  6,000,000  h.p.,  now  developed,  saves 
at least 33,000,000 tons of  coal.  If  the amount  of  water 
power used could  be made fourfold, this would  save annu- 
ally more than 130,000,000 tons of  coal.  So great a saving 
of  a fundamental resource would mean much to the future of 
the nation.  It is clear, therefore, that the greatest  "waste 
of  water power is its non-use."  But we must recognize that 
its rapid development can only be accomplished by unifica- 
tion  of  storage,  coupling up, and  coijperation with  public 
utilities corporations.  Thus water  powers  probably furnish 
the best  illustration of  the tendency toward  concentration 
of  a natural resource limited in quantity. 
Public Control. -  The prices charged for water power  at 
present are substantially those that the traffic will bear.  If 
the prices are made too high, public utilities and manufac- 
tories using water power will not be rapidly developed.  It 
is obvious that the price for water  power  cannot be made 
higher than for equivalent  energy produced by coal; there- 
fore in the part  of  the East where  coal  is  cheap, water- 
developed energy is relatively  low.  In localities where coal 
is expensive, as in the Pacific Northwest, the traffic will bear 
more ;  and the price of  water-created  energy is placed very 
high  by  the  controlling  companies,  in  some  instances  as 
high as WO  per  horse power  per  annum to the large con- 
Burners. 
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developed will  be  far  short  of  the  energy  which  in  the 
future will be required for the industries and public utilities. 
This is evident by the fact that there is already in use  al- 
most  as much  energy as the entire minimum horse power 
available  for  the  United  States.  For  the  great,  densely 
settled regions, it will  not be  possible  to gain through  the 
use  of  water  more  than a relatively  small fraction  of  the 
energy  needed.  Hence  there  is  a  sound  reason  for  not 
placing the price of  energy derived from water on the market 
at a lower rate than that derived from the consumption of 
coal, otherwise those who are obliged to obtain their power 
from coal would  be at a disadvantage. 
Since, however, energy derived from water power is upon 
the whole very cheaply  produced,  requiring  only a  capital 
investment of  from $40 to $300 per horse power  for instal- 
lations of  moderate size, and the expense of  the operation is 
very low, it is clear that the profits from the development of 
water power  upon the average are large.  The public should 
gain the advantage of  this natural source of  power which will  Public 
be available in perpetuity.  In all cases in which  the public 
still retains the right to the energy of  falling water, some 
plan should be devised which will give to the public a large 
part of  the difference between the cost of  producing energy 
by water and of  producing an equivalent amount of  energy 
by  coal.  Where  the government  or  the states retain  the 
water  power  sites this will  be easily accomplished through 
a lease or rental system. 
Fortunately  the United  States government still owns the 
land adjacent to many of  the streams in  the western part 
of the United  States, and has all the water rights for a large 
number  of  water  power  sites.  Some of  the states,  illus- 
trated by Illinois and New York, also own some of  the water 
Power there located.  A number of  municipalities own water 
Powers, among which Los Angeles has first place, controlling 
more than 100,000 h.  p. ; and Chicago, Augusta, Ga., Seattle, 
and  Tacoma,  are  very  important,  each  controlling  from 
12)00~  to  76,000  h.p.  In several  of  the Western  states, 
illustrated  by  Colorado,  California,  North  Dakota,  Wash- 166  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
ington, Wyoming,  Idaho, and Oregon, the use of  water for 
all purposes has been  declared  to be  a  public  use; and in 
some of them the water in its entirety has been declared to 
belong to the public. 
Future  Whatever public rights to the use of  water for the develop- 
ment of  energy exist, they should be jealously guarded ;  for in  of water 
powers.  the distant future, when the coal is gone, the power of  falling 
water is the only source of cheap energy of  which we  have 
knowledge  at present.  When that time comes, the owners 
of  the water powers will control the industries of  the nation. 
The energy from falling water  so  far as  publicly  owned  or 
controlled should  be  sold  for  a  limited term of  years at a 
rate sufficiently  low  to lead  to prompt  development, and 
thus displace as much coal as possible.  A large part of  the 
margin  between  the  selling price and the cost  of  develop- 
ment should go to the public. 
In those  states in which  the energy of  falling water  has 
been given through legislative enactment or judicial decision 
to the riparian owners, the problem of  water power control 
is more difficult.  In such instances one way to secure con- 
trol by the public would  be  to condemn  privately  owned 
water powers, and after such condemnation have them oper- 
ated as public utilities. CHAPTER  I11 
ENGLAND 
IN  England, in the time of  Edward VI, a very strict statute 
was  passed by Parliament  against "forestalling,  enhancing, 
regrating, and engrossing."  Without going into details the 
things  prohibited  by  these  laws were  roughly  as  follows:  E~IY  ~pid 
Forestalling was the offense of  going out on the road  and 
buying merchandise which  was coming to the market, with 
the intention of  selling at a higher price  upon  its arrival. 
This applied especially to wheat, or as it is called in England, 
corn.  Enhancing defines itself ;  it applied to buying a prod- 
uct, one of the necessities of  life, with the intention of  selling 
again at an increased price.  Regrating was  the offense of 
going into the market and buying products in a greater quan- 
tity than needed for consumption with the intention of  selling 
in the same market at a higher price.  Engrossing was buy- 
ing corn growing, or any other corn, butter, cheese, fish, or 
other dead victual, with intent to sell the same again.  Under 
these old laws transactions were prohibited which raised the 
price of an essential article.  Many of  the regulations went 
50 far as to fix prices. 
While at  this time these offenses were made statutory, they 
apparently  had  been  offenses  against the  common law  at 
a much earlier date.  Indeed, so far as we  can ascertain, the 
law in the Middle Ages was very strict against com- 
binations in restraint of  trade, as well  as against regrating, 
'For  full information  concerning this  part  of  the  subject, see  Eddy On 
Callaghan & CO.,  1901 ; Noyes on Intercorporate Relations, 
Brown & Co., 1902 ;  Wyman on Control of  the Market, Moffat,  Yard  ' 1911, and Jenks  Report of  the Industrial Commission, Vol. 11. 
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forestalling, and engrossing.  Since the statutes were found 
to have a tendency to prevent free trade and to enhance the 
price of  essential commodities, they were repealed during the 
reign of  George 111.  Notwithstanding this fact some of  the 
judges held that the common law against these offenses still 
existed and penalties were  imposed for them.  In order to 
clarify the situation, in 1844, Parliament definitely abolished 
the offenses of  badgering, engrossing, forestalling, and regrat- 
ing, for Great Britain as a whole, and repealed a large number 
Rigid  of  acts which had been passed prohibiting restraint of  trade. 
statutes  The repealed acts included those which required foods to be 
repealed.  sold at reasonable prices, which allowed justices of  the peace 
to fix the rate of  wages of laborers, various statutes fixing the 
prices of  different articles, and finally acts which prevented 
men from  engaging in allied lines of  business, such as not 
permitting ''an hostler tomake horse bread," and prohibiting 
a butcher from being a grazer.  Thus, at one stroke Parlia- 
ment  repealed the statute laws against restraint of  trade. 
This repealing act guarded against fraudulent or unfair prac- 
tices by adding the following clause : - 
l Provided always and be it enacted, that nothing in this 
act contained  shall be construed to apply to the offense of 
knowingly and fraudulently spreading or conspiring to spread 
any false rumor, with intent  to  enhance or decry the price 
of  any goods or merchandise, or to the offense of  preventing 
or endeavoring to prevent by force or threats any goods or 
wares, or merchandise being brought to any fair or market, 
but that every such offense may be punished as if  this act 
had not been made." 
Combination in trade may be defined as the cooperation of 
two or more persons, partnerships, or corporations to achieve 
a given result.  According to Eddy l the purposes of  combi- 
nation are to reduce the cost of  producing and marketing 
products, to contrd prices, and to discourage and if  possible 
to suppress, competition.  Since 1844, the law in England 
has permitted combination in all commodities including the 
essentials  of  life  even  if  the purpose  of  the same were  to 
1 Eddy  on Combinations, Vol. I, Section8 167, 176, 184. THE  LAWS  REGARDING  COOPERATION  169 
enhance the  price.  Any  combination  is  permitted  which 
does not involve immoral, unlawful, and oppressive acts, is  LW per- 
,t  contrary to public policy, and  does not  go  to the ex-  r:'itYr 
tent of  monopoly.  Magnitude alone does not make a com- 
bination  illegal;  but  monopoly  is  prohibited  in  order  to 
retain  It is realized  in  England  that  "corn- 
petition has it disadvantages as well as its advantages, and 
may be the death as well as the life of  trade." ' 
In England also in early times the common law restrictions 
were  very severe upon  contracts  in restraint of  trade.  By 
contract in restraint of  trade is meant any contract "whereby 
any party binds himself to not follow some particular occupa- 
tion, trade, calling, or profession, or engage in some particular 
business or enterprise for a period within a particular terri- 
tory."  2  Gradually the rigidity of  the early rule forbidding 
contracts in restraint of  trade  was modified, so that in England  Early limi- 
at  the present time whether contracts in restraint of  trade are  ~~~c~ 
lawful is dependent upon their reasonableness.  They may be  removed. 
sustained  even if  they  be  indefinite,  both  as to time  and 
place;  but such contracts to be lawful are to be supported 
by a consideration, are to be essential to the protection of 
the  legitimate  interest  of  the  contractees,  and  must  be 
reasonable.3 
The above statement shows that at the present  time the 
laws have so developed in England that there is freedom to 
combine in trade to any extent, provided that the combina- 
tion is not immoral, unlawful, or oppressive, is not contrary  Freedom to 
to public policy, and is not a monopoly.  Thus there is free-  ~~~~~dom 
dam to combine in trade as well as freedom to compete.  This to compete. 
great  policy  is  in  accordance with  the principle of  Zuissez 
faire which for many years has had such a vast influence in 
England.  It is  a  very  radical  departure  from  the  early 
under the common law and the policies of the old 
statutes.  As we  shali see, freedom for combination as well 
freedom for competition has had a very far-reaching influ- 
ence Won the development of  trade in the United Kingdom. 
'  Eddy on Combinations, %l.  I, Section 308. 
'  Ibid., section 688.  a Ibid.. Section 713. 170  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
Partial  con- 







THE UNITED  STATES 
The laws of  England regarding trade, both common and 
statute, were brought over to this country;  and here they 
have  gone  through the  same stages of  development  as in 
Great Britain. 
The statute laws, originally severe, were gradually amelio- 
rated and finally wiped out.  The common law regarding con- 
tracts and combination in restraint  of  trade went  through 
the same stages of  development as in England, until finally 
they  permitted  combination  and  contracts  which  were 
reasonable.  The purposes of  contracts may be to restrain 
trade, to suppress competition, or to control the market.  It 
has been held that contracts in restraint of  trade which go 
to the extent of  the entire United  States for an unlimited 
time  are  unreasonable.  Contracts  in  partial  restraint  of 
trade, such as not to use a trade in a particular place for a 
definite term, if  founded  on a  good  consideration and for 
a proper and useful purpose, were valid;  and  they were so 
even if  an entire state was comprised by the contract. 
The limits of  the combinations which were permitted are 
given in general terms by Noyes  as follows : - 
(6 
(1)  Any combination of  corporations or individuals the 
object of  which is, or the necessary or natural consequence 
of  the operation of  which  will  be, the control of  the market 
for  a  useful  commodity,  is  against  public  policy  and  un- 
lawful. 
( (2)  Any  combination of  quasi-public  corporations, the 
object of  which is, or the necessary or natural consequence 
of  the operation of  which will be, the increase of  charges be- 
yond reasonable rates, or the curtailment of  facilities afforded 
the public, is against public policy and unlawful." 
Under the above principles the following have been held 
to be lawful, viz.,  combinations which  had  for their object 
maintenance  of  a fair  price,  union of rival  manufacturers, 
1 Noyes on Intercorporate Relations, Section 352. THE  LAWS  REGARDING  CO~~PERATION  171 
agreements in  selling price  or  division of  profits, and  ex-  Extent of 
elusive  trade  agreements.  Even  if  such  combinations  ~~~~;ed 
tended to raise the price of  a commodity, they were lawful. 
agreements to remove a rival from the field  are legal 
unless they result in monopo1y.l 
From  actual  cases  which  have  been  considered  by  the 
courts,2  Eddy gives the following statement regarding the na- 
ture of combinations which were permitted  before the stat- 
utes of  recent years were passed : - 
"  Combination to control  competition is legal where op- 
pressive monopoly is not intended." - "  Combination by 
consolidation of  competing companies, by the formation of 
a  new  corporation to take over  the assets of  the compet- 
ing companies, the object  being to diminish competition, is 
legal."--  Combination among individuals by the forma- 
tion of  a partnership to handle produce or merchandise and 
control competition in a given market is legal where no fraud 
or deception is practiced."- 
(L Combinations among com- 
petitors, the object of  which is to realise a fair price for the 
goods manufactured and sold, do not contravene any rule of 
public policy, even though they operate in some respects as 
in restraint of  trade."- 
(( Combination of  all competitors  Illustratio~ 
to control trade and prices by formation of  new corporation z::mbina- 
to take entire product  and act as exclusive selling agent is 
legal." - 
(L Combination by voluntary  association among 
competitors for the purpose of  suppressing ruinous competi- 
tion and establishing better prices through the appointment 
of  an exclusive selling agent  and a supervisory committee, 
held  legal." - 
I  Combination to prevent  competition by 
subsidizing competitor is legal." - 
<( Combination to sup- 
press  competition  by means of  contracts with independent 
manufacturers for their entire products is not illegal so long 
fts there is not a conspiracy to monopolize the market." - 
Combination of  workmen for  protection  and  to increase 
wages is legal ; so also is the combination of  common carri- 
ers to guard against undue competition and the reducing of 
'  Eddy on Combinations, Vol. I, pp. 124-127.  '  Ibid., Chapter 7, pp. 131-198. 172  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
(4  freights  below  a  fair  compensation."-  Combinations 
between  individuals or  firms  for  the  regulation  of  prices, 
and of competition in business, are not monopolies, and are 
not unlawful  as in restraint of  trade,  so  long  as they are 
reasonable and do not include all of  a commodity or trade, 
or create such restrictions as  to materially affect freedom of 
iL  commerce." -  An agreement between a number of  per- 
sons to act  concertedly in  fixing prices  at which  they will 
sell a particular commodity in a particular city is not illegal 
as being  in  restraint  of  trade  unless  it appears that they 
have a monopoly of  that commodity." - " I know of  no 
rule of  law ever  having existed which  prohibited  a  certain 
number  (not  all) of  the producers  of  a  staple  commodity 
agreeing not to sell below a certain price. " 
The general  principle regarding  contracts  in  restraint of 
trade was admirably  stated  by Justice Guthrie as  follow^:^ 
4i That all contracts in partial restraint of  trade are not void 
as against  public policy is  too well  settled  to be  gainsaid; 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  it is  as fully  established,  as a 
general rule, that contracts in  general restaint of  trade are 
against public policy and, therefore, absolutely void." 
While  combinations and  contracts  in  restraint  of  trade 
are permitted in England to a large degree and were permitted 
Freedomfor  in America  to a similar extent  under  the common law, in 
fair compe- 
tition.  both countries it is a fundamental principle that there must 
be  freedom  for  fair  competition.  Contracts  must  not  be 
tainted with fraud, against public policy, or contrary to the 
statutes.  All  claims on the part of  any person or partner- 
ship to have the exclusive right or monopoly in any business 
have  universally  been  denied  the protection  of  the  law, 
whether  such exclusive privilege  was  claimed  as  a  general 
right or because of  a contract.  Moreover, freedom of  com- 
petition under the common law has not been allowed to go to 
the point of  establishing business to injure a person through a 
malicious purpose, nor so far as to allow the breaking of  one 
contract to make another on more advantageous terms.  If 
1 Eddy on Combinations, Vol. I, Sections 270,271,272,276,277,278,280, 
281, 282, 313, 315, and 316.  Ohio State, 666. THE  LAWS  REGARDING  COOPERATION  173 
fraud be used in competition, it is illegal ;  as, for instance, the 
misleading use of a firm name.  A company manufacturing 
watches in Waltham was not allowed to call the same Wal- 
tham watches, since this was a well-known manufacture of  a 
established company.  Libelous statements may 
not be used  to secure business.  Intimidation or coercion to 
secure trade or to compel exclusive employment of  a certain 
class, such as the members of  a business, has not  the pro- 
tection of  the common law. 
Since by reference  to Eddy the very  numerous  cases  in 
which  combinations  in  restraint  of  trade  have  been  per- 
mitted  in  this  country under  common  law may  be  easily 
found, they are not here repeated.  There will be mentioned 
a few cases showing how  far contracts in  restraint of  trade 
have been permitted. 
In New Jersey a contract not to manufacture anywhere in 
the United  States except in Nevada  and Arizona for fifty 
years was held to be valid so far  as the state of  New Jersey 
was concerned.'  In New York a contract not to engage in 
the manufacture of  matches for ninety-nine years except in 
the state of  Nevada and the territory of  Montana was held 
to be partial and not  general restraint of  trade, and  there- 
fore valid.2  In another  case in that state it was  held  that 
a contract under which  a steamboat company paid another 
company not to run a  competing line  of  steamboats was 
valid on the ground  that it may be a benefit  to keep com- 
petition from becoming too ~trong.~ 
While  it is clear  under the common law in this country 
that there  was  great liberality  regarding combination  and 
contracts in restraint of  trade, when such contracts and com- 
binations  affected  partnerships  or  corporations,  they  were 
uniformly declared to be illegal.4 
Here  falls the famous  case  of  the  People  v.  the  North 
River Sugar Refining  Company under which  the shares of 
the  capital  stock of  the constituent  companies were  trans- 
ferred to a board of  trustees.  This was  the case in which 
'  66 N. J. Eq.  680.  2  l06 N. Y. 473.  8  110 N. Y.  619.  '  121 Ill. 530; 68 S. W.  Rep. 853; 86 Tenn. 688. 174  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
the trust was first  brought before  the court.  Speaking of 
the trust, Justice Barrett of  the circuit court says that the 
acts of  this trust are unlawful for two reasons:  "l.  They 
constitute  the  corporation  a  partner and  a  corporation  is 
not allowed by law to enter into partnership.  2.  Any com- 
bination, the tendency of  which is  to prevent competition 
in its broad  and general  sense and to control, and thus at 
will enhance prices to the detriment of  the public, is a legal 
monopoly, and is  against  public  interest."  Justice Finch, 
of  the court of  appeals, declared  "that defendant corpora- 
tion has violated its charter and failed  in the performance 
of  its corporate duties, and that in respects so material and 
important as to justify a judgment  of  dissolution."  l 
Under this principle the Standard Oil Trust of  Ohio was 
declared to be illegal.2  In this case the action of  the cor- 
poration  was  held  to be  ultra  wires,  against  public  policy, 
and therefore ground for the forfeiture of  the charters of  the 
offending companies.  Apparently in this decision was also 
the  element  of  monopoly  since  Justice Minshall  declared 
that under  the trust form of  combination  "by the invari- 
able  laws  of  human  nature,  competition will  be  excluded 
and prices controlled  in the interest of  those connected with 
the combination or trust." 
Numerous cases could be cited which have declared combi- 
nations which go to the extent of  monopoly to be contrary 
to public  policy as intending to control  the  market,  but 
the principle is so well known that details will not be givea3 
THE  SHERMAN  ANTITRUST  LAW' 
The law as above described  in Section 2 for this country 
was  a  natural development  under which  the law conforms 
to  the conditions of  trade.  Large  liberty  was  permitted. 
1 121 N. Y. 582.  '49  Ohio State 131, 1892. 
a 139 N. Y. 105; 145 N. Y. 267; 47 Ohio 320:  111 Pa. 473: 77 Mich. 632. 
4 For  the full  text of  the law see Appendix I.  Many discussions of  the 
Sherman antitrust act and  its influence on law and  trade have been pub- 
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~~dd~~ly,  in 1890,  a  ncw policy was  introduced  by statute Sudden 
law, the principle of  which was to go back to severe rmtric- z:;;yf 
tions regarding trade, not so severe as in the Middle Ages in 
England,  but  far in  that  direction.  This  policy  was  in- 
augurated  by  the Sherman  antitrust  law.  Combinations 
of  the  kind  above mentioned  and which  before  had  been 
regarded as legitimate were  by congressional act for inter- 
state commerce declared to be unlawful.  The Sherman act 
clearly stated that restraint  of  trade in  any degree is ille- 
gal.  How marked is the contrast between this law and the  Provisions 
existing common law is shown by the following 
summary of  its important provisions. 
Sections 1  and 3 of  the Sherman act make "  every contract, 
combination in the form of  trust or otherwise, or conspiracy 
in  restraint of  trade or commerce"  illegal.  This provision 
applies as among the several states and territories, the Dis- 
trict of  Columbia, and foreign countries;  as between per- 
sons,  corporations,  and  associations  engaged  in  interstate 
commerce;  and as between one of  any of  these groups with 
any member of  another group, except contracts between two 
foreign countries. 
Section 2 provides that "  every person who shall monopo- 
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with 
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of  the 
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign 
countries, shall be deemed guilty of  a misdemeanor."  Thus 
the law  forbids  both  restraint  of  trade  and monopoly or 
attempt at monopoly.  Violation of  any of  the above pro- 
visions of the act is made a misdemeanor and is punishable 
a fine not exceeding $5000, or imprisonment not exceed- 
ing one year, or by both. 
(( 
Section 7  provides that any person who  is  injured  in 
%t,"  Robert L.  Raymond, Harvard Law Review, Vol. XXIII, PP. 
353-379:  The Standard Oil  and Tobacco C~ses,"  Robert  L. Raymond, 
+?a~d  Law  Rev&,  Vol.  XXV, pp.  31-58;  Antitrust  Legislation  and 
ktlgation,"  annual  sddress before the American Bar Association, Boston, 
l9l19  by William B.  Hornblower ; "  Recent Interpretation of  the Sherman 
Act*" George  W.  Wickersham, Michigan  Law  Review,  Vol.  X,  pp.  1-25, 
Hearin@*  Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, Albert H. Walker, Pert 
pp. 1537-1571, and Victor Morswet.,  Ibid.,  pp. 1629-1642. 176  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
his business or property by any other person or corporation 
by reason of  anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful 
by this act . . . shall  recover  threefold  the damages  by 
him  sustained  and  the  cost  of  suit including  reasonable 
attorney's fee." 
Other sections of  the Sherman law provide for instituting 
proceedings by  the Attorney-General  of  the United  States 
and the conduct of  cases by the court. 
Amendments  to  the  Sherman  law  have  extended  the 
inhibition  of  combinations to importers,  and  have  given 
cases  which  arise  under  the  law  precedence  over  others. 
While the act is called the Sherman  antitrust law because 
introduced by Senator Sherman, it was more largely written 
by  Senator  Edmunds  than  any other  one  man,  although 
some clauses were  based  upon  drafts by Senator Sherman 
and other clauses were written by Senators Hoar and Ingalls.' 
The Sherman antitrust act has now  been on the statute 
Early  books for twenty-two years, and many cases have been  de- 
decisions  cided under it.  Some of  the early decisions were of  a kind 
which gave little promise of  the effectiveness of  the law. 
Thus in 1890 some seventy distilleries united, capable of 
producing 77,000,000 gallons of  whisky.  Their output was 
three fourths of  that of  the United States.  The combina- 
tion approached if  it did not reach monopoly.  The distil- 
leries were  located in different states.  The products were 
shipped into states other than those in which the distilleries 
were located.  It  was held by the court that these acts did 
not  constitute an unlawful  agreement  under  the antitrust 
actse  Again it was  held  to be a legal  act for two or more 
traders to agree among themselves that they will  not deal 
with those who purchase goods of  any designated traders in 
the same bu~iness.~  An  agreement  to make exclusive pur- 
chases from a dealer with  the provision that this would en- 
title the purchaser to  a rebate if  the agreement was carried 
out, was held not to violate the law.' 
When dealers in lumber in different towns and  cities of 
1 Hearinge, Senate Interstate  Commerce Committee, XXVI, pp. 2422- 
2431.  '61  Fed.  205.  a 65 Fed.  851.  4 61 Fed. 213. THE  LAWS  REGARDING  COOPERATION  177 
the states of  Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, and Mis- 
souri agreed  to raise  the  price  of  lumber  fifty  cents  per  Early  deci- 
thousand feet in advance of  the regular market price of  pine :eortniP"- 
lumber, it was held that the agreement did not necessarily 
raise the price generally and that the combination to come 
under the statute must be such that the members of  the com- 
bination through the combination controlled the price of  the 
entire output.'  In other words, if  the combination was not 
such  as  to introduce  the element  of  monopoly, it was  not 
illegal. 
Even more important than this case was that of  the Ameri- 
can Sugar Refining Company.  This corporation, organized 
under the laws of New Jersey, secured control of  four Phila- 
delphia refineries,  thus gaining  practical  monopoly  of  the 
business.  It was held  by the court that monopoly in the 
manufacture of  an article necessary to life is not interstate 
commerce, and that combinations which  restrain interstate 
commerce indirectly are not under the ban of  the lawV2 This 
decision was all the more disconcerting because  the manu- 
facturers  who  combined  were  located  in  different  states. 
While the decision did not say so, it was supposed that manu- 
facturers in different states could combine and the company 
afterwards dispose of  the products without reference to state 
lines.  Apparently this was not the intention of  the decision, 
or if so it was reversed by later decision. 
The Kansas  City Live Stock Exchange was a voluntary 
association doing  business  in  Kansas  and  Missouri.  The 
business was essentially that of  a selling agency for cattle. 
The association had very strict rules regarding the methods of 
dealing of its members and also rules forbidding members of 
the exchange from buying of  non-members.  In this case it 
Was held that the effect of  the agreement in restraining in- 
terstate  commerce was only indirect and therefore not under 
the ban of  the act.3 
The Traders'  Live Stock Exchange, which at the Kansas 
City yards bought  live stock coming from more than one 
'U. S. a. Nelson, 52 Fed. 646. 
'U-  8.  V. E. C. fight  Co., 156 U.  S.  1.  8 171 U. 8.78. 
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state, differed from the above exchange in that cattle were 
bought  and sold.  The members of  the Traders'  Exchange 
cooperated under strict rules as to the method of  conducting 
their business, among which was the provision that the ex- 
change would not recognize any trader who was not a mem- 
ber.  The undoubted effect of  the arrangement was coopera- 
tion in prices and in other ways in buying and selling.  In 
this case, it was held that if  there was restraint of  trade, it 
was not direct, but only an indirect  result  of  the operation 
of  the association;  and that the business, all being done in 
Kansas City, was intrastate rather than interstate commerce, 
although the cattle came from more than one state.' 
While the above decisions seemed to promise little for the 
effectiveness of  the Sherman act, even in early years  there 
were  other decisions which  looked toward  its effectiveness. 
Thus, combinations king price  and contracts for  exclusive 
Resaonsble  dealing were  declared  to be  in restraint  of  trade,2 also all 
the earlier decisions held that whether the restraint of  trade  eonable im- 
material.  was reasonable or unreasonable was immaterial.3 
The more  important of  these  decisions were  the Trans- 
Missouri '  and  the  Joint  Traffic  cases.  In  the  Trans- 
Missouri case, Justice Peckham  said it is  "urged  that the 
statute in declaring illegal every combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of  trade or com- 
merce, does not mean what the language used therein plainly 
imports, but that it only means to declare illegal any such 
contract which  is in unreasonable  restraint  of  trade while 
leaving all others unaffected by the provisions of  the act." 
With this view the court disagreed, and held that all combina- 
tions in restraint of  trade without exception or limitation are 
prohibited  by the act.  This was a bare majority decision. 
In  the same case it was held that the Sherman act applies to 
railways and  other  public utilities as well  as to industries. 
In the Joint Traffic case the same justice shaded this sweeping 
L(  decision somewhat, by saying,  The act of  Congress must 
1 171 U. S. 604.  * 432 Fed. 898. 
885 Fed. 252 ; 115 Fed. 610 ; 166 Fed. 290 ; 167 Fed. 721. 
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have a reasonable construction,"  and he indicated in bib opin- 
ion that certain combinations were not necessarily inhibited 
by the act. 
The  decisions  under  the  Sherman  act  have  uniformly 
held that exchanges and selling agencies and combinations, 
where the commerce was clearly interstate, which  fix prices,  Combins- 
divide  territories Or  business, or  limit  output, are illegal.'  tion per-  mitted by 
This statement is slightly modified by a decision  concern-  common 
ing a  boat  company which  sold  to another company with  law med. 
the agreement  not to do  business between Cincinnati and 
portsmouth for five  years  after  the sale.  This  agreement 
was held to be  valid. 
In the case of  an agreement between a number of  manu- 
facturers  to market  their  entire  output  through  a  selling 
agency at specified prices, it was held that a selling agency 
organized to  control all  the business of  the manufacturers 
was in restraint of  trade and contrary to law.  Combinations  Selling 
of  companies for the purpose of  preventing others from enter- 
ing a business are in restraint of  trade.3 
All  combinations which have been shown to have the ele- 
ment of  monopoly, or agreements which attempt to produce 
monopoly, have been declared to be  illegal.  This principle 
has been applied not only to industry, but to transportation, 
both  boats  and  railways.  While  the decisions have  been  Mere  size 
does not  uniformly against monopoly, it has been decided that mere 
size  does  not  constitute  monopoly.'  Unfair  practices,  the  monopoly. 
aim of which was  to drive from  business  and  thus secure 
mono~oly,  are illegal.s 
The  antitrust  act  forbids  combinations  of  labor  in  re- 
straint of  commerce as  much  as it does  combinations of 
For laborers to interfere with interstate commerce 
is  ille,aal under the act.  It is illegal for an organization to 
attenl~t  to compel  an establishment  to employ none but 
men.  Boycotts have been declared to be illegal.  It  kct .P- 
"  whether the pepons who combine in a boycott  toI.bon~~ 








by  decision. 
are themselves engaged  in interstate commerce.'  AS  illus- 
trating these principles may be cited the award of  $222,000 
against  the striking hatters of  Danbury, Connecticut,  same 
being against about two hundred working men.2 
Of  the  more  important decisions which  have  laid  down 
broad  principles affecting the  future  interpretation  of  the 
Sherman act the following may be mentioned : - 
The Northern  Securities Company  was  a  holding  com- 
pany, possessing all or the majority of  the stock of  several 
railroads.  This company was  declared to be in retraint of 
trade.  The decision was rendered comparatively early, and 
the question of  reasonable or unreasonable restraint of  trade 
was  held  to be immaterial.  This decision, like the Trans- 
Missouri and  Joint  Traffic  decisions, was by a five to four 
vote. 
While Justice Brewer was with the majority, he dissented 
from  the opinion given by  Justice  Peckham  already cited 
that every contract or combination in restraint of  trade was 
within the statute.  This decision is of  far-reaching  impor- 
tance, in that it appears to raise a doubt as to the legality 
of  the great holding companies. 
Recently  there  have  been  broad  decisions declaring  the 
Standard Oil, the American Tobacco, and the Dupont Powder 
Companies to be illegal combinations. 
As  has  already  been pointed  out, the earlier decisions of 
the Supreme Court, under the first sectionof thesherman act, 
insisted that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of  the 
restraint was immaterial ; and in this position the court fol- 
lowed the literal statement of  the law as it looked to Peck- 
ham and as it still looks to a layman.  The interpretations 
of  the act in the cases of  Standard Oil and American Tobacco 
shows a change in the position of  the court.  In the future 
it will declare only business to be interdicted by the act which 
is  in undue restraint  of  trade.  The second and third sec- 
1 64 Fed. 994 ; 208 U.  S. 274. 
Hearings. Interstate  Commerce  Committee, XX. pp.  1729-1730.  For 
full presentation of  the two sides of  the Sherman act as applied to laborers 
eee Hearings, Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, XX, pp. 1727-1778; 
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tions of the Sherman act are apparently interpreted together. 
~t  seems to be the argument that the first section, prohibiting 
all  and contracts in restraint of  trade, is meant 
to cover the same ground as the second  section, which  pro- 
hibits  monopoly or  attempt to monopolize;  and  thus  the 
interpretation  seems  to  be  that  restraint  of  trade  which 
monopoli~e~  or  attempts  to  monopolize  is  interdicted  by 
the law.  This is the restraint of  trade which is undue, and 
being undue is unreasonable ; that is, undue  and unreason- 
able are made synonymous terms.' 
The court gives the opinion that-it was the intention of 
Congress that "the standardof reason, which had been applied  Return to 
at the common law and in this country in dealing with sub-  ;n??ii.law 
jects of  the character embraced by the statute, was intended 
to be the measure used for the purpose of  determining whether 
in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about 
the wrong against which the statute provided."  The court 
l( 
says,  The fact must not be overlooked  that injury to the 
public by the prevention of  anundue restraint on, or the monop- 
olization of  trade or commerce is  the foundation  upon which 
the prohibitions  of  the statute rest, and, moreover, that one of 
the fundamental purposes of the statute is to protect, not to 
destroy, rights of  property." 
Apparently the decision of  the court goes as far as practi- 
cable towards reintroducing the common law regarding com- 
binations and contracts in restraint of  trade.  Combinations 
and  contracts may take place provided they are reasonable; 
but the sweeping decrees regarding the disintegration of  the 
Standard Oil  and American  Tobacco and other  companies 
make it appear that it was not the intent of  the court to go 
as far toward freedom as was permitted by the common law. 
Thus we  are left in doubt as to how far the court will in the 
future permit combinations and contracts in restraint of  trade. 
The effects of  the Standard Oil  and American Tobacco 
decisions upon those organizations were as follows : - 
The Standard  Oil  Company. -The  Circuit Court of  the 
'  The Supreme Court of the United Statee, No. 398, October  term, 1910 ; 
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United  States  for  the  Eastern  district  of  Missouri  on 
November  20,  1909, declared  the  Standard  Oil  Company 
to  be  an  illegal  combination;  that  the officers  of  the 
Standard  Oil  Company and  thirty-seven  constituent  com- 
panies  have  combined  and  conspired  to monopolize  and 
have monopolized  a  substantial  part  of  the  commerce in 
oil  among  the states and in the territories and with foreign 
nations.  The  officers  of  the  Standard  Company  were 
prohibited  from  voting  the stock  of  the subsidiary  com- 
panies,  and  the officers  of  the subsidiary  companies were 
enjoined and prohibited  from paying any dividends to the 
Standard Oil  Company, although  they were not prohibited 
from distributing rateably to the shareholders of  the com- 
pany the shares of  the subsidiary companies.  The subsidiary 
companies were  enjoined from acquiring  stock interests in 
potentially  competitive companies, or from placing the con- 
trol of  any of  the corporations under a trustee and making 
any agreement, implied or expressed, as to the management 
of  other  corporations, or to regulate  prices,  sales, rates of 
transportation, or outputs. 
On May 15,1911, this decree of  the Circuit Court was af- 
firmed by the United  States Supreme Court, except in the 
minor modifications of time for executing the decree and for 
continuance of  business during the time necessary to carry 
out the decree.  The time  for the dissolution  of  the cor- 
poration was extended to six months from the 21st of  June, 
1911, and pending the dissolution the Standard Oil Company 
continued business in the United States. 
As  a  result  of  these  decisions  and  orders  the Standard 
Oil  Company has  now  been  broken  into  thirtyeight  com- 
panies.  These companies are not to have common officers  or 
directors.  The stock of  the Standard was not widely dis- 
tributed and the new companies have common owners.  The 
officers of  seven of  the more important new companies remain 
in the same quarters which  the Standard Oil  Company be- 
fore occupied, 26 Broadway. 
President Taft has announced that the plan of  the adminis- 
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by which competition  between its parts shall  be 
restored and preserved."  l  Will this result be reached in the 
of the Standard Oil Company ?  Will the officers of  the 
seven large companies  in different rooms at  26 Broadway really 
compete in  prices?  That this will  occur  has been widely 
doubted by the public from the outset, and on February 29, 
1912, it was announced that the Waters-Pierce Company of  10  co8pera- 
Texas had alleged that the disintegrated  companies are com- Etroyed, 
bining, and this company had instituted an investigation in 
order to show the facts. 
Also  the "Street"  evidently does not take the Standard 
Oil decision seriously.  When  the case was  in  the courts, 
the  stock  gradually  declined  and  reached  a  low  level  of 
585.  After the  decision  was  rendered  which  finally  dis-  Oilrising. 
solved  the  company, Standard  Oil  stock  again  rose  until 
900 was  reached, more  than  300  points  highem  than when 
the  company  was  under  attack.  Apparently  the  men 
who know believe  that the  decision of  the  court will  not 
be  sufficiently destructive to reduce the great profits which 
the  Standard  has  enjoyed  and which  will  now  go  to  the 
constituent companies. 
The American  Tobacco Company. -  On May 29,  1911, the 
Supreme Court of  the United States declared the American 
Tobacco Company to come within the prohibition of  the first  Comprehen- 
and second sections of  the Sherman antitrust act.  The com-  terms 
of  decision. 
bination of  itself  as well as the elements composing it, both 
corporate and individual,  were  collectively  and separately 
declared to be  in restraint  of  trade and were  found  to be 
attempting to  monopolize and monopolizing the tobacco busi- 
ness.  In order to carry out the effect of  this decision the lower 
court was  ordered to ascertain some plan of  dissolving the 
combination, or recreating out of  the elements a new condi- 
tion which should be in harmony with the law.  To accom- 
plish this a period of  six months was allowed.  If  at the end 
that time some plan had not been devised in harmony with 
the law for disintegrating the company, it  was to be restrained 
engaging in interstate business.  In the meantime, the 
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company was restrained from enlarging its powers or extend- 
ing its business. 
In accordance with this decree and order the Circuit Court 
of  the United States for the Southern District of  New York, 
on November 6, 1911, approved a plan for disintegrating the 
American Tobacco Company, which, as we have seen, repre- 
sented a consolidation of  some two hundred and fifty corpora- 
tions into fourteen companies.  The outstanding  securities, 
bonds,  preferred  and  common  stock,  of  the  American 
Tobacco  Company were  found  to  aggregate  $223,168,250. 
Ineffectual  The  tobacco  business,  which  was  by  far  the  larger  part 
of  the business  of  the company, was  divided among three 
companies, the American Tobacco Company, having a cap- 
italization  of  $53,408,499;  Liggett & Myers Tobacco Com- 
pany; having  a  capitalization  of  $67,447,499;  and  the  P. 
LoriIIard  Company, having a capitalization of  $47,552,501. 
Thus these three companies together  have a capitalization 
of  $168,408,409, which constitutes 70 per cent of  the entire 
business of  the original company and leaves but 30 per cent 
of  the assets  to be  distributed  among  the  other  eleven 
companies. 
One  small  subsidiary  company,  the Amsterdam  Supply 
Company, which was a purchasing agency, was dissolved and 
the assets transferred into cash and distributed to the share- 
holders.  A number of  companies, including the Conley Foil 
Company, the MacAndrews & Forbes Company, the Ameri- 
can Snuff Company, the American Stogie Company, and the 
American Cigar Company, each were required to divide into 
not less than two companies each, or to convert their assets 
into cash.  Further the restrictive  arrangements which had 
been made by the American Tobacco Company with foreign 
companies were abrogated. 
The fourteen companies are enjoined from coijperating in 
business in any way ;  they must not occupy the same offices ; 
they cannot hold the stock of  one another, or even stock in 
companies in which other companies hold stock.  Each com- 
pany must do business insits own house, and the products of 
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joined from having common offices or directors or the same 
agents. 
The stock of  the American Tobacco Company was, in a 
manner like that of  Standard Oil, distributed proportionally 
to his  holdings  to each  stockholder  of  the  fourteen  com- 
panies.  There were  twentynine men who  held  a dominat- 
ing  position in the old corporation, and they in like manner 
hold a dominating position in the three new companies into 
which the chief assets of  the old company have been divided. 
1t is the opinion of  the Attorney-General that the disinte- 
gration ordered will accomplish the objects of  the law, and will 
effectually prevent the recurrence of  the agreements which, 
in the past, have resulted in a monopolistic situation.'  He 
says that "  the natural  tendency of  men to compete  with 
one another will operate and the fact that there is community 
of  stockholding cannot  prevent  that  natural  tendency." 
It appears, however, from the evidence presented in this book  1s competi- 
that the tendency for large companies to co6perate is much  ~~'r~~~~ 
greater than their  tendency to compete.  This fact has led  thestronger 
other men  to hold views in sharp contrast with those of  the  *OrCe? 
Attorney-General.  In the opinion of  Mr. Louis Brandei~,~ 
one of the counsel for the independent companies, the order 
to disintegrate the American Tobacco Company will prove to 
be a farce.  He says that not only was the tobacco business 
distributed among three companies, but the part of  the busi- 
ness which was assigned to each company was such as to give 
them  substantial monopoly  for important lines of  business 
=signed  to them.  Mr. Felix H. Levy,4  another of  the attor- 
neys of the independent companies, says the plan of  disinte- 
gration "  is a sham and a subterfuge."  Mr. Samuel Unter- 
(I  meycr  says,  They have simply changed its clothes ; that  A change of 
is all; and they have not made a very complete change at clothes. 
that." 
As a matter of fact, we now have fourteen tobacco combina- 
tions which have the sanction of  the courts instead of one that 
Annual Report of  the Attorney-General of  the United States, P. 6.  '  CW~V Magazine, Vd. LXXXIII, No. 4, p. 620. 
a Bearing, Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, Part XVI, pp. 1186, 
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did not.  It is notable that after the order was given by the 
Supreme Court to dissolve the corporation, the stock of the 
American Tobacco Company fell to 390 per share ; but that 
after the decision of  the Circuit Court as to the kind of  disin- 
tegration which was to take place, the common stock rose to  as 
high a price as ever before in the history of  the company, with 
the exception of  a single day, $529 per share.'  This is the re- 
sult of  more than four years'  litigation which  cost the inde- 
pendent  companies and  the American company vast  sums 
of  money, and the government as large or  larger sums, all 
of  which will ultimately be paid by the public. 
There remains to be  mentioned the most notable  feature 
of  the tobacco decision.  The Supreme Court said : "While in 
many substantial respects our conclusion is in accord with that 
reached by the court below, and while also the relief which we 
think should be awarded in some respects is coincident with 
that which the court granted, in order to prevent any compli- 
cation and to clearly define the situation we think instead of 
affirming and modifying,  our  decree, in view  of  the broad 
nature of  our conclusions, should be one of  reversal and re- 
manding with directions to the court below to enter a decree 
in conformity with this opinion and to take such further steps 
as may be necessary to fully carry out the directions which we 
have given." 
The radical feature of  the decision is contained in this last 
((  clause,  to take such further steps as may be necessary to 
me  oourt  fully carry out the directions which  we  have  given."  As 
undertaking we have already seen, the lower court in complying with this  administra- 
tive work.  request approved a plan for the disintegration of  the tobacco 
trust which had been proposed by the tobacco combination 
and had been approved by the Attorney-General.  Thus this 
court took on the function of  giving an order to the lower 
court to do administrative work, of  a kind which has usually 
been done by a commission (see pp. 233-244),  and for which 
a commission is much better adapted.  When the order was 
executed as directed, the members of  the disintegrated trust 
had the advantage of  having the sanction of  law.  The admin- 
1 Hearing, Senate Interatate Commerce Committee, Part XYIII, g. 1368. THE LAWS  REGARDING  COOPERATION  187 
istrative work  of  the court in  disintegrating the American 
Tobacco Company, already severely criticised and generally 
believed to be futile, is one of the best evidences of  the lack 
of  of  the courts to the handling of  the complex 
abinistrati~e  problems of great concentrations in industry. 
The Du  Pont  Powder  Company. -  In the case of  the E. I. 
DU Pont  de Nemours  Powder  Company,'  known  as the 
powder trust, the company was dissolved and the broad prin- 
ciple was laid down by the Supreme Court, "  that a combina- 
tion  cannot  escape the condemnation  of  the  antitrust act 
merely by the form it assumes or by the dress it wears.  It 
matters  not  whether  the combination be 'in the form of  a  ~orm  of 
trust or otherwise,' whether it be in the form of  a trade associ- :,"',"S$ 
ation or a corporation, if  it arbitrarily uses its power to force 
weaker competitors out of business or to coerce them into a 
sale to or union with the combination, it puts a restraint upon 
interstate commerce and monopolizes or attempts to monop- 
olize a part of  that commerce in a sense  that  violates the 
antitrust act." 
Dissolution by Mutual Agreement. -  In  addition to dissolu- 
tion of corporations by the court, after  full  trial  and  con- 
viction, there is another class of  cases in which as a result of 
complaint the company without trial has agreed with the gov- 
ernment as to the violation of  the Sherman act, and decrees 
have been issued in accordance therewith with  the  consent 
of the company against which complaint was made. 
One of  the most notable of  these cases was that of  the Gen- 
eral  Electric  Company.  This  company  was  charged  with 
having a moliopoly in the manufacture of  incandescent elec- 
tric lamps.  This monopoly was secured through secret com- 
panies, and by having the exclusive rights in this country to  Unfair 
use  tantalum and tungsten  filaments.  This right  through 
exclusive agreement was used to require that any firm buying  tioa 
lamps of these kinds should also buy all their carbon filament 
lamps from the General Electric Company  Through unfair 
methods, such as fixing prices, exclusive agreements, rebates, 
etc., monopoly was secured, the company having obtained 97 
'  Annual Report of  the Attorney-General of  the United Steta, 1911, p.  8. 188  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
per cent of  the incandescent lamp business of  the country. 
In consequence, excessive charges for lamps were made, be- 
ing seventeen cents apiece in this country, while  the same 
lamps are sold abroad at ten cents. 
A most  comprehensive decree was issued restraining the 
General Electric Company from the various unlawful acts set 
forth  in  the  petition,  and  particularly the  following were 
ordered:  That  all  subsidiary  companies  of  the  General 
Electric Company should be known as such and should con- 
duct their business in the name of  that company;  exclusive 
Sweeping  contracts of  all kinds were forbidden, such as requiringanother 
decree.  company to sell goods exclusively  to the General  Electric 
Company,  combining with  other  companies to  fix  prices, 
requiring  that those  who  purchase  tantalum  and tungsten 
lamps should also purchase from the General Electric Com- 
pany their carbon lamps.  The company was enjoined from 
making a discount depending upon quantity of  lamps pur- 
chased when the result is to combine or aggregate the  discount 
on an unpatented and apatented lamp ;  it  was further enjoined 
from making prices or terms of  sale for the purpose of  driving 
out of  business any rival manufacturer ; "  provided that no 
defendant is enjoined or restrained from making any prices for 
incandescent electric lamps to  meet, or to compete with, prices 
previously made  by  any other  defendant, or by any rival 
manufacturer;  and provided  further  that  nothing  in  this 
decree shall be taken in any respect to enjoin or restrain fair, 
free, and open competition." l 
Another interesting case is that of  a business association. 
In  October, 1911, a most sweeping decree was given by agree- 
Grocersv  ment  of  both  the  United  States and Southern Wholesale 
agree men^  Grocers' Association.  The members of  this association were 
illegal. 
perpetually  enjoined  from  restraining  trade  by  having  a 
list of  dealers to whom special privileges were granted, in- 
cluding selling only to members of  such association.  They 
were enjoined from making any agreement regarding prices, 
'United  States of  America  v.  General  Electric  Company  et  al.,  In 
Equity. Circuit Court of  the United States for the Northern District of  Ohio, 
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or  even  preparing  a  list  of  prices  for  the  information  of 
one another, from giving rebates or bonuses from any dealer 
because he is a member of  the association, from boycotting 
any manufacturer who is not a member of  the association or 
does not maintain limited selling prices.  In  short, the decree 
in most comprehensive terms enjoins the association from re- 
straining trade in any way by fixing prices, making exclusive 
or granting exclusive privileges to members of 
the association.  Under the decree it is difficult to see how 
there can be any combination of  the members in restraint of 
trade either reasonable or unreasonable.' 
Other Corporations under Attack. -  In addition to decrees 
of this kind there are a number of  organizations attacked by 
the Attorney-General.  Among these are the following: - 
The United States Steel Corporation is attacked, both on 
the ground of  the combination  itself and of  trade arrange- 
ments.  It  is charged that the American Steel Wire Company, 
one of  the subsidiary companies of  the corporation, has made 
combinations concerning a number of  its products ; and also 
that  there  are informal  price  understandings  between  the 
officers of  the United States Steel Corporation and those of 
other companie~.~  The United Shoe Machinery Company  is  Patent 
under indictment for combination in restraint of  trade on a 
number of  counts, including both monopoly and unfair prac- 
tices in securing and maintaining monopoly.  Similarly the 
National Cash Register Company  and the Keystone Watch 
Case Company  are attacked both for gaining monopoly and 
for unfair practices in securing the monopoly. 
l The  United  States of  America  U.  The Southern  Wholesale  Grocera' 
Association  et  d.,  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Northern 
District of  Alabama.  Decree of  Injunction. 
'United  States of  America v. United States Steel Corporation and others, 
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of  New Jersey.  Petition. 
United  States  v.  Sydney  W.  Window  et  al.,  February  Term,  1911, 
Nos.  113 and 114, Circuit  Court of  the United  States for  the District  of 
Massachusetts.  Indictment. 
'The United States of  America 0. The National Cash Register Company 
and others, Circuit  Court of  the ~iited  States for the Southern Judicial 
District of  Ohio,  Western  Division. 
The United States of  America v. The Keystone Watch Case Company 
and others,  Circuit Court of  the United States for the Esatern DMct  of 
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The National Cash Register Company is especially charged 
with a number of  the most objectionable of  unfair practices. 
In  the petition it is complained that this company maintains 
 nook-out  a group of  agents known as "knock-out  men,"  who are em- 
men.  ployed  for  the  special purpose  of  destroying  competitors. 
They spy upon the business of the competitors, misrepresent 
cash registers of opposing companies, and sell registers which 
resemble their machines at a very low figure.  It is charged 
that competing companies were purchased by the National 
Cash Register Company and this fact kept secret. 
It is said that at  Dayton was maintained a '(graveyard "  or 
(I  midway"  and a "glooming room."  In  the former were dis- 
A dooming  played cash registers of  companies that had been driven out 
mom.  of  the business,  and in the latter it was  shown how  these 
colnpanies were driven from the business.  Also, it is charged 
that patents  covering  cash  register  inventions  have  been 
purchased,  and that inventors of  other devices have  been 
prevented from putting their inventions on the market.  It is 
said that unwarranted and unjustifiable suits and threats of 
suits have been brought from time to time against competi- 
tors with the purpose of  intimidating them.  In  order to make 
the plans of  intimidation more effective, the National Cash 
Register  Company  distributed  statements  regarding  dead 
cash register companies.  One issued in January, 1910, stated 
that, during fifteen years, one hundred fiftyeight companies 
had been organized to compete with the National, and that of 
these, one hundred fiftythree had  failed.  With  this state- 
ment is given a list of  the defunct companies.  Finally it is 
charged that at places where  there  was  keen  competition, 
prices  were  cut  so  as to prevent  competitors  from  doing 
business except  at a loss, the losses of  the National  Com- 
pany being recouped by large profits where competition did 
not  exist.  No  opinion  is  expressed as to whether  or not 
these charges against the National Cash Register  Company 
will be proved to be well founded. 
Other  companies  which  are  under  attack  include  the 
following:  Swift, Armour,  and other beef  packers,  several 
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the American Sugar Refining Company, the Trans-Atlantic 
,teamship  pool,  the  Periodical  Publishing  Company,  the 
standard Wood Company, and several elevator companies. 
General Statements. -  In recent years whenever cases have 
been  in the court  under  the Sherman act,  pools,  combina- 
tions, or agreements, producing restraint of  trade, have been 
declared to be  illegal.  From the tenor of  the decisions the 
might  be  reached  that the law had been fairly 
effective  in producing the results which were sought when the 
act was passed, at least for later years ; but an examination 
of the situation shows the contrary to be true. 
All  of  the  railways  connecting  any  two  points  in  the 
United States charge exactly the same prices for the same 
service, be it freight or passenger.  As already pointed out, it RBilwam 
is a matter of  common information that competition in price  OObFte. 
between the railroads does not exist;  and this fact is tacitly 
accepted by the public and by the Attorney-General of  the 
United States, although every person having common sense 
knows that  the  situation is  only  possible  by  agreements 
through informal understandings, traffic associations, etc. 
For twenty years the major effect of  the decisions has been  Law drivee 
to change the forms of  combination, from the informal agree-  ~~b~,"~ 
ment or pool to the trust, from the trust to the holding com-  entrench- 
pany, and finally there is the beginning of  the transformation g:;,"," 
from the holding corporation to the complete merger.  At 
the same time this evolution has been going on for the great 
industries, hundreds of  informal associations of  exactly the 
same kind as those which have been declared to be illegal have 
arisen, such as the various retailers' and wholesalers' associa- 
tions,  the  fruit  growers'  associations,  the  butter  makers' 
associations, etc.  Indeed, a comparison of  the situation in 
the United States with other countries, such as England and 
Germany, in which  combination is open, shows that at the 
Present moment combinations exist to a greater extent in the 
United States than in either of  those countries, in which trade 
Bgreements are enforced by the courts. 
Could there be more positive evidence than this of  the fail- 
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Impotency  The impotency of  the Sherman act to accomplish the results 
of Sher- 
man act.  for which it was made has been admitted by all, alike by those 
who would have it amended so as to give greater freedom in 
combination and by those who would  have it amended so as 
to give a very strict construction, with the vain hope that it 
might thereby destroy cooperation. 
Since the Sherman act was passed a child born has attained 
his majority.  While there has been gain in the elimination of 
unfair practices, there has been no gain in preventing combi- 
nations in restraint of  trade, the fundamental purpose of  the 
Time  law.  It would seem that the time had now come for a ra- 
arrived for 
national  tional consideration of  the principles which should apply to 
eolution.  the situation in order to secure reasonable results both for 
combinations and for the public without interfering with great 
economic tendencies.  Any attempt further to amend the law 
so as to make it more rigid as against cooperation cannot but 
be futile.  The problem of  combination in restraint of  trade 
is one too large, too complex, and too irresistible to be handled 
by the courts.  This situation has been clearly seen by Knox, 
by  Wickersham,  and  by  others  who  have  attempted  to 
secure the results aimed at by the Sherman law;  they have 
found themselves baffled.  The constructive side of  the case is 
presented on pp. 248-266. 
STATE  LEGISLATION  AGAINST  TRUSTS 
Many of  the states have constitutional provisions or stat- 
utes  which  embody  the  same  principles  as  the  Sherman 
act.  Among  the states which  have  constitutional  provis- 
ions  against  combination  in  restraint of  trade  or  monop- 
oly  are:  Alabama,  1901 ; Arkansas,  1836 ; Idaho,  1889 ; 
Kentucky, 1891 ;  Maryland, 1867;  Mississippi, 1890; Mon- 
tana,  1889;  North  Carolina,  1875 ; North  Dakota, 1889; 
South  Carolina,  1895 ; South  Dakota,  1896 ; Tennessee, 
1870 ;  Texas, 1875 ;  Utah,  1895 ; Virginia, 1902 ; Washing- 
ton, 1889 ; Wyoming, 1889. 
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the date of  the statutes against  restraint of  trade and 
monopol~  are as follows : Alabama,  1907 ;  Arkansas,  1897, 
1899,  1905,  and  1907 ; California,  1907;  Florida,  1897 ; 
Georgia, 1896; Illinois, 1891, and 1893 ;  Indiana, 1897, 1899, 
1908 ;  Iowa, 1897 ;  Kansas, 1889, 1897, and 1899 ;  Kentucky, 
1903 ; Louisiana,  1890,  1892, and 1894 ; Maine,  1899 and 
1903 ; Massachusetts,  1908 ;  Michigan,  1889  and  1903 ; 
Minnesota,  1891, 1899, 1905, and  1907 ; Mississippi,  1890, 
1906, and 1908 ; Missouri, 1891, 1899, and 1907 ;  Nebraska, 
1897 ;  New Mexico, 1891, 1897, and 1907 ;  New York, 1892, 
1897, and  1899;  North  Carolina,  1899  and  1905;  North 
Dakota, 1890, 1897, and 1907;  Ohio, 1898, 1905, and 1906; 
Oklahoma, 1890 and 1908;  South Carolina, 1897, 1899, and 
1902 ;  South Dakota, 1890,1897, and 1899 ;  Tennessee, 1889 
1891, 1897, and  1903;  Texas, 1895,  1899,  1903, and  1907; 
Utah, 1898 and  lSW ;  Wisconsin, 1893 and 1897. 
It is notable that only two of  the states had antitrust acts 
prior  to 1890, the year  the Sherman act was  passed.  The 
State antitrust acts were the natural response to the public 
demands within the states for prohibition of  restraint of  trade  The  con- 
in intrastate business, similar to that which had been enacted  f,","~,"~:~. 
regarding interstate business.  As would be expected, under 
the circumstances, while the phraseology varies, the prohi- 
bitions of  the state laws are substantially like those of  the 
Sherman act, except that  they, of  course, contain no refer- 
ence to trade between the states and territories or with for- 
eign countries.  In a number of instances, trusts, pools, and 
holding  companies which  have  the  purposes of  regulating 
output, dividing the market, or controlling prices are specifi- 
cally prohibited.  In a few states there are special features 
which should be noted, as giving additional insight into the 
situation. 
In Georgia  is a provision that the general assembly of that 
state shall have no power to authorize any corporation to buy 
shares of stock in any other corporation in that state or else- 
where, or to make any contract or agreement whatever, with 
such corporation, which may have the effect to defeat or 
lessen competition in their respective businesses, or to encour- 194  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
age monopoly;  and all such contracts and agreements are 
declared to be  illegal and void.  This is the only instance in 
which the law specifically forbids the interholdings of  stocks, a 
remedy which is advocated by many for interstate commerce. 
In the Illinois and Louisiana laws there is a clause which 
states "that the provisions of  the act shall not apply to agri- 
cultural products or live stock while in the hands of  the pro- 
ducer or raiser " ; and in the Louisiana law is the additional 
clause that the law shall not be construed to affect any com- 
bination  or  confederation  of  laborers  for  the  purpose  of 
increase of  their wages or redress of  grievances.  The legis- 
latures of  Louisiana and Illinois in passing an antitrust law 
apparently fully appreciated the fact, practically unnoticed in 
the public discussions, that the selling agencies of  the farmers 
for marketing their produce may be as  clearly a combination in 
restraint of  trade as are similar selling agencies of  manufac- 
turers.  The exempting clause for agricultural  products was 
declared  to be void by the United States Circuit  Court of 
Illinois as being class and special legislation. 
In Massachusetts  it is a criminal offense to impose  "the 
condition in a sale of  goods that the purchaser shall not sell 
or deal in the goods of  any person other than the seller." 
This law has been held to be constitutional. 
In  Michigan is a provision of  the law declaring illegal con- 
tracts "not to engage in any avocation, employment, pursuit, 
trade, profession, or  business, whether  reasonable or unrea- 
sonable, partial or general, limited or unlimited."  This state 
law specifically goes  beyond  the  common  law principle  of 
reasonable  restraint.  This  law accords with  the  decisions 
of  the Supreme Court of  the United States which had  been 
made up to that time.  It was not until 1911 that the courts 
introduced, by interpretation into the Sherman act, the word 
(I  reasonable." 
In Oklahoma  the antitrust  law prohibits  several  unfair 
practices.  Thus it is prohibited to discriminate by sale at a 
lower rate in one section  than in another, "or  at the same 
rate or price at  a point away from that of  production or manu- 
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facture as at the place of  production,  etc.,  if  the effect or 
intent  is  to hinder  competition  or restrain  trade."  Also, 
the Oklahoma  law  is  very specific  regarding trusts,  hold- 
ing corporations, limiting output, and marketing.  It is de- 
clared unlawful to issue or own trust certificates, or to enter 
into any combination, etc., for the purpose of  placing the man- 
agement or control of  such combination, or the conduct or 
operation of the same, or the output or produce thereof, or 
the marketing of  the same in the hands of  any trust or trus- 
tees, holding corporations, etc., with the intent to limit or fix 
prices, lessen the production or sale of  any article, or the use 
and  consumption of  the  same,  or  to prevent  or  restrict, 
the manufacture or output of  any such article.  Further, in 
this state the following very significant provision is inserted 
(l  in the law:  Whenever any business, by reason of  its nature, 
extent, or the existence of  a virtual monopoly therein, is such 
that the public must use the same in such a manner as to make 
it of  public consequence, or to affect the community at large  Industries 
as to supply, demand, or price  thereof, or said business is it::'  a 
conducted in violation of  section 1 (6679)) said business is a  interest. 
public business and subject to be controlled by the state, by 
the corporation commission, or by an action in any district 
court of  the state, as to all of  its practices, prices, rates, and 
charges."  This  paragraph  cleatly  looks toward  the point 
of view that the great concentrations of  industry become public 
utilities;  indeed, whenever the element of  monopoly or re- 
straint of  trade  to the extent  of  affecting the community 
enters as a whole  it makes them so.  When this situation 
is reached for any business, it comes under the same princi- 
ples of control as the common carriers. 
In South Dakota  the law especially protects  the farmers, 
as follows:  Any  combination  to prevent  competition  by 
raising  the price beyond  the reasonable cost of  production 
or that tends to advance the price to the user of  farm machin- 
ery,  implements,  tools,  supplies, lumber,  wood,  and  coal, 
imported  into  this state from  any other state, territory, or 
county, beyond the reasonable cost of  production  and sale 
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corn, oats, barley, flax, cattle, sheep, hogs,  or other farm or 
agricultural products for less than they are worth at time of 
sale, or for what they would sell at in open market, if  such 
contract did not exist, is declared to be unlawful. 
In Utah it is seen that when professional men agree on prices 
the principle is the same as in other combinations, and the 
law says, "Any combination having for its object the control- 
ling of  the prices of  any professional services, any products of 
the soil, any article of  manufacture or commerce, or the cost 
of  exchange  or  transportation  is  prohibited  and' declared 
unlawful." 
The Nebraska antitrust law of  1897 was most sweeping in 
its  character.  It  very  definitely  makes  all  combinations 
in restraint of  trade to whatever extent a trust and declares 
the same to be  illegal.  Also  it prohibits  in  comprehensive 
terms all classes of  cooperation.  It, however, excludes from 
its provisions  all assemblages and associations of  working- 
men and provides that "there is thereby reserved for them 
all the rights  and privileges now accorded them by law."  l 
This  act was  declared  to  be  unconstitutional  by the fed- 
eral courts as depriving persons of  their liberty in violation 
of  the federal  Constitution  and  also  as exempting  labor 
organizations from  its  provisions, thus  denying  equal pro- 
tection of  the laws to persons  not  members of  such organ- 
izations. 
In Texas, refusing  to buy or sell  to another  any article 
of  merchandise is declared to be  conspiracy in restraint of 
trade.  Also, agreements to boycott or threaten to refuse to 
buy are made illegal.  The state statute prohibits all com- 
binations in restriction of  competition or trade, but exempted 
agricultural  products  and live stock while  in the hands of 
the  producers  or   raiser^.^  This  law  was  declared  by the 
federal  courts  to be  a violation of  the  amendment to the 
Constitution of  the United  States, which  declares  that no 
state shall deny any person within its jurisdiction equal pro- 
tection under the laws. 
The Illinois, Nebraska, and Texas decisions seem clearly to 
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show that the antitrust laws in  those states which contain 
exemptions in favor of  any class will be held  to be unconsti- 
tutional by the Supreme Court of  the United States. 
Decisions under the Statutes. -In  this brief  book there is 
not space to discuss in detail the decisions which have been 
rendered under the statute laws.  In general, the statutes  Restrictive 
regarding combinations  and  contracts in restraint of  trade  ::,":Lfws. 
have gone much fartber than the common law in imposing 
restrictions upon  commerce.  The author knows of  no in- 
stance in which  state statutes have  moved in  the direction 
of the English  Parliamentary act in enlarging the scope of 
combination.  The effort of  the statute law has been to reach 
restraints of  trade which would have escaped the ban of  the 
common law.  Pools, trusts, combinations, and monopolies 
have been declared not to be legal.  For the most part re- 
straint of  trade taking the form of  contracts regarding division 
or restriction of  territory, or regulation of  output or prices, 
have  been  declared  unlawful.  Such  decisions  have  been 
rendered in many statesjl although, under the common law, 
many of  the forbidden agreements would have been allowed. 
It is not necessary to give the details of  decisions covering 
these points, and only those having some special feature will 
be summarized. 
Agreements regarding the fixing of  price for insurance have 
been  held  to be  illegal.  In Iowa  this has been  applied to 
a group of  local insurance agents who agreed upon the price 
for each class of  risk.2  In Minnesota a combination bywhich 
twenty-eight independent companies agreed to place the con- 
trol of their business with one company to the extent of  fixing 
the rate was held to be in restraint of  trade and a violation of 
the code?  In  Missouri, an  agreement of  insurance companies 
regarding rates was declared illegal.* 
A local  agreement to raise the price of  beer in Kentucky 
'147 Cal. 115, 1905; 107 Pac.  712,  1910; 65  Ill.  App.  502, 1896; 182 
m.  551, 1889 ; 171 Ill. 391, 1898  ; 65 Km. 240, 1902 ; 112 KY.  925,  1902; 
119 Mich. 255, 1899 ; 134 Mich.  103, 1903 ; 140 Mich. 538.  1905; 187 
MO.  244, 1905; l16 N. W.  302,  1908; 177 N. Y. 473,  1904; 139 N.  Y. 
251,  1893 ; 72 Ohio State, 210, 1905 ; 61 Ohio State, 520,  1900; 106 Pac. 
1910; 128 S. W.  599,  1910.  * 102 Is. 602,1897. 
'  75 Minn. 28, 1897.  4 152 MO.  1,1899. 198  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
$1  a barrel was declared to be illegal, although it had for its 
purpose  the  raising  of  the  price  of  an  intoxicant,  the 
increased use of  which the law does not favor.' 
It is not necessary that a combination shall secure a practi- 
cal monopoly of  the product in order  to be in  restraint of 
trade under some of  the state ~tatutes.~  Transactions creat- 
ing a  local monopoly for a limited period (ten years)  have 
been declared to be illegaL3  In Oklahoma this principle has 
been  carried so far as to hold  that a combination by three 
companies manufacturing ten per  cent  of  a  product  is  in 
restraint of  trade.4 
Contracts for exclusive dealing have been declared to be un- 
lawful in a number of  states.  In Kansas exclusive contracts 
of  agents to handle International Harvester machinery were 
declared to  be in restraint of  trade.6  In  Michigan agreements 
to sell all the salt manufactured to  a single concern and to stop 
the manufacture of  salt upon the payment of  a certain rental 
was held to be illegal.6  In Texas an agreement to buy oil and 
beer from a single firm, to sell at a fixed price, and not to sell 
to competing dealers, was declared to be in violation of  the 
laws in restraint of  trade.' 
In general, agreements made by associations by which their 
members would have the advantages of  exclusive dealing or 
which  discriminate  against  non-members  regarding  prices 
and other matters, have been held to be unlawful.8 
Thus produce exchanges which discriminate in prices be- 
tween members and non-members have been declared to be in 
restraint of trade.O  In Michigan it has been held that a con- 
tract to sell lambs where the buyer agrees not to purchase any 
other lambs to a fixed time is held to be void, since under the 
statutes all contracts designed in any manner to prevent or 
restrain price competition is unlawful.10 
In  Oklahoma an agreement not to enter business within one 
1 112 Ky.  925, 1902.  '214 Ill. 421, 1905.  128 S. W. 599, 1910. 
4 59 S.  W. 709, 1900.  81 Kas. 610, Feb., 1906. 
6 134 Mich. 103, 1903. 
7 19 Texas Civ. App. 1, 1898:  90 Texaa  277,  1896.  See also 119 Mich. 
255, 1899, and 97  ~i&.  App. 280, 1902. 
8 211 MO. 181, 1908 ; 75 Neb. 637.1906;  103 Tenn. 99, 1899. 
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hundred miles of  Oklahoma City was declared to be in conflict 
,ith  the statute which provides for disposal of  good will on 
exclusive basis only to the extent of  a specified c0unty.l 
In Minnesota it has  been  held  to be  a  violation  of  the 
statute to sell kerosene, as has been done by the Standard Oil 
Company, at different prices at various localities, with the in- 
tent to destroy business of  competitors and create m~nopoly.~ 
Selling agencies are under the ban of  the law in some states. 
In  New York City there was created an agency for the buying 
and selling of  milk at wholesale and retail.  The majority of 
the stockholders in this agency were milk  dealers in the city 
of New York.  The board of  directors fixed the price at  which 
milk  should be  purchased by the stockholders.  This price 
so fixed, controlled the markets and the combination was de- 
clared to be ~nlawful.~  Similarly the producers of  bluestone 
combined in an association to regulate the price and appor- 
tion their output under which separate companies made the 
sales for each  participant.  This arrangement was declared 
to be ~nlawful.~ 
The above sufficiently illustrates the dominant trend of  the 
decisions against restraint of  trade.  Some of  the states have  Restraint 
allowed contracts in restraint of  trade to a very limited ex- E:,":  to 
tent.  In California, when  a merchant purchased  a  certain  extent. 
quantity of  olive oil, agreeing not to sell the same below a 
certain price per gallon, this agreement was held not to be in 
violation of  the code restraining mon~polies.~  In New York 
in one case it has been held that an agreement under which 
wholesale dealers, manufacturing certain proprietary articles, 
"11  their goods at  a uniform jobbing price only to such dealers 
85 would  conform to the manufacturers'  price list  is legaL8 
the same line it has been held lawful for manufacturers 
give jobbers rebates who would  agree not to sell for less 
than the list price prescribed by the manufacturers.' 
In  New York an agreement between a builders' association 
and a bricklayers'  union, under  which the association gave 
wilson's "Review and Annals," St. Okl.. 1903,  sections 819-820. 
'126  N. W.  527,  1910.  8 145 N.  Y.  267,  1895.  164 N.  Y.  401,  1900. 
l56 CM. 611,  1909.  9 176 N.  Y. 1,1903. 
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preference to the members of  the union, and no member of  the 
bricklayers' union could work for any one not complying with 
the regulations, was declared  not to constitute a monopoly 
within the New York statute.'  An agreement of  the Duluth 
board of  trade providing that all members of  the board shall 
charge uniform rates of  commission for selling grain to non- 
members was declared not to be'a violation of  the Minnesota 
antitrust acL2 
Contracts for limited exclusive agencies, and to refrain from 
business for a limited time and place, have been held  to be 
legal.  In  Mississippi a contract for an exclusive agency for a 
definite territory to sell a certain article manufactured by a 
single company was held not to be in restraint of  trade.3  In 
Arkansas an agreement to refrain from soliciting insurance 
in Jefferson County for five years was held to be la~ful.~  It 
has been held to be reasonable for shopkeepers to agree as to 
the hour of  closing their shops.5 
General Statements. -  The foregoing discussion of  the situa- 
tion within  the states shows that the statute laws have been 
very strictly construed  regarding  restraint  of  trade.  The 
great majority of  the decisions  under  the laws  have  been 
against combinations and contracts in restraint of  trade, and 
against regulation of  output, division of  territory, and agree- 
ments in prices.  However,  the last set of  cases cited show 
that contracts  restraining  trade  to a  very  limited  degree 
have been allowed. 
The statute laws are as strongly against combination or re- 
straint of  intrastate  trade as is the Sherman  antitrust act 
for interstate commerce.  Upon the whole the situation within 
the states with regard to restraint of  trade under the laws and 
decisions is practically  the same as with interstate commerce 
under the Sherman act. 
The legislation against the trusts among the states along 
the  same  lines  as  that of  Congress  shows  the  influence 
of  contagion,  and  the  willingness  of  legislatures  to  act 
upon a generally accepted faith such as that which prevails 
1 169 Fed.  256,  1909.  '101  Minn. 606,  1909.  a77 Miss. 476,  1899. 
4 121 S. W.  293,  1909.  54 S. W.  969,  1900. THE  LAWS  REGARDING  COOPERATION  201 
concerning the power of  competition adequately to regulate 
commerce. 
already  pointed  out, combinations, in prices formal or 
informal, exist everywhere, from the two or three grocers at 
the country crossroads to the great business concerns.  Just 
,, the effect of the Sherman law has been steadily to increase 
the concentration of  industry, so the legislation  in the states 
regarding restraint of  trade has been an  influence in the same 
direction. 
The foregoing makes it clear that where a sound and power- 
ful  economic tendency appears which appeals to the common 
sense of the community as  necessary for the general welfare, a 
law, however drastic, cannot stand in its way.  Burke said 
in his address upon Conciliation with America, "I  do nat know 
the method of  drawing up an indictment against an whole 
people."  If  at  the present time the laws against combination 
in this country are to be strictly enforced, it will be necessary 
to draw an indictment against the larger part of  the business 
men of the country. 
The great combinations which have been selected for indict- 
ment have been those against which popular clamor has been 
directed.  The selection of  them has been largely due to this 
cause combined with their magnitude.  Is it not a most unfor- 
tunate situation when tens of  thousands are guilty, that here 
and there one is picked out for prosecution? 
One of the most serious evils in connection with the situa- 
tion arises from this fact.  The business men, knowing that 
cooperation is not possible under the law, are driven to secret 
~nderstandin~s  and gentlemen's  agreements.  In the dark, 
serious abuses appear in connection with cooperation which 
would not arise if  the cooperation were legal and therefore 
there was no reason to hide the facts from the public.  In  this 
the business men of  England and Germany are in an 
advantageous position as compared with those of  the United 
States.  In  those countries they may cooperate ;  in the United 
States they may not. 
It would indeed have been fortunate had we  allowed the 
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prohibit cooperation, had undertaken its  control through some 
administrative  instrumentality.  While  it is  believed  that 
the present  campaign, by the Attorney-General,  to destroy 
cooperation and return to competition will not be successful, 
yet if  it should  be  successful  for trade, manufacture  and 
commerce will again be in the position that they were when 
England  and America  were  under  the  old  restrictions  of 
common and statute law.  If  it should  turn out that busi- 
ness is forced to this situation, we shall again be obliged to 
go through the same stage of  development  that both coun- 
tries have once undergone, -amelioration  of  the  law until 
reasonable  cooperation  is  again  permissible.  In that case 
we  shall, by  our  unwise attempt  through  statute  law  to 
stem the tide of  great economic  forces, make  America  go 
through two cycles of  evolution to reach,  permanently, rea- 
sonable trade conditions, whereas one cycle has been  suffi- 
cient for all other civilized countries. CHAPTER  IV 
THE SITUATION  IN OTHER  COUNTRIES 1 
To describe adequately the situation regarding concentra- 
tion in industry for other countries would involve for each a 
book as large or larger than this ; therefore there can be in- 
serted but the briefest summary of  the principles which have 
controlled combinations and restraint of  trade in several of 
the more important countries. 
ENGLAND 
The situation in England is fully described by Macrosty,' 
and from his book this statement is mainly taken. 
As already pointed out, the law of  England originally pre- 
vented  combination  in  restraint  of  trade.  This principle 
was  abandoned many  years ago,  and the doctrine was ac- 
cepted  that freedom in trade gave freedom to combine as 
well  as freedom to compete,  provided  the  combination did 
not  result  in monopoly.  Under  these  circumstances there  Federations 
have  grown  up  extensive  combination  and  cooperation  in  ~~~~n 
almost every line of  industry in Great Britain ; but, not be- 
ing  driven from  one  position to another  by prohibition  of 
combination, the movement toward giant holding conlpanies 
or mergers has not been so far-reaching as in this country. 
To a considerable extent the combinations are through coop- 
erations and federations rather than mergers, although in a 
number of  cases consolidation has gone far; and there  are 
'  The situation regardidg industrial combinations in Europe to the year 
1900 is fully described b;  J. W. Jenks, Report of  the Industrial Commission, 
Vol. XVIII. pp. 343. 
'"The  Trust  Movement in British Industry." 
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a few industries in which a single combination controls more 
than half  of  the business. 
In the iron  and  steel  industry  amalgamation  is far ad- 
vanced,  so  that  at the present  time the larger part of  the 
business  is  controlled  by  a  few  large combinations.  The 
greater  consolidated companies are united  into an associa- 
tion under which there are agreements or understandings re- 
garding prices,  markets,  and allotments.  Says Macrosty: ' 
1  Summing up the situation in the iron and steel industries, 
the conclusion forced on us seems to be  that the tendency 
is towards the evolution of  a comparatively few large units in 
each branch, and then that these units should combine into 
a loose organization for the regulation of  their trade."  The 
combinations in iron and steel include both horizontal com- 
bination, that is, union of  plants of  the same kind, and ver- 
tical  combination, or  union  of  the industry  from  its  raw 
material to the finished product. 
In coal  mining and  cement  making,  consolidation  and 
cooperation have taken place, but the process has not gone 
so far as in iron and steel. 
In the textile industries concentration  has extended very  . 
far.  This  combination,  unlike  that of  steel,  is  mainly  of 
the horizontal kind.  The first great success in amalgamation 
in  this business was the J. & P. Coats consolidation.  This 
business has expanded so as to become an international com- 
pany.  The success of  this combination led to similar ones 
for various textiles, although large combinations as yet have 
not  extended  to all lines  of  the business, nor for all have 
they been successful. 
In  the chemical industries, combinations have extended very 
far.  Concentration has been rapid in the grain-milling indus- 
try.  In  tobacco there is one great consolidation, the Imperial 
Tobacco Company, which occupies a position in Great Britain 
analogous to that of the former American Tobacco Company 
in this country.  Even in the retail business, which Macrosty 
points  out  is the last  stronghold of  competition, combina- 
tion and cooperation exist upon an extensive scale. 
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While in the various consolidations of  Great Britain over- 
and promoters  manipulations have been  fre- 
quent, these have not gone so far, nor been so widespread, as 
in this country, where consolidation  has been stimulated by 
adverse laws, and where combination has had the protection  Combina- 
tion and  of a tariff.  Macrosty says: l  "The weakness of  every form  tariff. 
of  combination in the United  Kingdom  is  due to the free 
admission  of  foreign competition."  He states that if  that 
condition  can  be  removed,  the combinations  will  be  enor- 
mously  strengthened.  The combination  which  confines its 
operations strictly to Great Britain is at a disadvantage as 
with combinations in countries which have a pro- 
tective tariff, for the reason that the excess products of  the  British corn- 
foreign countries can enter Great Britain without payment ~~2~ni8ned 
of duties ;  whereas the reverse is not the case.  This situation  to United 
has resulted  in international combinations for a number of  Kingd0m. 
the more successful of  those which center in or do business in 
Great  Britain.  Such  international  combinations  are illus- 
trated by  the Imperial Tobacco Company with a  capitali- 
zation  of  £17,500,000,  the United  Alkali  Company with  a 
capital of  £8,200,000, the W.  Cory & Sons  Coal  Company 
with a capital of  £2,800,000, the J. & P. Coats Thread Com- 
pany  (this  combination  includes  England,  America,  and 
Belgium), the Nobel Dynamite Trust Company with a capi- 
tal of £3,000,000, and the international steel rail combination. 
Macrosty summarized the situation as follows: - 
L ( 
The position of  the British combinations in regard to the 
interests of  the community may be  summed up as not at 
Present dangerous but containing,  like every new  develop- 
ment, great and unknown possibilities alike for good and for  Cannot go 
evil.  Over prices their powers are not great but are growing.  ",",nn 
far they have shown no increased  power over their em-  ditions. 
ployees,  and  with  a  strong  trade  union  they  need  not 
have."  . . . 
L 6 
Nothing  could be more fatal than in a  panic to try to 
turn back  a  great industrial movement.  So far as can be 
seen  the great amalgamations are the best  instruments of 
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production  yet  devised, and  to  break  them  up into their 
original components would be foolish if  it were not in most 
cases impossible.  Crude methods of  suppression are always 
wrong,  nor  does  it seem  sensible to  search among  legal 
principles relevant to a different stage of  industry for weapons 
to hamper and obstruct."  . . . 
(L  Repressive legislation could only affect the outer form of 
combination.  Amalgamation cannot be prohibited without 
forbidding the union of  even two firms, while to make mo- 
Futility of  nopoly illegal would be  fruitless where no formal monopoly 
repreve  exists, and  there  is  no way  of  determining the greater  ef-  legidation. 
fectiveness for evil of  a merger including eighty per cent of 
the trade over one containing only fifty.  No law can suppress 
the Gentlemen's Agreement, where there are no rules, no con- 
stitution, no contract, but common action is effected verbally 
and informally, and yet some of  the most oppressive combi- 
nations have been of  that form.  Neither combination nor 
agitation should be driven underground, and it is significant 
that to-day complaints are  generally raised in the  United 
Kingdom, not against the legally recognized amalgamations but 
against associations which have no existence in the eyes of  the law 
md  work  in secret.  To strike at the  methods adopted by 
combinations is not easy without at  the same time repressing 
measures blamelessly adopted by the individual trader.  Boy- 
cotting, dumping, selling at  a loss to crush competition, main- 
taining prices at  the highest level which the market permits - 
these  are  no  monopoly of  combinations, but  are weapons 
in  everyday  use  by  manufacturers,  merchants,  and  shop- 
keepers.  It  would  be  indeed  an  extraordinary  thing  to 
strike at competition in the name of  competition." 
In Germany, combination has gone  farther than in Eng- 
land.  In 1897 Liefmann gave a list of  345 combinations in 
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that  Usually  the  combinations,  called  cartels, 
are  among independent establishments which limit 
output,  divide  markets,  and  control  prices.  Oftentimes  Extent 
these are accomplished through central agencies.  It is clear  in Germany. 
that these cartels for each of the lines of  business, concerning 
which they exist, act powerfully in restraint of  trade.  Many 
of  them  comprise  substantially  the feature  of  the typical 
trusts of  the past in America which have been dissolved by 
the courts.  But in Germany, violations of  these contracts 
are  held  to be  immoral.  In other words,  the principle is 
broadly accepted and enforced by the courts, that freedom in 
commerce involves freedom to combine as well as freedom to 
compete. 
As illustrations of  these cartels, the Steel and Potash com- 
bines will be bridy described. 
The German Steel Combine. -  Combinations  in Germany 
have extended farthest in the iron industry.  One of  the larg- 
est and most successful of  these combinations is that of  the 
steel  producers.  This  combination is especially important  steel Com- 
bine lawful  because of  its analogy to the United States Steel Corporation,  in G-any. 
the fundamental difference being that the German steel com- 
bination  is within  the  pale  of  the  law, while  the  United 
States Steel  Corporation  is attacked by the United  States 
Attorney-General as being interdicted by the law.  The state- 
ment given below is by Professor T. K. Urdahl: - 
d i  The  German  Steel  Combine is  the largest private  in- 
dustrial undertaking in the world outside of  the United States. 
The aggregate capital of  the combined firms amounts to over 
1,250,000,000 marks,  and the  average annual  value  of  its  Magnitude 
products  exceeds  this sum.  The contracts and  articles  of 
incorporation upon  which  this giant  combination  is based 
were  signed  on  the 29th  of  February, 1904.  Its duration 
originally  limited  to three  years, but  in 1907 it was 
renewed, and today it stands as one of  the strongest organi- 
zations in the  industrial  world, controlling, as it  does, 95 
Per cent of  the steel output of  Germany. 
(i 
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brain of  a genius, but, like the modern political state, was 
preceded by a long series of  experiments. 
"  Each of  the organizations representing the stages in the 
origins.  evolution of  the steel combine was more complex and more 
perfectly adjusted to its environment than were  its prede- 
cessors. 
l6 Instead  of  swallowing  up  and  assimilating the  many 
competing elements, as have the American trusts, the Ger- 
man Steel Combine represents a confederation in which the 
individual members retain much of  their independence and 
autonomy.  In one  sense, it is  a  syndicate  of  syndicates, 
since it grew out of  and took over the functions of  six large 
cartels, each controlling one large line of  steel products. 
6 ( There were : 
(a)  Half-manufactured Products Combine, Diisseldorf. 
(b) Steel Beam Combine of  Lower  Rheinish-Westphalian 
District, Diisseldorf. 
(c)  German Steel Rail Association, Diisseldorf. 
(d)  German Steel Tie Association, Diisseldorf. 
(e)  South  German  Steel  Beam  Association, St.  Johann 
a. d. Saar. 
(f)  German Steel Beam Association, Wiesbaden. 
-- 
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L  L Each of  these was organized to handle and sell its special 
products in its own  field,  and had  developed  a  successful 
organization to carry out special purposes. 
I( In organizing the steel combine it  was necessary to de- 
vise a scheme to do  the work of  the above named  cartels 
and in addition to perform similar duties for a large variety 
of  firms and associations, altogether thirty-six, out of  which 
the combine was  formed.  Among  these  there  were  some 
relatively  simple  manufacturing  plants  known  as  'pure 
roller mills,'  steel  mills without  smelters of  their own, en- 
gaged in transforming  pig  iron and steel ingots into roller 
mill products.  There were other firms that not only com- 
bined  smelters with  roller  mills, but  owned  and operated 
coal and ore mines and conducted wire nail  and steel rail 
mills as well. 
L  L In order  to  carry on  the marketing of  this great va- 
riety  of  material  the steel combine  established three  main 
A products.  divisions  or  bureaus  for  handling  A  products:  1.  half- 
manufactured products  (ingots, pig iron, steel blocks, etc.) ; 
2.  heavy  railroad  material ;  light  railroad  material  (ties 
and  rails).  3.  structural  iron;  (I and  U  beams,  etc.). 
Each  division  has  separate  bureaus  for  taking  care  of 
domestic trade and of  exports. 
L  L In handling all A  products  the steel combine  has com- 
plete control of  the purchase and sale, and becomes the owner 
of  the product during the brief space of  time intervening be- 
tween the purchase from the smelter and sale to the manu- 
facturer.  This system is an improvement upon the scheme 
that prevailed in the earlier syndicates whereby the syndicate 
acted merely as an agent for the individual members.  Fur- 
thkrmore, the combine exercises the power to determine what 
the  maximum  output shall be,  and apportions  among the 
different firms their quota of  the total output of  all the mills. 
(L In  handling B products, which include all other roller mill 
goods,  the syndicate  pursues  an entirely  different  policy. 
B products.  Here all  orders are received, either directly  from the con- 
sumer or through the members, and are distributed by the 
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These are : First, each  member  shall receive orders 
until its output, when compared with its allotment, is rela- 
tively as large as that of  the other members of  the combine. 
second, cheapness of  freight charges and avoidance of  cross 
freight shall be  considered  Third, so far as possible orders 
shall be so distributed as to stimulate territorial division of 
labor.  Whenever an order is 3ent to a steel firm it must at 
once be forwarded to the cemral bureau, which then places 
the  with the firm  entitled to it under the above rules. 
The wishes of  the person placing the order are not considered 
unless his desires conform with what is deemed desirable from 
the standpoint of  the combine. 
"All  producers of  B products  are  divided  into groups. 
Every  group has  allotted  to it a  certain  quota of  output,  Terms of 
which quota is always established by a resolution of  the en- 
tire steel combine.  The combine may increase or decrease the 
quota of  any group at  pleasure, but, thus far, no radical reduc- 
tion  has  been  attempted.  Instead,  a  gradual  increase, 
amounting  in  ten  years  to nearly  33  per  cent  has  been 
authorized.  All  goods bought  from the syndicate must be 
paid  for on the fifteenth of  the  following  month,  and the 
syndicate itself  settles with  the individual members on the 
twentieth of  the following month. 
"  The price paid to the producers is fixed by the syndicate, 
and  is  generally  called  the  table  price  (Tabellen-preise), Price at 
which  is supposed to cover roughly the cost of  producing. 
Prices to the consumer are generally quoted free on board 
for railroad material at the works, -  for structural iron at 
Diedenhofen;  and  for  half-manufactured  products  at cer- 
tain centers  for groups  of  producers, five  of  which  are 
specified in the syndicate agreement.  Freight to the center 
is paid by the works, and freight from the center is paid by 
the  consumer.  Should the consumer be located nearer  to 
the  works than to the centey,  he is still compelled  to pay 
freight from the center.  This saving in freight is given to 
the works enjoying the advantage.  All general sales prices 
are hed  quarterly and apply usually for $he next two quar- 
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in an exceptional case is any one allowed a rebate or a lower 
price.  For extra quality or exceptional forms of  steel goods 
the  combine establishes  exceptional prices.  The difference 
between the  table  price  and the selling price  is noted  for 
each group of  products.  Careful accounts  are also kept of 
losses  and  administrative  expenses  connected  with  each 
group of  production.  After these losses and expenses have 
been  deducted  from  the  surplus,  the  remainder  is  dis- 
tributed  pro  rata  among  the  members  of  the  group  in 
quarterly  payments. 
L L  Since 1902 there has been in existence, in Diisseldorf, a 
bureau  maintained  and  originally  organized  by  the  four 
syndicates producing half-manufactured  goods, but at pres- 
ent jointly  maintained by  the coal syndicate, the raw iron 
syndicate,  and  the  steel  combine.  When  the  syndicate 
exports  to  foreign  countries,  it  pays  the  producers  the 
regular table prices, and the loss involved, if  any, is charged 
against profit and is thus shared by all members of  the group 
Rules of  producing the exported  products.  In order to promote ex- 
ports  a  system of  export  premiams  has been  established. 
These premiums amounted in 1907 to the following sums : 
t L Marks 1.50 per  ton for coal used  up in the production 
of  steel exported. 
tt Marks 2.50 per  ton for iron ore used in the production 
of  steel exported. 
rt Marks 15 per  ton for partly manufactured  steel (inclu- 
sive of  the coal and iron ore premium). 
"  Marks 20 per ton for  steel rails  of  all kinds  (inclusive 
of the premiums on coal and raw iron). 
t L In addition to these premiums others are added by spe- 
cial cartels, such as the wire nail syndicate, the  wire syndicate, 
etc.  Premiums  are ordinarily paid  to works  in proportion 
to the amount of  raw material,  coal, etc.,  used  in the pro- 
duction of  its exports;  but a firm which  owns  its coal and 
iron mines is not always  entitled to the maximum amount 
authorized by the bureau.  Only firms that use coal and iron 
included  in  the  output  authorized  by  the syndicate  are 
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established  by the syndicate and may change from time to 
as the conditions warrant. 
The  manufacturing  industries  claim,  and  apparently  Effect of 
with good grounds, that the export policy of  the steel com-  export  policy. 
bine will in the long run prove disastrous to the exports of  the 
German machine  industries.  Whenever  the home  market 
is  unable to absorb the amount of  steel that the producers 
place  at the syndicate's disposal, it is generally forced to re- 
duce its price to foreign buyers in order to get rid of  the out- 
put.  In this way, the foreign manufacturer of  machines, by 
obtaining  his  raw material  from the  German  combine,  is 
in  an unduly  advantageous  position  in  competing 
with the German producer.  In 1904, for example,  pig iron 
was sold abroad at from 69 to 71 marks, whereas the domes- 
tic  buyer was forced to pay from  82i to 923 marks.  The 
steel combine admits this charge, but claims that its impor- 
tance has been greatly exaggerated by critics of  the syndicate. 
'' The combine is bound  by contract to receive and pay 
for all the product of  each individual member, provided the 
same does not exceed the quota allotted to the firm in ques-  Fines and 
tion.  The steel thus purchased  is sold  by the combine  to  penalties. 
industrial and other concerns  at a  uniform price  known as 
standard price.  Only in very exceptional cases is any steel 
disposed of  to a domestic concern at any other price.  The 
standard price is established by the directors of  the combine 
at the beginning  of  each quarter.  The quota assigned  to 
each  relates  exclusively to products  offered for sale.  Any 
member of  the combine may use as much steel and iron as 
it pleases in its own factories. 
"  If any member  violates the contract of  the syndicate by 
selling directly A  products to consumers, he is compelled to 
Pay  a  fine  of  one  hundred  marks  per  ton for each ton of 
goods sold.  Every  other violation  of  the contract  is pun- 
ished by a fine of  1000 marks for each offense.  A restricting 
Penalty of twenty marks per  ton is imposed upon the firms 
for each ton they produce in excess of  the amount of  B prod- 
ucts allotted to their plants.  If  any firm produces A  prod- 
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five marks per ton.  In the same way, firms producing less 
than their quota are entitled to five marks per ton premium 
from the syndicate.  No member of  the combine is allowed 
to sell or rent his plant to an outsider without  the consent 
of  the  syndicate.  He  is  also  forbidden  to establish  new 
plants or to own shares in any company  outside  the com- 
bine.  All  differences of  opinion  between  members of  the 
combine are to be  settled by  a Board of  Arbitration, and 
under  no  circumstances are to  be  carried into the courts. 
The syndicate exercises no control whatever over the method 
of  securing iron ore or other raw material by the individual 
members.  It also refrains from interfering with labor strug- 
gles, strikes, or other disputes. 
L1 The combine has secured sufficient orders to enable all 
its members to increase their output about 3374 per cent and 
at the same time  has secured gradually  increasing prices. 
Increase in  Increased output in large scale production necessarily results 
prices-  in  cheapening the cost per  unit  of  production to the limit 
of  maximum efficiency. 
I1  As  a  result  of  the combine,  the profitableness of  steel 
works and the value of  steel stocks has increased materially 
since the syndicate came into existence.  Apparently, there- 
fore, the syndicate has been decidedly beneficial to the plant 
owner.  Still  it must  not  be forgotten that the period  in 
which it has been in existence has been one of  favorable in- 
dustrial  conditions.  The gross  profits  of  fourteen  of  the 
Increase in  largest works increased, in the year 1904-1905,31.8 per cent, 
profits.  whereas the capital invested in the works in question was in- 
creased only 8.6 per cent.  Averages, however, do not indicate 
fully the influence of  the steel trust upon each  individual 
member.  Generally the larger and more powerful  members 
have benefited more than the weaker ones through its activ- 
ity, and in some cases the condition of  the weaker members 
has  deteriorated  rather than improved.  While  some  com- 
panies have undoubtedly been able to remain in existence as 
a result  of  the  syndicate's activity,  that would  under the 
competitive system have been forced to the wall, others that 
might  have  developed under  the competitive  system  have THE  SITUATION  IN OTHER  COUNTRIES  215 
apparently  been  held  back  by  the cartel's  policy  of  com- 
bination. 
1f the combine had not been  created, the smaller works 
would probably have been swallowed up, one after another, 
until the steel industry of  Germany developed into a trust- 
like consolidation resembling the United States Steel Corpo- 
ration.  This  tendency  has  been  restrained  rather  than 
eliminated, since numerous  consolidations have  been  made 
within  the  combine  during  the  period  in  which  the steel 
has existed. 
"  The most  important advantage which the steel  syndi- 
cate  has  secured  for  its  members  is  a  diminution  in  the 
costs of  handling  and sale of  steel.  The average per  ton  hwd 
cost has amounted to only 25 pfennig, whereas it is claimed 
that  the  cost  for  the same service in  the American  steel 
combination is $2 per ton.  The comparison is not correct, 
however,  since the $2  per ton in the latter includes a large 
number of  overhead  charges, which in the  German  works 
are borne by the individual firms. 
I ( Costs of  production  have also  been  cheapened by the 
steel combine as a result  of  the increased division of  labor 
made  possible by its  creation.  Under  the  cartel contract 
it has been possible for one mill to exchange orders for cer- 
tain kinds of  goods for which its equipment was inadequate 
with  another mill  whose  facilities for making  this class of 
goods  were  more  up-to-date.  In  this  way  it  has  been 
Possible for some mills to produce on a large scale relatively 
few kinds of  steel products, such as steel rails, beams, etc. 
(L 
Another advantage obtained  by the members from the 
existence of  the cartel is in dealing with  strikes and labor  Advantag- 
difficulties.  Whenever a strike threatens,  the concern can  instrikea- 
transfer  its quota  to some other  mill  where  there  are no 
labor  difficulties.  Furthermore,  the  syndicate  contract 
a  provision releasing  the mill  from  obligation  to 
deliver goods  whenever  a  strike  is  on.  Such  an arrange- 
ment  would  have  been  impossible under  the  competitive 
system, and losses growing out of  strikes would undoubtedly 
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l( In general it is feared that the organization of  the steel 
Wty  of  industry  in the form of  the steel combine will  result  in a 
gradual  deterioration in  the quality of  steel products and 
that the chief  object of  the combine will  become quantity 
rather  than quality.  On  the other  hand,  it is  also  clear 
that the steel works  will  be  able to specialize much more 
successfully under  the cartel r6gime than has been possible 
under  the  competitive  system.  The  steel  producers  are 
now  able  to devote  themselves  solely  to the problem of 
production,  since  the cartel  takes  over  the  entire  distri- 
bution  of  the  products.  In addition  to  this  tendency, 
the owners  of  smelters  are not  forced  to devote  so  much 
time to the problem of  the purchase of  raw materials, since 
this side of  the business has also been systematized so that 
purchases  are  made  on  a  large  scale by  joint  agreements 
between iron ore owners and steel producers. 
(4 It is also  asserted  that  the steel  combine has  secured 
much  greater  stability in  the iron  and steel  market  than 
Stabfity.  was  possible  before  it came into existence.  This stability 
has  made it practicable  for  manufacturers to avoid  losses 
which  formerly  were  almost  inevitable.  It has  been  pos- 
sible for the cartel to shift the burden more and more upon 
the  less  organized  manufacturers  who  use  steel  products 
as raw  material.  Consequently  the  last  and unorganized 
stages of  steel  product manufacture, e.g.  machine  making, 
etc., have been forced to bear the greater proportion of  the 
burdens  caused  by  a  gradual  increase  in  prices.  These 
manufacturers will  undoubtedly  be  able to shift a  part  of 
the burden  upon the final  consumer.  As  yet,  this process 
has not been entirely completed in a great many lines. 
I( In times of  business prosperity the steel combine fulfil18 
its contracts only partially and this also constitutes ground 
for complaint on the part of  purchasers of  steel goods. 
L  Many  complaints  are  also  directed  against  the  strict 
~amh  sde  conditions  of  sale  imposed  by  the combine.  It is  main- 
tained that the wishes of  customers are not given due con- 
sideration,  that they are compelled to take  the quality of 
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of  the special  needs  of  their  business.  Furthermore,  it is 
asserted  that  the  combine  delivers  steel to certain  firms, 
from different  plants,  which  makes  it  difficult  for  the 
to secure as uniform  a grade of  goods as he 
had been  able to obtain when  he bought  all  his steel from 
the  same  firm.  The steel  syndicate  claims that most  of 
these complaints are based  upon prejudice  and imaginary 
differences in quality. 
"A comparison of  the total output of  steel in Germany 
with the total steel output of  the United States during the 
last  ten years  demonstrates the fact that for  some  reason  macton 
or  other  the steel production  has been  much  more  stable  doutput. 
in  Germany than in  America.  The crises of  1903 and of 
1907 resulted in a violent slump in the production of  Amer- 
ica.  These crises had relatively little effect upon  the work 
of  the steel mills.  Whether  the absence of  fluctuation  in 
Germany can be traced back to the steel cartels, or whether 
it is due to the fact that German  industrial conditions are 
more stable than they are in America, is a question  which 
cannot  be  easily answered.  It is probable, however, that 
the German  cartels have solved  the problem  of  adjusting 
the supply  to probable  demands  about  as successfully, if 
not more successfully, than the American steel combine." 
For the great German  steel  combine,  thus described by 
Professor  Urdahl,  controlling  ninety-five  per  cent  of  the 
industry of  the country, it is clear that coijperation is allowed  Surplus 
sold abroad  to  proceed  to  the extent  of  monopoly, and that  without 
any administrative control  by  the government  or attempt  prices. 
to  prevent  the  combination  from  king prices  which  the 
markets  will  stand.  It  is  notable  that  the  combination 
sells  steel abroad  lower  than at home;  in  some  cases  as 
much as twenty per  cent  cheaper, in this respect following 
the  same policy  as  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation. 
This is possible because Germany, like the United States, has 
a Protective tariff; and therefore the foreign producer  can- 
not  enter  the domestic  trade  of  these  countries.  This  is 
reserved for the home corporations.  If  it were not for the 
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possible to keep the level of  prices for iron and steel higher 
at home  than they are in the world's  markets.  The same 
is of  course true for the United States. 
The Potash  Industry.'-  One  of  the most interesting of 
the combinations in Germany is that of  the potash industry. 
In the Stassfurt district  are the  greatest  potash  mines  of 
the  world.  A  comprehensive  law  concerning  potash  was 
passed  in  1910  creating  a  board  of  apportionment.  This 
board fixes the amount which is to be sold during any year; 
it determines the proportion that each producer -  and they 
are some fifty in number -  shall be allowed to mine.  Any 
producer may exceed  his allotment by ten per  cent; but if 
he does, the excess is deducted from his next year's  allow- 
ance.  If  a  company exceeds this maximum it must pay a 
Allot~nents  greatly  increased  tax  upon  the  excess.  The  companies 
are  forbidden  to  lower  grades.  The  maximum  price  is 
fixed. 
fixed for each grade of  the product;  and not only this, but 
freight rates are adjusted,  so that the prices  are equalized 
at  different  commercial  centers,  just  as  the  anthracite 
combination  fixes  the  price  of  that article at Boston and 
Buffalo.  The law  also  provides  that the price  of  potash 
in Germany  shall  not be  greater  than it is  abroad.  The 
taxes on the potash companies are reserved for the adminis- 
tration  of  the governmental  machinery  necessary  to con- 
trol the industry.  Each  company must give  a  full report 
of  all  its transactions.  The books  are open to the board 
of  apportionment.  There is  an appeal from  the board  of 
apportionment  to a  commission,  just  as in  the proposed 
plan  allowing cooperation in America  there is  appeal from 
the commission  to the courts.  (See pp. 242-243.) 
Beforc  the above law  was  passed  there was  a  syndicate 
which  controlled  the  potash  industry.  When  this  syndi- 
cate  agreement  terminated,  two  companies  broke  away 
and made  contracts  for  large  sales of  potash  in  America. 
This situation led to the above law, which embodies many 
of  the  regulations  previously  contained  in  the  syndicate 
1 The full text of  the potash law is given Hearings, Senate Interstate Com- 
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agreements.  The law was  therefore  a  direct outgrowth of 
experience under  the  pressure  of  an emergency.  Combina- 
One  reason  which  was  strongly  urged  for  its passage was  ~~~~,"~~ 
that  it would  result  in  the conservation  of  the potash  re-  ment. 
sources  in  Germany.  Before  combination,  the  potash 
industry  had  all  the  difficulties of  many  competing  con- 
cerns with  regard  to a  natural resource limited in  extent. 
Prices were  too  high  or  too low.  The plan  of  controlling 
the potash  industry in  Germany promises to work  to the 
of  the producer,  and to the satisfaction of  the 
government, which is a part owner in the potash mines. 
It is notable  that for the potash industry, in which com- 
plete monopoly is allowed, restrictions are introduced which 
are not  regularly  applied to the cartel in Germany.  The  Complete 
board  of  apportionment  has  authority  to  control  prices; z0:,"'lY 
not only so, but to prohibit the selling of  material  abroad 
cheaper than in Germany.  In both  of  these  respects  the 
policy  of  the government  is  an advance  over  that which 
applies to the steel combination.  That combination, while 
not a complete monopoly, controls 95 per  cent of  the out- 
put of the country; and there is no government  regulation 
of  prices  either  at home  or  abroad.  In consequence  of 
this,  as we  have seen, prices are kept up at home and re- 
duced abroad sufficiently to sell the surplus product. 
While in Germany cooperation is permitted to an almost 
unlimited  extent,  the  laws  are  there  very  severe  against 
unfair  competition.  The types  of  unfair  competition  are 
closely  defined,  and a  party  who  is injured  through  their 
violation may recover damages. 
AUSTRIA 
In Austria the laws make  illegal all agreements  to raise 
prices and other contracts to the detriment  of  the  public. 
There  are exceptions to the extent that agreements which 









more  favorable  conditions  of  production,  such as lowering 
of  freight  rates,  large  scale  purchases,  etc.,  are  lawful. 
While, upon the whole, the law of  Austria is against cartels, 
the industrial situation is similar to, but not identical with, 
that of  Germany.  Combinations  extensively exist.  Some 
of  the more  successful ones  are those  in  iron,  sugar,  and 
petroleum.  Ordinarily  these  combinations  control outputs 
and  prices.  This  may  be  accomplished  through  selling 
bureaus and by division of  markets. 
The courts, acting under the laws stated, have been  less 
favorable  to the  combinations  in  their  decisions than the 
courts  of  Germany.  While,  in  some  cases,  contracts  for 
the division of  the market, fixing of  prices, etc., have been 
declared illegal, these decisions have not been any more suc- 
cessful in checking the tendency toward  combination  than 
have  similar  decisions  in this  country; indeed, they have 
somewhat accelerated mergers in Austria as they have greatly 
in this country.  According to Jenks l the tendency to com- 
bination has been retarded to some extent by the regulation 
requiring publicity in business, and because of  the fact that 
taxes are heavier on corporations than on private  firms. 
Looking  toward  the  future  in  Austria,  a  government 
commission  has recommended  the recognition of  combina- 
tions by law  and their  supervision and regulation  by  gov- 
ernment authority. 
FRANCE 
In France the laws provide heavy penalties against price 
agreements for food products.  The courts have held  that 
combinations  which  do  not  have  the  purpose  of  raising 
prices,  but to prevent  prices  from  falling and to regulate 
their  fall,  are  lawful.  Also  combinations  which  do  not 
strive to raise prices  but only to secure a  market so as to 
put them in a  position  to  compete with  their rivals have 
been held to be lawful. 
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One of  the effects of  the laws against  combinations and 
agreements in France  has  been  to drive them  to secrecy, 
the  same  as  in  this  country.  It  is  therefore  difficult  to 
ascertain  the extent to which  combinations exist, but it is 
certain that they are widespread. 
Selling  bureaus  have  been  established  which  receive  Coaperrttion 
orders  and  fix  prices  for  the  establishments  concerned.  On. 
This form of organization has not been successfully attacked 
in the courts.  These agreements and selling agencies affect 
many industries, including sugar, petroleum, and porcelain.' 
SECTION  5 
GENERAL  STATEMENTS 
Belgium  has  many  cartels  which  are  very  similar  to 
those of  Germany, and often the cartels in the two coun- 
tries are closely related.  Some other countries having cartels 
for various products are : Bulgaria, Egypt, Italy, Portugal, 
Roumania, Spain, Scandinavia, Switzerland, and Russia. 
From  the  foregoing  summary regarding the situation in 
foreign countries it appears  that  the  premises  with  which 
Great  Britain  and Germany start concerning combination  The faith   of 
in  restraint  of  trade is  just  the reverse of  our  own.  Our  Britain and 
Germany in 
faith is in competition ;  their faith is in cooperation.  Clearly  ooiiperation. 
the theory  of  the United  States or  that  of  Great Britain 
and  Germany  is  wrong.  In this  country  there exists  a 
popular  distrust  and  fear  of  combination  and  the  desire 
to strike it wherever  it appears;  in  Germany  and  Great 
Britain combination is accepted as a necessary step in com- 
mercial  progress.  The  expanding  trade  of  Great Britain 
and Germany gives strong evidence of  the  merit  of  their 
point  of  view.  Those  who  have  watched  the  develop- 
ment of  Germany since the Franco-Prussian  war have been 
amazed at the rise  of  that country to a  position in  com- 
merce  at home  and  abroad  second  to no  country  in  the 
world.  In many  lines of  manufacture, for  instance,  steel, 
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Wide extent 







the  foreign  trade  of  Germany  and  Great  Britain  vastly 
exceeds our  own;  not  only  so,  but it is  more  rapidly  ex- 
panding.  It, of  course, cannot be  held that the astonishing 
advance of  Germany in  commerce and the increase in for- 
eign trade of  Germany and Great Britain are due exclusively 
to  freedom  to  cooperate  in business as well  as freedom to 
compete ; but it may be safely asserted  that this was one 
of  the essential conditions to their great success. 
INTERNATIONAL  COMBINATIONS 
Combinations  not  only  exist  in  the  European  countries 
and  in  the  United  States, but  for  many  industries  inter- 
national  cooperation  has  begun  between  the  great  com- 
panies in different countries.  Macrosty '  says that  "rails, 
tubes,  nails,  screws,  sewing  thread,  bleaching  powder, 
borax,  nitrates, and tobacco are to a  greater or less degree 
brought  under  international  control,  while,  at  least  till 
lately,  dynamite  was  so  controlled,  and  repeated  efforts 
have  been  made  similarly  to  syndicate  the  whole  steel 
trade."  The  forces  which  have  produced  such  interna- 
tional  combinations  are  the  same  as  those  which  have 
resulted  in those confined to one country, the maintenance 
of  prices, division of  territories, and limitation of production. 
Perhaps  the  most  important  of  these  combinations  is 
the International Rail Syndicate, which was formed in 1883 
between  Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  Belgium.  Under 
this  agreement  England  was  awarded  66  per  cent  of  the 
business, afterwards  reduced  to 63%  per cent ; Germany, 
27,  afterwards 29 per cent;  and Belgium 7, afterwards 7% 
per  cent.  Later  this  pool  was  broken  up  with  a fall  of 
prices,  but  in  1904  it  got  together  again  on  a  different 
basis,  that of  division  of  territory.  In 1905 the  United 
States was taken  into the arrangement.  Also,  there have 
been international combinations for a number of  other iron 
and  steel products. 
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One of  the most important of  the international combina- 
tions  is that of  the marine  interests.  In 1902 the Inter- 
national  Mercantile Marine Company was organized  under 
the  laws  of  New  Jersey,  with  a  capital  of  $120,000,000,  Themarine 
one half  common and one half  preferred stock.  The com-  'yndicate. 
bination  included  the following lines : Leyland  (49 vessels, 
295,000 tons) ; White Star (29 vessels, 181,000 tons) ; Atlan- 
tic  transports  (23  vessels,  183,000 tons) ; American  and 
Red Star (24 vessels, 181,000 tons) ; Dominion  (L4 vessels, 
i10,OOO  tons). 
Without being a member of  the International Mercantile 
Marine Company, the Hamburg American  and North Ger- 
man Lloyd Companies, with 190 vessels and 1,093,000 tons, 
have  entered into a working  agreement with it by which a 
committee composed of  four representatives, two of  which are 
named by the International Mercantile Marine Company and 
two by the German company, are authorized to fix rates, dis- 
tribute steerage passengers,  etc. 
TABLE  61.  SHOWING  CONSTITUTION  OF  SHIPPING  COMBINBI 
a. International  Mercantile  Marine 
Company 
North German Lloyd 
Hamburg-Amerirn Company  1  Cartel  I  Cadell 
known  as 
b. Belgian hd  Star Line. 
c.  Holland-American Line. 
d.  Com~agnie  TrawAtlantique. 
e.  Cunard Line. 
Shipping 
Combine 
Another shipping combine  is  said  to control  the freight 
business between  New  York  and the Far East.  Both  of 
these marine  companies  are under  attack for  violation  of 
the Sherman antitrust law.' 
'  United  Statae  a.  Hamburg-Amerikanische  Packeffahr~Actien-G%d- 
Bchdt, and  others, U. 8. Circuit  Court, Southern District  N. Y. 2d  Dist.; 
United states a. American-Asiatic Steamship Company, and others, District 
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At Jena there is a central bureau.  Each member of  the 
carte!  sends a statement to the bureau,  giving the freight 
al,d  passenger  business  of  the company.  If  a  member  of 
the combination has carried  more  than his  share, he  pays 
the surplus  into  the treasury or  pool, which  in turn reim- 
burses the companies whose businesses have been curtailed. 
Oil  is  one  of  the businesses  in  which  the  international 
combination and cooperation have gone far, in some  places 
there being union, in others division of  territory. 
As  we  have  already  seen  the American  Tobacco  Com- 
pany made an agreement with the Imperial Tobacco Com- 
pany  under  which  each  was  to respect the home territory 
of  the other, and a combination company was  created, the 
British-American  Tobacco  Company,  through  which  the 
two handled their foreign business. 
The  nitrate  combination  regulates  prices  and  output. 
Some  businesses  have  become  international by one of  the 
great companies buying other companies in the same busi- 
ness,  or  establishing  branches  in  foreign  countries.  The 
latter applies to a  number  of  the greater companies of  the 
United States, illustrated by the Westinghouse Company. 
It is not  the intention to give a  detailed  description of 
Combina-  international  combinations,  since  this  would  unduly  ex- 
tion  pand  this book.  That international combination has gone  wide. 
so  far shows  the world-wide  extent  of  the tendency  for 
cooperation in business. 
The United  States cannot  successfully  compete  in  the 
world's markets without large industrial units.  When com- 
bination  and cooperation are permitted  not only in foreign 
countries but as between foreign countries, if  the manufac- 
turers of  the United  States are excluded from  uniting and 
from taking part in international cooperations, they will not 
be important factors in the world's markets.  No nation can 
walk  by  itself in the world's  trade.  If  the Sherman act is 
rigidly enforced in its present  form, and the administration 
apparently  regards this duty as resting  upon it, American 
manufacturers must look mainly to their home markets. REMEDIES 
SPECIFICATIONS  TO  BE  MET 
BEFORE  presenting a constructive plan to meet the existing 
situation in trade, it will be well to give specifications regard- 
ing the things that are to be accomplished and the things that 
are to be avoided, the same being based upon the statement 
of  facts  contained  in  the  previous  chapters.  In making 
these specifications, the aim will be to present a consensus of 
opinion, not personal views. 
1.  While the existence of  a non-competitive field, that of 
the public utilities, is admitted, and in many cases for such, 
monopoly must exist, outside of  public utilities there is still 
a large field for competition.  Competitive conditions should 
be  retained  in the industries.  Certainly  there  should  re-  Competi- 
main competition for business ;  there should remain competi- zi2P 
tion for quality;  there should remain competition in prices 
so far as this is consistent with other specifications.  A con- 
dition should not be allowed to arise such as to render com- 
petition in prices, quality, or service impossible.  In order 
to retain freedom of  competition it will be necessary to pre- 
vent  monopoly.  In those  industries  in  which  freedom of 
competition does not now exist, the facts regarding individ- 
ual  industries (given pp.  104-150)  show that this condition 
has  arisen  and  has  been  maintained  very  largely  through 
unfair practices or by monopoly. 
2.  Unfair practices must be prohibited and unfair advan- 
tages must not be permitted.  Only so will it be possible to 
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unfrtir  retain competition.'  Some of  the more  important  regula- 
prwtices.  tions should be as follows : - 
(a)  All corporations should be placed upon the same basis 
with reference to common carriers.  Discrimination, rebates, 
drawbacks, and  exceptional services should not be allowed. 
(b)  Business should not be allowed to be carried on by se- 
cret  companies  or  combinations.  The complete organiza- 
tion of  any corporation should be open.  No company should 
appear to be independent which is not so. 
(c)  The grosser forms of  unfair  competition, such  as es- 
pionage of  business competitors, bribing of  men  in the em- 
ploy of  competitors, etc., should be prohibited. 
(d)  No  agreement should be  allowed  requiring exclusive 
dealing ;  nor should any rebate or advantage be gained from 
exclusive dealing. 
(e) Local selling at or below cost to kill competition should 
be prohibited. 
3.  Reasonable  cooperation  between  corporations  should 
be permitted.  It is believed that in business under modern 
conditions, cooperation not  competition should be the con- 
Coaperation  trolling word.  Sufficient  cooperation should be  allowed  to 
to be per- 
mitted.  prevent  fierce and unrestrained  competition which  goes  to 
the extent  of  reducing prices  below  a  reasonable amount. 
Only by cooperation can the enormous wastes of  competi- 
tion be avoided.  In this connection the form of  the solution 
which  may be  adopted to secure cooperation may depend 
very largely upon the definition of  reasonable and unreason- 
able.  If  all restraints of  trade are reasonable which do not 
produce monopoly,  then we  may  accept  the common  law 
principle that unreasonable restraint of  trade is not to be al- 
lowed, and under this principle secure cooperation.  But if 
unreasonable restraint is to be narrowly construed, so as to 
interdict all combinations which  divide territories,  regulate 
outputs and make price  agreements, then unreasonable re- 
straint of  trade must  be  redefined  by  statute in order to 
secure the benefits of  cooperation.  Much of  the confusion in 
1 Details as  to the kinds of  unfair practiceawhich have arimn in buaina 
may be found by reference to  Chapter 11. REMEDIES  227 
the thinking and discussion  concerning concentration is at 
this  point,  some  persons having in their minds that all re- 
straints of trade are reasonable which do not go to the ex- 
tent of  monopoly, and others holding that almost any form 
of  coijperation  in  business  is  unreasonable  restraint  of 
trade. 
JUS~ as  cooperation  of  capital  should  be  allowed,  so 
coijperati~n  of  laborers should be  permitted.  The laborers 
find themselves prevented from cooperation by the Sherman 
law  precisely  as have  the  industrial  combinations.'  It is 
clear that unless laborers may unite in trade unions, in joint 
bargaining,  and  in  all  legitimate  matters  which  concern 
them,  they  will  be  helpless.  Not  only  should  coopera- 
tion between  capitalists and coijperation of  laborers be al- 
lowed, but cooperation  of  the two groups  should be per- 
mitted.  In short,  it is  advocated  that  the  principle  of 
cobperation  should  control  in  commerce,  including  both 
laborer and capitalist. 
4.  Corporations should be allowed to be of  sufficient mag- 
nitude to give the highest economic efficiency in order that 
(a) they may be able to supply the needs of  our own people 
at  the lowest practicable rate, and (b) to secure an increased 
proportion of  foreign trade.  As to magnitude which may be  Sufficient 
allowed without the presumption that in consequence of  this ::Fde 
there is unreasonable restraint of  trade, it may be suggested  ciency 
as a working basis that no one corporation, including all its 
subsidiary companies, should be permitted to control more 
than  50  per  cent  of  any line of  business  of  the country. 
There is no sanctity in the number 50, and this may be re- 
duced to 40 per cent or increased to 60 per cent if  either be 
more acceptable to the public.  This rule is not only to apply 
to a corporation as a whole but to each of  the different lines 
of business which may be covered by it.  If  this principle be 
accepted, it is natural to say that any corporation which has 
more  than 50  per  cent of  the business of  the country is a 
mono~~ly,  and that  monopoly is unreasonable restraint of 
trade. 
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5.  It must be possible to secure the freedom of  competition 
defined under  1 and the prohibition  of  the unfair  practices 
under 2 practically without cost to the complainant.  It is the 
Juatice  theory that all are equal before the law, but everybody knows 
this theory is unsound.  Under modern conditions, in which  to complain- 
ant.  there  are  giant  corporations  with  substantially  unlimited 
funds, the man who has a small business is not equal to such 
organizations before the law'because of  his inability to bear 
the expense of  the contest.  If  concentrations of  industry be 
allowed to exist, some machinery must be devised under which 
the weak  man may  be sure of  fair practices  and an open 
field. 
6.  For  all  businesses  in which  there is any restraint  of 
trade, reasonable or unreasonable, through cooperation, there 
Full pub-  should be full publicity.  As soon as cooperation is permitted, 
licity.  the business as a matter of  fact is invested with a public in- 
terest;  and even if  not declared to be a public utility, if  any 
privileges are given for cooperation, or for magnitude, which 
involves restraint  of  trade to the extent of  controlling the 
market,  all  the operations of  the company,  including  the 
profits, should be matters of  public knowledge. 
7.  Corporations should be  required  so to conduct  their 
businesses  as to conserve the natural resources.  This will 
involve the restraint of  competition so as to prohibit waste. 
With  reference  to the future,  this  specification is  one of 
Conserve  paramount  importance.  The difficulties regarding produc- 
resources.  tion and distribution of  wealth we are sure to solve.  In  the 
meantime there may be loss and waste and unjust distribu- 
tion.  There is not  of  necessity permanent  loss.  If, how- 
ever, natural resources of  great value are allowed to  be wasted 
or  destroyed,  this  is  a  perpetual loss to the race.  Thus, 
as has already been pointed out (pp. 89-94),  if  a large per- 
centage of  coal be wasted under severely competitive condi- 
tions of  mining, if  there be waste in the mining of  our metals 
so  that a  considerable part of  the  deposits are left  in the 
ground in such a  condition that they cannot in the future 
be recovered, -  this is an irreparable loss which permanently 
impoverishes our people. REMEDIES  229 
8,  Coiiperating corporations should give just  rewards to  Just re- 
labor.  The wages paid should be fair ; and fair wages for a  ::$  to 
mm means wages such that he can support a family under 
decent conditions so that his children may have open before 
them the avenues of opportunity. 
g.  The business of  the great corporations should be con- 
ducted under good  social  conditions.  It has been  charged 
that some of  the great corporations require too long hours of 
labor, and that the work is carried on under very unfavorable 
On the contrary, with regard to other great cor-  GOO~  social 
porations, it is claimed that in these respects the larger or-  cOnditiona 
ganizations are in a  better position than the smaller ones. 
Both  of  these  statements  appear  to be  true.  So  far  as 
large businesses are allowed to exist, because of  their magni- 
tude, these social factors become of  special importance; and 
the  great  concentrations which  have  exceptional strength 
or magnitude should not  be  allowed  to take advantage of 
labor in hours, service, sanitation, or other social factors. 
10.  Fair  prices  should be  obtainable  by  individuals  or 
groups selling to the great corporations.  Corporations should  F&  prima 
no  more  be  allowed  unduly  to depress prices for materials 
necessary for their manufactories than they should be allowed 
unduly to depress prices of  labor. 
11.  Corporations should not be allowed to charge excessive 
prices to the consumer.  So far as the public in general is 
concerned, the greatest complaint with respect to the concen- 
trations of  industry has been the excessive prices;  that is, 
the stockholders of  the great corporations rather than the 
public have gained the major part of  the advantages of  their 
exceptional efficiency.  If  great organizations are allowed ta  The public 
exist and to eoiiperate, it is clear  that they  cannot  remain 
without restraint in fixing prices.  Some way must be found 
to  Prevent excessive charges and thus guard the interests of 
the public.  In order that fair prices may be  secured, it is 
necemr~  that certain  other  things  be  prohibited;  among 
are the following : - 
(a)  If great concentrations of  industry be permitted  to 
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zation of the mergers and consolidations in order to protect 
the public against the ill-advised purchase of  watered stock, 
and against the payment of  dividends upon  watered  stock. 
It is fully appreciated that this matter of  overcapitalization 
is one of  extraordinary difficulty concerning which  it is not 
Owrcapi-  easy to formulate definite rules.  This will  be appreciated 
tdtation'  if  the report of  the Railroad Securities Commission of  1911, on 
public utilities, be  examined.  In some cases it is fair to a 
certain extent to capitalize good will, trade marks, and pat- 
ents.  Also  in passing from the competitive system  to the 
cooperative system, it may be necessary to take into an or- 
ganization  some plants which  cannot be utilized but which 
must be paid for.  In such cases there is loss in either method, 
by operating under the competitive system or by capitalizing 
under the cooperative method.  This is well illustrated by the 
whisky combination.  When this consolidation was  formed, 
it was found economical not to utilize a considerable number 
of  plants taken into the combination.  So far as such plants 
could not be used  for some other purpose than that of  dis- 
tilling they became a complete loss.  Thus, while some capi- 
talization of  unproductive property and good will  is allow- 
able, this should be on a conservative basis.  Capitalization 
of  hoped for earning power may not be legitimate. 
(b) Excessive costs of  organization and  manipulation  by 
promoters should not be allowed.  It is clear that while fair 
charges for promotion,  including underwriting,  are  permis- 
promote.m*  sible and should be included in the capitalization, one of  the 
great evils of  the recent era of  consolidations has been exces- 
sive charges in these particulars. 
(c)  Speculative management  should  be  guarded  against 
and payment of  unearned dividends prevented.  While these 
speculative  evils are not peculiar to the great corporations, as an organi- 
zation increases in  size it becomes of  increasing public  in-  mat. 
terest, and therefore should be considered in an exceptional 
way in proportion to the magnitude of  the enterprise. 
12.  Finally the scope of  the powers of  the United States 
and the several states should be clearly defined in the control 
of commerce.  Mr. Bryan said at the White House in 1908 : REMEDIES  23  1 
''mere is no twilight zone between the nation and the state,  The twilight 
in which exploiting interests can take refuge from both."  "One. 
~f this phrase were changed from "there is" to "there should 
be)) it would  precisely  express the situation.  Nothing  is 
plainer than that there is a twilight Bone  between the nation 
and the states where the great corporations have taken ref- 
uge  from both.  This has clearly appeared in the prosecu- 
tions carried on by the Attorney-General of  the United States 
in attempting to enforce the Sherman act. 
Minimuna  Specijications. -  It cannot  be  expected  that 
at  once  a  scheme  will  be  enacted  into  legislation  to 
meet  all  of  the  above  specifications.  It  may  be  doubt- 
ful,  indeed,  if  it  be  advisable  to  present  a  complete 
plan  to  meet  them,  since  any such  plan  would  be  sure 
to be profoundly  modified  in  all but its essential features 
before the time %as  reached for the enactment of  the more 
remote parts of  it.  It will be the work of  many years to se- 
cure a system of  legislation, state and national, which  will 
meet the specifications made in regard to which there seems to 
be a consensus of  opinion.  It must be remembered that the 
temper of  our people is such that in handling any complex  Conserve 
situation by legislation, advance is made step by step, each 
one being very short.  This is very well  illustrated  by the  people. 
legislation for handling public  utilities  to be  subsequently 
spoken of. 
It is therefore essential, if  possible, that we  select the fun- 
damental points among the specifications upon which a con- 
sensus of  opinion  can be reached,  and propose a  program 
which  deals definitely only with  those  points, leaving  the 
other specifications to be handled by later amendments. 
Of  the specifications given it appears to me that two are 
fundamental and paramount to the others. 
The first is that the weak and the strong shall alike have 
full opportunity to secure justice from the great corporations. 
That this is the situation at  'the present time no one would 
daim.  There have  been  a  few  recoveries of  damages by 
companies or combinations against greater com- 
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binations which have been in restraint of  trade;  but so far 
as the general  public is  concerned, the individual  who  has 
been overcharged, the small company that has been weakened 
or  destroyed by  unfair  practices, has had  substantially no 
The weak  redress.  The law may have been such that if the individual 
and strong  or the small company had unlimited money, and the courts 
to  be equal. 
proceeded with ten times the expedition that they now  do, 
an approximation to justice might be reached ;  but these are 
not the facts ;  they never will be the facts.  No sane man can 
deny that the existing laws or any other possible ones, how- 
ever severe they might be  made against the great concen- 
trations of  industry, would be of  no avail to the workman who 
is overcharged for an article of  daily consumption, or to the 
small producer.  If  we are to retain the essentials of  a democ- 
racy, and are not  to become a plutocracy, some plan  must 
be devised under which  the weak  as well  as the strong has 
redress for wrongs, has his rights respected.  If  the most ar- 
dent advocate of  court method of  procedure against corpora- 
tions in  restraint  of  trade through amendments of  existing 
laws to be enforced by the courts believes that there is any 
possibiiity  of  redressing the wrongs  of  the individual  and 
securing the rights of  the weak, he must indeed be blind to 
the experience of  the past fifty years of  development and be 
content with faith without works. 
Second if  the arguments in the earlier chapters of  this book 
are approximately sound, we  must now accept for this coun- 
try the principle of  cooperation in business.  Even the most 
ardent defender of  the competitive system says that com- 
petition must be regulated ;  and he says that the alternative 
is between regulated  competition and regulated monopoly.' 
Reseonable  The writer  holds  that there  is  no  such  alternative.  We 
coT,peratiOn.  should not accept  competition as the controlling  principle 
on  one side, nor  monopoly as the  controlling pri'nciple on 
the other side.  We should accept the broad  principle that 
reasonable cobperation should be allowed in business as it is 
allowed everywhere else in our social structure. 
l Brandeis my0 : "The real  he  is regulate competition or regulate 
nopoly."  Hearinga, Part XVI, p. 1162. REMEDIES 
we have  seen that the laws against great concentration 
of  industry  have been without  avail to give justice  to the 
individual.  Similarly, they have been without avail in pre- 
venting coiiperation.  The Sherman law and some of  the state 
antitrust laws are now over a score years old.  At the time 
the Sheman law was enacted it was supposed that the courts 
would be  competent to regulate the trusts so as to produce 
reasonable rather than unreasonable cooperation.  That this 
would not be the case  Professor Richard  T.  Ely 1  clearly  Failure of 
foresaw a  dozen  years  ago.  He  says:  "If  there  is  any 
serious student of  our economic life who  believes that any- 
thing substantial has  been  gained  by  all  the laws passed 
against trusts, by all  the newspaper  editorials  which  have 
thus far been  penned,  by all the sermons which have been 
preached against  them, this authority has yet to be  heard 
from.  Forms  and names have been  changed in  many  in- 
stances, but the dreaded work of  vast aggregation of  capital 
has gone on practically as heretofore.  The writer does not 
hesitate to affirm it as his opinion that efforts along lines 
which have been followed in the past will be equally fruitless 
in the future." 
As  has been clearly developed in the earlier parts of  this 
book, the views which Professor Ely held at that time have 
been fully justified.  The laws against trusts and the actions 
of the courts in their enforcement not only  have not pre- 
vented the existence of  concentrations and the enlargement 
of  the trusts,  but have  greatly  accelerated  their  develop- 
ment. 
In marked contrast with the situation for industry during 
the Past  score of  years, there has been sound development 
ln  control of  one great line of concentration, that to which 
the term public utility applies.  For many years it was an 
aCc"ted  faith that the wrongs to individuals  perpetrated 
L "Monopolies and Trusts," p. 243 (1899). 234  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
by the great public utilities corporations were to be redressed 
through the courts of  law and that competition was to regu- 
Wrom  un-  late prices.  Under this faith, millions of  wrongs went unre- 
dressed;  and  competition  led  to unnecessary  duplication, 
great loss to the public, destruction to the weak, and finally, 
complete dominance of  the great public utilities and especially 
the railroads. 
The well-recognized maxim upon which the traffic  managers 
worked  under  the old regime was to impose all the traffic 
would bear, to make the kind of  service rest exclusively upon 
the returns.  In short, the theory originally enunciated, it is 
alleged, by Commodore Vanderbilt, "The public be damned," 
if  not always announced openly, was the real feeling which 
was  dominant in many  of  these  corporations.  They were 
"   he  regarded as private properties to be run for those who owned 
public be  the stocks and bonds and not for the advantage of  the public. 
damned." 
All  the laws made against the public utilities corporations 
and their enforcement through the courts by action for dam- 
ages or by state's attorneys to protect the public rights ac- 
complished  practically  nothing.  But  the  fqct  that  these 
organizations were public utilities in law and therefore did 
have an exceptional relation to the public led step by step to 
another method of  control, -that  by commission. 
Early Commission. -  As early as 1869, the state of  Mas- 
sachusetts created a railroad commission, upon which was im- 
posed the duty of  supervising all the railroads of  the state, 
"whether  operated by steam, horse, or other motive power." 
It rested upon the commission to ascertain whether the rail- 
road company complied with the laws of  the state and to con- 
sider the complaints of citizens.  However, the commission 
had only the right of suggestion.  It might  inform the rail- 
road company that the rates charged were too hi& ;  it had 
no authority to enforce a lower rate. 
California, in 1876, established a railroad commission called 
Commissioners of  Transportation, the powers of  which went 
far beyond those of  the Massachusetts  commission.  They 
included  the establishment  of  stations, the prohibition  of 
discrimination, and the power of  examination of  books. REMEDIES  235 
N~  york established a state railroad commission in 1882. 
This  commission had power  to investigate  accidents result- 
ing  in  injury  or  loss  of  life, had  the  power  of  examining 
the books, had  imposed  upon it the duty of  calling to the 
attention  of  the company  any violation  of  the law,  unfair 
practices,  excessive  rates,  inadequate  facilities,  etc.,  with 
recommendations.  If  these recommendations were not com- 
plied with by the railrosds, the commission could present the 
facts to the  attorney-general,  who  was  to  secure  redress 
through the law. 
These cases illustrate  the beginnings of  commission con- 
trol of  public utilities in this country.  In this brief  state- 
ment, it is not possible to give a history of  the application of 
to  public utilities, for  adequate  consideration 
of  the commission laws would involve  a  book much  larger 
than the present  one.  In general, however, it may be said 
that these early commissions had  the power  to investigate 
and make suggestions and recommendations to the railroads. 
If  these recommendations were not complied with, they might 
be presented to the Attorney-General  for prosecution in the  power 
courts.  While  the early  commissions  accomplished  some- ::::::- 
thing,  there  was  no  fundamental  change  in  the situation.  dation. 
The railroad company need do no more than it desired to do 
in  any  of  the matters  recommended, except as compelled 
by action of  a  court of  law;  and, as we have  already seen, 
this method of  procedure has been a failure for the control of 
concentration of  industry from the outset. 
From these beginnings, the commission idea of  control of 
railroads extended  to many other states;  and there was a 
gradual expansion of  their power until finally in some states 
'ate-making  authority was given. 
The first state to pass a comprehensive law including this 
Power was Iowa.  In 1897  a law was passed in  that state 
which gave to a commission of  three members general super- 
vision  over all the common  carriers of  the state.  The in-  1oWa fixd 
hibitions of the sct and the powers of  the commission were  rates. 
the same as those contained  in the interstate 
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undoubtedly served as the model for Iowa.  If  the railroad 
companies failed to obey the order of  the commission,  the com- 
mission could petition the district court to enforce the order. 
The Iowa law went farther than the interstate commerce 
law in that it gave the commission the power  to prescribe 
maximum rates.  After hearing the evidence in  a  case "the 
board shall prescribe a reasonable maximum rate.  Such find- 
ing of  the board shall in a judicial proceeding against the rail- 
road company be  considered as prima  jacie  evidence of  the 
unreasonableness of  a rate higher than that prescribed by the 
board." 
The Wisconsin Commission. -  It was  in Wisconsin, when 
U. S. Senator R. M. La Follette was governor, that the full 
solution was  first  reached.  In that  state, in  1905, W.  H, 
Hatton was  chairman of  the committee on transportation in 
the state senate.  He laid down  the principle "that it was 
as  much the  duty of  the state  to  furnish  transportation 
facilities as it ever had been to make roads or build bridges, 
and that if  the function was delegated to any one, it was the 
duty of  the state to regulate it so that the agent  should be 
required to furnish adequate service, reasonable rates, and 
practice no  discrimination."  l  Senator Hatton further said 
regarding the proposed bill to accomplish the above : "I want 
this procedure so simple that a man can write his complaint 
on the back of  a postal card, and if  it is a just one, the state 
will take it up for him." 
We have here enunciated the two principles now generally 
recognized as applying to public  utilities, regulation  so as 
to get reasonable rates and no discrimination, and machinery 
so simple as to give justice to all. 
The act passed by the Wisconsin legislation gave the com- 
mission the power of  regulation regarding rates, service, and 
discrimination, for  railroads  and  correlated  organizations, 
such  as refrigerator  lines,  sleeping  car, and dispatch com- 
panies.  In the regulation of  service the  power  of  various 
state  commissions  had  been  gradually  extended,  and  the 
Wisconsin bill merely carried this phase of  the matter to its 
1 "The Wisconsin Idea," Charlea McCarthy, p. 39.  'Ibid., 41. REMEDIES  237 
The first fundamental new point of  the  Power to 
law was that while the onus of  fixing  the rates rested upon 
the  the commission could  investigate by  its own 
initiative or  by complaint  any rate or charge;  and if  the 
same was  found to be unreasonable,  the commission could 
order a new rate, which new rate must be substituted for the 
old one.  Thus, the commission was given a  possible task. 
~t  was not assigned the task of at once fixing all rates, but 
the task of readjusting unreasonable rates. 
The second fundamental principle of  the law was that the 
alterations of  service and  rates were  accomplished by the 
commission  without cost to the complainant ;  and thus justice 
was  as certainly obtainable  by the man who had  imposed  t he power 
upon him an excessive charge for shipping a single article as giz,"" 
by  a  great  corporation.  There  was  no  escape  from  the  sec- 
decision of  the commission  by  the railroad  except  by an jUStiCB. 
appeal to the court ;  and the appeal was against the commis- 
sion, not  against  the individual  who  made  the complaint. 
As a matter of  course both complainant and defendant had 
full opportunity to present their cases in public hearing be- 
fore the commission in advance of  action. 
The  third  important  principle  introduced  into the  law 
was  that, in case of  appeal,  the burden  of  proof  that the 
order of the commission was unreasonable was upon the ap- 
pealing  railroad.  Still  further, if  evidence was introduced 
into  court which  did  not come before the commission, the  New avt 
court was obliged to stay its proceedings and remand the case 
to the commission for a rehearing, thus preventing the hold- 
ing back  of  evidence by  the corporations  to discredit  the 
Commission. 
All  the provisions of  the bill were  such as  to make the 
Powers given the commission lie within those which may be 
by a legislature.  The legislature is to make the 
law; is to lay down the rules which control ;  the commission  Regulation 
under ruler  does  notbiog  but administer the law ; the commission can-  of law, 
not  legislate, but it can make regulations under the rules of 
law fomulated by the legislature.  In  this Wisconsin  bill 
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regulations are sometimes called administrative law as op 
posed to legislative law. 
Following from the powers and duties of  the commission, 
there have come  many corollaries.  In order to determine 
just  rates,  it has been necessary to make a physical valua- 
tion  of the public utilities.  In the valuation  of  the prop- 
erties, both physical and good will,  it has been necessary to 
use trained experts, both in engineering and in economics. 
The powers of  the railroad commission of  Wisconsin were 
by three laws in 1907 extended to apply to all public utilities 
within the state.  In the same year a comprehensive public 
utilities law along somewhat different lines was passed in New 
York, that state being divided into two districts, one includ- 
ing New York City and the other the remainder of  the state. 
This principle of  control of  public utilities through  com- 
missions, first put into full force in Wisconsin and New York, 
has been accepted by a number of  other states. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission.  -Just  as the states 
have  undertaken  the  control  of  public  utilities  for  intra- 
state business, the United  States, by  the  interstate  com- 
merce  act of  fb87, has instituted a  system of  control for 
interstate commerce.  This act creates a commission of  five 
members,  later increased to seven, appointed by the Pres- 
ident, who hold office for six years.  The original act applies 
to railways and to boats  engaged in  the transportation  of 
passengers or property when the same is interstate.  Viola- 
tions of  the act are made a  misdemeanor punishable by a 
heavy fine  for  each  offense.  Unreasonable charges, unjust 
chergesto  discrimination,  and  unjust  or  undue  preference  to  some 
particular person are all  illegal.  Railroads must  afford  all  able. 
reasonable and proper facilities for the interchange of  traffic, 
and discrimination in the rates through  such  connection is 
prohibited.  The law provides for the posting of  schedules 
and requires advances of  the same to  be preceded  by ten 
days'  notice.  No variation from published rates are to be 
permitted.  All schedules are to be filled with the commission. 
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merit of  the business of  common carriers and to obtain full 
concerning them.  Any person sustaining dam- 
age may make complaint to the commission or bring a suit 
in his own behalf  in the District Court or Circuit Court of 
the United States;  but he cannot do both.  If complaint is 
made to the commission, this organization  will  investigate; 
and  if  the complaint  is  well  founded  the commission  will 
that reparation be made. 
The chief  defect of  the law of  1887 was that the commis- 
sion was a purely advisory body.  Further, the commission 
was  not  given sufficient appropriations to make  investiga- 
tions upon which to determine whether charges were reason- 
able.  Notwithstanding  these  limitations,  the  rebate  evil 
was reduced, and a great number of  cases were satisfactorily 
adjusted without going into court. 
In  1906  and  1910  the  interstate  commerce  law  was 
amended.  It now  applies to all  common  carriers  engaged 
in interstate  commerce and also  to companies engaged  in 
communication, such as telephone, telegraph, and cable.  In AU public 
1906 was given the power to fix maximum rates, and in 1910 
to suspend  increase  of  rates  pending  investigation.  The 
charges both in transportation and communication are to be 
just and reasonable;  unjust  and unreasonable  charges are 
declared to be illegal.  A charge for a short haul  shall  not 
exceed the charge for a longer distance over the same road, 
provided  that  the  Interstate Commerce Commission may 
grant relief  in special cases. 
menever the charges are found  unjust or unreasonable 
the commission is authorized  and empowered to determine 
and prescribe what will be a just  and reasonable rate.  In-  Power to 
creases in rates must first be passed upon by the commission, zete 
and the burden of  proof  is upon the carrier toeshow the rea- 
sonableness of  the advanced  rate.  If  the  carrier  fails  to 
with  an order  of  the commission, the complainant 
sue the carrier in the Circuit Court, where the finding of 
the  commission  shall  be prima facie  evidence against the 
cmrier.  Also the Interstate Commerce Commission may ap 
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The amendments adopted gave the commission the neces- 
sary authority to make the interstate commerce law effec- 
tive ;  and many decisions have been rendered declaring rates 
to  be  unreasonable,  and reasonable rates have been  fixed. 
Effective-  In many cases railways have been found guilty of  discrimina- 
nesa of law*  tion,  orders  have  been  given  for  such  discriminations to 
cease, and proper damages have been awarded.  In  numerous 
cases where  the joint  rates exceeded a  combination of  the 
different local rates, the joint rates have been reduced so as 
not to exceed the combined local rates.  Special rates have 
been  declared  to be  unlawful;  and unfair regulations, the 
effect  of  which  is  to favor some shipper  (in  one  case the 
Standard Oil  Company), have been  abated. 
At the same time the last amendment was passed giving 
the Interstate Commerce Commission power to regulate rates, 
a Commerce Court was  created.  This court has  exclusive 
jurisdiction of  all cases arising under the interstate commerce 
act  "otherwise  than  by  adjudication  and  collection of  a 
forfeiture  or  penalty  or  by  infliction  of  criminal punish- 
ment,  or  any order of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commis- 
Commerce  sion than the payment of money."  The pendency of  a suit 
CO"t.  in the Commerce Court does not in itself stay or suspend the 
operation of  an order of  the Interstate Commerce Commission ; 
but the Commerce Court may at  its discretion suspend such 
order  pending  final hearing or determination  of  the suit. 
There may be appeal from the Commerce Court to the Su- 
preme  Court  of  the  United  States, and such  cases are  to 
have priority except over criminal cases.  Complainants in- 
terested in a case before the Commerce Court have the right 
to appear and may be made parties thereto. 
Of  the cases of  appeal from the Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission  to the  Commerce  Court,  there  have  been  many 
affirmations and also many in which the orders of  the Inter- 
state  Commerce  Commission  have  been  temporarily  sus- 
pended or reversed. 
In some instances, charges which the commission declared 
to be unreasonable have been declared to be reasonable by 
the court.  In other instances where charges have been de- REMEDIES  241 
clared to be unreasonable by the commission, the court has 
declared that the order was based upon insufficient evidence. 
In one case a through railway rate had been lowered until it 
met a combined rail  and water  rate.  This resulted  in the 
railway getting the major  part of  the business, so that the 
water  was  eliminated.  The  higher  rate  was 
then resumed.  In this case the commission condemned the 
advance in the rates as unjust and unreasonable;  but the 
Commerce Court held that there was not sufficient evidence 
to  sustain this finding.  This decision is of  great consequence,  Decision 
since the method  that the railway  pursued  is  that which  ',ii$n?':e 
has  been  frequently followed to drive out water  competi-  water com- 
tion, -viz.,  lowering  rates  until  water  competition is  de-  petition- 
strayed, then raising the rates and taking increased profits. 
In another case the Commerce Court held that the commis- 
sion exceeded its authority when it laid down a hard and fast 
rule to apply to a large part of  the United States in regard 
to  the  long  and  short  haul  clause.  Finally,  the  Com- 
merce Court has held  that its jurisdiction  extends to those 
cases in which orders are for the payment of  money only.  In 
one class of  cases the court has gone farther than the commis- 
sion.  It was held  by the commission that the complainant 
could  not recover the excess  charges exacted  by unreason- 
able  rates  previous  to his  complaint  to the  commission; 
whereas the court held  that the complainant could recover 
from the time the unreasonable rate was inaugurated. 
Some of the chief  differences between the commission and  Right of 
the court are as follows : The commission holds that the court  revlew. 
has no right to review the orders of  the commission concern- 
ing charges, except such orders as are confkatory ;  whereas 
the court holds that it may review the action of  the commis- 
sion as to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of  charges. 
The  Commerce Court held  that the commission has no 
dght to require information concerning intrastate business, 
since the same is not interstate commerce.  Probably this is  Commldon 
the decision of  the court that has most hampered the commis-  hampered. 
in that it made it impossible for the commission to ob- 
tain  ioformation  concerning  intrastate business.  Without 
R 242  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
this knowledge the commission found it very difficult to de- 
termine the reasonableness  or unreasonableness of  interstate 
rates, since the reasonableness of  a charge for a given class of 
business is dependent as one factor upon the entire business 
done by the road.  Fortunately this decision of  the Commerce 
Court has been reversed by the United States Supreme Court. 
At this writing the other important differences between the 
commission  and  Commerce  Court  is  still  pending  in  the 
Supreme Court. 
General  Statements. -  From  the  early  public  utilities 
commission  of  the sixties  almost  every proposal  to create 
a  commission  or  to  extend  its  powers  has  been  de- 
nounced  as wildly  radical,  as  socialistic.  It  has  been 
said  that  if  the  laws  proposed  were  passed,  we  might 
as well  at once  go  to  the  socialistic  doctrine  and  have 
business carried on by the government.  The officers of the 
Resistance  public service corporations clearly foresaw that the commis- 
reda-  sions meant sooner or later the destruction of  the principles 
tion. 
of  imposing rates that the traffic would bear and the attitude, 
"the  public  be  damned."  Also  with  this appreciation by 
them there was undoubtedly an honest  fear on the part of 
many that their  properties  would  be unjustly raided;  but 
the old  situation was  intolerable.  The public  service cor- 
porations and the people were at  war ;  and under conditions 
of  war there was rancor and distrust on both sides, an ob- 
stinate determination on the part of  the railroad companies 
to resist  every encroachment  in the matter  of  control  and 
determination on the  part of  many of  the people  to find a 
weapon by which they might smash the corporations. 
In  a half dozen years this state of  mind both on the part of 
the owners of  the public utilities and upon the part of  the 
people has largely disappeared.  Where before we had war, 
we now have peace. 
Those who have studied the orders of  the commissions to 
the public utility corporations.  know  that comlaission  rule, 
upon the whole, results in reasonable requirements regarding 
service and rates.  If an unreasonable rate be imposed, there REMEDIES 
is appeal to the courts ; and if  the corporation can show that  Protection 
the rate imposed is confiscatory under the llthamendment of  $g~f:.perty 
the united States Constitution, the order of  the commission 
will be reversed by the courts.  To bring a suit in court im- 
poses no especial hardship upon the railroads, since these great 
 corporation^  have  the  money  to carry  their  cases  to the 
highest courts of  the land.  In consequence of  the adequate, 
indeed  unique,  protection  which  property possesses in this 
country under the 14th amendment, as compared  with any 
other country, some orders of  the  commissions  have  been 
reversed and property has been completely protected. 
The commissions, as a matter of  pride, desire to avoid hav- 
ing their orders found unreasonable, desire not to have them 
found to be of  a kind which confiscate property;  and thus the 
commissions upon the whole have been conservative in their 
actions in the lowering of  rates. 
If  there be any advantage upon either side through com- 
mission rule,  it is with  the corporations.  Notwithstanding 
this,  the people know  that the weakest one of  them  is no 
longer subject to unjust discrimination which would ruin his 
business;  he is certain that his stronger competitors are not 
directly receiving rebates and drawbacks;  he is certain that 
his rates are not exorbitant ; he accepts the situation even if 
he thinks the rates are somewhat high. 
In making the above statement it is not meant to say that 
everything is all that could be desired.  This state of  affairs 
never will be reached in a progressive, industrial democracy. 
So long as the conditions are dynamic rather than static, no 
one  will  ever  be  completely satisfied.  Many of  the more 
important railroad men, in private, make complaint of  some  Complete 
of the orders of  the commissions, both state and interstate,  :;&:pn 
because of what they regard as their too theoretical character  able. 
due to lack of  knowledge of  practical difficulties involved in 
executing the orders.  There are complaints as to divisions of 
cost between  freight and passenger  traffic;  there are com- 
plaints of orders regarding stations, frequency of  service, etc. 
the other hand some of  the people  complain that, be- 
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the commissions have been  too  conservative  and that the 
rates have not been sufficiently reduced ; that adequate ser- 
vice has not been  secured.  That each  side should  unduly 
stress  its own  point of  view and not see with perfect  fair- 
ness the point  of  view of  the other  side is natural, indeed 
inevitable.  But neither side would go back to the old condi- 
tion of  affairs.  The wiser  railroad men would far prefer  to 
be under  commissions than to be  under  blackmail  through 
holdup  bills  at every  session  of  many  state  legislatures. 
The pressure of  these holdup bills was so great that many a 
railroad man in high position and of  unquestioned  business 
standing has felt it necessary in the past to bribe legislatures. 
No longer does this extremely distasteful, disgraceful, and un- 
lawful  performance  generally  exist.  On  the  other  hand, 
while the people may not be completely satisfied, they realize 
that they are far better off  than when rebates and drawbacks 
existed,  when  there was  discrimination  between  men  and 
discrimination between  different localities. 
Perfect contentment we shall never have; but the results 
achieved in the control of public utilities by the administrative 
commissions are so great that we may be sure that from this 
time on the steps will be forward rather than backward  in 
commission  control  of  public  utilities.  The fundamental 
principle of  regulation of  the public utilities by commissions is 
Movement  substantially sound.  It remains only to  extend the principle 
worked out to the remaining states of  the country and develop 
details necessary for the perfection of  the method of  control. 
So satisfactory  upon  the whole is the situation that, as 
already pointed out, the people accept with equanimity the 
principle of  cooperation among the public utilities.  Every- 
mmtion where the latter cooperate in fixing rates so as to prevent de- 
mted-  structive competition.  No officer of  any state or of  the United 
States thinks of  bringing suit against the public utility cor- 
porations for violation of  the antitrust acts, although they are 
as flagrant violators of  these laws as any in the United States. 
In short, the administrative commission has secured for the 
public utilities reasonable justice to all and by common con- 
sent has permitted cooperation. PURE  FOOD  AND  DRUGS  LAWS 
~t  the  same  time  that  one  class  of  commissions  has 
arisen to control charges and service of  public utilities, an- 
other class of  administrative body has arisen to control the 
quality of  commodities.  As we  have  seen  (pp. 74-78),  the 
dogma of  competition  is that it is  to control  quality and 
price.  For the industries, we  have further seen that in con-  Failure of 
trolling quality competition has been an unqualified failure ; ~~~~t~e 
indeed, so  disastrous  was  the failure  and  so  menacing to  cure 
public welfare, especially with  reference  to health, that the  Q~~~~~~. 
great majority of  states have passed  pure food  laws, under 
which it is necessary for the label to tell the truth concern- 
ing  an article.  These  laws  prevent  the introduction into 
food  of  preservatives  inimical  to  health  and  prevent  the 
adulteration of  foods, drinks, and drugs. 
The states and possessions having pure food laws include 
the  following :  Alabama,  1907 ; Alaska,  1906 ; Arizona, 
1906 ; Arkansas,  1907 ; California,  1907 ; Colorado, 1907 ; 
Connecticut, 1907 ; Delaware,  1907 ; Florida,  1907 ; Geor- 
gia,  1906 ; Hawaii,  1903 ; Idaho, 1905 ; Illinois, 1907 ; In- 
diana, 1907;  Iowa,  1906;  Kansas, 1907 ; Kentucky, 1908; 
Louisiana, 1906 ;  Maine, 1907 ; Maryland, 1910 ; Massachu- 
setts, 1882 ; Michigan, l881 ; Minnesota, l905 ; Mississippi, 
19i0 ; Missouri,  1907 ; Montana,  1907 ; Nebraska,  1907 ; 
Nevada, 1909 ; New  Hampshire,  1907 ; New Jersey,  1907; 
Ohio, 1904 ; Oklahoma, 1909 ;  Oregon, 1907 ;  Rhode Island, 
1908 ; Philippines, 1906 ; New  Mexico,  1906 ; New  York, 
1909 ; North Carolina, 1907 ; North Dakota, 1907 ;  Pennsyl- 
vania,  1907;  Porto  Rico,  1906;  South  Carolina,  1907; 
South Dakota, l907 ;  Tennessee, l907 ; Texas, 1907 ;  Utah, 
1903 ; Vermont,  1907 ; Virginia, l908 ; Washington, l901 ; 
West Virginia, 1907 ;  Wisconsin, 1903 ;  Wyoming, 1907. 
It is noticeable that with two exceptions these laws were 
*ormulated from 1903 to 1910.  The salient point in connec- 









of  law. 
pure food laws, special administrative officers are assigned the 
duty of  their enforcemen$.  These officers may constitute a 
commission or a board.  The duty may rest  upon a single 
designated individual, in  a number of  instances called com- 
missioner. 
The same principles which  were  first applied within  the 
states in the control of  quality through commission was recog- 
nized by the United States when the pure food law was passed 
for interstate commerce in 1906. 
This law makes it a misdemeanor to manufacture adulter- 
ated foods or drugs or to misbrand same or to sell adulterated 
or misbranded foods or drugs ; it provides for examination of 
products upon the market  by the Bureau  of  Chemistry; it 
provides that the secretaries of  agriculture, of  the treasury, 
and of  commerce and labor shall issue rules and regulations 
for the enforcement of  the act; the violation of  these  rules 
is to be  punished  by  fine  or  imprsonment  or  both.  Mis- 
branded or adulterated foods or drugs are to be condemned. 
A  meat  inspection  amendment  was  added  to the pure 
food laws providing for the inspection of  all slaughtered car- 
casses.  This amendment applies both to commerce between 
the states and between the states and foreign countries.  Be- 
fore passing any carcass it is to be found in a healthy and 
sound condition.  This work  is to be done by  the Depart- 
ment of  Agriculture. 
In  general, the pure food laws, both state and national, lay 
down the general principles to be obeyed ; the commissions 
or other  administrative  officers formulate definite  detailed 
regulations under the general rules of  law.  These pure food 
officials have created laboratories for analyses of  foods and 
drugs; they  send  their  investigators to the various  parts 
of  the country to ascertain whether the laws are being com- 
plied with.  They issue necessary orders in connection with 
their duties.  In short, they are administrative bodies hav- 
ing imposed upon them the duty of  seeing that the laws for 
the protection  of  the public regarding quality are complied 
with.  Finally,  the pure food officials may prosecute in the 
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Under  the theory  that  competition  would  regulate,  the 
public would have remained without protection.  Had it not 
been for the creation of the administrative officials to enforce 
the qu?lity Inn-?, the only redress of  the injured  individual 
~ould  have been to take his case to the courts.  In the ma-  ..  - 
jority of  cases the damage was small and an injured individual  Redress 
could not afford to do this.  Jut  as with the public utilities,  ~~~~'~~~-o 
redress should be obtainable without expense to  the individual.  individual.  - - 
The  situation  Was  saved by the recognition of  legislatures 
and Congress at  the time they made the pure food laws, that 
they must create administrative officers to enforce them. 
~ust  as there was resistance by the railroads and other public 
utility corporations to commission form of  control  and the 
principle was established only as a result  of  many years of 
severe  contest,  SO  there  was  prolonged  and  determined,  Resistance 
indeed  fierce,  opposition  by  many  of  the  manufacturers t,",",yfood 
to the pure food laws.  There was great commercial gain by 
exploiting the public through deceit, and this advantage they 
were  determined  not to lose.  Resistance  was  so  powerful 
that it was only when there was an  aroused public sentiment 
in favor of  the passage of  the laws that the states and finally 
Congress enacted the same. 
A  case of  most  determined resistance  was  that of  meat. 
False brands were used;  the conditions in some of  the abat- 
toirs were unsanitary ; diseased meat was sold.  The packers 
opposed bitterly the necessary inspection to  secure wholesome 
meat.  The public was of  no consequence as compared with  The publio 
increased  gain.  Meat  inspection  was  so  strongly  resisted ;::'F 
that the law as finally enacted by Congress was only gotten 
through by the government taking upon itself the cost of  the 
inspection. 
Even to the present time there is determined resistance by 
Some manufacturers to  the execution of  the laws, and pressure 
is brought to  bear upon the Department of  Agriculture to  sus- 
pend or  modify  its rulings.  Other wiser  and more public- 
spirited  manufacturers  are  cheerfully  conforming,  indeed 
assisting, in the enforcement of  the pure food laws.  In  general 
the  reivolution has taken placeand a new situation  exists.  This 248  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
being so, it seems aImost  unthinkable that the nation  was 
allowed to be exploited for so long a time by the unscrupulous 
manufacturers  who  wished  to gain  through  deceit  at the 
expense of  the public. 
THE  CREATION  OF  TRADE  COMMISSIONS 
Following the inductive method, and tnlring steps in ad- 
vance with  the greatest care only as justified  by the expe- 
rience of  the past, is not the conclusion inevitable from the 
evidence  presented  in  the  previous  section  that  the  ma- 
chinery which has been applied so successfully to the control 
of  public service corporations and to the control of  quality so 
control by  far as essential articles are concerned, should be applied to the 
tracle com- 
missions.  great industrial corporations ?  The failure of  the competitive 
system for the  adequate  control of  the price and service for pub- 
lic utilities and quality for manufactures cannot be gainsaid. 
The thesis is presented that commissions should be created 
to  controI  industrial  corporations  affected  with  a  public 
interest just as they now control the public service corpora- 
tions, as they control quality in industry. 
That some method of  administrative control for the com- 
binations  must  be  created  is  shown  by  the  case  of  the 
American Tobacco Company, in which  the inferior court in 
cooperation with the Attorney-General undertook  extraordi- 
nary administrative work of  a new kind and to  which the court 
is  not  adapted.  (See  pp.  183-187.)  Regarding  the  dis- 
solution of  the American Tobacco Company, the Attorney- 
General said the  problems involved were economic rather than 
Courts not  legal.  He adds : "But neither the courts nor the department 
adapted  to  of  justice  is properly  equipped to work  out such problems 
control. 
save in exceptional  cases."  He points out that in the par- 
ticular instance in which a complex economic duty was im- 
posed  upon  the court, it so happened  that the  Bureau  of 
Corporations had made an elaborate investigation and  had 
the facts in its possession necessary to  base a plan for carrying 
out the decree.  The bureau was  called upon by the Attor- REMEDIES  249 
ney-General for the extra-ojicial  duty of  advising him regard- 
ing the manner of  disintegration. 
The Attorney-General suggests that the duty of  the bureau 
might be enlarged SO as to include investigations and reports 
upon  plans for disintegration of  monopolistic  combinations, 
which  either vo~untarily  or by pursuance  of  decree are ad- 
judged  to be  in violation of  the antitrust act.  He further 
that the bureau might be availed of  as the nucleus for 
'<an  administrative board  under  whose  supervision consoli- 
dations or  mergers  for  lawful  purposes might  be  formed." 
This proposal is a first step in the direction  of  that which  Administra- 
is herein made that administrative  commissions should  be 2:::- 
created  upon  which should  rest the duty of  supervision of 
combinations which exist in restraint of  trade.  To combine 
the duties of  the commissions with the courts, as suggested 
by the Attorney-General, would be most unfortunate; since 
of  necessity the courts must remain the body  to which  ap- 
peals  may be  made from the commissions.  The duties of 
administrative  commissions and the courts should be  kept 
wholly distinct. 
SECTION  5 
PROPOSED MINIMUM AMENDMENTS TO ANTITRUST LAWS 
To accomplish control of  combinations khrough  adminis- 
trative commissions, it will  be necessary to make the follow- 
ing amendments to the antitrust laws : - 
(1) Business of  a Public Interest. -  The law should declare 
that  businesses  which  restrain  trade to  such  a  degree  as 
to control  the market  by that fact becomes of  public in- 
terest.  No  one  can  doubt  that  the greater  corporations 
are  just  as much  affected  by  public  interest  as are  the 
railroads.  The United  States Steel Corporation, Standard  Great cor- 
Oil  Companies,  and  the  American  Sugar  Refining  Com-  porationa 
public utili- 
PanY,  producing  commodities,  some  of  which  are required  ties in fact. 
the larger portion  of  the population,  have  relations  to 
the  public as a whole.  This principle has already been rec- 
ognized bp some common law decisions ;  and, in consequence, 
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private  has become  a  public utility.  Elevating grain, as a 
result of  a long contest, was declared to be affected  with a 
public  interest,  and  therefore  to be under  the  same  obli- 
gations as other public  utilities.'  In the case of  Munn  v. 
Illinois,  Chief  Justice White,  speaking for the court,  said: 
"Property becomes clothed with a public interest when used 
in a manner to make it of  public consequence,and affect the 
Great busi-  community  at large."  Judge  Vinje,  of  Wisconsin,  in  dis- 
ness affects  cussing this matter, summarizes the conclusions of  the United 
community 
at large.  States Supreme Court in the following words : "We find that 
private property or business becomes affected with a public 
interest when used or carried on in a manner to make it of 
public consequence, and affect the community at large, and 
when thus affected such property or business becomes subject 
to legislative control in all respects necessary  to protect the 
public against dangers, injustice, and oppression." 
Therefore we have but to apply the principle of  law already 
recognized  by the United  States Supreme  Court  to busi- 
nesses which exist in restraint of  trade.  Indeed, in the case 
of  Oklahoma, this principle has already been embodied into 
~ig  busi-  statute  law in most comprehensive terms.  In  that  state, when- 
neSS Of  ever any business  by reason  of  its extent or by virtue of  public 
interet.  monopoly is such as to make it of  public consequence or to 
affect the community at large in reference to supply and de- 
mand or price, such business is declaked to be a public busi- 
ness and to  be under control of  thestate through the Corpora- 
tion Commission or by an action in any district court of the 
state (see p.  195).  Thus existing common law and statute 
law for one state are in accord with the principle here advo- 
cated.  It remains only to embody the principles enunciated 
into statute law for the several states and for the nation. 
(2)  Cooperation Reasonable. -  The law should define  rea- 
sonable restraint of  trade in such a manner as to permit coop- 
eration.  Regarding the extent to which cooperation should 
be permitted,  there will  doubtless be difference of  opinion; 
Munn a. IIlinois, 94 U. S. 113; Budd v. N.  Y.,  143 U.  S. 517. 
"  The Legal Aspects of  Industrial Coneolidationa," Reporb of ~ieoons~~ 
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but, as already indicated, the most logical place at which to 
stop is the point fixed by the common law principle, and declare 
restraint  of  trade unreasonable that gets to monopoly.  To 
make the law exact it should declare any corporation which, 
its subsidiary companies, controls a definite percentage  Reasonable 
of  the  business  a  monopoly  (see  p.  227).  This is  in  ac- g$:,"? 
cordance with  the proposal  recently  made  by  Mr.  W.  J.  permit 
Bryan, who  mentions  50 per cent  in this connection.  The  monopO1y. 
differencs between the view of  Mr. Bryan and the position 
taken here is that he apparently regards this regulation alone 
as ~~fficient  to insure  competition,  and he  believes in  the 
of  the control of  business by competition.  If  the 
meaning of  the court in the decisions regarding Standard Oil 
and Tobacco are that undue restraint of  trade means restraint 
of trade which extends to monopoly (see pp. 181-1873,  then 
the only additional point  embodied  in  the above  proposal 
beyond existing law is that monopoly be  definitely defined. 
However, amendments to the law must extend beyond the 
proportion of  business if  cooperation be permitted in prices, 
outputs, etc. ;  for, as shown by the decisions of  the federal and 
state courts, cooperation, except to a very limited degree as 
to time and space, is under the ban of  the law as it now exists. 
In this connection it should be mentioned that it has been 
proposed as a solution of  the problem of  combination that the 
amount of business which one company may control shall be  Futility of 
reduced to a relatively small fraction.  Some have said that  ~~~~~~n~~; 
no one corporation should be allowed to  produce more than ten  small frac- 
Per cent of  a product.  Others would limit the capitalization 
of a business ; and  this  is  another way to accomplish the 
me  purpose.'  Even if  the limitation were severe regarding 
Portion or  capitalization, it would  still  be  possible  for the 
corporations to cooperate, secretly or openly, and thus act 
substantially as a unit.  Indeed, at  the present time we know 
that there are many more than ten companies engaged in the 
same  business cooperating  in  various  ways in its control. 
Therefore the limitation of  amount of  business alone or of 
is wholly futile.  If  cooperation be permitted, 
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and that it should be seems to me to have been established, 
the cooperating units must be under the supervision of  some 
authority in order that the public may secure fair treatment. 
(3)  Competition to Remain Free. -  The law should declare 
any restraint  of  trade unreasonable  whioh  does not permit 
free  competition.  While  reasonable  cooperation  should  be 
possible,  no  cooperation should be permitted which in any 
way  prohibits  another  person  or  corporation  from  freely 
entering a business.  Similarly cooperation  of  labor should 
be  under  the  same  supervisory  authority  as  cooperating 
capital.' 
(4) Unfair Practices should be Prohibited. -In  the enumer- 
ation of  unfair  practices  to be  prohibited,  there  doubtless 
would be difference of  opinion.  One enumeration is given, 
pp. 225-226. 
General  Statements. -  But  how  are these  proposed  rules 
of  law, state and national, to be enforced?  Clearly, if  the 
argument to this point  be  sustained, -by  the creation  of 
trade  commissions, both  national  and state, an interstate 
trade commission to control interstate industrial commerce 
and state commissions to control intrastate commerce.  Court 
procedure would  be  as futile to secure the enforcement  of 
the above rules of law as it has been with the existing laws; 
but commissions granted the broad powers to enforce these 
rules of  law, being administrative bodies, able to take action 
without complaint, and acting on complaint without expense 
to the  complainant,  may  be  reasonably  expected  success- 
fully to enforce the proposed laws. 
It  is not necessary again to give in detail the powers which 
these trade commissions should  have, since in general they 
should be the same for the industries as those already exist- 
ing for public utilities.  (See pp. 233-244;) 
These powers should be ample to enforce all the above pro- 
visions.  Penalties should be providedfor violation of  the prin- 
ciples enunciated.  The findings of  a commission should be 
accepted  as  prima  jacie  evidence of  their  correctness  and 
Hearings, Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, Part XIX,  S. P Bush, 
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should go into effect at  once.  In case of  appeal to the courts 
no new facts should be introduced, provided same could have 
been  presented  to the  commission.  If  material  facts are 
brought forth, which  for  any reason  could  not have been 
presented  to the commission the case should be remanded to 
the commission for a rehearing.  In this way it will be pos- 
sible to prevent withholding evidence when  a case is before 
the commission in order to get the same into the court. 
There is no  question  that the creation  of  trade commis- 
sions  to  administer  the  general  principles  enacted  by 
Congress and state legislatures would  be legal and constitu- 
tional.  It is  to  be  noted  that the principles  of  law  sug- 
gested are stated in broad and simple terms, the idea being 
to leave the formulation of  detailed regulations to the com- 
missions.  Thus the law should  forbid unfair  practices, but 
the  specific  unfair  practices  should  not  be  enumerated; 
this  would  leave  it to the commission  to  stipulate  those 
practices  which  are unfair.  By this procedure  the list  of 
unfair  practices  and  their  definitions  could  be  modified 
from time to time as the exigencies demand ; whereas if  the 
unfair  practices were enumerated in detail  in  the statutes, 
there would  be sure to arise situations which are not ade- 
quately covered. 
Similarly,  regarding  coiiperation, the law  should  merely 
prescribe  that  reasonable  cooperation  is  allowable,  and 
the commission  should  work  out details as to what is per- 
missible under the rule. 
Again,  under  the rule  of  law  laid  down  by the courts 
prohibiting  monopoly,  the  matter  of  deciding  whether  a 
given corporation falls under that rule should rest with the 
commission.  Not only so, but if  a corporation be found to 
be a monopoly and therefore to be unreasonably in restraint 
of  trade,  the commission should  give the orders as to the 
modifications of  the business  which  are necessary  so  that 
the corporation shall cease to be a monopoly.  Such orders 
might go to the extent of  disintegration  of  the existing or- 
ganization, if  the monopoly be such that the public interests 
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The  above  provisions  present  an irreducible  minimum 
to which  the  antitrust laws,  state and national,  must  be 
amended  in  order  to secure freedom of  competition,  free- 
dom  of  cooperation,  destruction  of  monopoly, and justice 
to all.  If  such a  program  be  adopted, the first  conserva- 
tive  fundamental  step  will  have  been  taken  to  stop  the 
present  perfectly  futile attempts to regulate  concentration 
of  wealth  by  destructive  litigation,  adequately  to protect 
any corporation entering a business, and at the same time, 
to give protection to the individual and to the public. 
It sho'uld be  noted  that  the plan  to this  point  permits 
cooperation to  no greater extent than is allowed in England 
and  Germany.  Indeed,  cooperation  in  Germany,  as  is 
shown by the steel combination, is allowed to go to the ex- 
tent  of  monopoly,  and  in  this  has  the protection  of  the 
courts; although  if  the prices were  made so excessive as to 
excite general complaint, it would be possible for the courts 
to order  a  modification  of  the combination  as being  con- 
trary  to  public  policy.  No  disastrous  consequences  have 
come in those countries because of  the ability of  their busi- 
ness  men  and  manufacturers to cooperate.  Indeed,  there 
is  general agreement  in  these  nations  that  the gains from 
cooperation are  far greater  than  the disadvantages of  the 
unrestrained  competitive system. 
The proposal made does not permit cooperation to go to 
the extent of  monopoly, as is allowed in Germany.  Further- 
more the cooperation which is  allowed to exist in restraint 
of  trade is under  the supervision and regulation  of  an ad- 
ministrative  commission, and therefore  the  proposal made 
is  s  much  more  conservative one  regarding  recognition of 
concentration  of  industry than exists in  England  and Ger- 
many. 
FURTHER  EXTENSION  OF POWER OF  COMMISSIONS 
While the above is a minimum.program, adequate grounds 
can  be  adduced for further extending the authority of  the 
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additional principles into law, which  have been  mentioned 
in the specifications, given pp. 225-231,  as desirable.  The 
additional points will  be  enumerated in  the order in which 
they  are likely to be  acceptable  to the public, not  in  the 
order of their importance. 
(1) Publicity  Required. -All  corporations which  exist  in 
restraint of  trade should be  subject  to full  publicity.  For 
any one of  them the public should know the amount of  out- 
standing stocks and bonds of  each class ;  it should know the 
physical valuation of  the property;  it should  have  full  in- 
formation concerning the conduct of  the business, including 
the  amount  of  the profits  which  goes  for  improvements, 
depreciation,  sinking  fund,  and  dividends.  In short,  for 
each  corporation  allowed  to  cooperate  with  others,  the 
public should have full knowledge of  all  of  the facts neces- 
sary to pass a judgment upon the nature, extent, and effects 
of  its business. 
If  this  principle be  agreed  to,  the requisite  amendment 
to the antitrust laws should include another clause stating 
in broad  terms that the commission has  full power  of  in- 
vestigations, including access to the books of  the company, 
with  authority  to make  public  any facts  coltcerning  the 
business which  are regarded by the commissio~  as  having a 
public  interest. 
(2)  Regulation  of  Prices. -  While  the  above  provisions 
will  make a great advance over the present  situation, it is 
by no  means certain that they are sufficient to protect the 
public in tbg  matter  of  'fair  prices.  Turning  again to the 
commissions  regulating  pfiblic  utilities :  they  were  first 
given various powers regarding service, publicity, etc. ;  but 
the public  was  never adequately protected  until  they had 
authority to regulate prices, not the responsibility of  fixing 
Prices,  but  the  authority  to order  modification  of  prices 
complaint  or  by  their  own  initiative.  I am  aware 
that at this point there will  be  great difference of  opinion; 
therefore I have carefully refrained from including it as  an 
essential part of  the proposed  remedial plan.  But it is in- 
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that the rule of  law be  made  that all  cooperating  corpora- 
tions which control the market shall charge reasonable prices. 
Under this simple rule of  law the commission will be directed 
Reasonable  to see that such reasonable  prices  be  maintained.  If  this 
prices must  principle can be  agreed to, the situation is adequately cov- 
be main- 
tained.  ered ; for if  an unreasonable price  be  charged, the commis- 
sion will have authority to  fix maximum and minimum prices 
as is required to make the price reasonable. 
In justification of  this principle it may be said all that it 
is necessary to do is to apply the practice  of  the past con- 
cerning  monopoly  prices  to the  present  situation  and  to 
place the enforcement of  this rule of  law with the commis- 
sion rather than the court.  In early historical times, indeed 
until the nineteenth  century, transportation was  so  poorly 
developed, that it was  possible  to have monopoly in a rela- 
tively small area.  Even in a township or county, the diffi- 
culties in transportation were sometimes such that it was not 
easy to carry needed articles from one place to another, and 
an  individual,  or  two  or  three  individuals,  might  have 
monopoly  for  some  product  essential  to the  community. 
Under these circumstances, it was wholly  natural  that the 
control  of  monopoly  should  have  been  a  function  of  the 
state -  it was so under Roman law and under  the common 
law of  England.  Control went so far as to regulate  prices. 
This  was  very  common  in  Rome.  In  England,  prices 
Fixiner  of  were fixed by law at different times  for many commodities; 
price in  among  these  were  books,  beer  barrels,  coal,  wheat,  rye,  early timea. 
bread,  and  Iabor.  In Massachusetts  the  revised  laws of 
1649 limited the prices of  wages,  freight, ferryage, mill tolls, 
wharfage.  In both Massachusetts and New York the scale of 
wages was fixed for farm laborers, mechanics, and teamsters. 
Many other illustrations of fixing prices could be given. 
These laws  show  with  perfect  clearness  that the public 
has a right to a fair price;  that in this matter  as in others 
(( the welfare of  the people is a  supreme law."  Whenever 
it becomes advisable for the welfare of the people that the 
state authority be  invoked  to regulate prices, this may  be 
done.  The question of  so doing is merely one of  expediency. REMEDIES 
The right of state regulation of  prices is beyond question.' 
~t has merely been suspended for a time because inexpedient 
to exercise it. 
With  the  modern  development  of  transportation,  it 
became  more  difficult to  maintain  monopoly;  the  com- 
petitive  factor  became  more  important;  and  it was  less 
for prices to be  controlled by regulation.  By the 
beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  with  minor  excep- 
tions, this country had gone over to the theory of  the regu- 
lation of  prices by  competition.  As  we  have seen,  during 
the nineteenth century we  had a period in which the system  Regulation 
of  letting everybody alone, of  freedom of  competition, was  ~~~~~-~ 
our  faith.  If  we  could  onl'y  get  free  competition,  we  be-  tion. 
lieved,  we  should  have  the remedy  for  our  ills,  so far as 
prices were concerned. 
But  as  we  have  seen  with  the  great  development  of 
transportation  and  concurrent  concentration  of  industry 
during the latter half of  the nineteenth century and especially 
during the last twenty-five  years, conditions have recurred 
for  large  sections  of  the country  similar  to those  which 
obtained in the smaller community during the early history 
of  the nation.  The factors  which  have  led  to such  con- 
centration  have  been  discussed,  pp.  8-31.  Concentration 
has  gone far for all  industries;  and  at the  present  time 
for  many  important  commodities  has  gone  to the extent 
of  monopoly,  either  through  a  single  corporation  or  by 
the  cooperation  of  a  number  of  corporations.  Staples 
in  which  the  monopolistic  factor  clearly enters  are  steel, 
sugar,  oil,  anthracite,  beef,  tobacco,  matches,  shoe  ma- 
chinery, electrical appliances, and many others.  For  some 
of  these  commodities a  single  corporation  controls  from 
fifty  per  cent  to  as  much  as  ninety per  cent  of  the 
Product. 
As  has been fully shown (pp. 77-78),  not only where mo- 
nopoly  exists,  but  where  there is  cooperation far short of 
'  "  Government Regulation of Prices,"  Eugene A. Gilmore,  Green Bag, 1906. 
Addreaa  before  the Illinois  State Bar Aeaociation, Charles Carroll Bonney, 
*-can  Law Review, Vol. 25. 
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monopoly  so  far  as  any  one  organization  is  concerned, 
prices may  be  maintained  by  mutual understanding,  with- 
Excessive  out regard  to whether  such prices  are  reasonable  or  un- 
prices where 
there is  reasonable;  simply with  reference  to the dividends which 
monopoly.  may  be  secured  by  the  corporations.  It is  believed  by 
many,  if  corporations are  made  subject to publicity, that 
they  will  not  dare  to  charge  unreasonable  prices;  but 
the  public  should  place  no  confidence  in  this  conclusion, 
and therefore should place the power with  the commissions 
to  make  orders  regarding  prices  in  such  cases  as in  fact 
they are found to be  unreasonable. 
It is  safe  to say that  under  court  enforcement 'of  laws 
against trusts and combinations, the prices charged by single 
companies or  companies working in  cooperation have  been 
such as to give unreasonably large profits.  This has  been 
shown to be  true for  some  of  the corporations, facts con- 
cerning which are given (pp. 104-150).  In order to reinstate 
the matter in the mind it may be  recalled that the Cornmis- 
sioner of  Corporations says that in the United States Steel 
Corporation,  upon  the  actual  investment,  from  April  1, 
E.ceraive  1901, to December  31,  1910, the profits have  been  twelve 
profit..  per  cent  per  annum.  Since  the bonds bear  five  per  cent, 
this gives a much higher rate of  profit than twelve per cent 
upon that part of  the stock which represented substance and 
not water.  The Commissioner says that the earnings have 
been  so great that the company has been  able to put back 
into extensions and improvements,  into the sinking fund, 
and into the treasury  together,  from the net earnings, the 
collossal  sum  of  $435,000,000.  This  is  in  addition  to the 
dividends which have been declared on the stock, including 
both substance  and water, and the interest  on the bonds.' 
Again,  the  profits  of  the  American  Tobacco  Company, 
according to the  Commissioner  of  Corporations,  have  in- 
creased with amazing rapidity, and in 1908 were  $40,000,000 
upon an investment of  $240,000,000, or nearly seventeen per 
cent.  In addition  to the net  profits  declared,  enormous 
Summary  of  Report  of  Commissioner of  Corporations  on  the  Steel 
Industry,  Part  I, p.  49. REMEDIES 
,,turns  have  been  derived from the inflation of  securities.' 
Further, it  has  been  seen, when  the  element of  monopoly 
entered in the American Sugar Refining Company and the 
standard Oil Company, the margins for manufacture were in- 
creased so as to give enormous profits.  The Commissioner 
of Corporations says that the dividends of  Standard Oil, from 
1882  to  1906, averaged  above  twenty-four  per  cent,  and 
the  profits  due to  the  increased margins were  more  than 
$200,000,000.  The  total  profits  for  three  years  were 
about  $790,000,000 upon  an investment of  not  more  than 
$75,000,000.  Thus  in  fifteen  years  the  profits  have  been 
more than  ten times the capital originally in~ested.~ 
In view  of  these  and similar facts  regarding  other  cor- 
porations, it seems unsafe to believe,  if  coijperation be  per- 
mitted,  that the corporations will  have  so  great a  change  With C+ 
of  heart  as to treat  the public  fairly.  If  cooperation  be  OPue~~~~ 
permitted, with  this  must  go  control, else  the  public  will  control. 
be  without  protection.  It is perfectly clear  under modern 
conditions that the determination of  prices by legislation is 
an impossible  task.  However, as  already indicated,  under 
the clear  legislative  right  to  control  prices, Congress  and 
state legislatures  may  enact the rule that  prices  shall  be 
reasonable,  and  authorize  administrative  commissions  to 
regulate  prices  under  this  rule.  The  reserve  power  to 
require modification of  unreasonable prices should be placed 
with the commissions. 
In this connection it  is notable,  for the potash  industry 
in  Germany,  where  complete  monopoly  is  allowed,  that 
this industry is placed  under  control of  a commission with 
authority  to  regulate  prices.  Therefore,  at the  present 
time in Germany the plan of  regulating prices by commis- 
sion is in operation for one industry. 
It may be said that the burden of  controlling prices will 
be  so  great  that it cannot  be  performed  by  commissions. 
Precisely  the  same  statements  were  made  regarding  rail- 
'  Report of the Commissioner of  Corporations on the Tobacco  Industrg, 
PM 11,  PP.  310-313  '  Report of the Comm~~per  of  Corperationa on the Petroleum Indm 
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roads  when  it  was  proposed  to  control  prices  of  public 
utilities by  commission.  It may  be  asserted,  without fear 
of  successful contradiction,  that  there  is  no  problem  of 
adjustment  of  prices  more  difficult than  that  of  freight 
Control of  rates.  Different  rates  apply  to  different  classes  of  com- 
pricas a 
practical  modities;  rates  are  variable  under  different conditions  of 
problem.  shipment, such as quantity, distance, etc.  Furthermore  in 
fixing  the  price  on  freight  it'  must be  made  reasonable; 
and this  can only  be  determined  by  finding the valuation 
of  the enormously complex  and  variable  class  of  railroad 
properties,  taking  into account  the extremely  complicated 
business  operations.  Notwithstanding  these  difficulties, 
which  by the railroad  men  were  declared to be  absolutely 
insuperable  and  impossible  to perform  except  by  the  ex- 
perienced  railroad  man, the commissions  have  been, if  not 
wholly  successful, at  least  reasonably  so.  Therefore,  the 
arguments regarding the impracticability of  regulating prices 
by commission falls to the ground.  It is not to be presumed 
that every price would  be regulated all of  the time;  quite 
the contrary ; only exceptionally would  prices be  regulated 
by the commissions.  Whenever  a  complaint is made that 
the market is controlled and a price is unjust, then a corn- 
mission would investigate and make  an appropriate order; 
or if  a commission reached the conclusion that a case needed 
investigation, it could do this on its own initiative. 
It should be emphasized that it is not proposed  that the 
commission shall have the power to regulate  all prices, but 
only  this power  where there is monopoly or the market is 
controlled through cooperation.  Also a commission need go 
Maximum  no farther in a given case than to fix a maximum price or 
and  mini-  a minimum price, or both, as may be required by the situa-  mum  prices. 
tion, leaving competition to regulate further within the pre- 
scribed  limits.  As  at bresent,  competition  would  remain 
the sole regulative of  prices in the vast number of  instances 
where  the market  is  not  controlled.  These  qualifications 
enormously simplify the task of  the commissions. 
The very  fact that  the  commissions have  authority  to 
regulate  prices,  when  they  become  unreasonably  high  or REMEDIES 
unreasonably  low,  would  act  as  an important  restraining 
force upon those controlling the market  and tend  to  keep 
prices  reasonable,  and  thus  reduce  the  number  of  cases 
in which it would  be necessary for the commissions to act. 
This power  of  the commissions,  we  know,  has  been  a  re- 
straining influence with the railroads ; it will be a restrain- 
ing influence in preventing  unreasonable prices  if  extended 
to the industries. 
~hus,  so  far as we  can foresee, the task of  the commis- 
sions, which  to some men seems dreadful, will  in  all  prob- 
ability turn out, as a matter of fact, just as with the railroad 
commissions, practicable.  The  misconceptions  which  arise 
in  connection  with  controlling  prices  may  be  illustrated 
by  statements made  by Mr. William  B.  Hornblower.'  He 
says it means "the right to control the prices of  the neces- 
saries of  life to the ultimate consumer.  What the average 
American  and  his  wife  and  children  shall  eat  and  drink 
and  wherewithal  they  shall  be  clothed  depend  upon  the 
prices to be  paid for such necessaries of  life."  Apparently 
Mr. Hornblower is appalled by the dread of  the catastrophe ; 
but  who  fixes  the  prices  of  these  necessities  now?  The  Control of 
gigantic  corporations certainly in  large measure.  It seems  ~$~o:'io, 
plain  that  the public would  be  safer if  some organization,  or commia- 
having responsibility to it, had a part in the process.  The 
situation will, as a matter of  fact, be substantially as it is at 
present, in  the  initial  fixing  of  prices.  The most  that is 
proposed is that, whenever the market is controlled for any 
commodity, a commission fix maximum and minimum prices 
from time to time when prices are found not in  accordance 
with the rule of  reason. 
We  may return to a  state of  subdivision of  industry in  . 
which  the  economics  of  concentration  are  not  available, 
and depend upon competition to control prices.  If it were 
Possible  to secure "tolerant"  competition, to use  a  phrase 
which has been proposed, under  these conditions it is prob- 
able  that  the prices  would  be  higher  than  they are with 
concentration,  even  with  cooperation and without  control. 
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That  we  can  return  to such  a  condition  contrary  to the 
world-wide  tendency  is  extremely improbable,  almost  un- 
thinkable.  The  other  alternative  is  to  have  large  units; 
Regulation  if  we  have  large  units,  cooperation  becomes  inevitable; 
the  and with  concentration  and cooperation the prices  unreg-  way. 
ulated  will  become  unduly  high.  The only protection  for 
the public is  regulation in some way;  and such regulation 
is  best  accomplished  through  a  commission  which  has 
authority to place maximum and minimum prices  at reason- 
able levels.  This  situation  has  been  very clearly seen  by 
Attorney-General  Wickersham.  He says : "  If  we  permit 
the existence of  organizations or combinations of  producers 
under such conditions that they can fix  prices, there is  no 
means  of  securing justice  to the consumer except through 
the government's asserting its right  to step in and  dictate 
prices, or at least  to require that they shall not  be  raised 
above reasonable limits." 
It  has  been  repeatedly  asserted  that  the  proposal  to 
give commissions authority to order prices to be  changed, 
Regulation  when found unreasonable, is socialism.  Precisely the same 
not 
socidism.  statements were made when it was proposed to give the rail- 
road commissions similar powers a few years ago.  Socialism 
to the extreme conservative means anything with which he 
does not agree;  but the meaning of  socialism is the taking 
over and management of property by the state. 
The plan presented does not involve taking over property 
or  its management.  Indeed,  it does not involve anything 
whatever except securing to the public a reasonable price in 
the same manner that reasonable prices have been secured 
from the public utilities, the only way in which it has been 
found practicable to do this.  It is probably the only satis- 
factory  way  in which  fair  prices  can  be secured  from  the 
great industrial corporations.  Under the plan proposed the 
industrial concentrations remain private property in charge of 
those who own them just  as at present.  Being granted the 
privilege of  coijperation in restraint  of  trade, they are for- 
bidden to take advantage of  the public by charging unrea- 
1 Century Magazine, Vol. LXXXIII, No.  4, p. 619. REMEDIES 
sonable prices ; and if  forbidden so to charge, there must be 
some organism which will enforce the prohibition.  The pro- 
hibition probably could  be enforced  by lawsuit under com- 
mon law;  and therefore the proposal  made simply gives to 
an efficient administrative  body  authority to do what  the 
courts probably have power to do under the common law, but 
which they could not efficiently perform.  Those who  hold 
up the bogy of  socialism because of  the modest proposal to 
allow  commissions to regulate prices, if  they  reflect,  must 
conclude that they have only a bogy. 
(3)  Conservation Enforced. -  It should be made unlawful 
for any person,  firm, or  corporation  unreasonably to waste 
or maliciously to injure, destroy, or impair  any natural  re- 
source.  This rule has been  made a  statute in Wisconsin.' 
Upon the commissions should  be  imposed  the duty of  re- 
quiring the enforcement of  this rule for all corporations which 
exist in restraint of  trade.  Under this simple regulation the 
major portion  of  the great wastes  of  the natural  resources 
under the competitive system  (described pp. 89-97),  so dis- 
astrous to the future of  the race, could be  prevented.  The  Unneces- 
unnecessary and unreasonable wastes never will be prevented  E,",zt:: 
under  the competitive system;  indeed, they are compelled 
under that system.  Regulation of  the kind proposed is likely 
to be of  little avail if enforced  only by the courts.  But, if 
any case of  unnecessary  waste of  a natural resource by any 
corporation  can  be  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  a  com- 
mission  by  an individual,  and  the  commission is  thereby 
compelled  to investigate  the  same  and  give  appropriate, 
reasonable orders, we may expect that progress will be made 
in the protection of  our natural resources. 
Preventing unnecessary waste of  a  natural resource may 
somewhat raise  the price  of  certain articles because  of  the 
increased cost of  so conducting the business as to give this 
result.  Indeed, it is certain in  coal mining and in various 
other  industries, that if  as large economies as practicable 
be secured, there will be slight increases in prices.  In such 
cases, if if  be necessary for  the future welfare of  the race, 
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this generation should be willing to bear the small additional 
expense. 
(4)  Good Social Conditions  Securable. -  The rule  of  law 
may be laid down that corporations which exist in restraint 
of  trade shall conduct their business in accordance with good 
social conditions.  Under this rule the administrative com- 
missions would have power  to formulate  reasonable regula- 
tions in these respects and to enforce them.  From the point 
of  view  of  many, the possibility of  introducing  reasonable 
social  conditions for  the labor  force of  great corporations 
will  be  one  of  the  greatest  arguments  in  favor  of  com- 
mission supervision.  To others this will  seem to be going 
very  far; but it is  certain  under  the  competitive system 
that the social conditions for labor are very unsatisfactory. 
The mining industry is extremely hazardous.  Many of  the 
great manufacturers press their labor to the  limit, and this 
under dangerous conditions.'  To introduce  safe and  sani- 
tary conditions will  involve greater  expense in  production. 
Under  commission  regulations the necessary  additional  ex- 
pense may be compelled, and the additional price warranted 
may be allowed by the commissions.  Like other regulations 
which  have been suggested, that regarding social conditions 
stands upon its own merits;  is not a necessary part of  the 
plan  to remedy the most  pressing  evils of  the competitive 
and court system of  control of  industry. 
(5) Fair Wages Realizable. -If  desirable, the rule of  law 
may be laid down  that corporations  doing  business  in re- 
straint of  trade shall pay fair wages.  If  this rule be adopted, 
again it would rest upon the commissions in cases of  complaint 
to determine what are fair wages under the conditions which 
exist in a given instance.  Like other suggestions under con- 
sideration, this is not an essential part of  the plan of  control, 
but it is believed to be one of  the advantages which may in 
the future accrue from it. 
When  the  author wrote the  preceding it seemed  some- 
what radical even to him;  but since that time in ~ngland, 
1 Hearings,  Senate Intemtate Commerce Committee, Part XXVI, p. 2322 ; 
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country commonly  spoken  of  in  America  as  conserva- 
tive, has enacted a law establishing the principle of  a mini- 
mum wage for coal miners,  under which  local  boards  each 
fix  such wages for its district.  This is a definite recognition 
by statute that wages must be paid which are adequate to 
furnish at least  a  livelihood, even if  upon a  somewhat  low 
scale.  Probably there will be a wide difference between the 
wage of  England and a fair wage in this country, 
but the principle involved in each is the same. 
(6)  Control  of  Capitalization. -  If  advisable,  the  law 
may  lay  down  rules  controlling  the  issue  of  stocks  and 
bonds  in  order  to prevent  overcapitalization  and  stock 
manipulation.  This subject, however, is one  of  such  com- 
plexity  that  the  author  does  not  venture to  formulate  a 
rule  of  law to cover  it.  An  appreciation  of  the  difficulty 
of  so  doing may  be  gained by referring  to the report  of 
the Railroad Securities Commission  upon  stocks and bonds 
of  railroads.'  The same principles  which apply to the rail- 
roads  apply  to  a  large  extent, if  not  altogether,  to the 
great industrial corporations. 
(7)  Delimitation of  Powers of  State  and Nation. -  A clear 
rule  of  law  should  be  formulated  regarding  the limits  of 
interstate  commerce.  The early  decisions under the Sher- 
man  act inclined  toward  narrowly  construing  the  power 
of  Congress.  The  later  decisions of  the court  have gone 
much  farther, and  it now  looks  as if  the United  States 
Supreme Court  would  sustain  the  position that  Congress 
has the right  to control all businesses  in which any part is 
interstate  in  character.  This  seems the only logical place 
at which  to stop.  If  this position  be accepted, the neces- 
sary federal commissions would have under their regulation 
corporations  having  any  interstate  business.  The state 
commissions would have  the  authority  to deal  with  those 
businesses which are strictly within the states.  This would 
include a  vast  field, for  instance,  practically  all  of  the 
business  of  the country; not only  so,  but the vast 
numbers  of  small  manufactories  in  various  lines,  and in 
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many  cases  the  cooperation  of  laborers  and professional 
men.' 
General Statements. -We  have now covered the specifica- 
tions given on pp. 225-231  relating to what is desirable to ac- 
complish by amending the antitrbst legislation.  A bill must 
first be passed covering the essential points mentioned, (1) to 
(4), pp. 249-252.  If  this can be accomplished, the existing 
futile and exasperating situation will cease to exist.  Justice 
will  be  equally obtainable by all.  The frightful  wastes of 
the competitive  system  will, in  a  measure at least, cease. 
The business men may cooperate, and thus be able to carry 
on their business without becoming criminals under the law. 
Monopoly will  not be permitted.  Competition  will  remain 
open. 
With these essentials accomplished the advantages of  the 
additional proposed rules of  law, (1) to (6), pp. 255-265,  may 
be  introduced  as fast  as practicable.  Regarding some  of 
them, possibly a consensus of  opinion of  the lawmakers may 
soon be reached;  but if  this does not prove to be true, they 
may be added from time to time, as justified  by experience 
and demanded by public opinion. 
OTHER  PLANS  FOR  AMENDMENT  TO  SHERMAN  ANTI- 
TRUST  LAW 
The plan above proposed for handling the existing situa- 
tion in this country concerning concentration of  industry is 
not  necessarily  contradictory to, but may be  regarded  as 
supplementary of, a number of  other plans which have been 
proposed. 
Federal registration or license, federal incorporation, and 
federal  tax  have  all  been  suggested.  Senator  Newlands " 
would permit all corporations that comply with definite regu- 
lations, including publicity,  engaged in interstate commerce, 
1 See  Senator  Newlands, Hearings, Seaate Interstate  Commerce  Corn- 
mittee, Part XIX, p. 1598. 
1 Hearings, Senate Interatate Commerce Committee, Part I, pp. 1-4. REMEDIES  267 
doing a gross business of  more than $1,000,000 per annum, 
to have federal registration,  which registration would grant 
certain privileges.  Low l would require a federal license for 
all corporations having $2,000,000  of  assets or paid up capital. 
Mr. Elbert H. Gary and Mr. George W.  Perkins  also favor 
a license system for corporations doing an interstate or inter- 
national business.  Untermeyer  would require every corpora- 
tion engaged in interstate commerce, having gross  assets of 
$1,000,000 or more, to secure federal incorporation.  Low 4 
and  Wickersham  would  permit,  but  would  not  require, 
federal incorporation. 
The industrial commission proposed  a franchise tax upon 
corporations in proportion to the actual value of  stocks and 
bonded  debts less the local assessment on  the real  estate, 
and in addition a graded  tax upon the incomes of  the cor- 
poration~.~  An  allied proposal is that of  an increasing tax 
upon the capital of  corporations.  Thus W. S. Dwinnell,'  of 
Minneapolis, suggests "a graded annual tax upon the capital 
of  every corporation engaged in interstate commerce, whose 
capital exceeds a certain amount."  Senator Newlands makes 
a similar suggesti~n.~ 
Another class of  proposals is in the direction of  limitation 
of corporate powers.  Some men  would altogether prohibit 
holding corporations from engaging in  interstate commerce. 
Among  these  is Mr. Seth Low,g  He thinks  the  evils  of 
holding  companies  are  such  that this class of  corporation 
should no longer exist.  According to his idea, each company 
d-muld  be  independent.  This would require the disintegra- 
tion  of  a great many companies  or  their complete merger. 
Others have  argued that one corporation  should  not  hold 
any stock in any other corporation  in any way whatsoever.  *  number of  men  have taken  this position  before  the In- 
terstate Commerce  Committee.  Some men would  not go 
l Hearings, Benate Interetate Commerce Committee, Part XVI, P. 620.  '  Ibid., XXVI, pp. 2407-2412 ; XV, p. 1091. 
'  Ibid., part XVI, pp. 487, 488.  4 Ibid., Part V, P.  19. 
"he  Cbtury Magazine,  Vol.  LXXXIII, pp. 619-620.  '  U.  8. Industrial Commission, Vol. XIX, pp. 1067-1068.  '  Hearings, Senate Interetate Commerce Committee, Part 111, P. 90. 
Ibid., part VIII,  g. 482.  Ibid., Part IX, p. 488. 268  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
so far as to prohibit  holding companies, but would require 
that the voting power  of  stocks owned by holding  compa- 
nies should be eliminated.  Here is included Mr. Frederick 
W.  Kelsey.'  Still  others  would  place  a  limitation  upon 
community of  directors so as to make sure that companies, 
apparently  independent,  are  really  so.  Among  these  are 
Mr. Louis Brandek2 
None of  these proposals will be argued.  Each must stand 
upon its own merits and justify itself if  it is to be adopted by 
Congress and the state legislatures.  None of  these proposals 
interfere  with  the plan  which  has  been  suggested.  If  it 
seems advisable to do any of  these things  either by inde- 
pendent  act or  as additional amendments to the antitrust 
laws, this may be done without interfering in any way with 
any of  the proposals made by the author on previous pages. 
However, it is notable, that a number of  those who have 
suggested the above measures desire to place their execution 
as well as the execution of  the Sherman antitrust act with an 
administrative  qommission.  Among  these  are Newlands,3 
Untermeyer14 Low16 and  perk in^.^  Further, in some cases 
the proposals have gone so far as to include the regulation of 
prices;  for instance,  Untermeyer would  lay down the rule 
that the maximum price which may be chargeable "does not 
allow an undue profit." 
PATENT  MONOPOLY 7 
There is  another  important problem  in  connection with 
combinations in restraint of  trade which  has not been con- 
sidered.  This is patent monopoly.  Many of  the businesses 
in  restraint of  trade are so in large measure  beciuse  they 
1 Hearings, Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, Part XVII, p. 1364. 
Ibid.. Part XW. D.  1179.  a 162.. P&  I, DD.  1. 2. 
Ibid.; Part IX, pp. 487,488.  IN.; Part IX,-~.  520. 
"bid.,  Part xv, p. 1102. 
For full information regarding the patent situation, see Hearinga before 
the Committee on Judiciary, Houae  of  Representatives, 1912, Patent Le@ 
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The very idea of  a patent is monopoly.  Under 
the  new  conditions of  consolidation  the  patent monopoly 
has  taken  an entirely  new  aspect.  The great  manufac- 
turing corporations, such as the General Electric Company, 
the  United  States  Shoe  Machinery  Company,  and  the 
National  Cash  Register  Company,  have  acquired  a  large 
part of  the patents which affect their  businesses.  Some of 
these they have used,  others they have simply acquired  to 
prevent use by others.  A combination of  patents under one 
ownership, as compared with a single  patent, has produced 
a situation regarding patents somewhat analagous to that 
which arose when partnerships of  corporations were  formed 
from  corporations,  by  means  of  the  device  of  trusts.  The  danger 
The vast  importance of  this question of  patent  monopoly ~~~~~~;. 
has become even more clear through a recent decision of  the 
Supreme Court  of  the United  States.l  Previous decisions 
have made it clear that the patentee may restrict  the time, 
place, or manner in which a patented machine may be used. 
The recent decision of  the court, however, goes farther than 
this in that it is held that restrictions may be made regard- 
ing  other  things  necessary  for  the  use  of  the patented 
article, even if  such things are not patented.  Chief  Justice 
White and Justices Hughes and Lamar strongly dissent from 
this opinion.  They hold this principle to be dangerous and 
give as illustrations  of  these  dangers the following.  The 
quotations  are  from  the  Chief  Justice : - 
"Take a patentee selling a patented engine.  We will now 
have the right by contract to bring under the patent laws all 
contracts for coal or electrical energy used  to afford power 
to work the machine or even the lubricants employed in its 
operation.  Take a patented carpenter's  plane.  The power 
now  exists in the patentee by contract to validly confine a 
carpenter purchasing one of  the planes to the use of  lumber 
sawed from trees grown on the land of  a particular person or 
"wed  by a particular mill.  Take a patented cooking utensil. 
The Power is now recognized in the patentee to bind by con- 
'  Henry et al. c. k  B.  Dick  Company, U. S. Supreme Court, 20,  doh 
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tract one who buys the utensil to use in connection  with it 
no other food supply but that sold or made by the patentee. 
Take the invention of  a patented window frame.  It is now 
the law that the seller of  a frame may stipulate that no other 
material shall be used in a house in which the window frames 
are placed except such as may be bought from the patentee 
and seller of  the frame.  Take an illustration which goes home 
to every  one -  a  patented  sewing-machine.  It is now  es- 
tablished that by putting on the machine, in addition to the 
notice of  patent required by law, a notice called a license re- 
striction, the right is acquired, as against the whole world, 
to control the purchase by users of  the machine of  thread, 
needles, and oil  lubricants or  other materials convenient or 
necessary for operation of  the machine. 
"My mind cannot shake off  the dread of  the vast extension 
of  such practices which must come from the decision of  the 
court now rendered.  Who, I submit, can put a limit upon 
the extent of  monopoly and wrongful restriction which will 
arise,  especially if  by such a power a contract which  other- 
wise would be void as against public policy may be success- 
fully maintained ? " 
It is clear that the situation is such that the patent laws 
under the new conditions will require amendments to protect 
the public,  However,  this matter lies outside of  the scope 
of  this book.  It is mentioned  because so closely related to 
that under consideration;  indeed, for many concentrations 
of industry, patents have been the basis upon which monopoly 
has been secured. 
POSSIBLE  OBJECTIONS  TO  PLAN OF  REGULATION  PRO- 
POSED 
In order that the remedial plan proposed may be fairly be- 
fore the readers of  this book, the  writer will  now consider 
some objections which may possibly be raised regarding it. 
(1)  It  may be said that the commission form of  regulation 
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of  controlling  the  commissions  will  be  too  powerful  for 
them;  and that  the public  will  not  be  protected.  In the 
of  many,  this  will  be  a  serious  objection  to  the 
proposals made;  and the danger is one which must be  es- 
pecially  guarded  against.  One  of  these  guards  should  be 
that all of  the business of a commission should be open.  The 
complaint  made,  the conduct  of  a  case,  the facts brought 
out, the  reasoning  relating  to the facts, and the conclusion  Public must 
reached should  all  be made public.  In short, in order that :!F&:;- 
the people shall be protected, there should  be the same pub-  countable. 
licity  in the actions of  a  commission as is now  demanded 
regarding the actions of  a corporation.  In time, methods of 
public bookkeeping  will  be  developed and rules formulated 
to guide the commissions in their work and thus enable them 
to perform their duties, notwithstanding the great pressure 
which may be brought to bear upon them. 
If it be desirable, a further precaution may be inserted simi- 
lar to that which exists concerning commissions in Europe. 
Upon the request of  a certain number of  senators or repre- 
sentatives of  Congress  or of  state legislators a  commission 
may be summoned before the creating legislative body and 
be required to give answers to written interrogatories and be 
interrogated regarding any matter which is before the com- 
mission.  Further, if  the above are not sufficient to guard the 
public interest, provision may be made that any member of 
a commission may be removed for cause by the President or 
governor, or by Congress or legislature upon the passage of a 
joint resolution.  By these various methods the public may 
be amply protected  against any failure of  a  commission to 
Perform its duty. 
While there is the possible danger on one side that the pow- 
erful interests will control, on the other side there will be the 
fear by the corporations that the commissions will go too far 
and raid property.  But on this side there is adequate pro- 
tection  under the Constitution,  since from the commission 
there is appeal to the courts;  and the courts under the 14th 
&mendment  are  obliged  to  prevent  the  confiscation  of 
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trade commissions, it may  be  regarded as probable  that a 
judicial balance will be maintained. 
While the early experience in this country with commissions 
for control of  railroads was not especially encouraging, the 
experience we  have had with the railroad commissions later 
appointed, especially illustrated by that of  Wisconsin, and 
by  the Interstate Commerce Commission, since it has been 
given adequate authority, is very hopeful. 
Doubtless difficulties will  appear in  connection with  the 
administrative work  of  the commissions;  but these do not 
seem likely to be nearly so serious as those which confront us 
if  the Sherman act is  invoked to destroy great concentra- 
tions  in  industry  to the extent  that  will  be  necessary  in 
order to return to adequate control of  prices through com- 
petition. 
(2)  It  may be said that the greater corporations will destroy 
the smaller corporations in the same business.  The experi- 
ence of  other countries where coijperation is permitted gives 
no just  ground for this conclusion.  We  have seen  in  this 
country  under  the  competitive  system  and  under  severe 
laws  against  combination,  that  many  small  corporations 
have been  destroyed.  Upon  the other  hand,  in  England 
and  in  Germany,  where  the  various  corporations  have 
been  allowed  to  cooperate, while  there  has  also  been  a 
strong tendency to consolidation, the concentration  has not 
gone  nearly  so far as in  America.  Also  the smaller com- 
petitors in most  cases have been  made a useful  part of  the 
cooperative or consolidated system rather than destroyed. 
(3)  If  the amendments include the regulation of  prices, it 
may  be  said  that  it will  be  especially  difficult  to control 
prices  in  those  industries  where  the  corporations  do  not 
manage  the business from the source to the final product. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation 
handles its materials from the ore, limestone, and coal to the 
finished product.  In such a case the problem of controlling 
prices is easier than the control of the pricesof freight.  But in 
cases illustrated by tobacco, beef, sugar, and oil, the combi- 
nation is a buyer as well as a seller.  In such an instance if REMEDIES 
the corporationtoo greatly depresses the price of  its supply, the  Cannot un- 
duly depreun  product will not be furnished.  In the long run, if  the farmers  prices. 
do not get a fair price, they will  not produce beef  cattle nor 
tobacco ; they will raise something else. 
This is illustrated  by the beet  sugar industry.  For  any 
district the purchase of  beets by the sugar factory corporation 
is  a practical monopoly, because transportation is so expen- 
sive for the heavy product, beets, that they cannot go to dis- 
tant factories.  This being the situation, the farmer will  not 
plant  beets  unless  he  knows  in  advance  the price  he  will 
receive.  The sugar corporations are obliged to offer a price 
for beets which will induce the farmers to raise a sufficient 
supply for the adjacent factory.  If  the price offered is not 
sufficient,  the factory will lack material for its run. 
As we  have seen, pp. 148-149,  there is little complaint that 
the American Sugar Refining Company has unduly depressed 
the price of  raw sugar.  It  has been charged that the packers 
at different  times have unduly  depressed the price  of  beef 
cattle ;  but if  this practice existed, it has largely ceased, for it is 
now realized by the combination that it must maintain a rea- 
sonable price for beef, cattle, hogs, sheep, etc., in order to se- 
cure a sufficient amount of  raw material through the years. 
The farmers will  only  permanently  raise  material  for  this 
industry  when  it  is  not  as  profitable  to  them  as  other 
products. 
Precisely  the same  principle  applies to tobacco.  While 
undoubtedly there have been causes for complaint against the 
American Tobacco Company, if  this organization had been al- 
lowed  to continue permanently,  it is  certain  that it would 
have been obliged to be fair and reasonable in prices paid for 
the raw material ; otherwise, the combination would not be 
able to secure a sufficient amount to meet the demands. 
For many years the great monopolistic company, Standard 
Oil, bought  by  far the larger  portion  of  the crude  oil  for 
its refineries from hundred of  sellers.  In the early days of 
Standard  Oil  there  was complaint  regarding  depression  of 
prices ; but for many years the prices paid by the Standard 
have been sufficient to induce drillers to search for and obtain 
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sufficient oil  to supply the market.  Indeed, there has  been 
upon the whole an oversupply, which, from the point of  view 
of  conservation, is a detriment to the nation.  So long as the 
prices paid for a natural resource produced from the interior 
of  the earth are sufficient  to supply the market  not only 
in  this  country,  but for  a  large part  of  the world,  this is 
evidence that the price of  the raw material has not been un- 
duly depressed. 
The principle  which  applies  to  the  above  commodities 
applies to all commodities in which the corporations are buy- 
ers as well as sellers.  While there may have been  occasion 
for complaint from time to time, probably the producers  of 
raw products for the great corporations have had as equitable 
prices as are ordinarily secured  for  those  commodities  con- 
cerning which unrestrained  competition  completely controls. 
In further  answer  to the statement  that  there  will  be 
cause for complaint regarding prices paid for materials by the 
great corporations, it may be said that if  prices at  which the 
products of  the combinations are sold, are subject to control of 
commissions and profits cannot be excessive, there will  be no 
strong motive to  depress unduly the purchase prices of  the ma- 
terials whichmust be bought.  Indeed, it is a probable advan- 
tage of  the plan  proposed  that fair and reasonably uniform 
prices will be secured for the products needed by the combi- 
nations. 
(4)  It  may be  said under  the plan  in  which  prices are 
held at a reasonable level that the income on the bonds and 
stocks of  a corporation,  so far as they are substance,  not 
water, will be guaranteed ;  and, therefore, an  organization will 
rest on its laurels, and progress will  be stayed.  The answer 
to this objection is  that the proposal  made eliminates only 
competition  in  prices ;  it does  not interfere  with  competi- 
tion in service  (see p.  75).  If  a  ton of  freight be  shipped 
from New York to Chicago, it makes no difference what road 
is used ;  the rate is the same.  But has competition ceased be- 
tween the railways running between New York and Chicago  ? 
On the contrary, it is of  the keenest.  The agents of  these 
roads are everywhere soliciting busineas,  explaining advw- REMEDIES 
tages,  promising  to put  through  freight  promptly.  Simi- 
larly, for passenger service ; the speeds have been increased ; 
new  steel cars have been  introduced;  more trains are run. 
In many ways the service is becoming safer, more reliable, 
convenient, and satisfactory.  Why is this true when prices 
are the same ?  Because the road which makes most, progress 
is most efficient  will do more business, and be able to pay 
a larger profit than its competitors.  Those who know the facts 
appreciate how keen is the competition between the New York 
Central and Pennsylvania systems; each has done its best to 
increase and extend its facilities in order to get the largest 
possible proportion of  business. 
At this point we see a fatd defect of  another proposal which 
has been  made regarding combinations, viz.,  that prices be 
controlled through limiting profits or dividends.'  This pro- 
posal would stifle competition in business, and hence progress ; 
because, if  an organization be sufficiently efficient so that it 
gives just  the returns allowed, five or six per cent on its bonds, 
and seven per  cent  on  the stock, why do  anything more? 
Hence  the  proposal  to  control  the trusts  by limiting  in- 
comes and dividends is economically fallacious.  The corpora- 
tion which is efficiently managed should pay a higher dividend  Controlling 
than the  poorly  managed  concern.  Indeed,  in Boston the  ~~~~~,"d', 
gas company is allowed to pay higher dividends in proportion  unsound 
as  it lowers  the  price  of  gas.  The commissions may find :;lm- 
it advantageous  to use  this  principle and thus give strong 
inducements for high efficiency. 
Therefore, it is insisted that the plan advocated does not 
do away with competition in service.  It does not interfere 
with technical improvements, as held by Clark;2  it does not 
interfere with the installation of  cost accounting, nor any of 
the advantages of  the competitive system, except competition 
in  prices;  and, as already seen,  competition in prices is far 
from an unqualified gain. 
(5)  It may be objected to the proposal to allow concentra- 
lProfessor  J.  Laurence  Laughlin,  Hearings.  United  Stab 
Interstate Commerce Committee, Part XIV, P. 1000.  '  Ibrd., Part XIV,  p. 972. 276  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
tion and industrial coiiperation that this will result in putting 
the major portion of  the money for the great lines of  business in 
a few centers ;  in short that it will promot,e  the so-called money 
trust.  Indeed, this objection has been  made regarding large 
concentrations of  industry by Mr. I3randeis.l 
The reform  of  our  banking  system  is  a  question  to be 
Banking  handled  by separate ,legislation.  We  already have a report 
reform.  by the Aldrich Monetary Commission upon improvements of 
the banking system of this country, which admittedly is far 
behind that of  other great industrial  nations.  Many other 
plans have been proposed.  Our banking system is now being 
investigated  by Congress and is the subject of  special study 
by  the  National  Citizens'  League  for  the Promotion  of  a 
Sound  Banking  System.  As  to  what  should  be  done  to 
improve the situation in banking, the author will venture no 
opinion;  but he  insists  that this problem  is  one  which  of 
necessity  must  be  solved  by  special  laws  and  indepen- 
dently of  the general plans for conducting industry. 
(6) It may be said that the plan for regulating all concen- 
trations and cooperations in industry which go to the point 
of  controlling the market will  create a great series of  com- 
Numerous  missions, national and state.  This is undoubtedly  the fact. 
commissions 
may be  It may well  be  in the future that in addition to an interstate 
necessary.  trade commission, which  has  the position  in  industry of  a 
supreme commission, there may be subordinate to it another 
class of  commissions to which must first go certain questions 
exactly as law cases commonly first go to district and circuit 
courts.  In the states, it is probable that a single commis- 
sion with  its scientific  staff  of  experts will  be  sufficient to 
handle the business that will  come before it;  but  if  neces- 
sary, there may be created in the states two classes of  com- 
missions precisely as there is more than one class of  courts. 
Certainly whatever cost is necessary in order to relieve the 
present  chaotic condition of  affairs and to secure justice and 
development, that cost is justified. 
(7)  It may  be  said that the plan proposed  provides no 
method  of  punishment  for  those  who  have  violated  the 
1 Hearinga, Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, Part XVI,  p. 1189. REMEDIES  277 
national  and  state  laws  against  restraint  of  trade.  The 
answer is that there is nothing in the proposals made which 
any individual or corporation  from  the sins of  the  Shall the 
past.  Some  men  believe  that  those  who  have  violated  ::E&1 
the trust laws, and especially those who have engaged in the 
grosser unfair practices, should not escape punishment.  Upon 
this point the author has merely to say that he is far more 
interested  in  the future than in  the past.  The proposals 
which  have been  made are for the future.  They leave the 
question of  punishment of  individuals for violation of  exist- 
ing laws to be settled by the good sense of  the community. 
It may be that there will  be  advantage in punishing some 
of  those who  have  indulged  in the more  outrageous forms 
of  unfair  practices.  When in  the future we  have rational 
laws  with  administrative  commissions to enforce them, we 
shall have a situation for industrial corporations like that we 
now have for the railroads.  There will be comparatively few 
who will violate the laws, and it will be possible to punish those 
who do violate them. 
SECTION  10 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion  there  is  presented  as  the  solution  of  the 
difficulties of  the present industrial situation, concentration, 
cooperation,  and control.  Through  concentration  we  may 
have the economic advantages coming from magnitude of  opera- 
tions.  Through cooperation we  may limit the wastes of  the 
competitive  system.  Through  control  by  commission  we 
may secure freedom for fair competition, elimination of  unfair 
practices, conservation of  our natural resources, fair wages, 
good social conditions, and reasonable prices. 
Concentration  and  cooperation  in  industry  in  order  to 
secure efficiency are a world-wide  movement.  The United 
States cannot  resist  it.  If  we  isolate ourselves  and insist 
upon the subdivision of  industry below the highest economic 
efficiency  and do not allow cooperation, we  shall be defeated 
in the world's markets.  We cannot adopt an economic sys- 
tem less efficient than our great competitors, Germany, Eng- 278  CONCENTRATION  AND  CONTROL 
land, France, and Austria.  Either we must modify our pres- 
ent obsolete laws regarding concentration and cooperation so 
as to conform with the world movement, or else fall behind in 
the race for the world's markets.  Concentration and coop- 
eration  are conditions  imperatively  essential for  industrial 
advance;  but  if  we  allow  concentration  and  cooperation, 
there must be contral in order to protect the people, and ade- 
quate control is only possible through the administrative com- 
mission.  Hence,  concentration,  cooperation,  and  control 
are the key words for a scientific solution of  the mighty indus- 
trial problem which now confronts this nation. APPENDIX 
THE  SHERMAN  ANTITRUST  LAW 
[Act of  July 2, 1890 (26 Stat., 209)l 
AN ACT to protect  trade  and  commerce  against unlawful 
restraints and monopolies. 
Be it enacted by the  Senate  and  House of  Representatives  of 
the  United States of  America in Congress assembled, 
SEC.  1.  Every contract, combination in the form of  trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of  trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby 
declared to be  illegal.  Every  person  who  shall  make any 
such  contract or engage  in  any such  combination or  con- 
spiracy, shall be deemed guilty of  a misdemeanor, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one 
year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court. 
SEC.  2.  Every  person  who  shall  monopolize, or  attempt 
to  monopolize,  or  combine  or  conspire  with  any  other 
person or  persons, to monopolize  any part of  the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
shall be deemed guilty of  a misdemeanor, and, on conviction 
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand 
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by 
both said punishments, in the discretion of  the court. 
SEC.  3.  Every  contract,  combination in form of  trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of  trade or commerce 
in any Territory of  the United States or of  the District of 
Columbia, or in restraint of  trade or commerce between any 
such  erri it or^ and another, or between any such Territory or 
279 APPENDIX 
Territories and any State or States or the District of  Colum- 
bia, or with foreign nations, or between the District  of  Co- 
lumbia and any State or States or foreign nations, is hereby 
declared  illegal.  Every  person  who  shall  make  any such 
contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, 
shall be deemed guilty of  a misdemeanor, and, on conviction 
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand 
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year,  or by 
both said punishments, in the discretion of  the court. 
SEC.  4.  The several  circuit  courts of  the United  States 
are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain 
violations of  this act; and it shall be the duty of  the several 
district attorneys  of  the United  States, in their  respective 
districts,  under  the direction  of  the  Attorney-General,  to 
institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such 
violations.  Such  proceedings  may  be  by  way  of  petition 
setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be 
enjoined  or  otherwise prohibited.  When  the parties com- 
plained of  shall have been duly notified of  such petition the 
court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and 
determination of  the case;  and pending such petition and 
before  final  decree, the court may at any time make such 
temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed 
just in the premises. 
SEC.  5.  Whenever it shall appear to the court before which 
any proceeding under section four of  this act may be pending, 
that the ends of  justice require that other parties should be 
brought  before the court, the court may  cause them to be 
summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the 
court is held  or  not;  and  subpoenas to that end  may be 
served in any district by the marshal thereof. 
SEC.  6.  Any property owned under any contract or by any 
combination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the 
subject thereof)  mentioned  in  section one of  this act, and 
being in  the  course  of  transportation  from one  State  to 
another, or  to a  foreign  country, shall be  forfeited to the 
United  States, and may  be  seized  and condemned by like 
proceedings  as  those  provided  by  law  for  the forfeiture, APPENDIX  281 
seizure, and  condemnation  of  property  imported  into  the 
United  States contrary to law. 
SEC.  7.  Any person who  shall be  injured in his  business 
or property by any other person or corporation by reason of 
anything forbidden or declared to be  unlawful by this act, 
may sue therefor in any circuit court of  the United States in 
the district in which the defendant resides or is found, with- 
out respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover 
threefold the damages by him sustained,  and the  costs  of 
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
SEC.  8.  That the word "person,"  or "persons,"  wherever 
used in this act shall be deemed to include corporations and 
associations existing under or authorized by the laws of  either 
the United States, or the laws of  any of  the Territories, the 
laws of  any State, or the laws of  any foreign country. 